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Abstract 
Terrorism literature is replete with concerns for the future, endorsing terrorism as 
an unwavering problem of the past, present and well into the future. These 
concerns must be challenged by identifying and engaging with stakeholders and 
with alternate visions of terrorism futures, such as futures alignment and even 
competing utopian terrorism futures. To achieve this level of insight, one must 
take a journey into the various layers of terrorism knowledge – the litany, 
systemic causes, worldviews and myths to examine interdependencies and 
disconnects, frames, and metaphors. The application of Futures Studies theories 
and methods, such as Causal Layered Analysis (CLA) and Scenarios, facilitates 
the deconstruction of the ‘unwavering’ terrorism problem and the construction of 
alternative terrorism futures. 
 
This thesis advocates the view that there are different levels of terrorism 
knowledge; the litany, systemic causes, worldview and myth. The litany and 
systemic are commonly dealt with in much existing terrorism literature, but 
represent a superficial level of understanding. The challenge is to extend research 
beyond the traditional confines of the litany and systemic causes into an 
examination of terrorism worldviews and myths. The worldview and myth levels 
facilitate the uncovering of unconscious parameters, particularly the governing 
metaphors that are shaping terrorism knowledge and our capacity to think about 
alternative terrorism futures. Uncovering these grand metaphors enables us to 
challenge the current knowledge funnels and to open the futures in order to 
realise the potential of political engagement and positive manipulation of those 
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futures. Terrorism futures can be likened to a maze viewed from above; depicting 
prospects for opening new doors and pathways into, around or out of the maze, 
presenting an opportunity to build layered knowledge, understanding and even 
shared and preferred terrorism futures. Generating alternative images of terrorism 
futures, whether positive, negative, possible, probable or preferable, is essential 
for advancing terrorism knowledge and preparations for those futures.  
 
This thesis advances the futures conversation within Terrorism Studies by 
presenting scenarios at every level of analysis: within the litany, systemic causes 
and the combined worldview and myth layers. These scenarios depict different 
terrorism futures based on the layer of knowledge and the major drivers of 
change evident or expected within that layer. It is argued that these (and 
additional) images of terrorism futures, in combination with new terrorism 
language, frames and metaphors will aid in challenging preconceived ideas about 
the future of terrorism by opening the futures beyond the confines of viewing 
terrorism as simply an ever-present and escalating evil. Opening the futures will 
also introduce the prospect of positive terrorism futures manipulation, which will 
work by enabling stakeholders to engage with different futures and identify 
mechanisms to achieve their preferred future. It is hoped that this thesis provides 
a stepping stone to challenge traditional preconceptions of terrorism futures and 
promote strategic and futures-oriented conversations within Terrorism Studies.  
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Chapter One: Introduction 
 
Terrorism has been a steady feature on humanity’s future horizon (see Glenn, 
Gordon and Florescu 2008, 2010, 2012) and is implicitly tied to risk, and the 
management of that risk. Threat scenarios and probabilities remain the most 
problematic part of terrorism risk analysis (Von Winterfeldt 2010), raising the 
need for greater incorporation of futures thinking. Engaging with the futures is 
an increasingly significant element to incorporate into research. “[B]eing 
competent in innovation and foresight will come to be seen as perhaps the most 
important source of competitive advantage” (Hines 2002, 339). Futures 
engagement through scenario scripting and narrative or metaphor engagement is 
not a method of prediction, but rather a mechanism to consider the past, present 
and futures at the preferred, probable and possible levels. It provides the 
opportunity to identify whether, why and how to deviate from the current path 
and unfolding futures – and ultimately who owns or gives reality to that path. 
This is a form of research that can provide valuable insight for policy-makers 
and has applications in areas such as the environment, global political structures, 
and security, crime and terrorism.  
 
While my interest in studying terrorism was largely driven by the events of 11 
September, 2001, (hereafter September 11) my interest had first been sparked 
several years earlier. At the time of the September 11 attacks, I remember being 
curious as to why the events of that day had not been anticipated in a broad 
sense. Hindsight is a powerful factor and informs the story of the Twin Towers: 
the ‘target’ determined in 1993; the potential to hijack aircraft for non-traditional 
tactical purposes demonstrated in 1995; and the growing (and innovating) threat 
which had been posed by extremists during the 1990s. September 11 generated 
one major shift in my thinking: I became more interested in what the future 
would hold in the theatre of terrorism; and what the options for policy-makers 
seeking to prevent terrorist acts and the conditions that lead to terrorism could 
be. My curiosity led me on this quest to generate a level of foresight within 
Terrorism Studies that would encapsulate terrorism trends, systemic causes, 
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worldviews and myths as a means of constructing and deconstructing terrorism 
issues to positively influence the future. This thesis details my engagement with 
the past and present to encourage greater utilisation of futures thinking and 
scenarios as a means of achieving positive manipulation of terrorism futures: 
 
Will tomorrow’s terrorist simply be a more bloodthirsty version of 
today’s terrorist bent upon big bangs and body count, perhaps even 
more indiscriminate, but sticking with conventional explosives? 
Will tomorrow’s terrorist turn instead to chemical, biological, or 
nuclear weapons to cause mass destruction? Or will tomorrow’s 
terrorist be a sophisticated electronic warrior penetrating and 
sabotaging the information and communication systems upon which 
modern society increasingly depends? (Jenkins 1999, cited in 
Kegley 2003, 6) 
 
Generating scenarios for the futures of terrorism, such as those provided by 
Jenkins (1999, cited in Kegley 2003), is essential for facilitating proactive 
engagement with the future. The process of creating and describing alternative 
images of the future encourages the extension of thoughts and perceptions 
beyond the confines of the present (Masini 1998b, 344). This also assists in 
fostering responsible decision making in the present (Hicks 1994, 11). The future 
can evolve in an indeterminable number of ways (deJouvenel 2001, 12), and 
hence future spaces are referred to as a number of futures, rather than as a 
singular and definitive future1: the future is plural and open (Dator 2002, 6). 
Unfortunately, this concept of “[p]lural futures is immediately distinct and 
foreign to our normal pattern of thinking” (May 1998, 466), often making the 
concept challenging to comprehend and achieve. May (1998, 466) highlights the 
importance and challenge: “[i]t is only when we begin to examine how we know 
the past and the present that uncertainty and, consequently, the opportunity for 
alternative explanations arise.” However, it is not only ‘alternative explanations’ 
as stated by May (1998), it is also the process of examining how the present has 
eventuated over the course of what Inayatullah (2004b, 71) describes as ‘other 
presents’. That is, “the real has come about for various reasons and… the coming 
about of a specific ‘present’ means the non-realisation of other ‘presents’.” 
(Inayatullah 2004b, 71) For example, reverse forecasting leads one to speculate 
                                               
1
 For the purpose of this dissertation, the term “futures” denotes a range of alternative future 
images. The singular term “future”, will be used when referring to the abstraction of the future as 
a period in time. 
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about what the events of September 11 would have been if the 1993 attack on the 
New York World Trade Centre had been successful; or if the 1998 cruise missile 
attacks on Afghanistan-based training camps ordered by former United States 
President Bill Clinton had taken the life of Osama bin Laden as intended; or 
furthermore, as questioned by Cid (2008, 5), had security measures to reinforce 
and lock cockpit doors been implemented. 
 
The September 11 attacks highlighted to the global community the existence of a 
range of serious risks, opportunities and vulnerabilities relevant to the threat of 
terrorism (O’Hagan 2003, 326). The experiences of the 20th and 21st Centuries 
have highlighted the adaptive nature of terrorism. As a subject for research, the 
threat of terrorism must be approached in a multifaceted manner that aims to 
understand its past, present and futures. What holds true for one geographic 
place, terrorist group and time may not hold true for others. “Terrorism has 
existed for over 2,000 years and owes its survival to an ability to adapt and adjust 
to challenges and countermeasures and to continue to identify and exploit its 
opponent’s vulnerabilities.” (Hoffman 2002a, 26) This continual evolution makes 
terrorism not only more dangerous, but also more challenging to counter 
(National Commission on Terrorism 2000, 1).  
 
September 11 was a ‘wake-up call’, as referred to by Wulf, Haimes and 
Longstaff (2003, 429), highlighting the need to review, and where applicable, 
transform the traditional responses to terrorism. Previous counter-terrorism 
initiatives that have been successful in responding to terrorist activity may now, 
or in the future, become less effective (Enders and Sandler 2000, 312) due to the 
adapting nature of the threat and/or the governing metaphor. Too often ‘we’ are 
playing catch up with the terrorist threat in terms of responses and preparedness, 
and this has been attributed to a lack of understanding and/or acknowledgement 
of the variability of the phenomenon (Sealing 2003) and the role of language, 
discourse and metaphor. This clearly demonstrates that “the significant problems 
we have cannot be solved at the same level of thinking with which we created 
them.” (Quote attributed to Albert Einstein, cited in Gidley 2013, S172.) This 
                                               
2
 Gidley (2013) notes that the original source of the quote remains unknown. 
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highlights the need to review preparedness strategies and response mechanisms 
in light of the anticipated continuous evolution of terrorism, but from a different 
vantage point that actively incorporates issue framing. The foundation of this 
alternative approach is the development of a comprehensive understanding of the 
nature of terrorism, including the stakeholders and time spheres of the past, near-
present and futures. To build the futures component, a holistic understanding of 
where ‘we’ are, where ‘we’ have been, and what governs ‘our’ futures must be 
achieved.  
 
Whether presented as predictions or forecasts, producing images of the futures is 
difficult (Dolnik 2003). “The future is not something that can be empirically 
located and quantified. The future cannot be reduced to a mathematical 
proposition or formula. The future is not a ‘received view’ but is, instead, a 
‘constructed view’.” (Hayward 2007, 21). The purpose of this thesis is not to 
predict the futures of terrorism. This is because prediction in the strictest sense is 
an impossible task (Pettiford and Harding 2003, 180). However, just “because 
the future is unpredictable does not mean that it can be left to take care of itself” 
(Department of Homeland Security 2008, 9). Future possibilities and 
consequences can be explored and decisions can be made with an intention to 
influence the outcome (Glenn, Gordon and Dator 2001, 178). The challenges in 
the security environment mandate the need for approaches of hedging or 
shaping3 (Department of Homeland Security 2008, 9). My objective is to 
advance this conversation within Terrorism Studies by constructing and 
deconstructing a range of terrorism futures to positively manipulate the outcome 
(otherwise referred to as positive futures manipulation) through effective 
counter-terrorism decision making. We can shape the futures: 
 
We cannot hope to predict the future, but we can draw our pictures 
carefully so as to avoid some common mistakes…With careful 
analysis we can make better decisions about how to protect people; 
promote values; and lead towards a better world over the next few 
decades. (Nye, cited in O’Hagan 2003, 327) 
 
                                               
3
 Hedging refers to strategies devised to design and produce capability that prove relevant to 
many alternate futures, while shaping strategies are designed to influence events towards a better 
or preferred outcome (Department of Homeland Security 2008, 9). 
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The importance of incorporating foresight within research is clearly articulated 
by Slaughter (1998, 376): 
 
[i]f we were not able to understand our situation and act with 
informed foresight to avert the worst dangers, we would be 
committed to social learning by the crudest of experiences. We 
would have to experience catastrophe in order to prevent it. This is 
clearly unacceptable. 
 
 
The application of these concepts to the threat of terrorism could lead to 
additional ‘crisis learning’, as referred to by Milbrath (1989, cited in Slaughter 
1998, 376). It is argued that such studies should not be limited exclusively to the 
confines of the terrorist threat. A range of natural and global issues, including 
geographic and social conditions, can and should also be examined in such a 
manner because, as noted by Paz (2012, 207), the government has proven unable 
to cope effectively with disasters. Achieving this level of knowledge in the 
national security arena will assist in limiting the propensity for crisis learning in 
the context of terrorism. Identifying and averting all terrorist threats and 
opportunities is not a realistic objective, but the central intention of encouraging 
the identification and discussion of a range of terrorism futures to positively 
manipulate the outcome is a feasible and proactive national security strategy. 
 
1.1 Terminology 
 
In this thesis, the term “futures” is preferred to “future”. This reflects the Futures 
Studies approach to examining the ‘future’, which reinforces the requirement of 
presenting a number of futures instead of a single, predictable future. This 
emphasises the idea that the future is not predetermined, and therefore that our 
past and present actions (and inactions) contribute to the actualisation of 
particular futures. This understanding introduces the opportunity to positively 
influence the future today, by conducting futures-oriented research to identify 
and discuss the options, processes and knowledge constructs. Preference has also 
been given to the term “forecast” over “prediction”. This is because the term 
“forecast” denotes a degree of determinism; the suggestion of what may occur in 
the futures, pending the combination of surprise, inevitability and consistency of 
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events or factors (Kurian and Molitor 1996, 334). Forecasting provides advanced 
insight by considering a range of futures, rather than a singular and definitive 
image provided by prediction. The term “prediction” implies a definitive 
suggestion of what is going to occur in the future. Forecasting, on the other hand, 
is a process that facilitates the identification and discussion of a range of futures 
in a manner that encourages continuous evaluation, rather than the description of 
a specific or irrefutable image of a single future (deJouvenel 1967, cited in May 
1998, 466). The use of the terms “future” and “prediction” contradicts the 
purpose and objectives of this research. 
 
Futures literature often utilises the futures grading or value system of “possible”, 
“probable” and “preferable”. These typologies, in addition to worst-case 
scenarios, are conceptually familiar to the Terrorism Studies community when 
compared to the six basic concepts of futures thinking: used, disowned, 
alternative, alignment, models of social change and uses of the future (see 
Inayatullah 2008a).4 The three basic typologies of possible, probable and 
preferred are used to refer to the likelihood and favourability of future images. 
Possible futures describes what might occur. Probable futures refer to those 
futures that are deemed more likely to eventuate in the futures landscape due to 
the projection of reliable trends. Hence, the distinction between possible and 
probable futures is drawn from the opinion that those labelled “probable” carry a 
higher likelihood of occurring, given stated conditions and measures, than those 
labelled “possible”. Preferable futures are value-oriented images, which are 
favoured over others. Utopian thought is an example of preferred future images. 
Worst-case scenarios are also value-oriented images, though in this case of the 
negative – those that users of the method wish to avoid. These distinctions are 
important and can assist with initiating effective and responsible decision making 
processes and preparations for the futures. “[K]nowing what futures are 
preferable is essential for making competent, effective and responsible decisions 
as is knowing what futures are possible and probable” (Bell 1998, 336). Images 
of preference are value oriented and often personal, differing according to 
culture, sex, social status, age (Dator 2002, 7-8) life experience and knowledge 
                                               
4
 The concepts of futures thinking will be examined in more detail in the methodology chapter. 
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frames. The generation of alternative terrorism futures (including possible, 
probable and preferable) is a level of foresight that is required by the Terrorism 
Studies community. This is because, as noted by Glen, Gordon and Dator (2002, 
177), futures research that inspires decision makers with choices and warnings of 
inaction, can challenge and change attitudes and priorities. Foresight projects 
provide a means of supporting decisions in uncertainty, thereby increasing the 
effectiveness of decisions made in the present (Schartinger et al. 2012, 41) to 
influence terrorism futures positively. 
 
Defining terrorism has been a source of international disagreement (U.S. Army 
Intelligence Center and Fort Huachuca 1998a), and so far there is no 
unequivocally accepted definition of the term (Oberschall 2004, 26; Perl 2003, 
4). This is a unique situation given the subjective relative ease of recognising a 
terrorist attack when one occurs, and yet arriving at a consensus on a suitable 
definition, or even the elements to be included, has proven difficult (Ward 2003, 
292). Some academics5 have taken the approach of pointing out elements of 
terrorism that are common to many definitions, thereby seeking to capture and 
explain the term, rather than define the phenomenon. Upon examining various 
definitions, it is evident that an array of new characteristics, or definable 
elements, has been incorporated. Examples include: the concept of a group 
(Laqueur 2001a), and the element of fear (Enders and Sandler 1999; 2000; Ruby 
2002; Taylor and Winnifred 2004). This difficulty illustrates the changing nature 
of terrorism, and the resultant difficulties and limitations that emerge when those 
with the power to define try, to affix a definition to the term. Alterations to the 
meaning and application of the term “terrorism” to accommodate the political 
vernacular and discourse of each era have also proven problematic to the task of 
defining the term (Hoffman 2004, 13). That is, the definition utilised often 
depends on the circumstances and attitudes, and these change over time 
(Whittaker 2002, 11). Interestingly, Laqueur (2003, cited in Morgan 2004, 31) 
diverted from attempting to define terrorism, advocating instead the idea that 
there are many ‘terrorisms’. For the purpose of establishing the context and 
                                               
5
 This is perhaps most evident in the work of Laqueur (1996a; 2001a). 
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parameters of this research, it is necessary to adopt a working definition of the 
term.  
For the purpose of this thesis, terrorism is a form of violence and is defined as:  
an action or threat made with the intention of advancing a political, 
religious or ideological cause to coerce, influence or intimidate the public 
office or members of the public (summarised from Criminal Code Act 1995 
(Cth)). 
 
In the absence of a definition provided by a global body such as the United 
Nations, the definition above, which is a summary of the elements incorporated 
in Australian legislation, has been selected. The definition incorporates the main 
elements of political objectives, threatened and/or actual violence and civilian 
targets, while also providing scope for future threat adaptation. This definition 
will facilitate the examination and incorporation of a range of elements relative 
to the past, near-present and future natures of the terrorist threat. For example, 
this definition does not provide temporal, geographic or identity constraints 
which would limit terrorism to being either a domestic or international 
phenomenon, or an act committed only by groups, nations6 or individuals, nor 
does the definition distinguish between target types.7 Having originated from 
government legislation, it provides greater scope for the consideration of the 
research outcomes. It is acknowledged that the definition is broad and subjective, 
revealing the current political positioning and conforming to the Western and 
official terrorism discourse and worldview of the present. 
                                               
6
 It is acknowledged that the terrorist identity has included, and could continue to include, state 
actors; however this study will not be examining nation state violence as terrorist violence. The 
reason for this exclusion stems from the focus on non-government terrorist actors. While portions 
of the findings may be transferable, the thesis has not consulted or considered the different litany, 
systemic causes, worldviews or myths specific to state terrorist actors. This could represent an 
interesting topic for future research and comparison.   
7
 There is debate as to whether attacks on military targets should be classed as terrorist violence, 
or as acts of war. (For example Carr 2002, cited in Garrison 2003 and Held 2004.) This thesis 
does not seek to delve into this argument, but to state that, for the purpose of this thesis, terrorist 
events do include those where military targets have been attacked. Without the inclusion of such 
attacks, it is thought that some pertinent aspects of the nature of terrorism would be overlooked, 
and, furthermore, that this could introduce confusion in determining what is to be classed as an 
‘act of war’ or an act of terrorism. For example, the September 11 attack on the Pentagon, from 
the ‘act of war’ perspective is only considered to be terrorist violence because a civilian airliner 
was involved. The inclusion of military targets also facilitates the examination of other pertinent 
attacks including the 1998 embassy attacks in Africa and the attack on the USS Cole. 
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1.2 Conducting Futures-Oriented Terrorism 
Research 
 
Theories of Complexity, Catastrophe, Chaos and Sustainability have been used to 
generate understandings of the futures (Slaughter 1996b, 36). Chaos theory for 
example, suggests that the world is inherently unstable (Inayatullah 1996, 195), 
whilst Complexity theory advises that despite the chaotic nature of the futures, 
patterns will emerge showing that characteristics of the potential futures can and 
will be both known and unknown. As such, these theories highlight that the 
futures can be examined and discussed through an avenue that supports 
methodical futures inquiry.  
 
Emerging in the late 1960s (Gidley 2010a, 1046), Futures Studies has evolved 
into an independent discipline (Van der Duin 2007b, 212); a social science 
facilitating the examination of an issue and how people conceptualise and engage 
with the futures (Van der Duin 2007a, 13). This is facilitated by the six pillars of 
futures inquiry: mapping, anticipation, timing the future, deepening, creating 
alternatives and transforming (Inayatullah 2008a)8. Futures Studies is a complete 
discipline with its own theories, courses, conferences and academic journals that 
facilitate cross disciplinary investigations (Dator 2002, 21). 
 
“Thinking about the future in a systematic way allows one to consider the myriad 
forces that will affect the type and amount of terrorism we might expect 
(forecast)” (Jensen 2001, 917). Futures Studies offers a number of unique 
methodologies to incorporate futures thinking into Terrorism Studies. The 
previous application of cross-impact analysis9 by Jensen (2001) demonstrates the 
validity of applying the Futures Studies discipline and concepts to the Terrorism 
Studies field. One of the central premises of Futures Studies is the need to 
produce a comprehensive understanding of the past and present to give insight 
into the futures.10 Increasing the level of systematic terrorism foresight within 
                                               
8
 Inayatullah’s (2008a) six pillars will be examined in more detail in the methodology chapter.  
9
 One technique offered by Futures Studies. 
10
 This is reflected within the mapping, anticipation and timing the future pillars. 
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decision making processes is an effective mechanism to positively influence the 
futures. 
 
The importance of creating an environment and mechanisms for incorporating 
foresight into decision-making frameworks is highlighted by the fact that: 
 
…human decisions and actions play an important part in 
determining the future of both humanity and the world in which we 
live… To make effective decisions we would need knowledge 
about the future that we cannot possess, yet we are often forced to 
make decisions which have long term implications in conditions of 
considerable uncertainty. (Leeds Metropolitan University 1996, 
cited in May 1998, 468) 
 
Hence, it is thought that Futures Studies provides the bridging element that the 
Terrorism Studies community needs in order to examine and identify a range of 
terrorism futures, for the specific intention of initiating positive futures 
manipulation through methodical foresight projects. These processes, as 
identified by the Leeds Metropolitan University (1996, cited in May 1998, 468), 
may assist in reducing not only the levels of uncertainty in the futures, but also 
society’s understandings of the potential positive and negative impacts from 
proposed counter-terrorism strategies and the way in which they are activated 
and communicated. 
 
A major deficiency in the terrorism research arena is in the lack of studies that 
incorporate a methodical futures component that, as highlighted by Dator (2009, 
4), challenges the misguided belief that the future will be a continuation of the 
present. The methodological approach offered by Futures Studies addresses this 
deficiency while maintaining and advocating a multi-disciplinary approach to the 
research subject. Futures Studies facilitates the integration of various theories 
and viewpoints while offering an alternative approach to the traditional terrorism 
research techniques. Futures Studies is not a predictive science, nor does it intend 
to be; rather, Futures Studies, as will be highlighted in the methodology chapter, 
facilitates the incorporation of foresight into research to encourage the 
development of alternate futures, which, as also highlighted by Dator (2002, 7), 
furthers participative futures inquiry by identifying and understanding the 
various images. For example, why some people have particular images and not 
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others; how decisions (and inactions) of the past and present influence the future 
(Dator 2002, 7), and; how a person’s perception of the space-time-person 
continuum (Inayatullah 2012c, 414) impacts their terrorism futures images. 
Futures Studies facilitates understanding the variety and sources of alternative 
futures images (Dator 2009, 6) of terrorism; a deficient area of research for the 
Terrorism Studies community.  
 
The development of a comprehensive understanding of terrorism is pivotal to any 
research on terrorism and is supported by the six pillars approach. If terrorism 
remains a concept that is poorly understood, or left to the devices of its 
governing metaphors, the implementation of effective counter-terrorism 
strategies may become an overwhelming and ineffective task. As the 
phenomenon of terrorism continues to change and evolve, research that 
encapsulates an understanding of the evolution of terrorism, and how this 
knowledge is framed, will provide beneficial insight. Already we can note two 
key terrorism metaphors that have featured within this introductory chapter: 
September 11 was “a wake-up call” (Wulf, Haimes and Longstaff 2003, 429) and 
that ‘we’ are “playing catch up with the terrorists” (Sealing 2003). Hence, this 
thesis advocates proactive engagement with terrorism futures through a layered 
framework to begin the inquiry into terrorism futures and knowledge constructs 
in the interest of incorporating methodical futures inquiry into counter-terrorism 
initiatives. This is a valuable level of research for the global community, 
because, as argued by Glenn (2000, 4), it is “strategically better to anticipate 
rather than respond”. This should represent a continuous engagement process as 
alternative images will require reviewing and rejuvenation as adaptations, 
vulnerabilities and opportunities are identified. This will facilitate the proactive 
adaptation or adoption of effective counter-terrorism initiatives aimed at, or 
assisting in the achievement of, positive terrorism futures manipulation.  
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1.3 Terrorism Research: Issues of Importance and 
Awareness 
 
Terrorism Studies is considered to be a relatively young field in academia, 
emerging in the 1970s11 within the social sciences (Brannan, Esler and 
Strindberg 2001, 4; Duyvesteyn 2004, 440; Laqueur 2004, 138). It is estimated 
that in the decade following September 11, the rate of scholarly publications 
increased by 400% (Aly and Striegher 2012, 849). Despite the expanding 
knowledge base, the research area is yet to be completely established as a mature 
and stable discipline in academia (Gordon 2001, 116). One of the reasons offered 
for this concerns the challenges inherent in investigating the phenomenon (Silke 
2001, 2). “Many researchers and professionals have tried to capture the essence 
of this elusive subject, often with frustrating and inconsistent results” 
(Schweitzer and Schweitzer 2002, 31). For example, the task of seeking to create 
an overall ‘general theory’ of terrorism, as referred to by Laqueur (2004, 22), is 
considered to be “a futile and misguided enterprise”. Hence, the field has 
received numerous contributions from several disciplines seeking to theorise 
elements and characteristics relevant to the threat of terrorism. Difficulties can 
also be experienced when seeking to select an appropriate definition for the term 
“terrorism” itself, and in obtaining reliable data and primary sources of 
information through, for example, field studies or interviews (Barrett 2011, 749; 
Hudson 1999, 15; Mukhina 2005, 523); determining the methodological position 
taken by researchers, particularly ontology and epistemology (Dixit and Stump 
2011, 502), and selecting an appropriate research approach (Smith and 
Damphousse 1998, 133). Furthermore, attention must be drawn to the wider 
aspects of terrorism research, including its inherent difficulties and the need to 
adequately acknowledge, portray and, as highlighted by Dixit and Stump (2011, 
509), sensitivity to context when studying terrorism.  
 
The term terrorism carries negative connotations, as it is generally applied to 
one’s enemy, and therefore what constitutes an act of terrorism depends on the 
originator’s point of view (Jenkins, cited in Hoffman 1998, 14). Hoffman (1998, 
                                               
11
 However, it is believed that terrorist publications initially emerged in the 1940s (Gordon 
2005a, 48; 2005b, 56).  
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15) contends that the decision to affix the ‘terrorist’ label is subjective. The 
expression that terrorism is used by “them”, and is therefore condemned, is 
evident within the literature: 
 
We all righteously condemn it – except when we ourselves or 
friends of ours are engaging in it. Then we ignore it, or gloss over 
it, or attach to it tags like ‘liberation’ or ‘defense of the free world’ 
or national honor to make it seem like something other than what it 
is (Taylor 1988, cited in Marsella 2002, 15).  
 
 
Dixit and Stump (2011, 508-509) explore this very issue, challenging the notion 
that terrorism is an independently existing phenomenon, arguing instead that it be 
viewed as a practice. “By doing so, the focus would shift to how the discourse 
and/or symbol of terrorism is used by states, individuals, communities, or by 
researchers to produce and stabilize certain identities and policy courses” (Dixit 
and Stump 2011, 509). It is important that the implications of knowledge framing 
issues are recognised and the potential effects are understood, and incorporated 
within the research as standard. Issue frames not only shape the dominating view, 
but set the parameters of debate (Haider-Markel, Joslyn and Al-Baghal 2006, 
545).  
 
Dependence on secondary data sources is a major potential problem for 
Terrorism Studies. This is attributed to the difficulty of securing access to 
classified information or persons of interest (Gordon 2001, 124; Hudson 1999). 
Reliance on secondary data sources has in many instances resulted in the field 
being dominated by sources and information originating from either governments 
or research institutes (Brannan, Esler and Strindberg 2001, 7; Gordon 2001, 119-
123; Silke 2001, 3). One of the implications of this is the prevalence of authors 
and publications from the USA (Reid and Chen 2005, 326). Flint (2003, 164-
166) has identified the importance of acknowledging this point, because US 
scholars present a different view of terrorism from scholars from other parts of 
the world. One of the flow-on effects of this pertains to the emotive nature of the 
subject area, and, as a result, the way in which many researchers have not 
remained impartial in their view on, and interpretations of, the subject (Silke 
2001, 2); that is, the “terrorism studies community has created a profoundly 
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adversarial relationship with its research subject” (Brannan, Esler and Strindberg 
2001, 10). Utilising research methodologies that are inclusive of the full variety 
of stakeholders and their interests could address this systemic limitation. 
 
Selecting an appropriate research or methodological approach to investigate 
terrorism can also be problematic (Smith and Damphousse 1998, 133). There is a 
need to expand the research base of the Terrorism Studies community and 
encourage the use of non-traditional methods of enquiry to examine the terrorist 
threat.12 Traditional modes of enquiry have created a dependence on either 
interviews or secondary data via documentary analysis. Applying non-traditional 
research techniques that maintain a multifaceted approach by encouraging the 
integration of various terrorism theorems will expand the terrorism research 
field. This is an important objective for the Terrorism Studies community 
because “the events of September 11th argue for nothing less than a re-
configuration of both our thinking about terrorism and of our national security 
architecture” (Hoffman 2001b, 1). Hence terrorism research should seek to 
incorporate innovative thinking, which not only attempts to provide an 
understanding of the past, present and futures of terrorism (acknowledging the 
roles, actions and inactions of all stakeholders), but also contextualises the threat 
in terms of the actual threat and engages with epistemology.  
 
Attention being focussed on the threat of terrorism must remain within the 
context of the broad array of issues facing Australia and the global community. 
The point that governments and researchers alike have increased the interest, 
consideration and public debate regarding terrorism, especially following the 
events of September 11, necessitates the importance of not over-emphasising its 
threat at the expense of other critical areas. It has been estimated that between 
2001 and March 2009 the United States Congress provided the Department of 
Defense with approximately $808 billion in supplemental and annual 
appropriations, primarily for military operations in support of the “global war on 
terrorism” (United States Government Accountability Office 2009, 1). The threat 
of terrorism must be accurately conceptualised in terms of other political and 
                                               
12
 Silke (2001, 4) notes that traditional modes of enquiry comprise either documentary (or 
secondary data) analysis or interviews. 
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societal issues and requirements (Crelinsten 2002; Wermuth 2004). This 
conceptualisation should encompass the occurrence, responses (including 
alternatives) and resourcing devoted to countering the threat of terrorism.  
 
Past experiences in Australia and other regions of the globe, ranging from the 
USA to Israel, Palestine, the United Kingdom, Ireland and Spain, the attacks in 
New York, Bali, Madrid, London, Beslan and Mumbai have brought the 
concepts of terrorist violence to the forefront of public attention, particularly for 
Western nations. The social construction of terrorism has been challenged by the 
above-mentioned high profile events. Historically, Australians’ knowledge of 
terrorism was largely dependent on their origins and personal experiences. While 
many would have been familiar with the topics of the Palestinian-Israeli conflict 
and the 1972 Munich Olympics, the British experience with the Irish Republican 
Army (IRA), and possibly Spain’s experience with Basque separatist group 
Euskadi Ta Askatasuna (ETA), and many other terrorist campaigns, such as 
those in Algeria and Sri Lanka, such conflicts did not raise a sense of risk and 
uncertainty within the Western middle class until the last decade. Perhaps in 
these instances the violence was viewed as being between ‘others’, limiting 
active interest until the effects were felt at home. For many Australians, the 
events of September 11 and Bali challenged the concept that terrorism is a threat 
experienced on foreign soil by foreigners (Richardson 2006). 
 
In approaching terrorism, the threat should be considered within the context of 
other societal problems and our preparedness and capacity to affect them 
(Wermuth 2004, 2). That is “[w]hat we must realise is that there is no single risk 
that is the most dangerous to our societies, but a combination of risks, either 
linked in a short timeframe or in a common purpose by a variety of actors.” 
(Kujat 2004, 40) The importance of achieving this level of knowledge is 
highlighted by the realisation that global problems are exceeding our knowledge 
and preparedness to effectively deal with them (Tough 1996, 179). The exclusive 
(or over-) attention given to terrorism has the ability to subtract attention and 
funding from other key societal issues (Mueller 2005a, 492). As highlighted by 
Johnson (1994, cited in Crenshaw 2005, 518), “conceptions of threat matter 
enormously – in the case of the cold war fuelling massive defense spending and 
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dangerous arms races”. Another example emerged in the wake of September 11, 
when national security and response agencies underwent profound structural and 
financial reorganisation. A prime example of this was the amalgamation of 
several American government agencies, including the Federal Emergency 
Management Agency (FEMA) under the Department of Homeland Security 
(Glasser and White 2005, ¶22). In the wake of Hurricane Katrina, it became 
evident that FEMA’s redirection, arguably towards a focus on the 
terrorism/counter-terrorism sphere, had reduced its ability to efficiently perform 
its role of providing overall emergency management13 (Glasser and White 2005, 
¶29-32). This example illustrates the importance of ensuring that society, and the 
government of the day, are well informed of all threats and issues, and that these 
are provided in an accurate context beyond the confines of political cycles, so 
that the most appropriate and adequate balance can result. 
 
The need to apply a wide outlook to the terrorist phenomenon/practice is 
important. The achievement of this will enable, as identified by Taylor and 
Horgan (2000, 2), a holistic examination and understanding of not only the 
current terrorist threat environment, but also an extended focus to seek 
understandings from the past as well as interpretations of the possible futures. 
Extending the research focus and thought on threat preparation beyond 
immediate threats is important, and remains a substantial task for terrorism 
researchers and policy-makers alike.  
 
1.4 The Research in the Context of the Reviewed 
Literature14  
 
Literature pertaining to the threat of terrorism has been written from a variety of 
perspectives including politics, history, sociology, economics, psychology, and 
                                               
13
 It is acknowledged that FEMA was originally created in response to the concerns of the Cold 
War, but was overhauled in the 1990s to update not only the security response system but also 
national preparedness for natural disasters in the wake of Hurricane Hugo (1989) and Hurricane 
Andrew (1992) (Glasser and White 2005, ¶18-20). 
14
 This is a brief outline of the reviewed literature and its pertinent aspects relating to this 
research. Further examination of the literature will be integrated throughout the thesis in order to 
adequately address the variety of theories and viewpoints relevant to terrorism research, thus 
achieving a multifaceted approach. 
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geography. Given a broad range of disciplines examine terrorism, the focus of 
the research is often diffuse, accompanied by a significant amount of debate on 
an array of issues and viewpoints. The following overview of literature on 
terrorism is intended to provide a general basis from which to explore the major 
categories and themes that are evident in the field. Issues and perspectives in the 
literature that specifically concern the futures of terrorism will also be 
summarised and critiqued. These assessments will provide the foundation of this 
thesis by identifying research gaps and key requirements, demonstrating that the 
research constitutes a significant contribution to the Terrorism Studies 
knowledge base. 
 
General Terrorism Literature: Sources, Categories and Themes 
  
Terrorism literature can be grouped into categories according to: the sources (for 
example, academics, government officials and organisations, interest groups, 
professional bodies, including think tanks and the media); a timeline approach 
(for example pre- or post-September 11), or; subject matter. Three dominant 
subject categories have emerged within the literature: understanding terrorism, 
responding to terrorism, and the futures of terrorism. Source15 and time 
distinctions enable the assessment of similarities and disparities in the literature, 
and whether there has been a shift in perspectives concerning the subject 
matter.16  
 
It has been concluded that, in terms of focus, academic terrorism literature 
provides a more all-encompassing approach to terrorism research, which 
attempts to examine many facets of the threat. Official literature, meanwhile, 
predominantly displays a reactive and time-specific approach to terrorism, 
presenting an overall focus on response mechanisms and on pinpointing the most 
pertinent and current threats. It has also been noted that academic sources 
                                               
15
 For the purpose of this literature review, the materials have been grouped into two broad 
categories: academic sources and official sources. The dominance of Western originated 
academic and official publications and the subsequent effect of conforming to the current 
Western and official terrorism discourse is acknowledged. 
16
 Pre- and post-September 11 distinctions, for example; it is arguable that the post-September 11 
literature has focussed far more on examinations of al-Qaeda and that from 2010 onwards 
references to al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP) have become more common. 
28 
 
generally rely on official sources for data (for example, the number of terrorism 
incidents per year, the financial impact of damage caused by terrorism, and the 
number of casualties (injuries or deaths) resulting from terrorist attacks) which 
they then interpret by applying their own knowledge and expertise. This is seen 
in the use of Patterns of Global Terrorism, an annual publication of the United 
States Department of State. Official sources have shown a general reliance on the 
interpretation of official data by academic sources in the development of their 
understanding of terrorism.17  
 
With regard to the three broad subject categories evident within terrorism 
literature, the first category, understanding terrorism, is an area that is dominated 
by the academic community, and often involves the discussion of areas and 
issues that are the subject of much contention. Such areas include: constructing a 
definition for the term “terrorism”; identifying the categories/periods/waves of 
terrorism;18 ways of examining terrorism and terrorists;19 the root causes of 
terrorism; the financing and support of terrorism; the structure of terrorist 
networks/organisations; and the costs and repercussions of terrorist activity. The 
category of responding to terrorism is examined in both official and academic 
literature. This, as previously noted, is the category which discussion in official 
sources usually focuses on. The futures of terrorism is also an area where there 
appear to be few clear and consistent viewpoints. More detailed examinations of 
future conditions are usually found in academic literature, rather than in official 
                                               
17
 This is most evident in the work of Hudson (1999) for the Library of Congress. 
18
 Categories of terrorism commonly include: religious, political, ethnic and/or nationalist, and 
other ideologically motivations. The terminology used to indicate periods of terrorism varies 
substantially between: postmodern terrorism (Laqueur 1996b); post-Cold War terrorism (Beeson 
and Bellamy 2003; Enders and Sandler 2000); traditional terrorism (Laqueur 2001a); modern 
terrorism (Bergesen and Lizardo 2004; Hoffman 2002a; Perl 2003); and “the new terrorism” 
(Laqueur 2001a; O’Hagan 2003; Parachini 2001). Rapoport’s “waves of modern terrorism” 
theory consists of: the anarchist wave; the anti-colonial wave, and; the new left terrorism and 
religious wave (in Weinberg 2007, 41). 
19
 Literature pertaining to the development of an understanding of terrorism and terrorists is 
largely dominated by a psychological approach; however, various disciplines contribute other 
theories, for example: Childhood Socialisation Theory (Staub 2004); Psychological Identity 
Theory (Taylor and Winnifred 2004), and; the Frustration-Aggression Hypothesis (based on the 
relative-deprivation hypothesis of Ted Robert) (Gurr 1970, cited in Hudson 1999) have been used 
to foster an understanding of the terrorist threat and its actors. Other approaches include: 
geographical considerations (Black 2004; Pillar 2004; Staub 2004); the sociology of terrorism 
(Bergensen and Lizardo 2004); terrorist resource allocation (Crenshaw 2004; Enders and Sandler 
2003); physical or mental traits or characteristics that are common, or uncommon, amongst 
terrorist identities (Crenshaw 2004; Hudson 1999; Laqueur 2001a), and; pathways to 
radicalisation (Aly and Striegher 2012; King and Taylor 2011).  
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sources.20 This is arguably due to the official focus being on seeking to 
understand the threat in order to activate response and preparation mechanisms.  
 
A closer examination of the three categories reveals four dominant themes. The 
themes are: ‘us versus them’ rhetoric; the persistent devotion to understanding 
terrorism and terrorists; the changing nature of the terrorism phenomenon, and; a 
general impression of fear and concern surrounding the futures of terrorism. 
These themes emerge within the discussions in all three categories of the 
literature. For example, the theme of ‘us versus them’ rhetoric is most prevalent 
in the official literature (especially the literature concerned with responding to 
terrorism), but is also usually identified and acknowledged by academic sources. 
The theme of the importance of fostering an understanding of terrorist events and 
actors is most evident in the category of understanding terrorism, unsurprisingly. 
This is an element present in official and academic sources, though 
predominantly in the latter. The academic literature emphasises the need to 
examine the changing nature of terrorism, which extends beyond the traditional 
quantitative approach of examining the rate of attacks and casualties per year. 
Commentary on the future directions of terrorism which arouse fear and concern 
is linked to the escalating violence and lethality of attacks, and is particularly 
pertinent to discussions of weapons of mass destruction (WMDs).  
 
Ontology and epistemology are also important. Despite vast contributions from 
various geographic regions, literature in the terrorism field appears to be 
dominated by US sources. As previously noted, this dominance requires 
consideration due to the potential differences in perspective of US scholars as 
compared to their counterparts around the world (Flint 2003, 164-166). For Flint 
(2003, 164-166), the impact of the United States’ hegemony and the 
pervasiveness of its ideals have been echoed in some US-authored literature. This 
has often resulted in a situation that reflects an ‘us’ versus ‘them’ rhetoric. This 
has been acknowledged by several academic sources including Beeson and 
Bellamy (2003, 343), Harré (2004, 99) and Sederberg (2003, 267). Specifically, 
                                               
20
 There are, however, a few notable exceptions: refer to the Homeland Security Council (2004), 
the National Intelligence Council (1997; 2000; 2004; 2008; 2012) and the Department of 
Homeland Security (2008). 
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Beeson and Bellamy (2003, 343) noted that this insiders/outsiders view has come 
to characterise the post-September 11 discourse. A clear example of this can be 
seen in a statement released by the Central Intelligence Agency (2003a), noting 
that there was a “clear and present danger posed by terrorists who seek to destroy 
who we are and what we stand for”.  
 
Official sources have a more detailed focus on the threat of terrorism and how to 
counter that threat, and, at times, how to remedy the conditions that lead to 
terrorism. The academic community, while also covering these areas, highlights 
the need (and willingness) to adequately understand the threat and its actors in 
order to create effective response mechanisms. The idea that “[w]hile nothing is 
easier than to denounce the evildoer, nothing is harder than to understand him” 
(Dostoevsky, cited in Hudson 1999, 14) has been reflected in the work of many 
academics. This willingness, and persistence in seeking, to understand terrorism, 
including all relevant stakeholders, is thought to be more prevalent within post-
September 11 academic literature.21 This level of understanding was certainly a 
feature of pre-September 11 literature, but there does currently appear to be a 
renewed recognition of the value of such an approach, particularly in the interest 
of enabling effective preventative mechanisms. This is perhaps attributable to an 
idea, emphasised by several sources in both the official and academic groupings, 
that the terrorist threat is changing in ways that not only make it more dangerous, 
but also more difficult to inhibit (Albini 2001; Beeson and Bellamy 2003; 
Bergesen and Lizardo 2004; Canadian Security Intelligence Service 1999; 
Caruso 2002; Enders and Sandler 2000; Helgerson 2002a; Hoffman 2000; 
Hudson 1999; Jenkins 2001a; Johnson 2001; Laqueur 1996a; Marsella 2002; 
Merari 2000; Morgan 2004; National Commission on Terrorism 2000; Pillar 
2004; Sealing 2003; Staub 2004; Whittaker 2002).  
 
The fourth theme in the literature pertains to the element of fear and intimidation. 
Interestingly, this characteristic appears to have been used not only by terrorist 
actors to affect a wider audience, but has also been reflected in the public and 
private sectors, such as government and media publications. Arguments have 
                                               
21
 Possibly attributable to the 400% increase in scholarly publications on terrorism highlighted by 
Aly and Striegher (2012, 849). 
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been made regarding the use of fear politics by high profile individuals or groups 
who address and/or inform the public and can even influence public opinion and 
debate. Discussions examining the potential for further adaptations of the 
terrorist threat have a tendency to emphasise the most catastrophic and high 
profile terrorist acts of the past,22 and the potential for home-grown terrorist 
threats, or the realisation of worst-case scenarios, in the future. This emphasis 
usually makes reference to WMDs, and more recently, to cyber-terrorism.  
 
It is evident that an understanding of the overall nature of terrorism and its 
stakeholders is a prerequisite in attempting to characterise the changing nature of 
the threat. This thesis, in terms of initially providing an understanding of the past 
and near-present natures of terrorism,23 will be consistent not only with other 
studies within the field, but also with current research standards. This will 
provide a stable base upon which to apply the selected Futures Studies 
theory/methodologies to the phenomenon of terrorism in order to generate 
alternative meta-level terrorism futures.  
 
 
Terrorism Futures Literature 
 
Interest in assessing what the future may, or may not, hold in relation to the 
threat of terrorism has been shown by an array of professions.24 Despite this 
interest, systematic and methodical futures-oriented terrorism research appears to 
be relatively deficient in the field’s publications. This inadequate amount of 
futures examination could be attributed to the inherent questions and concerns 
regarding the feasibility of studying the future. The review of the literature has 
revealed that a clear distinction can be drawn between those sources which 
suggest that the futures of terrorism can be predicted, and those which suggest, 
conversely, that they cannot.25 It is possible that those sources arguing against the 
                                               
22
 For example, Munich, Lockerbie, the Tokyo subway attack, September 11, Bali, London, 
Madrid and Mumbai. 
23
 This represents the mapping, anticipation and timing futures pillars. 
24
 Professions represented in the terrorism studies community include: government officials and 
public servants; academics; law enforcement agencies; intelligence agencies; sociologists; 
psychologists, and; the media. 
25
 Preference within the literature is often given to prediction rather than forecasting or foresight, 
however there are indications that this may be shifting towards foresight as the terrorism studies 
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ability of generating foresight are usually those which are attempting to predict 
specific threat elements or trends, or which tend to concentrate on the inherent 
challenges of conducting futures-oriented research. This point is emphasised by 
Laqueur (2004, 209) when he states that “[p]redicting future trends in terrorism 
has always been next to impossible”. Hence, the focus of futures-oriented 
terrorism research appears to be on group- or incident/capability-specific 
prediction, rather than on meta-level futures that could describe the direction and 
flow of the terrorist threat and its stakeholders, an approach which extends 
beyond general thoughts on escalation and the worst-case scenarios of WMDs 
and cyber terrorism.  
 
Sources written in support of prediction or foresight highlight the need to ensure 
that knowledge of terrorist activity is timely and intricate; i.e. specific acts 
(planned over a long or short time frame), weapons systems and modes of 
operation, as well as an understanding of the actors and their motivations. Hence, 
those sources which support the notions of prediction and foresight, such as 
Crenshaw (1990) and Kondrasuk, Bailey and Sheeks (2005), support Frankfort-
Nachmias’ (1996, cited in Silke 2001, 13) requirement of incorporating elements 
that facilitate reaching sound futures-oriented conclusions; put succinctly: “[i]f 
knowledge is deficient, prediction is impossible” (Frankfort-Nachmias and 
Nachmias 1996, cited in Silke 2001, 13). A possible sub-branch of the 
application of this concept are those studies which investigate how, when or 
where terrorist acts have slowed or ceased (for example, see Svensson and 
Harding 2011; Alonso 2011; Waldmann 2011). This concept of the importance 
of knowledge is grounded in the logic that examining the past and the present is a 
means of investigating the future. This point is encapsulated by Marsella (2002, 
46) who writes that “[h]istory still remains the best predictor of future action.”26  
 
The review of the literature has indicated that there has been an increase in the 
level of foresight within terrorism research, particularly post-September 11. One 
example is the contribution, by Khalsa (2004), Forecasting Terrorism, which 
                                                                                                                               
community seems increasingly to believe that opportunities for positive futures-manipulation 
exist. 
26
 Further attention to the feasibility of using historical accounts of terrorism to inform the study 
of its possible futures is addressed in the methodology chapter.  
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provides an analytical framework that uses raw intelligence data in combination 
with a set of indicators to produce assessments of future acts of terrorism. These 
assessments are incident-, identity- and location-specific, and may rely on the use 
of classified data. Reports such as Planning Scenarios published by the 
Homeland Security Council (2004), the Department of Homeland Security’s 
Homeland Security 2015 (published in 2008) and those by the National 
Intelligence Council, including Global Trends 2010 (published in 1997), Global 
Trends 2015 (published in 2000), Global Trends 2025 (published in 2008), 
Global Trends 2030 (published in 2012) and Mapping the Global Future 
(published in 2004) further illustrate the growing interest in futures-oriented 
terrorism research. The Global Trends papers are not devoted solely to the threat 
of terrorism; they also provide characterisations of several general issues ranging 
from conflict, and population, to the environment, and governance.27  
 
The most comprehensive scenarios exploring future threats of terrorism are 
contained in the Planning Scenarios report by the Homeland Security Council 
(2004). This particular report provides fifteen scenarios based on the potential 
use of various chemical, biological, radiological and nuclear (CBRN) agents, and 
also attacks involving conventional explosives and cyber techniques. This 
examination of future threats focuses predominantly on the weapons that might 
be used, with the central objective of increasing preparedness and assessing 
response mechanisms for these events. Therefore, the scenarios depicted could be 
described as incident-specific, and, it could be argued, do not reflect overall, 
meta-level characterisations of terrorism futures. 
 
Hoffman (2001b, 3; 2002b, 306) notes that attempts to forecast or predict 
terrorism have been either focused too closely on high-end threats, usually 
involving the possibility of the use of WMDs (as evidenced by the Homeland 
Security Council (2004)), or low-end threats, such as truck and car bombs. This 
could perhaps be linked to Lia’s (2005, 3) characterisation of the tendency for 
“single event extrapolation”. This highlights the need to find a balanced approach 
                                               
27
 This illustrates that governments need to address a range of threats, and must avoid focusing 
exclusively on the threat of terrorism. The threat of terrorism needs to be adequately balanced by 
other national security, global relations and domestic arrangements, requirements and obligations. 
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to incident- and modus-operandi-based scenario construction that adequately 
addresses a range of threats and drivers for the reason that “[t]here is no obvious 
predictable scenario and vulnerabilities are infinite” (Jenkins (2001b, 2). Despite 
worst-case scenarios appearing as a permanent fixture in the field of Terrorism 
Studies (Brannan, Esler and Strindberg 2001, 12), doubts have been expressed by 
Hoffman (2001b) concerning the feasibility of relying on worst-case scenarios as 
a primary focus for developing effective counter-measures. Hoffman’s (2001b, 
3) identification of the ineffectiveness of catering counter-terrorism initiatives to 
the likely details of worst-case scenarios indicates the need to find and apply new 
research approaches that facilitate the examination of a range of terrorism 
futures.  
 
This review of unclassified terrorism literature has revealed several major 
considerations and research requirements, particularly relevant to examining 
terrorism futures. Current foresight capabilities evident within the reviewed 
literature can be generally characterised as either: incident-specific (particularly 
evident in the focus on worst-case scenarios), or a discussion of terrorism trends, 
which at times appear somewhat disconnected from, and uninformed by, 
knowledge of the past and present. Despite growing interest within the research 
field, there remains a lack of comprehensive scholarship devoted to identifying a 
range of terrorism futures that extend beyond the seemingly traditional 
examination of worst-case scenarios. This problem could be attributed to a 
mindset that identifies worst-case scenarios as an effective tool for developing 
counter-terrorism initiatives. The feasibility of this very approach has been 
rejected by terrorism expert Hoffman (2001a), thereby highlighting the need to 
apply new and innovative research approaches to facilitate a more holistic 
terrorism futures examination. This represents a substantial gap in the terrorism 
literature base; one that this thesis will develop. This research will apply 
innovative, yet systematic futures methodology to produce a range of meta-level 
terrorism futures. These futures will be founded upon a broad and layered 
understanding of the past and near-present natures of the terrorist threat. It is 
proposed that those futures which are founded upon a comprehensive 
understanding of the natures of the terrorist threat, rather than exclusively on 
worst-case possibilities, will provide a more rational foundation to identify, 
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discuss and propose a broad range of counter-terrorism initiatives to adequately 
prepare for and positively influence the futures. 
 
1.5 Objectives of the Research 
 
There remain dimensions of the terrorist threat that are poorly understood 
(Hoffman 2002a, 9). It is evident from the literature review that the area of 
alternative, meta-level terrorism futures is significantly deficient. The lack of 
systematic futures consideration at the meta-level, including the episteme (as 
opposed to weapon-, modus–operandi- or group-specific) presents a substantial 
gap in the Terrorism Studies knowledge base and a significant limitation for the 
global community in terms of its preparedness. Specifically, these gaps include: 
• a lack of attention given to identifying and characterising a range of 
terrorism futures. This range should encompass possible, probable and 
even preferred terrorism futures, and should also engage with the 
episteme; 
• a failure to identify meta-level futures that extend beyond the accepted 
wisdom that terrorism is an escalating problem, and beyond propositions 
of worst-case scenarios; 
• a failure to consider a range of terrorism futures that are informed by 
comprehensive and layered understandings of the characteristics, drivers 
and knowledge frames of the past and present natures of the terrorist 
threat; and 
• a failure to extend the Terrorism Studies community’s research 
framework to include methodological approaches that can facilitate 
systematic futures-oriented examinations.  
This thesis will contribute to the four key research and knowledge gaps identified 
above, and is situated within both the Terrorism Studies and Futures Studies 
disciplines (see Figure One below). This contribution will be made by applying a 
strong and validated futures-oriented methodology that advocates for the 
integration of various theories derived from understandings of the past and 
present. A range of terrorism futures will be presented in the form of scenario 
matrices. Addressing these research and knowledge gaps constitutes a significant 
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contribution to knowledge, but more importantly strengthens the prospect for 
positive manipulations of the future on the basis of the merits inherent in 
assisting counter-terrorism policy-makers to create effective initiatives for a 
range of terrorism futures, including preferred futures. Actively addressing these 
four deficient facets of terrorism research will provide a rational foundation for 
stakeholders to identify, propose, discuss and assess a broad range of counter-
terrorism initiatives. Although not all opportunities, vulnerabilities and threats 
will be identifiable, preparations for the futures will be enhanced by encouraging 
further discussion and by conceptualising preferred futures within new, and/or 
existing counter-terrorism measures.  
 
Figure One: Terrorism Futures Studies 
 
 
In examining the futures of terrorism, and thereby addressing the identified gaps, 
(particularly the lack of alternate, including positive, terrorism futures) in the 
literature, this thesis will seek to answer this research question: 
 
What are the meta-level futures of terrorism? 
 
This terminology is consistent with the requirements discussed earlier in this 
chapter. The use of the term “futures” facilitates working beyond the confines of 
the past and present and does not limit this thesis to producing a singular or 
definitive future of terrorism. The importance of identifying alternative images of 
global problems is highlighted by Slaughter (1994, 44), who maintains that:  
 
…there has been a loss of confidence about our ability to solve 
major problems and to survive in a world severely compromised by 
human activity. On the other hand, we have already achieved many 
things which people worked towards when they were only dreams 
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and visions located ‘in the future’. We live longer, travel further, 
and know more than ever before. But the social capacity to imagine 
new and different futures has clearly declined. 
 
Characterisations of terrorism futures, as found within the literature, rely on 
scenarios that describe specific threats (predominantly group-specific, event 
extrapolation, or based on modus operandi or weapons) and/or worst-cast 
scenarios. Identifying and discussing alternative meta-level terrorism futures that 
exist at different levels of understanding will encourage debate that could assist 
in positively influencing the futures by actively aiding counter-terrorism policy 
decisions. 
 
This research has six objectives: 
1. To identify a range of meta-level terrorism futures28 that represent different 
levels of knowledge. (These images should include possible and probable, to 
preferable and worst-case scenario, but with a lack of stakeholder 
engagement any characterisation and value-oriented assessment will be based 
on the author’s Western-oriented ontology and episteme.)  
2. To apply the Futures Studies methodology to Terrorism Studies. The theory 
and method of Causal Layered Analysis (CLA) and Scenarios will be 
applied. The use of Futures Studies methodologies will demonstrate the value 
of applying non-traditional Terrorism Studies methodologies to terrorism 
research (as advocated by Silke 2001).  
3. To utilise CLA to develop a comprehensive understanding of terrorism, 
facilitating the construction and deconstruction of terrorism futures. 
Specifically, the four levels (litany, systemic causes, worldviews and myths) 
will be applied, highlighting different levels of terrorism knowledge and 
deepening the future.29 No existing research has applied this method of 
analysis to terrorism.  
                                               
28
 While there is a requirement for trend extrapolation and forecasting for specific terrorist 
incidents, this is not the focus or intention of this thesis. As revealed in the literature review 
section, the traditional focus has been on high-end (WMDs) or low-end (car and truck bomb) 
threats (see Hoffman 2001b, 2002b) and worst-case scenarios, rather than meta-level terrorism 
futures.  
29
 CLA is part of the “deepening the future” pillar. 
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4. To use Scenarios to capture understandings of the past and near-present in 
combination with ‘drivers’ for the production of a range of meta-level 
terrorism futures.30 
5. To highlight the value that generating alternate meta-level terrorism futures 
can provide in formulating effective and proactive counter-terrorism 
initiatives aimed at positive manipulation of the futures. 
6. To provide a research base for further studies to actively engage with 
terrorism futures, including epistemological components such as the meaning 
given to terrorism. 
 
Individually, these six objectives would represent a significant contribution to the 
Terrorism Studies and Futures Studies research communities; in combination, 
they will address the research question: ‘what are the meta-level futures of 
terrorism’. The rational foundation for the futures component of this thesis is 
built on a comprehensive understanding of the terrorism phenomenon – a 
prerequisite for any terrorism research. This is because, as stated by Gold (2000, 
35), “[y]ou can’t know where you’re going until you know where you are. And 
you can’t know where you are until you know where you’ve been.” 
 
Academics have a responsibility to further knowledge and understanding 
(Brannan, Esler and Strindberg 2001, 11) toward a predictive capability:  
 
Research is ultimately aimed at arriving at a level of knowledge and 
understanding where one can explain why certain events have 
happened and be able to accurately predict the emergence and 
outcome of similar events in the future. Terrorism research, 
however, has failed to arrive at that level of knowledge (Silke 2001, 
1). 
 
It is accepted that “no one can predict the future with any degree of certainty” 
(Pettiford and Harding 2003, 180) and this thesis is not intended to offer 
predictions of the futures of terrorism in certain or absolute terms. Instead, this 
research is meant to reflect a comprehensive understanding of the natures of 
terrorism within a range of scenarios depicting meta-level terrorism futures. The 
scenarios are produced through the utilisation of a non-traditional method of 
                                               
30
 Scenarios are part of the “creating alternative” pillar.  
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terrorism enquiry that allows for the examination of the common trends, systemic 
causes, worldviews and myths used to govern and frame terrorism knowledge. 
 
1.6 Thesis Structure  
 
This thesis is structured around the six stated research objectives. The first four 
objectives, which pertain to identifying a range of terrorism futures and utilising 
methodical futures research approaches that extend beyond traditional methods 
of Terrorism Studies inquiry, are echoed throughout the thesis. Specifically, 
objectives three and four are the subjects of the discussion chapters and represent 
the concept of layers of knowledge, while objectives five and six represent the 
desired outcomes of this research and will be discussed in the concluding 
chapter. 
 
The structure of the thesis is as follows. Chapter One was an introduction to the 
research. Chapter Two contains a more detailed explanation of the Futures 
Studies methodology, and the selected techniques of CLA and Scenarios. 
Discussions of the validity of applying Futures Studies to terrorism research are 
detailed in this methodology chapter. The next three chapters are structured 
according to the four layers of analysis of CLA and contain an integrated 
discussion of the third and fourth research objectives. Chapter Three contains an 
examination of the litany layer of CLA, and a discussion of the popular trends 
associated with the phenomenon of terrorism. The next layer of CLA, which 
identifies the systemic causes of a problem, is the focus of Chapter Four. Due to 
the integrated nature of the worldview and myth levels of CLA, these two levels 
are the combined subject of Chapter Five; that chapter will explore the 
worldviews and myths that are used to frame terrorism – its governing 
metaphors. At the conclusion of chapters Three, Four and Five, scenarios 
representing meta-level terrorism futures are presented. Each set of scenarios is 
based on the revelations yielded by each layer of analysis. The concluding 
chapter, Chapter Six, will provide a summary of the research, as well as 
discussions of the implications of the research for counter-terrorism. A self-
assessment of the thesis and its stated objectives is also conducted in this final 
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chapter, including the identification of future research directions suggested by 
the thesis.  
 
Continual research and contributions to the Terrorism Studies community are 
vital if counter-terrorism strategies are to be improved through hedging or 
shaping to enable positive manipulation of the futures. This will inevitably 
challenge the meaning we give to terrorism.  
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Chapter Two: Methodology 
 
[M]any of us have been able to see rather clearly what was 
happening, and why, and to warn folks well in advance about the 
impending consequences of their actions. 
(Dator 2011, 581) 
 
 
The openness of the future, coupled with the need for a systematic approach to 
generating terrorism foresight, has situated Futures Studies as an effective, 
methodical and efficient means of delivering terrorism futures inquiry. Futures 
Studies will advance terrorism research towards an engagement with, and 
manipulation of, the futures. The challenge is utilising the knowledge in a 
meaningful way – to positively influence the flow of events in order to avoid 
tragedy (Dator 2011, 581). Whether this utilisation of knowledge is in the form 
of changing the attitudes and priorities of individuals, groups, governments, or 
even civilisations, or in challenging preconceived notions about terrorism and 
engaging populations to consider their own value-oriented futures, Futures 
Studies provides a methodical means to conduct this inquiry. Furthermore, the 
previous application of Futures Studies to a variety of disciplines, including, but 
not limited to, health, education, law enforcement, to national, societal and 
gender studies, is evidence of the versatility of the Futures approach. 
 
The Futures Studies methodology encourages a multi-disciplinary approach to 
research that is aimed at understanding change, forces of change and a range of 
futures (Glenn 2000, 3). The central intention of Futures Studies is not to predict 
a single or complete future (Blackman 2001, 14; Slaughter 1996b, 27), but to 
engage with the futures space to explore a range of futures and the layers of 
knowledge supporting, driving, and/or challenging those possible, probable or 
preferred futures. That is: 
  
…futures studies is less about prophecy and more about 
anticipating the way in which we will pass on the world to those 
who will live… in the future. It is also about taking responsibility 
for the consequences of the choices and decisions we make today 
(Stevenson 1996, xxi).  
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Futures Studies claims neither to know the future, nor to be able to predict a 
single, definitive future. Rather, Futures Studies asserts its value by creating an 
analytical space where conditions and problems can be identified and understood 
in the relative terms of preparing for those futures (Glenn 2000, 4; Jensen 2001, 
915-916) and engaging with knowledge structures: the theoretical frameworks 
employed to make the world (past, present and future) intelligible (Inayatullah 
2010b, 101). 
 
This chapter introduces Futures Studies and discusses its application to the field 
of Terrorism Studies. The first section of this chapter examines the dominant 
concepts, difficulties and paradoxes surrounding the concept of researching the 
future. This discussion will allow for the identification of how and why the 
futures field of enquiry emerged, and the value of its application to Terrorism 
Studies. This is followed by a more detailed examination of the interpretations 
and considerations surrounding the futures field. This will include a review of the 
theoretical underpinnings and approaches to research that Futures Studies 
provides. The validity of applying Futures Studies to terrorism research, thereby 
extending the traditional research boundaries of Terrorism Studies, will also be 
discussed. There is a variety of theories and techniques within Futures Studies, 
all of which assist in exploring and understanding the futures space (Saul 2001) 
with the desire to positively influence the futures (Inayatullah 2000). The theory 
and method of CLA and Scenarios have been utilised in this research. Following 
an introduction to each, a description of how CLA and Scenarios have been 
applied to the thesis and their purpose in giving insights into terrorism futures 
will be provided. The limitations of this thesis, and the anticipated effects of 
these limitations, will be summarised towards the end of this chapter. 
 
 
2.1 Introduction to Futures Studies 
 
A key debate that emerges within futures literature is the concept of researching 
‘the future space’. “The very notion of researching the future is a paradox. The 
word research lies within the time boundaries of the past and the present so to 
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research the future appears a logical impossibility.” (Blass 2003, 1041) This idea, 
as identified by Slaughter (1996b, 90), also appears to be the ‘default empiricist 
assumption’ held by people who are external to the futures field. People familiar 
with the discipline commonly possess two dominant thoughts or principles, and 
these are widely reflected in futures literature. The first of these principles is that 
the future is not predetermined, rather it represents an abstraction or ‘an empty 
space’ (Slaughter 1998, 372; 2002b, 359; Valaskakis 2001, 32), an opportunity 
even. The metaphor of the blank space is often applied to the future. It should 
however be noted that the future is not entirely open; Inayatullah (2012c, 414) 
argues that the future is already under the influence of current events and trends, 
and, most importantly, of the organising and supporting episteme. This leads to 
the second principle: that “[w]e create the future by our actions in the present” 
(Fricker 2004b, 252). Arguably a third principle, gaining prominence, promotes 
the idea of the necessity of examining knowledge constructs (see the works of 
Inayatullah). After all, the “[f]uture is already here, in our thinking, objectives 
and actions” (Kuosa 2011, 335). There is a general consensus within Futures 
Studies literature that the future is a malleable space, that will be formulated a) in 
response to decisions, action and inactions that occur in the present (Dator 2002; 
Manicas 1998; May 1998; Slaughter 1996b; Wallerstein 1998), and b) according 
to existing knowledge frameworks if they remain unchallenged. These principles 
highlight the value and need for undertaking systematic and layered futures 
enquiry across a range of disciplines. The “idea that the future is not 
predetermined but can be changed by our decisions has in fact been one of the 
main arguments for carrying out futures studies” (Schwarz, Svedin and Wittrock 
1982, 108-109).  
 
The futures field is regarded as an emerging discipline, as the research paradigm 
is undergoing further interpretation and development31 (Marien 2002; Slaughter 
1998; Wildman and Inayatullah 1996), which is a result of its continuous 
evaluation, and of its fluid application to various research fields. Futures 
literature reveals a general consensus that the field emerged as a distinct 
discipline in the late 1960s or early 1970s (Bell 1996; Gidley 2010a; Schwarz, 
                                               
31
 Dator (2008, 905) notes that the name of the field remains contentious.  
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Svedin and Wittrock 1982). However, what constitutes the initial occurrence of 
futures philosophy has been a point of contention. Masini (1998b, 340) claims 
that the field can be traced back at least fifty years, to developments occurring in 
the USA and France. Blass (2003, 1042) however, connects the early 
developments of the field to the 16th Century and the emergence of utopian 
literature.  
 
The discipline of futures inquiry has been steadily expanding, arguably due to its 
multifaceted nature and versatility for exploring a broad range of fields and 
issues relevant to our concerns for the future. “The human endeavour to be better 
prepared for the challenges of the future is ages old. It may even be considered as 
a natural part of human nature” (Kuosa 2011, 329). As noted by Chen (2011, 
607), Futures Studies may provide the missing connection between sociological 
discourse and identifying innovative alternative futures for humanity. According 
to Kuosa (2011, 327) there have been two eras, and an emerging third era, in the 
evolution of Futures Studies: prediction through 1) mystic explanations; 2) 
probabilities, planning and modelling for an indeterminable future, and; 3) 
disconnecting from Western-influenced controls on thought. Some of the initial 
implementations of futures philosophy are evident in the field of military 
aeronautics (refer to Masini 1993, 57). The present day application in business 
sectors (Slaughter 2002, 354), think-tank organisations, government research 
initiatives (Inayatullah 2005) and for instituting organisational change, shows 
that Futures Studies, as a field, has expanded to become a viable discipline with 
diverse applications (Slaughter 1998, 384). These broad and varied applications 
demonstrate an aspect of the value of Futures Studies and how it is “rapidly 
developing into a substantive interdisciplinary field of enquiry.” (Slaughter 
1996b, 35) 
  
Slaughter (1996a, 94) describes that the futures field is comprised of three areas: 
Futures Research, Futures Studies and Futures Movements. Futures Research 
focuses on quantitative means of examining futures (Slaughter 1996a, 94). 
Futures Studies concentrates on identifying, understanding and interpreting 
alternative futures, by conceptualising change, progress and impacts for policy 
and planning (Slaughter 1996a, 95). Futures Movements, as described by 
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Slaughter (1996a, 95), focuses on the role of social groups, for example, in 
initiating change and/or forces of change. It is noted that these distinctions are 
not often identified or distinguished within futures literature. The research 
objectives of this thesis, as stated in the introductory chapter, situate this research 
within the Futures Studies category. The thesis is applying Futures Studies 
theories and methods as a means of constructing and deconstructing terrorism 
futures. With the mode of futures inquiry identified, the approach to research and 
theories offered by the Futures Studies methodology, and their application to 
terrorism research will now be discussed.  
 
2.1.1 Futures Studies: Research Approaches and 
Theoretical Base 
 
Futures Studies incorporates the three research approaches of the 
empirical/predictive, the interpretive, and the critical (Inayatullah 1993, cited in 
Inayatullah 2004a, 5): 
 
The first, the predictive, attempts to predict and control the future; 
the second, the interpretive, examines how different cultures, 
cosmologies, discourses approach and create the future; and the 
third, the critical, makes problematic the categories used to 
construct the future, asking what are the particular social costs for 
any approach or view of the future. (Inayatullah 1993, 237) 
 
These three approaches are often incorporated simultaneously within futures-
oriented research, and this is attributed to the overlapping nature of these 
approaches, and perhaps, more recently, because of the introduction of layered 
methodologies. Due to this interconnectedness, these Futures Studies research 
approaches should be thought of as a continuum, rather than as three discrete 
approaches (Inayatullah 1993, 237).  
 
As such, the majority of futures inquiries are not located within, or limited to, a 
single research approach (Blass 2003, 1049). Actively incorporating each 
approach increases the overall value of the research because this enables a more 
holistic examination of different layers; for example the issues, stakeholders and 
framing of a given problem. Ultimately, the incorporation of each approach 
46 
 
facilitates the consideration of a variety of elements and perspectives that would 
otherwise not necessarily be included. Furthermore, each approach contributes 
“different assumptions about the real, about truth, about the role of the subject, 
about the nature of the universe, and about the nature of the future” (Inayatullah 
1993, cited in Inayatullah 2004a, 5). The introduction of a fourth approach, 
action learning, has been advocated by Inayatullah (1993, cited in Inayatullah 
2004a, 5). The action learning approach operates on the premise that ‘the future’ 
is formulated by the impacts and interests of the stakeholders (Inayatullah 2002, 
cited in Ramos 2004, 499). This thesis incorporates elements from all four 
Futures Studies research approaches; the anticipated contributions will be 
discussed later in this chapter with specific reference to the futures theory and 
methods applied and the inherent difficulties of stakeholder engagement in 
matters such as terrorism. 
 
The theoretical base of Futures Studies continues to develop. Key foundational 
assumptions, also referred to as principles, of Futures Studies prominent within 
futures literature32 are concentrated around four key themes. These are: 1) the 
role of time, in that it is unidirectional and can only move forward (Amara 1981, 
cited in Bell 1996); 2) that, because of the influence of human beings and other 
forces of change, the future is not predetermined (Bell 1996; Harmon, cited in 
Scheel 1988; Masini 1993; 3), that there can be many potential futures, and that 
these are to be presented as alternative images (Moll 1996), and; 4) that the 
identification of desirable or undesirable futures enables the development of 
appropriate actions to obtain or avoid those futures (Amara 1978, cited in 
Schwarz, Svedin and Wittrock 1982; Slaughter 1996b). Arguably, as these four 
principles became embedded in methods, additional lenses were created. 
Inayatullah (2008a, 5), for example, suggests six basic concepts in futures 
thinking: used, disowned, alternative, alignment, models of social change and 
uses of the future. These concepts lead to questions and approaches like: 
− Is the image of the future yours, or does it belong to or originate from 
someone or somewhere else? (Used) 
− Are you engaged in, or disengaged from, the process? (Disowned) 
                                               
32
 Refer to Amara (1978, cited in Schwarz, Svedin and Wittrock 1982); Bell (1996); Harmon 
(cited in Scheel 1988); Inayatullah (2005); Masini (1993, 1998b) and Moll (1996) for examples. 
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− The quest for alternatives. 
− Are the images sufficiently linked to, or supported by, strategy and an 
overarching vision? (Alignment) 
− Is the future perceived positively, negatively, as open, closed or cyclical? 
(Social change), and; 
− Are individuals and groups well placed, equipped, and knowledgeable on, 
initiating the strategy and development required? (Uses of the future) 
(Inayatullah 2008a, 5-6). 
 
Additionally, more recent literature highlights the overarching transformation of 
Futures Studies, noting the emergence of the “six pillars” approach to conducting 
futures inquiry, referred to as MATDCT. These are: 
− Mapping: mapping the past, present and futures to determine where 
we’ve been, where we are and where we are going. 
− Anticipation: are there emerging changes or drivers of change on the 
horizon; issues, problems or opportunities that will, or must interfere with 
the mapping? 
− Timing the future: identifying the overarching patterns of history and 
challenging our consciousness of change models and possible futures. 
− Deepening the future: engaging with the inner dimensions, be that the 
meanings we ascribe to the world (inner-individual), our behaviour 
(outer-individual), official/organisational strategies (outer-collective), or 
the interior maps of organisations (inner-collective). 
− Creating alternatives: using scenarios and questioning to create 
alternatives or identify different mechanisms to deliver the same state or 
outcome. 
− Transformation: focussing the futures on those paths which lead to 
preferred images. (Inayatullah 2008a, 7-18) 
 
Futures Studies, as alluded to by Kuosa (2011), is continuing its evolution 
towards empowering the populace to interact with the futures and knowledge 
frames to aid in the identification of preferred futures: 
 
As the world becomes increasingly heterogeneous, as events from 
far away places dramatically impact how, where, when, why and 
with whom we live and work, futures studies can help us recover 
our agency. By mapping the past, present and future; by anticipating 
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future issues and their consequences; by being sensitive to the grand 
patterns of change; by deepening our analysis to include worldviews 
and myths and metaphors; by creating alternative futures; and by 
choosing a preferred and backcasting ways to realize the preferred, 
we can create the world we wish to live in. (Inayatullah 2008a, 20) 
 
Despite the clear and concise understanding of the goals, directions and purposes 
of Futures Studies that Inayatullah (2008a) provides, confusion still surrounds 
the concept of studying the future (as mentioned above) and futures terminology, 
particularly in its interactions with other disciplines. 
 
2.1.2  Futures Studies: Conceptualisation Difficulties  
 
Wildman and Inayatullah (1996, 726) suggest that the futures field remains 
‘contentious’ because of the lack of a single, hegemonic defining paradigm;33 
this is a contributing factor to the confusion that surrounds determining what 
Futures Studies entails. It has been highlighted in the futures literature that the 
public commonly associates the concept of Futures Studies with prediction 
(Slaughter 1996b, 5). Hence, as noted by Dator (1996, xix): 
 
Futures studies is generally misunderstood. On the one hand, there 
are those who believe it is or pretends to be a predictive science 
which, if properly applied, strives to foretell with reasonable 
accuracy what the future will be.  
 
As addressed above, the central premise of Futures Studies does not revolve 
around prediction. This particular confusion imposes the requirement that the 
stated research objectives be clear, concise and consistent with the application of 
Futures Studies theories and methods. Fulfilling this requirement will assist not 
only in reducing the emergence of misunderstandings and misconceptions for the 
public and/or consumers, but will also help to ensure the validity of the research.  
 
 
 
                                               
33
 Substantial progress, and attention, to defining the knowledge base of the futures field has been 
made, and given, by Slaughter and Bell (see Slaughter 1996a; 1996c; and Bell 1997a; 1997b). 
49 
 
2.2 Futures Studies and Terrorism Research 
 
Futures Studies provides a valid and systematic futures-oriented research 
approach that meets the standard required by the Terrorism Studies community 
for the generation of foresight. This is demonstrated by: the contribution Futures 
Studies can make, particularly in expanding the terrorism research community’s 
methods and means of inquiry; previous applications of Futures Studies to 
terrorism research, and; the way in which Futures Studies naturally incorporates 
key research requirements and prerequisites specific to the terrorism research 
field. The validity of the methodology will be further demonstrated by its 
application to this thesis and by the manner in which it addresses the research 
question and objectives.  
 
Silke (2001) has encouraged the extension of traditional terrorism research 
methods (such as documentary analysis). The application of Futures Studies in 
this thesis not only illustrated the benefits of using non-traditional terrorism 
research methodologies, but also provides an effective vehicle by which to foster 
development of greater foresight in terrorism research. The previous application 
of Futures Studies to the terrorism field by Jensen (2001) highlights the value of 
using Futures Studies to encourage futures-oriented terrorism research. Jensen’s 
(2001) application involved the use of the Cross-Impact Analysis technique, 
which is one of several methods offered by Futures Studies to assess future 
conditions and problems. Each theory or technique offers a different contribution 
to research and to the four futures research approaches34 discussed earlier. 
 
The validity of applying Futures Studies to terrorism research is further 
demonstrated by the incorporation of terrorism research prerequisites and 
requirements within futures theory or method. Futures Studies incorporates, as 
required by the Terrorism Studies community: a multifaceted approach to 
research that enables the integration of various theories and viewpoints; the 
encouragement and production of comprehensive understandings of the past and 
present, and; fosters the development of terrorism foresight. Glenn and The 
                                               
34
 The empirical, interpretive, critical and participatory aspects of action learning. 
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Futures Group International (2000, 6) note that it is important to comprehend 
from the outset how it is that ‘we’ have arrived at the present day by identifying 
critical trends and issues. The application of the selected Futures Studies theory 
and methods will address the research question and objectives in a manner that is 
consistent with terrorism research standards. 
 
The Futures Studies theory and methods that have been applied to the research 
for this thesis are CLA and Scenarios, which incorporate the empirical, 
interpretive, critical and action learning Futures Studies research approaches. 
This represents a new and different level of analysis for Terrorism Studies, while 
remaining consistent with the terrorism research community’s criteria. Using 
CLA and Scenarios together facilitates the construction and deconstruction of 
meta-level terrorism futures, a depth of research not previously undertaken in 
either the terrorism or futures research communities. Additionally, CLA has been 
utilised in a manner that provides structure to the thesis, as discussed in the 
introductory chapter. At the conclusion of the litany, systemic and the combined 
worldviews and myths chapters, alternative futures will be presented in the form 
of a scenario matrix. Scenarios provide an effective means of providing distance 
from the present, facilitating the construction and deconstruction of alternative 
meta-level terrorism futures according to the layer of knowledge. 
 
This thesis, as with Futures Studies itself, does not aim to predict the futures of 
terrorism in certain or absolute terms; the objective of this research is to generate 
a higher level of terrorism foresight by establishing a sustainable conversation 
about meta-level alternative terrorism futures (and knowledge). This objective 
was chosen because, as identified by Blackman (2001, 14), the process of 
“considering possible and probable futures forces us to think about what we truly 
desire and, hopefully, helps to prevent any potential conflicts.”  
 
The Futures Studies theory and methods will assist in the development of an 
understanding of terrorism futures and positive futures manipulation on the basis 
of different levels of knowledge: trends, systemic causes, worldviews and myths. 
This multi-level understanding will be founded on a comprehensive 
understanding of the natures of the terrorist threat, past and present. 
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Understanding factors that may be producing, accelerating, or, indeed, inhibiting 
terrorism, will assist in enhancing futures preparations and counter-terrorism 
initiatives. This is an important aspect to incorporate into studies examining the 
futures of terrorism, as images of “future terrorism can only be based on theories 
that explain past patterns” (Crenshaw 2004, 64) because, as stated above, 
“[h]istory still remains the best predictor of future action” (Marsella 2002, 46); 
that is, of course, unless those theories are found to be closing off futures and/or 
prove to be irrelevant, or offer a challenge, to stakeholder-preferred futures. 
Fostering this level of awareness is important, because preparations for the future 
should commence in the present (Jensen 2001, 918). It is vital that such aspects 
are reflected within terrorism research, as anticipation is, strategically, better than 
response (Glenn 2000, 4). 
 
2.3 Causal Layered Analysis 
 
CLA is a structurally sound (Barber 2010, 173), innovative research theory and 
method that facilitates the expansion of knowledge and challenges to existing 
conditions and conclusions in any given subject (Kelly 2004, 184). The layered 
and critiquing power of CLA positions CLA as a core Futures Studies theory and 
method (Russo 2010; Nelson 2010). CLA emerges from critical and 
epistemological futures work (Kelly 2006, 41) and utilises several of Michel 
Foucault’s poststructuralist concepts, namely deconstruction, genealogy, 
distancing, reordering of knowledge and alternate pasts, presents and futures 
(Wright 2010, 11). CLA is founded upon the notion that “there are different 
levels of reality and ways of knowing. Individuals, organizations, and 
civilizations see the world from different vantage points” (Inayatullah 1998, 
392). The CLA method explores issues, problems and concepts beyond (what is 
often referred to as) the ‘conventional framing’ of the subject (Inayatullah 1996, 
199; 1998, 393; 2004a, 14; Wildman and Inayatullah 1996, 735), that is, the 
multiple dimensions to social reality that are operating at different 
epistemological levels (Inayatullah 2012c, 405). Hence CLA explores how 
particular truths circulate (Kelly 2010, 1111). 
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CLA uses understandings and interpretations drawn from the past and present, (a 
prerequisite of sound research) to construct and deconstruct futures by moving 
between different levels of knowledge. CLA has been applied to examine futures 
in various fields, including: education and higher education (Bussey 2004, 
Conway 2012, Inayatullah 2012b, Gidley 2012, Kelly 2010, Milojević 2005); 
genetic engineering in agriculture (Fricker 2004a), poverty (Fricker 2004b, 
Milojević 2004); Australian Aboriginal deaths in custody (Wildman 2004); 
globalisation (Gidley 2004, Ramos 2010) sustainability (Kelly 2006); the global 
financial crisis (Inayatullah 2010a); climate change (Hofmeester et al. 2012); and 
a variety of community-, city-, country- or continent-focused topics (see, for 
example, Daffara 2004, Milojević 2008, Wright 2010, Inayatullah 2007a, 2008b, 
2009a, 2011 and 2012a). The value of CLA is the way in which it enables 
researchers to incorporate existing knowledge and to deconstruct a given 
problem by analysing the various layers that collectively make it up. Due to 
CLA’s approach to unpacking an issue or research problem, it reveals that there 
are four distinct levels, or layers, of understanding. Additionally, CLA assists in 
the researcher’s removal of the self from those unfolding futures in order to not 
only consider alternatives, but also the process by which images are colonised by 
dominant discourses (Inayatullah 1998, cited in Wright 2010, 88). This enables 
the discussion of the inherent effects and challenges posed by different ways of 
knowing and different perceptions of reality. CLA is based on the contention that 
there are four levels of knowledge, each of which is individually represented by a 
layer of analysis: the litany; social or systemic causes; worldview/discourse, and; 
myth/metaphor. 
 
Figure Two illustrates the structure and conceptual framework of CLA – note the 
similarity to the concealed depths of an iceberg. Analysis undertaken at the first 
level, the litany, concentrates on trends, events and issues. These litany elements 
are often popularised and used by the media and/or for political or power 
purposes (Blass 2003, 1048; Wildman and Inayatullah 1996, 734). “Litanies are 
hard to challenge and can be used by those in power for their own ends.” (Kelly 
2010, 1111) This level is the “official unquestioned view of reality” (Inayatullah 
2004a, 1), or surface frame (Hofmeester, et al. 2012), and can often create and 
substantiate a sensation of fear (Inayatullah 1998, 393). As will be demonstrated 
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in Chapter Three, this is particularly evident with terrorism. The second layer of 
analysis seeks to explore the interpretations given to data (Blass 2003, 1048). 
These explanations usually focus on the social and systemic causes of an issue, 
including technological, economic, political and historical reasoning (Inayatullah 
2004a, 12). Kelly (2010, 1111) notes that while questions are asked of the data, 
the questions themselves conform to existing knowledge structures and 
paradigms. The discourses that cause, support or even legitimise the 
problem/issue are examined in the third layer: the worldview (Blass 2003, 1048; 
Wildman and Inayatullah 1996, 734). This is an important layer, as “the 
discourse we use to understand is complicit in our framing of the issue” 
(Inayatullah 1998, 393). Wright (2010, 90) notes that we are born into and 
inculcated with certain worldviews. Examining worldviews enables researchers 
to identify and challenge assumptions and to see the studied problem differently 
(Kelly 2010, 1111). The fourth layer of analysis, the myth or metaphor layer, 
seeks to examine what has caused the emergence and manifestation of a 
particular worldview- or value-oriented future, and how this has impacted on 
decisions and actions (Blass 2003, 1048). This level of analysis can uncover the 
“unconscious and often emotive dimensions of the problem” (Inayatullah 2004a, 
13) that shape civilisations without our immediate awareness (Wright 2010, 91). 
The myth is often presented as an unconscious assumption, a metaphor of how 
the world is or ought to be (Inayatullah 2004a, 26), and may, as noted by 
Turnbull (2004, 174), have “taken centuries or millennia to form and is deeply 
embedded in culture, social institutions and patterns of life.” Metaphors structure 
our cultures’ conceptual system and are reflected in our everyday language, 
experiences (Lakoff and Johnson 1980, 139) and social systems. The generation 
of new metaphors to describe ‘reality’ can provide new meaning to our pasts, 
presents (Lakoff and Johnson 1980, 139) and futures.  
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Figure Two: The CLA Iceberg 
 
 
 
CLA successfully incorporates knowledge and understanding from the four 
Futures Studies research dimensions (empirical, interpretive, critical and 
participatory action learning) and is located within the “deepening the future” 
pillar. Inayatullah (2004a, 5-6) summarises this inclusion: 
 
[CLA] contextualizes data (the predictive) with the meanings 
(interpretive) we give them, and then locates these in various 
historical structures of power/knowledge – class, gender… and 
episteme (the critical), along with the unconscious stories that 
express, and to a certain extent, define the episteme. This entire 
process, however, must be communicative: the categories need to 
be derived through doing in interaction with the real world of others 
– how they see, think, and create the future.  
 
Futures literature (refer to Inayatullah 1998, cited in Bussey 2004; Inayatullah 
2004a; Turnbull 2004 and Ramos 2010) more commonly situates CLA within 
the critical futures approach. This is because CLA enables the researcher to 
provide distance from the social practices that ultimately build and sustain the 
categories, discourses and metaphors. CLA is: 
 
…less concerned with disinterest, as in the empirical, or with 
creating mutual understanding, as in the interpretive, but with 
creating distance from current categories. This distance allows us to 
see current social practices as fragile, as particular, and not as 
universal categories of thought – they are seen as discourse, a term 
similar to paradigm but inclusive of epistemological assumptions. 
(Inayatullah 1998, cited in Bussey 2004, 201) 
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The quote above reiterates CLA’s strength in the critical research domain. With 
reference to the remaining three approaches, the litany level explores the 
empirical, the systemic level examines the interpretive, and the element of 
stakeholder engagement, particularly at the worldview and myth levels, can be 
used to reflect action learning in instances where stakeholder engagement has 
not been possible. CLA, used in combination with Scenarios, will produce sound 
futures-oriented terrorism research that will encourage the construction and 
deconstruction of alternative meta-level terrorism futures for the purpose of 
informing preparations for the future by enabling positive futures-manipulation. 
 
2.3.1 CLA and Terrorism Research 
 
Turnbull (2004, 167) claims that the strength of CLA is based on its extension of 
analysis beyond the traditional litany or systemic examinations of an issue to 
examine the overarching control and structural mechanisms, the governing 
metaphors that are constructing the reality. This depth is unique to CLA and is an 
important aspect to explore because “[c]urrent global problems suggest that we 
need to reconstruct our worldview – to change the ways we construe the world” 
(Slaughter 1996a, 110). Effective preparations for the future require the 
examination of both the worldviews and the myths that may be supporting or 
even legitimising current perspectives on terrorism, and that we challenge the 
meanings we give to it. Extending research to the critical and action learning 
approaches is valuable, because: 
 
Some dialogues may simply re-instate a particular litany; litany 
merely provides the avenue for social conflict. Other dialogues 
invoke analyses of the ‘social causes’ of the conflict. Social 
analyses may describe in greater complexity the dimensions of 
social struggle and power relations, but are inadequate for resolving 
social conflicts. This is particularly evident when different social 
actors no longer speak the same language nor have the same 
understanding of the world. Bridging these gaps require different 
forms of dialogue. (Turnbull 2004, 167) 
 
Hence, identifying and discussing the ‘dialogues’, the different worldviews and 
myths, and using these to deconstruct terrorism versus re-inscribing the current 
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‘Western’ dominance, will provide for a more holistic level of research of the 
sort that is in demand in Terrorism Studies. 
 
The above review of the terrorism literature revealed the over-arching dominance 
of viewpoints reflecting, and often reinforcing, Western thought on the subject. 
The importance of examining the implications of these viewpoints stems from 
the concern that “the global world is dominated now by the knowledge and 
reasoning of Western civilization” (Gáspár and Nováky 2002, 374). One key 
value of CLA, and its incorporation of the critical, is the identification of 
dominant discourses and different layers of perspectives. In the case of terrorism, 
these discourses include the decision to affix the ‘terrorist’ label, and the 
assumptions that constitute and/or reinforce ‘us’ versus ‘them’ rhetoric. The 
“critical futures” framework fosters discussion that “makes it possible to stop 
considering world problems as if they were somehow separate from the systems 
of human values and concepts that created them in the first place” (Slaughter 
1996a, 107). That is, the manner in which the problem and threat of terrorism is 
communicated and perceived has an inherent implication (or directing effect) on 
the reactive, action-oriented stance and policies that can be implemented. Lal and 
Nandy (2005, xvii) note that “few in the aftermath of 11 September 2001 have 
cared to investigate the systematic fashion in which terror has been 
institutionalized over the last 200 years as an integral part of modern statecraft 
and public policy.” This highlights the need to adequately acknowledge the 
effects of terrorism discourse and metaphors. This level of analysis will provide a 
stronger foundation, one that encourages long-term thinking that incorporates 
perspectives beyond those that constitute or reinforce the current dominant 
viewpoints of terrorism and terrorism futures. 
 
Holistic research that examines terrorism’s litany and systemic causes, while also 
identifying and challenging existing terrorism worldviews and myths, will 
achieve the construction and deconstruction of alternative meta-level terrorism 
futures. It will also encourage the discussion of preferred futures within terrorism 
literature and how counter-terrorism policy and initiatives can drive positive 
futures-manipulation through the use of back-casting. One key result of this will 
be a well-informed perception of threats. Achieving a level of public 
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understanding beyond the fear created by the litany and the use of “good versus 
evil” terminology (a common conclusion at the systemic level), is an important 
process, because “[h]ow terrorism is viewed by the public in turn shapes the 
kinds of choices considered for its prevention” (O’Neil 2005, 558). Inayatullah 
(2003b, 113) notes that if terrorism litany remains unchallenged we may become 
prone to accepting that because it is, it will always be. The current mindset 
appears to be that if “you are my enemy, it is unlikely that I will go very much 
out of my way to learn to see things from your point of view.” (Harris 2004, 1) 
And yet the strategic advantages of ‘knowing one’s enemy’ are widely accepted 
(Sun Tzu, cited in Shultz and Vogt 2003, 2). ‘Knowing one’s enemy’ is now 
required if we are to transcend the traditional boundaries of preparedness and the 
underpinnings of effective tactical responses, to enable the necessary inclusion of 
one’s broader mindset, support base, and the action-reaction dynamics that 
characterise the threat of terrorism. This will enable the challenging of the 
worldviews and metaphors that support, even perpetuate, terrorism. 
 
It is hoped that through these discussions the range of futures can be 
deconstructed, or alternatively, through additional research35 that it will be 
possible to explore the adoption of performance, or stage, indicators for the paths 
to a number of futures. Assessments of preferred futures, or advanced indications 
of additional threat adaptations, will aid with the process of positive futures-
manipulation by developing better informed counter-terrorism initiatives which 
will foster preferred futures. Understanding the role of terrorism worldviews and 
myths is a key consideration when proposing effective, pro-active and long-term 
counter-terrorism strategies. The Futures Studies Scenarios technique provides 
the means for the construction of alternative futures. As detailed above, a 
scenario matrix will be provided at the end of each layer’s section: litany, 
systemic and the combined worldview and myth levels. Thus each scenario 
matrix will capture a particular layer of terrorism knowledge. Inayatullah (2004a, 
42) encourages the use of CLA prior to scenario building, and this will enable a 
futures deconstruction discussion in the concluding chapter, identifying the 
different levels of terrorism understanding and knowledge and their effects on 
                                               
35
 That may, for example, utilise back-casting. 
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counter-terrorism and on the broader objective of progressing towards positive 
futures-manipulation. 
 
2.4 Scenarios 
 
Scenarios offer an efficient and effective means of providing temporal and 
epistemological distance for the purpose of describing alternative futures 
(Inayatullah 2009b, 78). Scenarios are defined as descriptions of the futures that 
can highlight an array of processes and decisions (Kahn 1967, cited in Glenn and 
The Futures Group International 2000, 4). “A scenario is not a prediction of 
specific forecast per se; rather, it is a plausible description of what might occur” 
(Glenn and The Futures Group International 2000, 4). Hence, a scenario is not 
limited to being a single forecast; rather, it is a manner in which various issues 
and perspectives on the futures can be organised and described in the form of 
‘images’ (Glenn and The Futures Group International 2000, 4). Inayatullah 
(2000) and Masini (1998a) explain that the aim of scenarios is essentially to 
‘undefine the future’. This is consistent with the requirement that ‘the future’ be 
presented as constituting a number of possible alternatives (Masini 1998a). This 
will reflect the variety of interacting factors and dynamics which affect the 
futures space (Inayatullah 2003a, 67). This point is particularly relevant to the 
threat of terrorism, which, as identified by Laqueur (1996a, 25), has many guises: 
there is not just one terrorism, but many ‘terrorisms’. Hence, it is essential to use 
scenarios to provide a number of alternative terrorism futures, and sufficient 
distance from temporal and epistemological boundaries. 
 
Bell (1998, 328), Masini (1993, 91) and Schwarz, Svedin and Wittrock (1982, 
23) depict scenarios as one of the most important and prevalent tools of the 
futures field. The objective of scenarios can range from describing alternative 
futures and providing likely future directions to initiating preference-oriented 
discussions to reach or avoid certain futures and aiding decision-making 
processes. As noted by Masini (1993, 90), scenarios are essentially an: 
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instrument that aids decision-makers, by providing a context for 
planning and programming, lowering the level of uncertainty and 
raising the level of knowledge, in relation to the consequences of 
actions, which have been taken, or are going to be taken, in the 
present. 
 
The presentation of foresight through scenarios can maximise the value of 
research (Gray 2005, 16) particularly research aimed at enhancing futures 
preparations and policy initiatives.  
 
The processes undertaken to formulate a range of alternative futures can be 
simple or comprehensive. This thesis, for example, applies a level of analysis 
prior to scenario construction to ensure that the range of issues and different 
levels of knowledge are captured, with the specific inclusion of those elements 
deemed most pertinent to the futures landscape within the scenario matrix. This 
enables the consideration of the current complexities surrounding change with 
reference to the possible consequences of proposed actions or inactions36 (Masini 
1993, 92). For research to accomplish this, appropriate background information 
must be consulted37 (Scheel 1988, 28).  
 
Scenarios can be constructed in a number of different ways, and the choice of 
method is dependent on the research objectives and on the elements incorporated. 
Some scenario archetypes include the ‘double dialectic’, as referred to by 
Inayatullah (1993, 242), which usually involves characterising a positive future 
as well as its countervailing, negative image (Inayatullah 1993, 242). Inayatullah 
(2005, 16) also provides the construction of scenarios via a single- or double-
driver approach which involves the selection of one or two key variables or 
emerging issues. Double-driver scenarios allow for the formulation of a matrix, 
creating four images of the future. Another approach that generates four futures 
is described by Dator (1979, cited in Rubin 1998, 501). This scenario 
construction approach has the four guidelines of: continued growth; the 
occurrence of a catastrophe or collapse; reversion to the past, and; 
transformation. Similar approaches are also provided by: Inayatullah (1996, 202) 
                                               
36
 Categories of consequences include intended, unintended, positive and negative.  
37
 The debate concerning the relevance of historical components of terrorism to the understanding 
of the problem will be examined in the next chapter. 
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(‘status quo’; collapse; return to a previous time, and; transformation as the result 
of a fundamental change), and, also; Clement Bezold (cited in Inayatullah 2005, 
17) (business as usual; best-case; worst-case; and ‘the outlier’, which is based on 
anticipated emerging issues that do not constitute a current driver). As each 
scenario can only represent one future, the creation of several scenarios is 
required to deliver a range of meta-level terrorism futures, and to demonstrate the 
different layers of understanding derived from CLA. 
 
2.4.1 Scenarios and Terrorism Research 
 
Scenarios have been a key feature of terrorism research that incorporates a 
futures element. Specifically, scenarios have been used to describe future 
terrorist threats, usually for the purpose either of indicating future capabilities or 
possibilities, or for assessing response mechanisms. For example, and this is 
perhaps the most commonly provided scenario, the use of a WMD by terrorists 
and the testing of relevant response co-ordination, along with analysis of the 
expected strain on public resources, such as medical and other emergency 
support.38 These scenarios are usually founded upon an acknowledgment of the 
changing nature of terrorism and the fearful anticipation of further destruction if 
worst-case scenarios actually occur. The focus on worst-case scenarios by the 
Terrorism Studies community produces two main limitations: a failure to engage 
with a range of terrorism futures, and the exclusion of preferred terrorism 
futures. This narrowed focus severely limits the foresight capability of terrorism 
research and its prospects for positive futures-manipulation in counter-terrorism 
policy.  
 
The application of CLA and Scenarios in this thesis will move terrorism research 
beyond this boundary, and towards a higher level of systematic futures inquiry. 
Scenarios provide an effective medium through which to illustrate the different 
levels of terrorism knowledge, per CLA; that is, the different understandings and 
interpretations derived from terrorism’s litany, systemic causes, worldviews and 
                                               
38
 These scenarios have moved beyond the theoretical to actual testing of state and federal 
resources in drills and exercises. For example, the Australian governments, state, territory and 
federal, participate in the National Anti-Terrorism Exercises. 
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myths. The discussion and comparison of the different levels of knowledge and 
the achievement of positive manipulation of terrorism futures will progress 
through the thesis.  
 
2.5 Limitations of the Research  
 
Conducting any investigation on terrorism is a substantial task and cannot 
address every potentially relevant facet. The task of establishing the research 
parameters and acknowledging the limitations of a given study is important. The 
limitations of this research can be grouped into three broad categories: the 
limited availability of information; the difficulties inherent in exploring futures, 
and; the research theory and methods utilised. This research relies on unclassified 
(and declassified) materials, as has been noted – predominantly unclassified 
government documents, and academic literature. Unfortunately, one of the 
inherent difficulties in examining terrorism is ethical: questions of politics and 
security are central in obtaining access to primary data; for example, accessing 
files or conducting interviews with imprisoned alleged terrorists (Hudson 1999, 
15; Mukhina 2005, 523). This represents a loss not only in terms of engaging 
with the relevant stakeholders, but also of data that may have improved the 
validity of the scenarios and assessments presented in this thesis.39 Such data is 
likely to be mainly tactical, but it may also provide insight into some important 
trends. 
 
Characterisations of the past and near-present natures of terrorism in this thesis 
have been developed using qualitative analysis; that is, by a summary of the 
literature combined with brief discussions of threat-related elements that pertain 
to particular terrorist events. One terrorist event per decade from the 1960s to the 
2000s has been selected for the event-specific discussions. Quantitative analysis 
could be incorporated by producing a timeline of terrorist events, however the 
feasibility of conducting such analysis is dependent on the compilation of a 
comprehensive list of terrorist incidents that have occurred since at least the 
                                               
39
 This is not an argument for the release of classified data; this statement is purely an 
acknowledgement of a research limitation.  
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1950s. It has therefore been concluded that quantitative analysis could be 
undertaken on existing listings, such as those composed by Mickolus (1980; 
1982; 1988; 1993; 1997); Mickolus and Simmons (2006) or the Global Terrorism 
Database run by the National Consortium for the Study of Terrorism and 
Responses to Terrorism (START)40. Because there would be in excess of 20,000 
events to collect and collate, there is no merit in producing (or reproducing) a 
timeline of terrorist incidents for this research given the central purpose of the 
thesis. It is therefore argued that accurate assessments of the past and near-
present natures of terrorism can, and will be, adequately characterised in 
qualitative terms. These qualitative discussions will comprise the main part of the 
next two chapters, dealing with the litany and systemic causes of terrorism.  
 
Assessing the full range of futures is difficult (Dolnik 2003), and any forecast 
produced cannot encompass every aspect or interacting feature or dynamic that is 
relevant to the occurrence (or non-occurrence) of future terrorist activity. “The 
number of issues for consideration and the number of possible scenarios are 
almost endless…[as] the number of alternative worlds expands exponentially” 
(Glenn and The Futures Group International 2000, 10). The scenarios depicting 
alternative meta-level terrorism futures discussed in this thesis have been 
formulated after careful consideration and analysis, and are in no way intended to 
be complete or absolute. The futures considered in this thesis represent sound 
futures-oriented terrorism research, which is supported by the systematic and 
methodical means of inquiry offered by Futures Studies.  
 
The futures field is considered to be relatively new, and one that continues to 
undergo further interpretation, research and development (Marien 2002; 
Slaughter 1998; Wildman and Inayatullah 1996). It is concluded that much of the 
scepticism that surrounds Futures Studies stems from the underlying reliance on 
science to prove or disprove an idea’s validity, and the difficulties in studying 
something that is yet to exist (Slaughter 1996a, 88): 
 
From the point of view of empirical science, we can know nothing 
whatsoever about the future. It does not exist, therefore, it cannot be 
studied. Yet intuitively we know that something is wrong with this 
                                               
40
 Formerly the National Memorial Institute for the Prevention of Terrorism.  
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view… There are many features of the world that are important to 
people which cannot be studied, measured, or even detected, from 
an empirical perspective. (Slaughter 1996b, 20) 
 
Masini (1993, 1998a) notes the debate concerning the scientific validity of the 
methodology, and concludes that the validity of Futures Studies does not relate to 
the subject matter it is being applied to, but rather to the approaches and 
techniques adopted in the research (Masini 1998a) and, arguably, how these 
contribute to the achievement of the research objectives.  
 
This thesis applies the Futures Studies theory and methods of CLA and Scenarios 
to produce a range of meta-level terrorism futures that represent different levels 
of knowledge about terrorism futures. The Futures Studies methodology enables 
the integration of key terrorism-related research prerequisites, including ensuring 
a multifaceted research approach, while extending the Terrorism Studies research 
base. These two aspects highlight the value, and the validity, of applying Futures 
Studies to terrorism research. Whilst Futures Studies and the selected theory and 
methods are valid, in terms of their application, to produce a sound terrorism 
futures contribution, their limitations must also be acknowledged.  
 
The litany, systemic causes, worldviews and myths layers of CLA contribute to 
the investigation of the empirical, interpretive, critical and, depending on 
stakeholder engagement, action learning. CLA challenges dominant worldviews 
and metaphors by encouraging the creation of shared visions of the futures 
through the consideration or active involvement of/with the various stakeholders. 
One of the most efficient ways to achieve this is by conducting focus group 
sessions with the relevant stakeholders (Fricker 2004b, 253). Actively 
incorporating the views and desired futures of all terrorism stakeholders is not 
achievable for this research. Interaction with alleged terrorist identities, to clarify 
and/or verify their visions of the futures space, is neither practical nor ethically 
viable. To this extent, the research outputs will be limited, resulting in a lack of 
epistemological challenges and divergent value-oriented futures. As such, the 
research largely remains within the confines of the dominant Western cultural 
and civilisational framework on terrorism. In an attempt to address this 
limitation, ‘non-Western’ thought will be sought out via statements and other 
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open-source materials that provide insight into what is commonly referred to as 
terrorists’ ‘demands’ and ‘propaganda’, albeit several of these have been 
produced by Western sources, often remaining within traditional knowledge 
boundaries. It is thought that more effective policies can be created by 
acknowledging and integrating different ways of knowing, and CLA not only 
encourages, but actually facilitates this process (Inayatullah 2004a, 44). The 
purpose of acknowledging and integrating different ways of knowing enables the 
identification of shared futures. This process can lead to the creation of a space to 
enable shared positive futures-manipulation, facilitated by implementing more 
effective and pro-active counter-terrorism initiatives that address specific 
requirements and create new shared metaphors to progress towards the preferred 
futures.  
 
The Scenarios technique is limited to the extent that each scenario can only 
depict one future. For this reason it is preferable to produce several scenarios, as 
will be done in this thesis. Investigation reveals that government stakeholders 
favour determining the likelihood of given scenarios occurring; this 
determination assists in prioritising scenarios according to their likelihood and 
the anticipated level of destruction -it also assists government stakeholders to 
determine the ‘coverage’ provided by existing counter-terrorism measures and 
preparedness strategies. This desire to determine an actual likelihood contrasts 
with the position of the Futures Studies community,41 which prefers, by and 
large, not to judge created scenarios on the basis of their apparent accuracy or 
inaccuracy. For example, Glenn and The Futures Group International (2000, 11) 
advise against identifying a ‘most likely’ scenario, as it is unlikely that a single 
scenario that accurately incorporates and reflects all of the interacting dynamics 
will be established. Futurists favour assessing a scenario on the basis of three 
capabilities: to encourage debate and discussion; to enable the identification of 
additional futures, and; to assist and enhance policy-makers’ understandings and 
abilities to effectively prepare for a range of futures (Glenn and The Futures 
Group International 2000, 4). Measuring success and accuracy is not 
deterministic, about ‘right’ and ‘wrong’, because good foresight can be self-
                                               
41
 An exception to this is Valaskakis (2001, 31) who notes that probability levels for each 
scenario should be determined in order to encourage a focus on solutions.  
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fulfilling or self-denying of opportunities, and time must pass before such 
assessments can be made post facto (Van der Steen and Van der Duin 2012, 
490). This ‘likelihood weighting’ represents the strongest clash between the 
Terrorism Studies and Futures Studies communities. This thesis attempts to 
categorise scenarios depicting possible, probable, worst-case and preferable 
terrorism futures; details pertaining to individual probability levels for the range 
of scenarios will not be provided, as it is not the intention of this research to 
portray the futures of terrorism as specific threat assessments. 
 
Substantial efforts have been made to reduce the number and impact of research 
limitations (the most pertinent of which have been discussed). In spite of these 
limitations, this research and thesis provides helpful and valuable insight into 
understanding the past and near-present natures of terrorism, while constructing 
and deconstructing meta-level terrorism futures. The value of incorporating 
systematic futures-oriented research into Terrorism Studies cannot be 
understated, particularly when the creativity this necessitates reflects the 
intention of facilitating the implementation of effective counter-terrorism 
initiatives to move towards an era of positive (and perhaps also shared) futures-
manipulation. 
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Chapter Three: Litany 
 
Terrorism, like other forms of violence, contains a logic (Harmon 2000). This 
logic is a key element of consideration for any strategy aimed at controlling or 
preventing future occurrences (Crelinsten 2002, 77-78) through positive 
manipulation of the futures. Understanding the logic of terrorism enhances 
general awareness of the threat and provides the most direct means of arriving at 
the required level of threat knowledge for Terrorism Studies. Central to 
achieving this understanding is the examination and interpretation of real or 
perceived terrorism trends. The introductory remarks of this thesis alluded to a 
common theme in terrorism literature: that the threat of terrorism continues to 
evolve. The projection of this trend into the future displays a broad acceptance of 
the continuation of the past – or perhaps of the idea that we are bound to the past. 
This ‘continuity of the past’ is arguably presented in the terrorism literature as 
the overarching ‘terrorism trend’. It is true that the terrorist threat has undergone 
some fundamental changes; but these changes must be recognised and 
understood in terms of their drivers, consequences and future directions. 
 
Litany, as a level of analysis, encourages the identification and discussion of 
trends; specifically for this research, the trends that encapsulate the past and 
near-present natures of terrorism. Because explicit trending considerations are 
less focussed on drivers and consequences, discussion of these factors is 
addressed at the systemic level, in Chapter Four. The litany level of CLA 
exposes trends and issues, enabling interpretive and critical research at the 
worldview and myth level (Chapter Five) to consider how both real and 
perceived trends emerge and the reality of those trends. Hence the litany level of 
CLA exposes the surface frames (Hofmeester et al. 2012) of issues while 
enabling a broader discussion of how trends are portrayed and used. 
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This chapter addresses the following research objectives, as outlined in the 
introductory chapter: 
• Objective One: to identify a range of meta-level terrorism futures that 
represent different levels of terrorism knowledge; 
• Objective Two: to apply the Futures Studies theory and method of CLA and 
Scenarios, demonstrating the value of applying non-traditional 
methodological approaches to Terrorism Studies;  
• Objective Three: to utilise CLA to develop a comprehensive understanding of 
terrorism litany, facilitating the construction and deconstruction of terrorism 
futures, and;  
• Objective Four: to use Scenarios to capture understandings of the past and 
near-present in combination with ‘drivers’ for the production of the litany 
scenario matrix, presenting a range of terrorism litany futures.  
The purpose of this chapter is to apply the first level of CLA, litany, to Terrorism 
Studies to reveal the popular trends identified in the terrorism literature and to 
use this knowledge to develop an understanding of the nature of terrorism. These 
past and present natures are assessed in terms of possible ‘tsunamis of change’ 
(as they are called by Dator42) which are used in scenario construction. The 
scenario matrix depicted in the concluding section of this chapter describes meta-
level terrorism litany futures.  
 
This chapter is structured in a manner that allows for an assessment of the value 
of using the past to understand the present and the relevance of the past to of 
terrorism futures. Following a more detailed explanation of the purpose and 
function of CLA’s litany level, the debate over the use of knowledge of the past 
and present to formulate understanding of terrorism futures will be discussed. 
Both the introductory and methodology chapters introduced the concept of 
studying the past and present to derive insight into the range of futures; this 
discussion is an extension of the introductory comments provided in the previous 
two chapters. A brief section on public perception is followed by a detailed 
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 Dator (1992 in 2002, 8) uses the metaphor of ‘surfing the tsunamis of change’: there are 
variables or facets of society that can become significant issues, or could even represent 
competing pushing/pulling/swirling forces of, or which enable, change.  
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examination of the trends in the terrorism literature coupled with insight into 
specific terrorist events.  
 
One event per decade between the 1960s and the first decade of the 21st Century 
has been selected. These are: the 1968 PFLP hijacking of El Al aircraft, the 
events of the 1972 Munich Olympics, the 1988 bombing of Pan Am Flight 103 
(hereafter the 1988 Lockerbie bombing), the 1995 Tokyo subway attack and the 
events of September 11, 2001.43 The discussions are arranged according to four 
popular categories in terrorism literature: mindset, tactics, weapons and logistics. 
Changes in terrorists’ mindset, tactics and weapons are mapped across the five 
decades, while the overview of logistical arrangements is dominated by 
discussion of September 11. The findings of this litany analysis are summarised 
in the ‘evolving nature of terrorism’ section. Upon reaching this level of 
empirical knowledge, two elements that encapsulate the litany ‘tsunamis’ are 
used to create a four-section matrix using the ‘double-driver’ approach to 
scenario construction – these are the meta-level litany futures. 
 
3.1 CLA: Litany  
 
Litany is the first analytical level of CLA and is situated within the empirical 
research approach. This level identifies and examines trends – assessing their 
relationship and connectivity to the given problem (Blass 2003, 1048); that is, 
what the key terrorism trends are and how these are related to the overall 
understanding, and our positioning, of the phenomenon. Litany often reveals the 
“official unquestioned view of reality” (Inayatullah 2004a, 1). This ‘reality’ 
emerges when popular sources of information become the dominant routes to 
knowledge:44 “[h]ow a population perceives the threat of terrorism is largely a 
product of how the media and the state choose to represent the threat.” 
(Wolfendale 2007, 86) Issues often become prone to exaggeration and to 
inaccurate portrayal by the media, which often, in turn, leads to feelings of fear 
                                               
43
 These events are recited frequently within Western originated terrorism publications. Their 
selection appears consistent with the current dominant Western knowledge framework. 
44
 For example, Hofmeester et al. (2012, 720) points out that the mass media provides 70% of 
public information on climate change. This domination can affect the messaging: for climate 
change, the media presents a misleading narrative of competing scientific viewpoints.  
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and helplessness in the audience (Inayatullah 1998; 2004a). This disconnection 
of knowledge from the problem facilitates the use of litany for political purposes 
(Blass 2003, 1048), thus further affecting the ability of the public to separate the 
real from the perceived.  
 
At the empirical level, terrorism litany provides a foundation of knowledge from 
which trends can be assessed in order to produce achievable research outputs, 
including developing accurate threat perception and informing terrorism futures 
thinking. The media, Members of Parliament and high-profile/high-ranking 
government officials have an important role in keeping their nation accurately 
informed.45 For much of the Australian public, the ‘reality’ of terrorism is largely 
informed by their personal networks’ experience with terrorism, or it defaults to 
the position of the media and official government sources. As will be 
demonstrated in the following sections, the opinion of the public on terrorism-
related issues does not reflect the characterisations provided in the terrorism 
literature, nor does the public perception of the terrorism threat appear to be well 
informed by accurate reporting of terrorism trends. Inaccuracies range from the 
likelihood of being a direct victim of terrorism and the ‘terrorist’ stereotype, to 
modes of operation, such as suicide tactics and the use of WMDs.  
 
3.2 Terrorism Trends: Looking at the Past and 
Present to Inform Futures Scenarios 
 
Examination of litany assists in mapping the progression of trends to determine 
whether the past is relevant to the present and also, therefore, to the future. Both 
the introductory and methodology chapters dealt with the concept of studying the 
past and present to derive insight into the future; “[t]he contemporary world 
presents terrorism in astonishing complexity and diversity” (Whittaker 2002, 20), 
so producing accurate and holistic understandings of terrorism, and using these to 
accurately inform the public and to shape counter-terrorism initiatives, is a 
challenging objective for governments and researchers. To reach this level of 
                                               
45
 It is arguable that keeping the nation accurately informed is not to be confused with, or 
superseded by, maintenance of national security and of the ‘need-to-know’ principle.  
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knowledge, the researcher must examine to what extent the present has come 
from the influences of the past, and must then conduct a similar examination of 
the future.  
 
If Harmon’s (2000) assessment of the comprehensibility of terrorist actions is 
correct, the question becomes one of making sense of the conduct of those 
actions – what is the logic of terrorism? The answer to this, it is thought, can be 
found in history. The role and importance of history in informing interpretations 
of the present and futures of terrorism is widely discussed in terrorism literature.  
 
Historical comparisons with the present are often communicated through trend 
analysis. The purpose of examining terrorism trends is two-fold. Firstly, these 
examinations facilitate the confirmation, or challenging, of some commonly held 
public perceptions of the threat of terrorism. Secondly, the process of examining 
how the present has emerged from the past can be repurposed to create informed 
understandings of the future, insofar as it will emerge from the present. This is 
because, as previously quoted, “[y]ou can’t know where you’re going until you 
know where you are. And you can’t know where you are until you know where 
you’ve been” (Gold 2000, 35). Hence, our understandings of the past and 
present, and the manner in which these understandings are approached, are 
implicit in our framing of terrorism knowledge and futures.  
 
The requirement of actively referring to history to inform not only 
understandings of terrorism but to specifically improve forecasting is debated in 
Terrorism Studies. Laqueur (2004) (despite highlighting the difficulties of 
prediction); Combs (2003) and Simonsen and Spindlove (2004) all argue that 
history is relevant to terrorism futures. Reviewing trends enables a determination 
of whether the historical patterns and root causes of terrorism remain relevant 
(Combs 2003, 29): 
 
If terrorism today is just like terrorism of previous centuries, then 
we can use historical patterns to predict behavior and to construct 
responses based on successful attempts to combat this phenomenon 
in the past. If terrorism today is different, however, then historical 
patterns will be less useful in designing responses, though still of 
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use in understanding the dynamics of the phenomenon. (Combs 
2003, 29) 
 
Whilst history can be informative it can also hinder the formulation of 
understanding of the futures (Pettiford and Harding 2003, 180). That is, “before 
leaders can eliminate or even partially reduce the negative effects of terrorist 
attacks, leaders must understand “terrorism” – its past, present and expected 
future.” (Kondrasuk, Bailey and Sheeks 2005, 277) Finding and presenting an 
appropriate balance between the past, present and future is imperative. Simonsen 
and Spindlove (2004, 38) and Laqueur (2004, 209) advocate reviewing history to 
determine whether past patterns remain accurate or applicable in the 
contemporary world. Pettiford and Harding (2003, 179) draw a distinction 
between examining history, to determine its differences from, and similarities to, 
the present, and assessing the future. Therefore, “[w]hat we need to know as we 
prepare for yet another century is whether twentieth-century terrorism was 
significantly different from its historical counterparts” (Combs 2003, 29).  
 
Laqueur (cited in Duyvesteyn 2004, 442) provides validation of Pettiford and 
Harding’s (2003) claim, noting that the so-called ‘usefulness’ of history may be 
limited, especially when considering the profound changes that are thought to 
have occurred to the ‘root causes’ of terrorism. This factor is perhaps 
contributory to Laqueur’s (2004, 8) viewpoint, which is that understanding the 
past is not the only key to understanding terrorism: weight must also be given to 
the dynamics, pulls and pushes of the present and the perceived futures. 
Warnings against becoming so confined to the past that the present is ignored are 
also given as a result of concerns that such confinement could lead to 
accidentally missing indicators of the future that are visible in the present 
(Marsella 2002, 46) or ‘near–present’. Kondrasuk, Bailey and Sheeks (2005, 
265) support examining the present to reveal its linkages, or disconnects with the 
past, and its possible connections to the future. 
 
Incorporating historical interpretations is strongly associated with the 
development of a comprehensive understanding of terrorism. “History enables us 
to place current mixtures… in context, which makes understanding easier.” 
(Combs 2003, 22) It is also thought that the processes involved in examining 
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who, why and what has taken place in terrorist incidents enable researchers to 
comprehend terrorists’ motivations and capabilities (Jenkins 2001c, 2). These 
processes also foster the assessment of past and present counter-terrorism 
arrangements in reviewing the capabilities and the resulting positive and negative 
consequences,46 inevitably placing governments in a stronger position to 
moderate the effects of potential terrorist acts. This is important because “if we 
fail to learn from history’s mistakes we will be condemned to repeat them” 
(Butler 2004, 291). Hence, a better understanding of terrorist-related dynamics 
can help to improve counter-terrorism preparedness (Butler 2004, 291; Parachini 
2001, 403), assisting with positive manipulation of the possible futures. 
 
Combs (2003, 280-281) notes that the examination of specific (and recent) 
trends, incidences, locations and targets, for example, may help to reveal the 
nature of terrorism futures, and therefore may also aid in generating more 
effective response capabilities: 
 
The terrorist will constantly seek to develop tactics and capabilities 
to circumvent or nullify antiterrorist countermeasures. It is therefore 
essential to develop the capability to monitor terrorist tactics and 
technical innovation in order to predict likely innovations. It is then 
possible to design and/or develop counter-countermeasures that can 
then be fielded quickly, as and when the need arises (Cralley, 
Garfield and Echeverria 2004, III-49). 
 
It must be determined whether, and how, terrorism is changing. As pointed out 
above, there is a general consensus in the reviewed terrorism literature that 
terrorism has changed and is continuing to change. To map the progress of this 
change, specific attention has been given to developments occurring in the 
mindset, tactics, weapons and logistics of terrorism. Understanding and 
characterising these changes is central to revealing terrorism litany. This enables 
the historical insight necessary to identify those trends which remain continuous 
versus discontinuous, and also those trends which are emerging in the present or 
near-present.  
 
 
                                               
46
 Examining both terrorist and counter-terrorism activities will reveal the threat dynamics in 
greater detail; this is explored at a meta-level in the next chapter on the systemic causes. 
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3.3 General Terrorism Trends 
 
Characterising the nature of the terrorist threat through past and near-present 
trend identification is an efficient and effective means of examining terrorism 
litany. It is the purpose of this section to identify, examine and compare trends 
that are acknowledged by the public (‘perceptions’), and those trends that are 
discussed in the terrorism literature. Comparisons of the two will reveal whether 
public perception appears to be informed by research. The importance of 
ensuring this connectedness, resulting in accurate threat perception, stems, in 
part, from the need for widespread public support for counter-terrorism policies; 
public perception that is well informed and accurate should lead to support for 
the most appropriate and effective counter-terrorism responses.  
 
3.3.1 Public Perception 
 
September 11 altered Western perceptions of the threat of terrorism. Howie 
(2007, 70) argues that the events of September 11, Madrid 2004 train bombing 
and July 2005 London bombing have played a significant role in shaping the 
Australian public’s perceptions of the terrorist threat. This reaction is not limited 
to Australia – for many residents of the United States, terrorism was an 
unfamiliar concept before the events of September 11 (Fischhoff, et al. 2005, 
126). This lack of familiarity existed in spite of high profile terrorist incidents 
occurring in the USA such as: the 1993 WTC bombing, the 1995 Oklahoma City 
bombing, and against US targets overseas, such as the 1998 embassy bombings 
in Africa and the 2000 attack on the USS Cole, as well as the publicised 
experiences of international partners, particularly the United Kingdom. 
September 11 altered the public perception that terrorism was an external and 
overseas problem (Perl 2003, 2), to an understanding that it could be a domestic, 
international, political and societal issue commanding the highest level of 
attention.  
 
Research into perceptions of threats has increased substantially in the 21st 
Century. This increase may be attributable to the role of globalisation in 
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increasing individual’s access to information on terrorism incidents (Kashima 
2003, cited in Goodwin, Willson and Gaines 2005, 403) through various media 
that have facilitated virtually instantaneous communication. This kind of 
exposure can create a heightened level of anxiety within the populace regarding 
issues that are seen to represent a risk to safety (Twenge 2000, cited in Goodwin, 
Willson and Gaines 2005, 401): 
Whilst terrorist acts may be rare, and the numbers of those caught 
up or killed in such attacks relatively small, widespread public 
anxiety and panic over the threat of terrorism can present us with a 
number of significant social challenges (Bandura 2004, cited in 
Goodwin, Willson and Gaines 2005, 403). 
 
Studies such as that undertaken by Goodwin, Willson and Gaines (2005)47 have 
recorded the relative levels of fear of respondents concerning major terrorist 
incidents. Exposure to terrorist incidents, whether as a direct victim or as a 
member of a broader ‘audience’, can affect an individual’s threat perception. 
This perception is also affected by individual and societal factors (Pyszczynski, 
Solomon and Greenberg 2003), as well as the defining and empowered 
worldview. 
 
The media, whether print or broadcast, is the dominant source for public 
knowledge of terrorist events (Crelinsten 2002; Pedahzur, Eubank and Weinberg 
2002, 141). The source and means of presenting information also influence 
peoples’ perception of threats. Issue framing, for example, can affect how 
individuals see a problem (Haider-Markel, Joslyn and Al-Baghal 2006, 546); and 
the problem of terrorism is no exception: 
 
Whether print or television, the media tend to report the news along 
explanatory frames that sue the reader, listener, and viewer to put 
events, issues, and political actors into contextual frameworks of 
reference. (Norris 1997, cited in Nacos 2005, 436) 
 
Terrorism issue framing impacts on the audiences’ understanding and perception 
of the issues (Haider-Markel, Joslyn and Al-Baghal 2006, 549). The media, 
therefore, has a significant role in shaping and feeding societies’ episteme 
through various decisions, including of what to present, when to present it and in 
what format. “Some framing patterns seem especially important with respect to 
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 A UK study. 
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terrorism news because they have [a] strong effect on the perceptions and 
reactions of news receivers.” (Nacos 2005, 436) 
Media coverage of terrorism, whether attacks, court proceedings or changes to 
counter-terrorism policies and measures, has remained a significant 
‘newsworthy’ item since September 11 (Haider-Markel, Joslyn and Al-Baghal 
2006, 546), often based on popular appeal, as opposed to a desire to deliver 
different perspectives or to provide an outlet through which all stakeholders 
could articulate their points of view (Whiting 2012, 489). It is images of high 
profile events (such as those of the Munich Olympics, September 11, the 2002 
and 2005 Bali bombings, the 2004 Madrid station bombing, the 7/7 attack in 
London and the 2008 hotel attack in Mumbai), which are and were broadly 
disseminated through a range of media, that have shaped individual and societal 
perceptions of the terrorism threat. “Claims that terrorism is an ongoing, 
omnipresent threat that might strike at any time are not true reports of genuine 
risk assessments, but are designed to instil anxiety and fear in the general 
populations, leading to a generally held belief that a terrorist attack is inevitable.” 
(Wolfendale 2007, 87) Events with a lower profile for Western populations, such 
as the activities of the Tamil Tigers in Sri Lanka,48 do not appear as commonly, 
and would seem, therefore, to shape and inform public perceptions 
correspondingly less. Non-Western incidents receive a different sort of media 
focus, or are viewed through a different lens, from incidents occurring in 
Western nations. The threat is described in a qualitatively different manner that 
suggests internal conflicts rather than the West being under threat.  
 
Caution must be exercised in the affixation of the ‘spectacular’ label and in 
basing an understanding and perception of the terrorist threat on singular 
incidents. “All too frequently, sweeping generalizations about terrorism are made 
on the basis of a survey of a single historical phase or single subspecies of this 
multifaceted phenomenon” (Wilkinson 2003, 110). The flow-on effect of this can 
be witnessed through media framing and/or stereotyping. The media attention 
paid to terrorist ‘spectaculars’, such as September 11, has coincided with an 
                                               
48
 This conflict arguably had a higher profile in Australia during 2009-2010 because of the link 
drawn between asylum seekers and the determination of whether any individual asylum seeker 
represented a threat to national security. 
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increase in individuals’ perception of personal risk (Goodwin, Willson and 
Gaines 205, 402), so too, arguably, with the perception (and fear) of the threat 
posed by home-grown terrorism. Yet, statistically, terrorism poses a lesser threat 
to life than many other activities, and the threats posed by pollution, global 
warming and the spread, actual and potential, of certain diseases is arguably far 
greater (Wolfendale 2007, 77-78).  
 
Images of large scale terrorist incidents arguably dominate the public’s threat 
perception. Fear is a central element, given that the intention of terrorism, by 
definition, is to achieve an ideological end by intimidation. Strategies of 
indiscriminate targeting not only extend the feeling of fear beyond the direct 
victims, but can also cause a prolonged state of fear of future threats. September 
11, for example, caused a fear of air travel. The increased risk to air travellers 
was not compared to other risky activities engaged in daily. It has been suggested 
that in order to avoid air travel following September 11, people resorted to road 
travel; the increase in driving-related fatalities directly following the attacks has 
been attributed to this precautionary response. Jackson (cited in Wolfendale 
2007, 77) noted, in the post-September 11 environment, that there was a greater 
likelihood of dying from bee sting allergies, lightning strikes or accidents 
resulting from do-it-yourself (DIY) jobs than as a result of terrorism. The fear of 
becoming a direct victim of terrorism is not proportional to the likelihood of the 
event. This highlights the need to communicate the risk of terrorism accurately; 
people could be taught how low the risk of terrorism is compared to many risks 
that are simply taken for granted.  
 
The events of September 11 also brought the use of terrorism by Islamic 
extremists to the forefront of public attention. Indeed, “political Islam may well 
have replaced the Soviet Union in the eyes of most Americans as serving as the 
object of opposition to American foreign policy.” (Mostafa and Al-Hamdi 2007, 
725) The link inevitably drawn between Islamic extremism and martyrdom 
challenged the public mindset that terrorist agents would be unwilling to 
participate in missions that required suicide. Different terminology is often used 
when referring to such operations; media reports are limited to describing such 
events as suicide attack, whereas the Terrorism Studies community provides a 
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mix between the ideas of suicide and martyrdom. ‘Martyrdom operations’ are not 
a new phenomenon, nor are they employed exclusively by Muslims or ‘Middle-
Eastern’ people. For example, in World War II, Japanese military aviators 
conducted ‘kamikaze’ attacks against allied naval vessels. The Islamic/Middle-
Eastern stereotype could arguably have been promoted by coverage of attacks 
against Western military forces in Iraq and Afghanistan. This “presumed 
connection between suicide terrorism and Islamic fundamentalism is misleading” 
and can seriously interfere with and misinform policy decisions and directions 
(Pape 2005, 3).  
 
Despite the high profile incident involving the release of Sarin gas in the Tokyo 
subway in 1995 (and the perpetrators’ precursor actions) public awareness of the 
potential use of WMDs by terrorists arguably came to the fore only during the 
anthrax attacks made in the US in the months following September 11. Public 
concern over WMDs was perhaps compounded by concerns in the international 
community that stockpiles and manufacturing facilities existed in so-called 
‘rogue’ countries (such as Iraq and North Korea). The public fear and perceived 
vulnerability to the anthrax attacks can be highlighted by the number of reported 
cases and demand for specific medical supplies; the Federal Bureau of 
Investigation (FBI) reportedly investigated some 2,300 suspected anthrax cases 
during a two week period in October (Hasenauer 2002, 5) and demand for 
antibiotics used to treat respiratory anthrax increased, prescribed by doctors to 
‘calm jittery patients’ (Resler 2001, 14). As such, there appears to be a 
disconnect between the public’s fear and concern regarding the use of WMDs 
and the likelihood of the successful utilisation occurring (noting the challenges 
discussed earlier). Indeed, Day (2003, 110) noted that there was an asymmetric 
relationship between perception and reality. 
 
This brief discussion of the public perception of the nature of the terrorist threat 
has revealed four dominant areas of current focus. These are: 1) large scale 
events, which result in substantial damage and indiscriminate casualties; 2) the 
use of martyrdom; 3) the possibilities of WMDs, and lastly; 4) the connection to 
Islamic extremism. 
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Howie (2007, 75) found that the Western public generally ‘picks out’ a terrorist 
by his/her “race and skin color, accent, dress, country of origin, religious and 
political views, and the ability to speak a language other than English.” The 
current terrorist stereotype in the West is that of a ‘Middle–Eastern’, ‘Arab’ or 
Muslim male wearing the traditional turban head-dress (Englert 1997, 3) who is 
connected to or affiliated with al-Qaeda: 
 
[T]he terrorist is usually the only image of Arabs or Muslims that 
American audiences see. For anyone ignorant to the diversity of 
Muslims and Arabs, the unsavoury types portrayed could easily 
have been understood as generalized characteristics of many of 
those in the group. When such images remain unchallenged, the 
attribution of guilt is made according to vague racial-religious 
categories. (Bornstein 2005, 59) 
 
This ethnically-based stereotype is limiting and fails to include other high profile 
operatives such as Timothy McVeigh (responsible for the Oklahoma City 
bombing of 1995) or members of Aum Shinrikyo (responsible for the Tokyo 
Subway incident in 1995) nor the increasing home-grown terrorist threat 
experienced in the United Kingdom. The ethnic stereotype also tends to 
characterise terrorists as irrational and uneducated. Stereotyping terrorists as 
irrational fanatics risks grossly underestimating their capabilities (Crenshaw 
1990, 24) and ignoring their political motivations.  
 
Additionally, the perception that terrorism is a predominantly male domain is 
also largely supported and reinforced by Western media portrayals. Public 
outrage appears to be a common response to attacks perpetrated by women and 
children. Mass Western-oriented media has tended to present terrorism as a male 
domain, portraying participating women as interlopers (Nacos 2005, 435). 
Corcoran-Nantes (2011) extends the terrorism media gender investigation, noting 
that images of women and violence are usually associated with the 
objectification of women as the victims of violence (Corcoran-Nantes, 2011) not 
the agent (Herman 2010, 259) or perpetrator. Thus, women who are involved in 
terrorism are constructed as abnormal and unnatural (Corcoran-Nantes, 2011). 
“[W]omen who commit violence outside of socially sanctioned, but exceptional 
circumstances, are often viewed as aberrant or “less than a woman”” (Eager 
2010, 269). Female participation is thought to be limited to largely supportive 
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roles in international terrorist groups, compared to their more active female 
counterparts in domestic terrorist groups (Gonzalez-Parez 2010); and history 
illustrates that women have had frequent involvement to varying extents.49  
 
Media depictions of terrorism often evoke feelings of fear and anxiety on the 
basis of the perceived likelihood of becoming a direct victim of an indiscriminate 
terrorist ‘spectacular’ conducted by a stereotypical Islamic extremist (or 
extremists). The following sections will examine whether the public’s perception 
is well-founded or contradicts the understandings of the Terrorism Studies 
community. Correct fear and threat perception is vital to the identification of 
alternative futures and to ensuring support for, and implementation of, effective 
responses and counter-measures.  
 
3.3.2 Terrorism Literature and Incident Trends 
 
Having established a level of comprehension of public perceptions of the terrorist 
threat, it is now important to explore, and to seek to understand why, as phrased 
by Wermuth (2004, 2), a return to a pre-September 11 ‘normal’ appears 
impossible. Increased occurrences of terrorism have been attributed to increasing 
global insecurity (Harmon 2000, 145); the terrorist threat is not geographically 
confined (Laqueur 2004, 7) and there has been an increase in the formation (or 
splintering) rate of terrorist groups (Pedahzur, Eubank and Weinberg 2002, 143). 
Acts of terrorism have been geographically dispersed, with the increased rate 
seen during the 1960s no longer confined to the Middle East,50 Europe or North 
Africa (Laqueur 2001a, 24-29).  
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 Women have featured in the frontline of national separatists movements, including the Black 
Widows of the Chechnya Separatist movement, the Kurdistan Worker Party and Al-Qaeda in Iraq 
(Corcoran-Nantes 2011, 6) the PFLP and the LTTE. Active participation can be illustrated by the 
following examples:  Leila Khaled, accredited as the first female terrorist, led the hijacking of a 
TWA jet bound for Tel Aviv in 1969 when she was a young commando of the PFLP (Corcoran-
Nantes, 2011, 5). In 2002, Wafa Idris, the first accredited female suicide bomber in the Israeli-
Palestine conflict, detonated a bomb in a shopping precinct in Jerusalem (Herman 2010, 260). 
Additionally, over one third of LTTE combatants are female, with women representing between a 
third to half of the members of the elite force, who are involved in suicide bombings (Zedalis 
2004 cited in Corcoran-Nantes, 2011, 6). With regards to leadership roles, Ulrike Meinhoff 
demonstrates leadership in domestic causes in the Baader-Meinhoff Gang. 
50
 Unresolved conflict between Palestine and Israel appeared to be a dominant factor leading to 
sustained levels of terrorist violence (Gunaratna 2004, 4). 
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Terrorism literature has pointed out, and in some instances detailed, changes in 
the nature of the terrorist threat. Historical anecdotes are useful for identifying 
these changes, and this may be why most research in this field commences with 
an historical examination (something now considered to be more or less 
obligatory) (Duyvesteyn 2004, 442). The difficulty in providing an accurate 
historical account of terrorism has a number of elements, including the selected 
definition and, perhaps more problematically, the determination of when 
terrorism first occurred or of what ‘phase of terrorism’ is to be considered. While 
brief and general historical points are included, a more detailed analysis of the 
nature of the terrorist threat from the 1960s to the first decade of the 21st Century 
is provided with the intention of characterising the nature of the threat in its 
‘modern’51 form.  
 
This section will use a combination of terrorism literature and incident 
examination to produce a comprehensive understanding of the nature and 
direction of terrorism. This will help to determine if the public perception of the 
threat appears to be well-informed, and also whether what was true in the past 
has credence in the present, and for the futures. Literature discussions will be 
integrated with details of specific incidents: the 1968 hijacking by the PFLP; the 
1972 Munich Olympics; the Lockerbie bombing of 1988; Aum Shinrikyo’s 
attack on the Tokyo subway in 1995, and; September 11. This analysis will be 
presented in four sections: mindset, tactics, weapons and logistics, each 
examining changes through the five decades. 
 
Mindset 
 
Terrorism has been categorised in terms of motivations, objectives and modes of 
operation. Such categorisation efforts have led to various mindset distinctions, 
such as: domestic, state, international, and transnational; left and right-wing, and; 
                                               
51
 A distinction between the modern phase of terrorism and its past has been acknowledged by the 
Canadian Security Intelligence Service (1999); Gunaratna (2004); Hoffman (2002a); and the US 
Army Intelligence Center and Fort Hauchuca (1998a). The year 1968 is usually taken to mark the 
advent of modern terrorism.  
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religious fundamentalist or apocalyptic, national- or ethno-separatist. 
Distinctions have also been drawn between so-called ‘redemptive terror’, which 
aims to achieve specific human and/or material gains, and strategic terror, which 
aims to introduce particular policy changes (Gambill 1998, cited in Abrahms 
2005, 532). A brief account of some of the categories used to describe the 
terrorism phenomenon historically will now be given. The overall understanding 
of terrorists’ mindsets presented will be derived from a detailed examination of 
the threat progression during the modern phase of terrorism. 
 
Battles between Jewish Zealots and the Roman occupiers of Palestine in 48 CE 
are thought, by some, to constitute the first terrorist campaign (Maxwell 2003, 
cited in Kondrasuk, Bailey and Sheeks 2005, 265). This far predates the anarchist 
movement of the 19th Century, which is often singled out on the basis of the 
concept that governments could be disposed of through ‘propaganda by deed’ 
(Garrison 2003, 45). Jensen (2004, 117) notes that the label of anarchist, was 
used by journalists and others to frame and contextualise the acts of political 
violence that occurred during the 19th and early 20th Centuries.52 According to 
Garrison (2003, 45), the anarchist theory positioned terrorism as a 
communicative device: 
 
[the] masses are asleep and need to be awakened so that they can be 
unified to revolt. In other words terrorism would stir the spirit of 
revolt within the masses. The use of terrorism will communicate to 
the masses that they can revolt, as well as communicating to the 
ruling class that they are not beyond the reach of the people, who 
resist their oppression. 
 
For example, the Narodnaya Volya, a Russian group operating between 1878-
1881 (Garrison 2003, 45), espoused the theory that if multiple establishment 
members met death at the same time, not only would the masses awake, but the 
government would lose its freedom of action out of public hysteria (Laqueur 
1977, cited in Garrison 2003, 45). Similarly, over the course of the last decade, 
Osama bin Laden was seeking to awaken the masses of the Muslim world.53 
                                               
52
 This further demonstrates problems associated with labelling and the effects of the media’s 
issue framing. 
53
 For example, Bin Laden’s 1996 statement dubbed the ‘Ladenese Epistle’ broadened Bin 
Laden’s appeal not only to Muslims in the Arabian Peninsula, but across the world, invoking the 
Middle East, Central Asia, the Horn of Africa, the Caucasus, the Balkans and Southeast Asia, 
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The 19th, 20th and 21st Centuries have been characterised by strong political and 
religious inspirations, and it is these same inspirations which arguably created 
terrorism as we understand it today. If terrorism is considered to be a 
phenomenon of the 19th, 20th and 21st Centuries (Walzer 2000, cited in Black 
2004, 20), the inspirations of left and right-wing politics, and of the imperatives 
of religion, are central to any discussion of motivation. Examinations of the 
progression of the overarching motivations of terrorism in the 19th, 20th and 21st 
Centuries are provided by Bergesen and Lizardo (2004); Black (2004); Hoffman 
(1998); Johnson (2001); Laqueur (2001a); Merari (2000); Rapoport (2003) and 
Wilkinson (1986, cited in Enders and Sandler 2003). Groups motivated by right-
wing political ideology emerged during the 1920s, and experienced prominence 
during the 1980s (Pedahzur, Eubank and Weinberg 2002, 145). Left-wing 
motivation was prominent during the 1950s and peaked in the 1970s (Pedahzur, 
Eubank and Weinberg 2002, 145). However, these right- and left-wing 
inspirations have largely been replaced, and terrorism is no longer characterised 
simply by these eroded distinctions (Ward and Hill 2003, 105). While a decline 
in terrorist activity was witnessed during the 1980s and early 1990s, the period 
also saw the continuation of ethno-centric and nationalist secession movements; 
left-wing groups all but disappeared, and the influence of right-wing ideology 
decreased (Laqueur 2004, 28). Laqueur (2003, 151) attributes this replacement of 
left- and right-wing ideologies by ethno-centric and nationalistic motivations to 
the base of support potentially available to such movements, enabling a longer 
campaign life-cycle. This theory could also be applied to the resurgence in 
religion-inspired terrorism, which, as noted by Enders and Sandler (2002), has 
steadily expanded since the 1980s.  
 
The religious component in terrorism is not new. For Quillen (2002, 287), the 
increase in the desired level of destruction is the differentiating characteristic of 
religiously inspired terrorism. The demonstrable link between acts of religious 
terrorism and lethality is emphasised widely in the terrorism literature (see 
Enders and Sandler 2000; Hoffman, cited in Morgan 2004; Hoffman 2000; 
                                                                                                                               
authorising defensive war (jihad) against the United States for its continued presence in Saudi 
Arabia (Lawrence 2005, 23).  
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2002a; Hudson 1999; Juergensmeyer 2000, cited in Albini 2001; Laqueur 2001a; 
Merari 2000 and Post 1997, cited in Hudson 1999). Linking terrorism with 
religion represents a return to earlier motivations of terrorism (Hoffman, cited in 
Morgan 2004, 32). It has been concluded in the literature that there has been a 
general change (and progression) from anarchist terrorism to ethno-centric and 
nationalistic secessionist terrorism, and now, increasingly, to terrorism which 
contains elements of religious motivation. The literature, as a product of its time, 
has a sharper focus on categories of terrorism and terrorists that are relevant to 
the present, and the fairly recent past; and the terrorism of the present is 
commonly characterised by political, religious or ethno-centric motivations. If 
terrorist motivations do in fact ‘cycle’, as suggested by Hoffman (cited in 
Morgan 2004, 32), understanding mindset progression is critical to making 
effective preparations. These brief descriptions of mindset progression will now 
be enhanced by analyses of each decade (from the 1960s to the 2000s) through a 
combination of literature and event investigation. 
 
1960s 
The 1960s witnessed several significant changes in group dynamics, and perhaps 
the most notable of these was the considerable increase in the formation of 
terrorist groups (Pedahzur, Eubank and Weinberg 2002, 143). Pedahzur, Eubank 
and Weinberg (2002, 143) partially attribute this increasing growth rate to 
splintering that occurred, predominantly within left-wing and nationalist groups. 
The terrorist mindset of the 1960s was not limited to left- and right-wing political 
ideology, as religiously inspired violence was also evident (Laqueur 2001a, 24). 
The rise of anti-Israeli terrorism appears to have dominated terrorism discussions 
(Laqueur 2001a, 24) in the later years of the 1960s.  
 
In the 1960s, terrorism provided an effective way for groups to achieve their 
objectives and to further their causes. Brief examinations of existing 
compilations studies of terrorist incidents (such as those provided by the National 
Consortium for the Study of Terrorism and Responses to Terrorism,54 Mickolus 
                                               
54
 Prior to the advent of the Global Terrorism Database by the National Consortium for the Study 
of Terrorism and Responses to Terrorism, the Memorial Institute for the Prevention of Terrorism 
(MIPT) maintained a Terrorism Knowledge Base. MIPT was funded by the US Department of 
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1980; 1982) have revealed that the terrorist’s mindset was dominated by the 
desire to affect the release and/or exchange of prisoners, and, for themselves or 
their comrades, to escape and/or secure safe passage out of unfriendly 
jurisdictions. For example, May 1961 saw the first hijacking of a US aircraft, 
when the pilot was forced, at gunpoint, to divert to Cuba, where the hijacker was 
then granted asylum. However, perhaps the most significant hijacking of the 
period was conducted by the PFLP in 1968; that incident demonstrated the 
potency of terrorism in securing attention and achieving objectives.  
 
The origins of the PFLP can be traced back to the Arab Nationalist Movement 
(ANM) (Centre for Defence Information 2002). The ANM established a strong 
alliance with Gamal Abdul-Nasser, the then president of Egypt, who claimed to 
share the ANM’s views regarding the need for an Arab revolution that would 
lead to a unified, free and socialist Arab world, featuring an autonomous 
Palestine (Centre for Defence Information 2002). The PFLP was established 
following revelations that Nasser’s plans failed to include any objectives 
reflecting, or actively working to achieve, the desired Arab revolution (Centre for 
Defence Information 2002). 
 
The PFLP is thought to be an amalgamation of three organisations: the Young 
Avengers (the Palestinian military branch of the ANM); the Heroes of the 
Return, and the Palestinian Liberation Front (PLF) (Karmon 2000). The PFLP 
combined Palestinian nationalism with Marxist ideology to promote itself as “a 
progressive vanguard organisation of the Palestinian working class [dedicated] to 
liberating all of Palestine and establishing a democratic socialist Palestinian 
state” (Centre for Defence Information 2002). The PFLP advocated armed 
struggle as the only way to settle ideological differences and accelerate the 
unification process (Karmon 2000). Favouring armed conflict over diplomacy led 
the PFLP to reject solutions involving partition of the disputed territory (Arab 
Gateway 2002). With a consensus that Israel was the enemy, in 1968 the PFLP 
began a series of high profile attacks (Arab Gateway 2002). 
 
                                                                                                                               
Homeland Security. Much of the data contained in MIPT’s database has been transferred to the 
Global Terrorism Database.  
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The first major act of the PFLP’s campaign was the hijacking of an El Al aircraft, 
which demonstrated to the global community that terrorism could be an effective 
way to achieve political objectives (Moore 2001). The apparent effectiveness of 
this attack coincided with the strategies of several nations which dictated 
cooperation with, and often surrender to, terrorist demands for fear of 
antagonising terrorist organisations, and/or their sponsoring governments 
(Karmon 2000). This may indicate why attacks in this period tended to 
concentrate on the exchange and/or release of prisoners, or on securing safe 
passage for the perpetrators or their comrades. Karmon (2000) claims that it is 
known and accepted that the PFLP conducted hijacking operations aimed at 
obtaining the release of fellow PFLP members in various, though usually 
Western, countries (Karmon 2000); countries which practiced ‘anti-provocation’ 
strategies. The 1968 hijacking illustrated the effectiveness of terrorism (Centre 
for Defence Information 2002) to other groups.  
 
1970s 
Terrorism research expanded significantly during the 1970s (Duyvesteyn 2004, 
440). This increase was motivated by efforts to counteract terrorism and to 
increase the effectiveness of the authorities’ responses. The dominance of 
terrorism over governments and their institutions was attributed to a lack of 
knowledge, training and expertise in responding to or combating terrorism 
(Johnson 2001, 909). Jenkins (2001a, 322) attributes this increased focus by 
governments and researchers alike to the ‘escalating’ nature of the terrorist 
threat, which is evident from comparisons to the nature of terrorism in the 1960s.  
 
Characterisations offered in the terrorism literature indicate that trends in terrorist 
mindset adjusted slightly from those observed in the 1960s. Some 1960s traits 
persisted, particularly left-wing orientation of several prominent terrorist groups 
(Laqueur 2001a, 9). It is thought that this continuation, perhaps even expansion, 
of left-wing political motivations was a consequence of widespread political, 
social and economic injustices (Laqueur 2001a, 9). Wilkinson (2003, 116) 
provides further support to this claim with the insight that strong Marxist 
ideology was a characteristic of many of the groups that emerged during the 
1970s. Moore (2001), however, notes that despite Palestinian activities 
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dominating attention in the ’70s, there was also an increase in the formation of 
religiously motivated groups. The 1970s witnessed a diversification of mindsets 
and this may have altered various facets and dynamics of terrorist groups. Some 
additional categories of motivation included: retaliation, revenge and/or 
punishment; economic prosperity or benefit, and; anti-technological sentiment.  
 
As in the 1960s, attacks motivated by securing safe passage and the 
exchange/release of prisoners remained prominent and, often, effective. Take, for 
example, the attack at the 1972 Munich Olympic Games. This attack, undertaken 
by members of the BSO, not only illustrates important aspects of the 1970s 
mindset, but also highlights the incorporation of dual motivations, and the 
extensive scope of the Palestinian terrorist network. Zimmermann (2003, 32) 
describes the flexibility and resourcefulness of some terrorist organisations in the 
1970s, these qualities demonstrating the sophistication of their organisational 
structures. A prime example of this can be seen in Palestinian terror groups, 
perhaps more accurately described as ‘networks’.  
 
Members of the BSO denied any affiliation with other Palestinian organisations, 
including the PFLP, the PLO and Fatah55 (Palestinian Facts Organisation 2004). 
Fatah, for its part, also denied allegations of involvement with the BSO. The 
BSO argued that details of any links between other organisations and itself were 
inaccurate and claimed that this information came from anti-Palestinian and 
Israeli sources (Karmon 2000). However, it is widely thought that the BSO was 
an arm of Fatah itself: “Black September was not a terrorist organization…but 
was rather an auxiliary unit [sic] of the resistance movement, at a time when the 
latter was unable to fully realize its military and political potential” (Iyad 1983, 
cited in Karmon 2000). Nonetheless, the secrecy of the connection between the 
PLO or Fatah and the BSO was preserved by the BSO refraining from publishing 
official statements identifying its leadership (Weisband and Roguly 1976, cited 
in Karmon 2000). 
  
                                               
55
 Fatah is the military arm of the PLO (Calahan 1995). Fatah is a backward acronym of Harakat 
al-Tahrir al Filistini, which translates as the Movement for the Liberation of Palestine (Calahan 
1995). 
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The BSO operatives, once they had captured the Israeli athletes from the 
Olympic Village, released a set of demands for the release of prisoners and for 
the assurance of the safe passage of those prisoners to Egypt. The demands 
specifically required the release of 234 Arab and German prisoners held in Israel 
and West Germany (including the leaders of the Baader-Meinhof Gang) and the 
supply of three aircraft that were to be equipped and prepared for immediate 
departure at the Furstenfeldbruck airport (Hunter 2001). Upon their arrival at the 
airport, the operatives, who were accompanied by their hostages, would select 
one plane and proceed to Cairo where the released prisoners would be collected 
(Calahan 1995; Hunter 2001; Palestinian Facts Organisation 2004). The plan did 
not go smoothly, and there are claims that harm to the athletes was never 
intended. The BSO operatives later blamed the German police and the then 
Prime Minister of Israel, Golda Meir, for the athletes’ deaths (Palestine Facts 
Organisation 2004). If the operatives’ had no desire to injure or kill their 
hostages, the statement made by Jenkins (1975, cited in Hoffman 2002a, 19), that 
terrorists desire for publicity is greater than for achieving destruction and 
casualties, may have proven to be a truism for the terrorist threat in the 1970s. 
The same underlying desire (for publicity rather than destruction) could also be 
loosely inferred from the fact that this incident was the first to receive real-time 
television coverage (Ditzler 2004; Garfield 2000), which captivated the world 
(Johnson 2001, 896) while disseminating mixed messages.  
 
1980s 
Despite the emergence of some alarming trends, terrorism in the 1980s continued 
to be considered a weapon of the weak (Laqueur 2004, 139) and relatively 
unimaginative56 (Veness 2001, 409). In the 1980s, terrorism displayed the 
characteristics of increased lethality (National Commission on Terrorism 2000, 
2) and an increase in the rate of attacks57 (Johnson 2001, 895-896). State 
sponsorship evident during the ’70s continued into the ’80s.58 This continuation 
could be attributable to the dependence on State sponsors of some secular and 
                                               
56
 This will be discussed in the tactics and weapons sections. 
57
 Johnson (2001) gives the increase as being from 238 events in 1971, to more than 700 events in 
1987. 
58
 For example Cuba, Iran, Iraq, North Korea and Syria were identified State sponsors. It is also 
acknowledged that the US provided forms of sponsorship to groups as an instrument of Cold War 
foreign policy to contain communism (Byman et al. 2001, 1). 
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nationalist groups. The 1970s view that terrorism was cost-effective continued; 
state use, or support, of terrorism allowed nations of limited means to damage 
those possessing greater conventional power (Veness 2001, 409). 
 
The regulation of violence evident during the 1970s, attributable to groups’ 
dependence on public support, continued during the 1980s (National 
Commission on Terrorism 2000, 2). This idea that violence was regulated or 
calibrated to maintain public support has been challenged by Jenkins (2001c, 5) 
who points out a decreasing respect for constraints observed in traditional acts of 
terrorism.59 This demonstrates an alteration in the terrorist mindset – Jenkins 
(2001c, 5) associates this with changes in motivation. The decade of the 1980s, 
according to Reeve (1999, 4), was predominantly characterised by groups 
reflecting a left-wing ideology with definable goals, especially those groups 
located in Europe and South America. Whilst there was a continuation of 
previous motivations, particularly for groups which were focused on issues of 
nationalism and secessionism, a visible change was evident in the form of the 
growth of religion as a motivating factor (Jenkins 2001c, 5). Enders and Sandler 
(2000, 310), Jenkins (2001c, 5) and Wilkinson (2003, 133) stress the significance 
of the increasing emergence of religiously motivated groups during the 1980s. 
This increase in the formation of groups of one kind of motivation was a specific 
continuation of the general trend of the 1970s of the increasing formation of 
terrorist groups (as identified by Pedahzur, Eubank and Weinberg 2002, 141) and 
it highlights the changing nature the terrorist mindset in the ‘80s.  
 
Incidents such as the hijackings of December 1984 June 1985 reflected a 
continuation of a previous motivation: obtaining the release or exchange of 
prisoners. Retaliation- and revenge-related motivations also continued during the 
1980s. The 1988 Lockerbie bombing exemplifies this motive.  
 
Intelligence reports suggested that the PFLP-GC (Popular Front for the 
Liberation of Palestine – General Command) and sections of the Iranian 
government were planning to attack American targets in retaliation for the 
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 Such constraints often entailed warnings of attacks, claims of responsibility, and the avoidance 
of indiscriminate civilian casualties.  
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accidental downing of an Iranian airbus by an American warship in July 1988 
(Anonymous 1991, 858).60 There is also speculation that the 1988 Lockerbie 
bombing was ordered in revenge for a US bombing operation conducted in 
Tripoli and Benghazi in 1986 (Church and Gibson 1991, 62), itself arguably 
launched in retaliation by the United States for the bombing (allegedly by Libyan 
agents) of a German disco that resulted in the deaths of two American soldiers 
(Church and Gibson 1991, 62).  
 
Certain details of the attack, and investigations, suggest other important aspects 
of the 1980s terrorist mindset. Hoffman (2000, 22-23), for example, emphasises 
that claims of responsibility of the incident was not forthcoming; a significant 
departure from the norm of previous decades. Hoffman (2000, 22-23) continues, 
with the later support of Bergesen and Lizardo (2004, 42), and Schmid (2000, 
108), by noting that terrorists’ demands have tended to become more vague, or 
have even ceased to be made at all, resulting in a situation where credit, or 
responsibility, for attacks is no longer claimed as a matter of course. A desire for 
anonymity can perhaps be inferred from the destruction of the Pan Am aircraft 
over sea, where little evidence, if any, could be recovered (Schwartz and Bayer 
1992, 61). In response to this apparent shift in mindset to one of concealing 
involvement in terrorist activity, it was anticipated that a decrease in terrorist 
actions linked explicitly to demands (such as securing the release and/or 
exchange of prisoners) would occur; causing further modifications of the terrorist 
threat. The desire for anonymity, or deniability, would lead to a decrease in 
communication between terrorism stakeholders, and this message was 
promulgated by political figures throughout the world. Ironically, as noted by 
Albini (2001, 256), the policy of not negotiating with terrorists has, itself, 
become an element of the threat that governments are now forced to deal with.  
 
1990s 
The 1990s saw a departure from some well-established trends in terrorist activity. 
This included an overall decline in terrorist group formation (Pedahzur, Eubank 
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 Investigations later revealed the involvement of the Libyan government; for example, the 
mastermind was found to be the then Libyan Intelligence officer Abdel Basset Ali al-Megrahi, 
later convicted. 
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and Weinberg 2002, 146), which has been linked to the decline of left-wing 
terrorism from its height during the Cold War (Ender and Sandler 2000, 139; 
Pedahzur, Eubank and Weinberg 2002, 144). This decline has been attributed to 
three main factors: an increasing willingness and desire to bring those involved 
in terrorism-related activities to justice; a visible reduction in the level of state 
sponsorship in Middle Eastern and East European nations, and; the collapse of 
Marxist ideology as a result of the implosion of the Soviet Union and most of its 
satellite states (Enders and Sandler 2000, 310; 2002, 4-5). Left-wing ideologies 
were largely overtaken by right-wing inspirations during the 1990s, particularly 
in the case of domestic terrorism threats (Ward and Hill 2003, 104). Johnson 
(2001, 899-900) reveals the prominence of national liberation as a motivation for 
terrorism by showing a doubling of incidents linked to this kind of ideology 
during the period 1992-98.  
 
Millennium and apocalyptic groups were also present during the 1990s (Hoffman 
1997, cited in Enders and Sandler 2000, 310). Religious and ethnic motivations 
arguably gained momentum during the 1990s because of the increased number 
and impact of ethnic and/or ethno-religious conflicts (Wilkinson 2003, 111). 
Religiously inspired terrorism rose significantly during the 1990s (Hoffman 
2002a, 3). The growth of religious motivations may also have accounted for the 
increased lethality of terrorist incidents in the early ’90s (Enders and Sandler 
2000, 307), an observation which adds weight to Laqueur’s (2004, 28) argument 
that greater lethality would be an aspect of future terrorist activity due to the rise 
of Islamic terror. The lack of concern for civilian casualties shown by religion-
inspired terrorists, as emphasised by Laqueur (2004, 28), has connections to the 
formation of new groups, which show less concern for restraint; thus “the 
restraints of an earlier period no longer applied”. 
 
In the 1990s, unlike earlier decades, automatic claims of responsibility for 
attacks were no longer guaranteed (Hoffman 1999, 9; Schmid 2000, 108) but did 
occur sporadically: 
 
Unlike the more traditional terrorist groups of the 1970s and 1980s 
who not only issued communiqués explaining why they carried out 
an attack but proudly boasted of having executed a particularly 
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destructive or lethal attack, terrorists are now appreciably more 
reticent. (Hoffman 1999, 27) 
 
Despite having achieved significant worldwide attention in earlier years, the ’90s 
demonstrated terrorists’ ability, and the importance of, securing a large audience 
to: display their actions; bring attention to their cause; mobilise further support, 
and; to create and spread fear and anxiety in populations around the world (U.S. 
Army Intelligence Center and Fort Huachuca 1998a).  
 
The terrorist threat of the 1990s was characterised by further changes to the 
terrorist mindset. Existing timelines and compilations (refer to the National 
Consortium for the Study of Terrorism and Terrorism Responses and Mickolus 
1993; 1997) show a significant reduction in attacks motivated by prisoner 
exchanges. This reduction in attacks motivated by prisoner exchange is thought 
to be in response to the overall reduction in claiming responsibility for attacks. 
The 1990s were also characterised by the introduction of additional categories of 
motivation, including: conducting attacks as tests for upcoming operations,61 
and; apocalyptic ideology, particularly evident from the activities of Aum 
Shinrikyo. Bergesen and Lizardo (2004, 42) and Karmon (1999) note that the 
emergence of religious cults occurred globally, and in advanced countries. This 
challenged counter-terrorism responses, as traditionally cults had been viewed in 
terms of the danger they presented to individuals, rather than as potential threats 
to national security (Morgan 2004, 33). Considering cults to be potential threats 
to national security is important because of the unrestrained use of violence that 
eschatological fanaticism promotes (Morgan 2004, 33; the National Commission 
on Terrorism 2000, cited in Morgan 2004, 30). Aum Shinrikyo is a useful group 
to examine in this light, and also as an exemplar of the changing nature of the 
terrorist mindset.  
 
Aum Shinrikyo (aum from the Hindu/Buddhist concept or embodiment of the 
universe, shin-rikyo, a Japanese compound word meaning ‘supreme truth’), 
which is believed to operate worldwide, promotes a religious-political ideology 
alongside a theology drawn from various sources ranging from Buddhism and 
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 For example, in 1994 Ramzi Yousef planted a bomb on-board Philippine Airlines flight 434 to 
test its suitability for future attack planning and aspirations.  
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Christianity to Shamanism, Hinduism and New Age beliefs (Olson 1999). Aum 
Shinrikyo began operating as a religious organisation in 1987, after its original 
founding, in 1984, as Aum Shinsen no Kai, with Chizuo Matsumoto (also known 
as Shoko Asahara, hereafter referred to as Asahara) as the group’s undisputed 
leader (Karmon 1999). As a religious organisation, the group operated legally 
and uninhibited (Karmon 1999). In 1990, Asahara and about twenty of his fellow 
group members contested parliamentary seats in the general election (Karmon 
1999; Olson 1999; Pangi 2002, 422). The electoral defeat suffered by the group 
is thought to have produced a change in its mindset and tactics (Karmon 1999), 
and, as noted by Olson (1999), some Japanese analysts suggested this marked the 
moment when the group’s leader began to pursue WMDs. 
 
Asahara has claimed, on many occasions, to be the reincarnated Jesus Christ, as 
well as the first ‘enlightened one’ since the Buddha (Olson 1999). Asahara has 
also frequently preached about the coming Armageddon, a vision that was 
consistent with the group’s apocalyptic doctrine (Olson 1999). In the theology of 
the group, Armageddon is a global conflict in which Japan is destroyed by 
WMDs, and which only followers of Aum Shinrikyo will survive (Olson 1999; 
Pangi 2002, 422). Survival of the apocalypse was originally ensured by 
affiliation with Aum Shinrikyo, but in 1988-89 this shifted to the survival only of 
the ‘chosen’, and later, in 1994, to ‘survival through combat’ (Karmon 1999). In 
order to survive Armageddon, members had to become ‘superhuman’ and prove 
that they possessed a special resistance to chemical and biological (CB) weapons 
as a result of their spiritual engagement and practices (Karmon 1999). 
 
Early in 1994, Asahara accused the USA of masterminding and carrying out a 
series of chemical attacks on himself and Aum Shinrikyo’s facilities; claiming 
that in the past few years over two hundred Japanese and American aircraft had 
sprayed gas over Aum Shinrikyo’s compounds (Karmon 1999). Asahara believed 
that the USA, as a part of a global conspiracy, had intentions to imminently 
bomb Japan, and Asahara therefore had to defend Japan from the attack (Laqueur 
2001a, 242). Asahara believed that to save Japan, he had no choice but to destroy 
the current government and establish a dictatorship under Aum Shinrikyo 
(Karmon 1999). In order to achieve this, Asahara had to bring about 
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Armageddon, and this, of course, required the preparation of an arsenal of CB 
weapons (Karmon 1999). As Laqueur (2001, 234) writes, Aum Shinrikyo moved 
from merely believing in the Apocalypse, to actively promoting it. Olson (1999) 
notes that “Aum’s actions were perfectly logical within the context of their value 
system. They were a self-legitimized group that had rejected, and ultimately, felt 
obliged to confront society”. This is considered to be true of cults in general; a 
lack of external supporters and other influences beyond the confines of the 
group, are thought to play a moderating role which restrains them from engaging 
in indiscriminate acts of violence (Hoffman, cited in Morgan 2004, 32, and 
Tucker and Sands 1999). Aum Shinrikyo is a good example, and illustrates the 
amorphous terrorist mindset and the challenges that cults and closed networks 
can present to counter-terrorism efforts. 
 
2000s 
The categories of terrorist organisation prominent in the 1990s continued into the 
first decade of the 21st Century and, as forecasted by Laqueur (1996b, ¶34), new 
inspirations emerged within both older (nationalist, anarchist, left and right-
wing) and newer (religiously inspired) kinds of group. Until the 1990s, ethno-
centric and nationalist secessionist movements dominated the terrorism arena 
(Hoffman 2002a, 3). The fact that none of the identified terrorist groups of 
196862 were classified as religious groups is evidence for this ethno-nationalist 
focus; it was not until the 1980s that religious groups began to visibly mobilise 
(Hoffman 2002a, 3) and, arguably, share the stage with ethno-nationalist groups 
(Laqueur 2004, 212). The characterisations provided have demonstrated that the 
linking of terrorism and religion was not a recent development (Garrison 2003, 
44; Hoffman 2002a, 3). Religion increased its ties with terrorism through what is 
commonly referred to as fanaticism (Laqueur 1998, cited in Morgan 2004, 30), 
fundamentalism (Ellingsen 2005; Hudson 1999), or extremism (Canadian 
Security Intelligence Service 1999).  
 
Hoffman (2002a, 4) detailed, with particular relevance to religious 
considerations, that some aims of religion-inspired terrorism extend from 
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 The year, recall, which is taken to mark the advent of modern terrorism. 
94 
 
traditional conceptions to include ‘transcendental and divinely-inspired 
imperatives’. This is highlighted in the following statement by Morgan (2004, 
32): “[t]oday’s terrorists increasingly look at their acts of death and destruction 
as sacramental or transcendental on a spiritual or eschatological level”. The 
Center for Counterproliferation Research, National Defense University (2002, 5) 
notes the concerns this causes in terms of the fact that current terrorist identities 
seem less likely to fight for what are considered to be merely ‘political 
statements’.  
 
Laqueur (1996a, 34) noted that the “new age has brought new inspiration for the 
users of violence along with the old”. This makes clear the necessity of 
developing a holistic understanding of the terrorist phenomenon, specifically: 
which historical trends hold true now, or could be resurrected in one or a number 
of futures. The Australian Government report on transnational terrorism (2004, 
2) has noted the unique challenge that the threat of terrorism currently poses in 
terms of establishing an understanding and context. At one end of the spectrum, 
the Australian Government (2004, 2) uses operations conducted by Irish, Basque 
and Tamil groups as examples of campaigns for which the motive (or motives) 
could be comprehended (the motives in these cases were secessionist politics). 
The challenge lies in not confusing individual acts of violence with the ideology 
associated with the terrorist group responsible (Australian Government 2004, 
106). Addressing this potential confusion has become a substantial and complex 
task and, as Crelinsten (2002, 85) indicates, terrorism has become more 
indiscriminate in nature, and is now more removed from the previous motivation 
of securing territory or power for the causes of liberation or secession. There 
may, because of this challenging theoretical environment, be a tendency to limit 
analyses to specific acts, rather than also addressing the stakeholders’ professed 
grievances.63  
 
Terrorist incidents occurring in the first decade of the 21st Century incorporated 
aspects of: securing the release and/or exchange of prisoners64; retaliation, 
revenge and/or punishment, as well as; economic factors and idea of attacks 
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 This is explored in the chapter on systemic causes. 
64
 Such incidents are particularly evident in Iraq and Afghanistan.  
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being ‘gifts’.65 This list shows the continuation of previous motivations, while 
also including some significant changes. Acts motivated by retaliation, revenge 
or punishment again appear to be significant in number, probably as a result of 
the military conflicts in Iraq and Afghanistan and the political environment these 
conflicts have produced. While revenge and punishment attacks were not always 
followed by statements of acknowledgement, the anti-acknowledgement trend 
did shift. That was a shift towards acknowledgement by groups or networks, 
demonstrating the broader, globalised membership of many organisations. Chalk 
(1999, cited in O’Neil 2003, 106), refers to these globalised memberships as 
belonging to a world-wide or transnational network, “whose goal is to overturn 
global trends that are deemed to be in profound conflict with their core religious 
or political beliefs”. The attacks of September 11 provided valuable insight into 
the mindset of Bin Laden and al-Qaeda (meaning, roughly, “The Base”), which 
is not only likely to enhance understanding of the past and present terrorist threat, 
but could also aid futures forecasting. 
 
“The history, culture, and body of beliefs from which Bin Ladin has shaped and 
spread his message are largely unknown to many Americans” (National 
Commission on Terrorist Attacks Upon the U.S. 2004, 48). Bin Laden alleged 
that the United States had attacked Islam and that it was responsible for all 
conflicts around the world involving Muslims (National Commission on 
Terrorist Attacks Upon the U.S. 2004, 51). It is believed that Bin Laden’s 
grievances with the US began with certain US policies, but that these grievances 
had since changed focus and become ‘far deeper’ (National Commission on 
Terrorist Attacks Upon the U.S. 2004, 51). That the United States (and the West 
more broadly) should leave the Middle East (Oberschall 2004, 34), that its people 
should convert to Islam and “end the immorality and godlessness of [their] 
society and culture” (National Commission on Terrorist Attacks Upon the U.S. 
2004, 51) were amongst the demands Bin Laden made of the West. Bin Laden 
believed that God willed the punishment of the USA to come through attacks on 
US soldiers (Albini 2001, 262) and civilians. This ‘extreme’ view of Islam and 
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 While ambiguous, for example, in March of 2003, Islamic Jihad claimed responsibility for a 
suicide bombing at a café in Israel, stating that it was a ‘gift’ to the people. Presumably the 
people of Israel or their oppressors.  
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Islamic history, as the National Commission on Terrorist Attacks Upon the U.S. 
called it (2004, 50), is thought to appeal to fundamentalist Muslims, particularly 
of the Sunni sect, throughout the world, creating a large base from which to 
potentially draw materiel and recruits. Bin Laden’s warning that if the present 
injustices continued the battle would move to US soil (National Commission on 
Terrorist Attacks Upon the U.S. 2004, 48), first came to pass in the 1990s (in the 
World Trade Center Bombing of 1993), but was given its most extreme 
expression in the attacks of September 11.  
 
Specific details of the September 11 attacks highlight some important aspects of 
the terrorist mindset, including individual abilities and the overall ambitions 
behind the undertaking and orchestration of such an attack. To begin with, the 
September 11 attacks illustrated the various skills of ‘terrorist entrepreneurs’ like 
Khalid Sheikh Mohammed (hereafter referred to as Khalid), who is thought to 
have been the principal architect of the attacks (National Commission on 
Terrorist Attacks Upon the U.S. 2004, 145). Khalid was a highly educated 
individual who applied various skills and abilities, including imagination, 
technical aptitude and managerial skills, to develop and plan the attacks 
(National Commission on Terrorist Attacks Upon the U.S. 2004, 145). Khalid’s 
profile was significantly different from those of the operatives referred to as the 
‘muscle hijackers’ who controlled the passengers and forced entry into the 
cockpits for those operatives who had been trained as pilots (National 
Commission on Terrorist Attacks Upon the U.S. 2004, 231). These ‘muscle’ 
operatives came from a variety of societal settings, but had no more than a high 
school education, were mostly unemployed, unmarried and between twenty and 
twenty-eight years old (George Tenent testimony 2004, cited in National 
Commission on Terrorist Attacks Upon the U.S. 2004, 231). Chalfont (1998, 
cited in Dolnik 2003, 18) notes that the terrorists of today are not merely 
prepared to be killed in the course of their missions, they desire it, as can be 
inferred from the actions of the nineteen hijackers on September 11.66  
 
                                               
66
 It is debated whether all nineteen hijacking participants, or only the four pilots, knew of the 
suicidal intent of the operation. 
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The ambitious nature of the attacks of September 11 reveals the appeal to a 
certain kind of terrorist of undertaking attacks clearly designed to maximise the 
psychological impact on the “audience”. This aspect of spectacle is highlighted 
by the fact that the hijacking and subsequent destruction of the four aircraft, were 
all intended to occur within a very short time frame and without warning 
(National Commission on Terrorist Attacks Upon the U.S. 2004, 156). 
“Terrorists do not plan their acts in ignorance or in a vacuum; acts precipitated 
without warning are clearly designed to maximize their victims’ perception of 
loss of control over the environment” (Ditzler 2004, 190-191). It is also noted 
that hijackings are no longer used solely for leverage in negotiations, as had been 
the case into the 1990s – yet another indication of the changing dynamics of the 
terrorist threat. Additionally, the National Commission on Terrorist Attacks 
Upon the U.S. (2004, 151) also alluded to the probability of attacks designed to 
negatively impact the American economy. Schmid (2007, 28) extends this 
forecast to energy and oil infrastructure, highlighting the more recent recognition 
that the disruption of the global energy market has, in the past, had major effects 
on those entities (national, multinational, corporate etc.) whose power depends 
on (or correlates to) their position in the energy sector. Such disruption could 
very well become an objective of future terrorist operations by al-Qaeda or its 
affiliates: 
 
Over its life span, al Qaeda has constantly evolved and shown a 
surprising willingness to adapt its mission. This capacity to change 
has consistently made the group more appealing to recruits, attracted 
surprising new allies, and – most worrisome from a Western 
perspective – made it harder to detect and destroy (Stern 2003, cited 
in Morgan 2004, 39). 
 
The concern about the influence of religious imperatives on terrorism relates to 
the justificatory power of religion and to the levels of violence its imperatives 
can condone (or, arguably, require). A propensity to carry out acts of mass 
destruction is thought to be echoed in rhetoric by those groups identified as 
religiously inspired (Hudson 1999, 10). Psychologist Jerrold Post (1997, cited in 
Hudson 1999, 10) notes that it is the religiously motivated terrorist groups’ 
tendency to justify acts in the name of a God that leads to the perception that 
religiously motivated terrorism is a more dangerous threat than, say, politically 
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motivated terrorism, which usually has a definable mission in which success is 
based on measurable goals, such as Government reaction or media coverage.  
 
Tactics 
 
Terrorist attacks, as Hoffman suggests (1998, 157), are premeditated and 
meticulously planned events; it is therefore important, to assess and evaluate 
tactical factors relevant to the facilitation and/or undertaking of terrorist attacks. 
This evaluation will assist in formulating a comprehensive understanding of the 
past and near-present natures of the terrorist threat, with the intent of discovering 
if trends in tactics remain relevant for terrorism’s futures litany. The variable of 
tactics encompasses a wide range of terrorist activity. Tactics can be broadly 
defined as the elements of a group or individual’s modus operandi, including 
decisions relating to the facilitation and/or undertaking of an action. This section 
examines changes in terrorists’ target selection criteria and general mode of 
operation, and seeks to explore and integrate characterisations of terrorists’ 
tactics found in the literature with details drawn from specific incidents of 
terrorism.  
 
The terrorism literature shows the extensive range of targets and modes of 
operation available to terrorists. This diversity incidentally highlights the 
importance of understanding the past and present natures of terrorists’ tactics as a 
way to foster greater foresight capabilities (Enders and Sandler 1999, 148) for 
the purpose of enabling positive manipulation of the futures. Physical targets 
dominate attempts to identify potentially vulnerable or symbolic targets; the most 
extensive list of such targets is provided by Whittaker (2002). Specific targets 
commonly featured in the terrorism literature include: the airline industry (which 
was identified by the Canadian Security Intelligence Service (1999) as an early 
and ongoing ‘victim’ of terrorism); aid organisations (due to perceptions of 
alignment with one ‘side’ of a conflict, especially in civil wars or smaller scale 
ethnic clashes) (Weinberg and Eubank 2000, 104), and also; symbols 
representing American (or Western) power and dominance (U.S. Army 
Intelligence Center and Fort Huachuca 1998a).  
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Official literature (government reports) often emphasises the threat of terrorism 
to the United States, against both domestic and foreign targets (Canadian 
Security Intelligence Service 1999; Caruso 2002; Central Intelligence Agency 
2003a; 2003b; Helgerson 2002a; 2002b). The Central Intelligence Agency 
(2003b) expanded its view by examining the frequency at which overseas US 
property were targeted; arguably in direct response to vulnerabilities detected to 
these sites. A more objective view, one which accounts for the changes evident 
in some terrorists’ targeting strategies, is provided by Caruso (2002). Caruso 
(2002) examines the nature of ‘hard’ and ‘soft’ targets in seeking to explain why 
international companies and their employees, and also tourists, are often targeted 
instead of embassies and other government installations (Caruso 2002).  
 
The literature also reveals an array of factors which influence the decision-
making processes of target selection. Helgerson (2002b) for example, discusses 
how attacks undertaken within the United States, such as September 11, hold a 
particular allure for terrorists, due to the psychological impact such strikes can 
achieve. Ditzler (2004) presents an alternative argument which focuses primarily 
on the symbolic value of a prospective target:  
 
Whether the particular targets are individuals, economic venues, 
religious icons, legal institutions, or social agencies, the symbolism 
of the target is a key element in understanding the ultimate purposes 
or function of a terrorist act (Ditzler 2004, 194). 
 
An additional factor identified in the literature was the consideration of the 
contributions that a particular target may make to the terrorist group’s goals, for 
example: gaining attention; the collection of resources, and/or; demonstrating the 
group’s capacity to undertake attacks (Drake 1998; U.S. Army Intelligence 
Center and Fort Huachuca 1998b).  
 
Just as target selection is influenced by a variety of considerations, so too is the 
method of operation. Determinants of the operational method include: the 
instilling of fear and anxiety in the target population; the target’s availability; the 
security environment, as well as; resource and fiscal constraints (Drake 1998; 
Marsella 2002, 19). Ditzler (2004, 195) acknowledges the above determinants 
while expanding on the elements provided by Drake (1998) and Marsella (2002) 
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to also include: political and logistical issues; potential publicity, and; the 
likelihood of retribution. Enders and Sandler (2000) provide the most extensive 
examination in the reviewed literature of terrorists’ decision-making processes 
regarding the availability and allocation of the resources required for operations.  
 
The lists of operational modes provided by Enders and Sandler (1999) and the 
U.S. Army Intelligence Center and Fort Huachuca (1998b) are the most detailed 
in the reviewed literature. The extensive focus in the literature on hostage taking, 
hijacking and suicide operations could lead readers to the conclusion that these 
modes of operation are the most prevalent. These modes of operation are 
considered prime examples of those that have been used by various terrorist 
stakeholders over a substantial period of time. This “reliance”, or “favouritism” 
by terrorists, as Jackson (2001, 192) and Pillar (2004, 31) called it, has led many 
authors to reach conclusions that broadly characterise terrorists as being 
‘operationally conservative’, and, to that extent, as hesitant to adopt new tactics. 
Jackson (2001, 192) writes that the longer a terrorist group exists and the more 
established it becomes, the more likely that it will develop expertise with certain 
technologies, thereby creating a disincentive to replace these technologies with 
others that are less familiar. This viewpoint is not wholly supported in the 
literature: Enders and Sandler (2000, 311) indicate that the post-Cold War period 
can be characterised by an increase in risky and logistically complex attacks. 
This propensity for adaptation illustrates the need to understand those dynamics 
that change, but also those that do not change.67  
 
1960s 
Target selection strategies of the 1960s terrorist, as suggested in the literature and 
existing timelines,68 appears to have been semi-structured, in that the targets 
selected were usually aircraft, religious sites, diplomats or government personnel, 
and other civilians. The targeting of aircraft appears to have been a popular 
choice; hijacking incidents involved a number of El Al, United Arab Airlines and 
                                               
67
 A geographically- or group-specific examination would enable an examination in better detail 
of the factors that cause or inhibit change from occurring, as well as the rate of change, in the 
interest of proposing effective initiatives for a range of futures. 
68
 See the National Consortium for the Study of Terrorism and Responses to Terrorism and 
Mickolus (1980 and 1982). 
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TWA flights. Civilians rarely featured as direct targets during the 1960s, with 
terrorists practicing what appeared to be a policy of targeting specific persons, 
who usually performed government functions, such as: police69 and diplomatic 
representatives.70 Overall, the US appears to have been the most targeted nation, 
whether in terms of its domestic or international property, or its citizens 
(Hoffman 2002a, 7).  
 
The propensity for change of the terrorism threat was demonstrated during the 
1960s; Moore (2001), for example, notes that the late 1960s were characterised 
by the targeting of civilians outside immediate areas of conflict – this aspect is 
representative of the activities of the PFLP, such as the 1968 hijacking. This 
attack demonstrated a transition to conducting terrorist attacks outside the 
‘traditional’ geographic area to which the Israel-Palestine conflict had been 
previously confined (Moore 2001). The decision to attack Israeli targets (both 
human and inanimate) beyond Israel’s borders (Karmon 2000), not only 
exemplifies the changing nature of terrorism in the 1960s, but also formulated a 
foundation for terrorists to continue expanding and advancing their tactics. 
 
Sieges of embassies or public buildings and the use of extortion or blackmail 
were also evident during the 1960s (Crenshaw 2004, 59-62). The most influential 
tactics of terrorism in this era were hijacking and kidnap (Crenshaw 2004, 59). 
Interestingly, hijackings and kidnappings, especially those involving diplomatic 
personnel, appeared to be the dominant tactic of the 1960s. The most significant 
increase in the use of hijacking can be seen in acts of pro-Palestinian terrorism: 
the attack by the PFLP in 1968 being a case in point, and one which displays the 
blending of hijacking and hostage-taking.  
 
Crenshaw (1990, 20) argues that attacks combining hijacking and hostage-taking 
increased terrorists’ power of coercive bargaining because responses then 
available to government provided little advantage against terrorists who had 
captivated a wide, and often global, audience. The PFLP, according to the Center 
for Defense Information (2002), was one of the first organisations to use 
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 For example, the chief of Basque City secret police. 
70
 Including the American Ambassadors to Japan and Brazil. 
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terrorism as a tactic to further its cause. The revolutionary movements then 
occurring in Latin America, North Africa and Southeast Asia, illustrated the 
effectiveness of using terrorism as an alternative approach to traditional, 
countryside-based guerrilla warfare to the Palestinians (Moore 2001). The PFLP 
used acts of terrorism during the 1960s, particularly hijackings, as a political 
weapon to effectively publicise their cause. 
 
1970s 
During the 1970s, the aviation industry, particularly in the Americas and Europe, 
continued to be a primary target for terrorism, as it had been in the ‘60s (Garrison 
2003, 48). There was also a continuation of the targeting of politicians, diplomats 
and embassy staff, as exemplified by the shooting of the Jordanian Prime 
Minister (November 1971) and the assassinations of the United States’ 
ambassadors to Sudan (March 1973) and Cyprus (Augusts 1974), the kidnapping 
of the US consul general in Guadalajara (May 1973), and of former Prime 
Minister of Italy Aldo Moro (March 1978). The diversification of the range of 
targets evident in the 1970s can be discerned from lists of terrorism incidents.71 
For example, attacks occurred against hotels, transport infrastructure (including 
buses and railways), embassies and other government sites, as well as clubs, bars 
and restaurants. Indirect civilian casualties increased as further targeting of 
transportation systems and places of public gathering occurred, indicating that 
government figures and property were no longer the sole targets of terrorists.  
 
The attack on Israeli athletes at the 1972 Munich Olympic Games is one example 
that demonstrates the continuation of the trend established in the ‘60s of targeting 
civilians outside the ‘traditional’ geographically-defined area of a conflict 
(Moore 2001). The expulsion of Fatah from Jordan and Egypt severely limited 
that group’s ability to launch cross-border operations into Israel (Calahan 1995). 
Calahan (1995) concludes that this led Fatah to resort to increased terrorist 
activity (as opposed to conventional warfare) as a means of attacking Israel. The 
targeting of the Olympic Games conveyed the unmistakeable message that any 
political or social institution, no matter how universal, historic or “sacrosanct”, 
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 See the National Consortium for the Study of Terrorism and Responses to Terrorism and 
Mickolus (1980 and 1982). 
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could become a terrorist target (Ditzler 2004, 195). This attack created a 
worldwide sense of vulnerability by demonstrating that the accepted “rules of 
order and conduct”, which had been thought to constrain terrorist activity, were 
no longer in play (Ditzler 2004, 195). The 1970s terrorist threat can be 
characterised by the expansion of the range of feasible targets, illustrating the 
changes in the nature of terrorism from the 1960s, and, perhaps, its propensity for 
additional change. Seemingly set up by the previous decade, “[t]he 1970s were 
known as the decade of air terrorism”; several hijacking, bombing and hostage-
taking plots on several European and US airliners support this characterisation 
(Garrison 2003, 48). In a sense, the characteristics of terrorism in the ’60s flowed 
into and continued during the ’70s.  
 
In terms of developments to the threat, terrorism in the 1970s became more 
complex. Take, for example, the first coordinated multiple hijacking, conducted 
in February 1970 by the PFLP, of which three of the four targeted aircraft were 
successfully seized. The word ‘massacre’ is used to describe the attack at the 
Munich Olympic Games in 1972: eight men, referred to as fedayeen (”those who 
sacrifice”), obtained access to the Olympic Village, by scaling fences or clearing 
security checks, and captured nine Israeli athletes after killing two (Calahan 
1995; Whittaker 2002, 136). The men, accompanied by their hostages, proceeded 
to the Fürstenfeldbruck airport where they were to board a plane for Cairo; there 
the operatives would meet the prisoners whose release they had demanded 
(Calahan 1995).  
 
This incident exemplifies further changes in the tactics of terrorism. The events 
at Munich demonstrated the potential benefits for terrorists of operating as part of 
a fluid network versus an organised hierarchical structure. Moore (2001) notes 
that networked structures, whether sponsored by states or criminal organisations, 
provide major channels for the spread of knowledge, techniques and experience. 
The BSO’s affiliation, despite numerous protestations to the contrary, with the 
PLO, for example (Palestine Facts Organisation 2004) is believed to have 
enabled and enhanced the planning and preparation of the operation. The events 
of the 1970s demonstrated to terrorists the benefits of collaborating with other 
groups as a means of expanding their tactical repertoire.  
104 
 
 
1980s 
Veness (2001, 409) suggests that despite some significant departures from 
previous threat characteristics, many of the so-called ‘unimaginative’ aspects of 
terrorism were transferred to the 1980s. United States interests maintained their 
status as the key target, however, the target selection process moved beyond the 
traditional objective of destruction. For example, the attack on the American 
Embassy in Beirut in April 1983 (Ditzler 2004, 196),72 demonstrated the value of 
target selection based on symbolism. The previous trend of the indiscriminate 
targeting of civilians continued, as exemplified by attacks in shopping malls 
(IRA, December 1983), places of worship and restaurants.73 December 1981 saw 
an attack on religious figures;74 this presented another transgression of so-called 
“legitimate target” constraints. The trend, established in the 1960s, of striking 
targets outside the immediate area of a conflict (Moore 2001) also continued in 
the ’80s.  
 
The symbolic element of 1980s targeting strategies can be further explored by a 
brief examination of the 1988 Lockerbie bombing. This aircraft bombing 
encapsulates the terrorist mindset of attacking icons symbolising, or affiliated 
with, the United States; it is believed that the identity and nationality of the 
passengers on-board the flight was irrelevant to the perpetrators (Schwartz and 
Bayer 1992, 61). A more developed picture of terrorists’ targeting strategy began 
to emerge in the 1980s, a strategy which factored in symbolism, was 
indiscriminate with regard to harm to innocents, and which continued to 
diversify.  
 
Johnson (2001, 896) characterises the 1980s terrorist threat as continuing the 
1970s dominance of hijackings and hostage-taking; he significance of bombings 
during this period has also been noted (Jones and Smith 2004, 2). Whilst not 
considered to be a new addition to terrorists’ tactics, the impact of suicide 
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 This event is also thought to be the first modern instance of the use of a suicide bomber, 
perhaps providing a template for other acts. 
73
 Especially restaurants known to be frequented by military or government personnel.  
74
 Three nuns and a missionary, believed to have been murdered by members of the National 
Guard, were found on the outskirts of San Salvador, El Salvador. 
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bombings increased, highlighting their potential to represent a major factor in the 
decade’s counter-terrorism strategies (Quillen 2002, 279). Despite tactical 
diversification, traditional methods, such as bombings, shootings, hijackings and 
hostage-taking incidents persisted (Veness 2001, 409). Hence, the “1980s were 
known as a decade of hostage taking, with terrorism finding a target in American 
interests around the world.” (Garrison 2003, 50) 
 
Having noted the continuation of previously established tactics, sabotage was 
introduced as an additional method, as seen in the sabotage and subsequent 
bombing of Pan Am Flight 103. The diversification of terrorists’ operational 
modes between the 1960s and 1980s showed a propensity for future change. The 
1988 Lockerbie bombing is an incident that not only illustrates the use of 
sabotage by terrorists, but also exemplifies the changing dynamics of the terrorist 
threat.  
 
Significant coordination and organisation was required on the parts of at least 
two identified parties to the bombing: Lamen Khalifa Fhimah (hereafter referred 
to as Fhimah) was a station manager at Laqu airport and was thought to have 
obtained Air Malta baggage tags and provided them to Adbel Basset ali al-
Megrahi to assist in circumventing security procedures at Luqa airport (Her 
Majesty’s Advocate v Megrahi, cited in Murphy 2001, 406). In addition to 
Fhimah using his access to airport facilities to obtain the baggage tags, it is also 
thought that Fhimah placed the bag containing the bomb on Air Malta Flight 
KM-190 to Frankfurt, where it was then transferred to Pan Am Flight 103A 
(103’s feeder flight) to London, where it was reloaded onto Flight 103 to New 
York (Church and Gibson 1991, 26 and Murphy 2001, 405). This attack 
demonstrated the potential for acts of terrorism to assume a surreptitious 
disposition; it also established the potential for future added complexity in the 
nature of the terrorist threat. 
 
1990s 
The previously established trend of attacking targets associated with the United 
States (foreign and domestic) continued throughout most of the ’90s, with a 
steady escalation (Jones and Smith 2004, 12). Terrorists’ continued to expand 
106 
 
their range of targets during the decade: broadcasters; financial centres; tourist 
attractions, and; missionaries, United Nations representative and/or aid providers 
all became targets in the ‘90s. A propensity for targeting civilians can also be 
inferred from the decade’s attacks, evident in the deliberate targeting of places 
frequented by civilians, in particular places of public gathering and, more 
specifically, tourist attractions. Further examination of the Tokyo Subway attacks 
undertaken by Aum Shinrikyo in March of 1995 may reveal the allure of 
targeting crowded public spaces. 
 
The simultaneous attacks on March 20, 1995 involved the targeting of five 
commuter trains which were scheduled to converge in the centre of Tokyo 
(Olson 1999). The attacks involved five Aum Shinrikyo members. Each member 
boarded a different inbound train that was located on one of the Hibiya, Chiyoda 
or Marunouchi lines (Pangi 2002, 424). The targeting of transport facilitates and 
civilians does not represent a significant deviation from terrorists’ targeting 
strategies of the 1990s, nor from that of previous decades. This attack does, 
however, reinforce the likely continuation of the targeting of people and places 
according to the potential to achieve significant impact and damage. Aum 
Shinrikyo intended to kill thousands of people on March 20; the attack resulted 
in twelve fatalities (Pillar 2004, 31). Targeting civilians and the transportation 
system in this manner not only increased the potential spread of contamination, 
but also expanded the area of the crime scene – both of these factors hindered 
counter-terrorism responses. The systematic increase in the indiscriminate 
targeting of civilian populations was anticipated, by analysts of the day, to 
continue beyond the 1990s. 
 
Terrorist activity of the 1990s continued to exhibit a nature similar to that of 
previous decades in terms of the number of operational modes used by terrorists. 
Existing compilations75 have revealed that incidents usually involved (either 
singularly, or in combination): assassination/murder; kidnapping; hostage taking; 
hijacking, and/or; suicide elements. Dolnik (2003, 26) pinpoints the 
‘internationalisation’ of suicide bombings to the attack on the Israeli Embassy in 
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 Refer to the National Consortium for the Study of Terrorism and Responses to Terrorism and 
Mickolus (1993 and 1997). 
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Buenos Aires, Argentina in 1992. There appeared, beyond this attack, no further 
diversification of operational modes from those established in previous decades. 
This is perhaps symptomatic of a variety of issues, including the reduction of 
state support and sponsorship, which had allowed for terrorist experimentation.  
 
The attack of March 20, 1995 by Aum Shinrikyo illustrated the continuation of 
modes of operation designed and orchestrated to maximise property damage and 
casualties. However, Aum Shinrikyo’s operation was “[p]lanned and executed 
clumsily and at short notice, this attack was less successful than originally feared, 
saving thousands of people from death” (Karmon 1999). Fortunately, the desired 
catastrophic damage was not achieved. It was estimated that, at the time of the 
attack, potentially over nine million people used the subway daily (Pangi 2002, 
424). Despite the fact that this event may have been considered by some authors 
(particularly Karmon (1999) and Pangi (2002)) to be a ‘failure’, it nonetheless 
illustrates important dynamics requiring our understanding.  
 
2000s 
It is thought that the preceding four decades can act as a valid and consistent 
indicator for further changes in terrorists’ tactics during the first decade of the 
21st Century. Specifically, the continuing diversification of targets in an effort to 
widen the potential audience could have been anticipated. The 2000s witnessed a 
renewed focus on emergency services personnel as targets. The targeting of these 
personnel is viewed to be a further extension of the targeting of non-combatants 
or innocents by terrorists, one which ultimately increases the potential for loss of 
life and destruction of property by hampering response capabilities. Another 
trend that continued from previous decades was the targeting of places and 
infrastructure frequented or used by civilians; transportation hubs and tourist 
sites continued to be attractive targets, evidenced by incidents in Bali (2002 and 
2005), Madrid (2004), London (2005) and Mumbai (2008).  
 
The terrorist threat is no longer considered to be against single identifiable 
individuals or collections of people, but one which, to the contrary, prefers not to 
limit the scope of potential damage (Grob-Fitzgibbon 2004, 111-112). This very 
notion was acknowledged by Bin Laden in an interview conducted by the 
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American Broadcasting Company. Bin Laden said he felt there was no need to 
distinguish between military and civilian targets because “[a]s far as we are 
concerned, they are all targets” (National Commission on Terrorist Attacks upon 
the U.S. 2004, 47). In 1998, Bin Laden called for the “murder of any American, 
anywhere on earth” as an “individual duty for every Muslim who can do it in any 
country in which it is possible to do it” (National Commission on Terrorist 
Attacks upon the U.S. 2004, 47).  
 
The September 11 attacks showed that “[t]argets are pursued with great 
persistence, and planning is developed and refined” (Australian Government 
2004, 13), as the 1993 and 2001 targeting of the WTC makes clear. It is believed 
that the WTC represented a symbolic target and was pursued for that reason 
(Beeson and Bellamy 2003, 353; O’Hagan 2003, 335). In February 1993, Ramzi 
Yousef attempted to destroy the WTC with a truck bomb parked on level B-2 of 
the North Tower’s car park (Miller, Stone and Mitchell 2002, 95). The towers 
“were supposed to fall that day, one toppling onto the other, knocking them both 
on their sides, killing everyone inside and everyone in the path of their collapse” 
(Miller, Stone and Mitchell 2002, 95). This incident provided great insight into 
the objectives and capabilities of Islamic extremists in the 1990s. 
 
The original plan for the September 11 attacks involved the hijacking of ten 
aircraft, nine of which were intended to crash into targets on both US coasts. 
These targets included the headquarters of the Central Intelligence Agency and 
of the Federal Bureau of Investigations, as well as nuclear power plants and other 
prominent buildings in California and Washington State (National Commission 
on Terrorist Attacks Upon the U.S. 2004, 154). The tenth aircraft was to be 
landed at a US airport, where all adult male passengers would be killed; this was 
to be followed by a televised speech detailing the repressive role that America 
had played in the Arab world (National Commission on Terrorist Attacks Upon 
the U.S. 2004, 154). Although these plans were dismissed by al-Qaeda for being 
overly complex (National Commission on Terrorist Attacks Upon the U.S. 2004, 
154), they demonstrate a high level of ambition in terms of operational proposals. 
Combs (2003, 235) argues that the complexity of September 11 revealed the 
109 
 
level of detail, co-ordination and planning undertaken for, and in, both the pre- 
and post-attack stages.  
 
Existing compilations76 reflect what could be characterised as a disproportionate 
use of suicide attacks during the first decade of the 21st Century, and the same 
could be said of kidnapping incidents. Both of these claims of disproportionate 
use of certain tactics are arguably attributable to the high occurrence of such 
incidents during the military conflicts in Iraq and Afghanistan; this should be 
considered when formulating threat characterisations. One interesting 
development in terms of suicide operations in the 2000s came in January 2002, 
when the first suicide attack by a Palestinian woman was officially recorded.77 
Such a development is not considered to be as significant as the hijackings of 
September 11, but each event provides a level of insight for threat adaptation and 
possible futures. The terrorism incidents of the 2000s continued to evince a 
desire to achieve significant levels of harm through wide-ranging target 
selection.  
 
September 11 altered the traditional perception of hijackings as a security threat. 
The use of aircraft as suicide missiles defeated all the measures implemented to 
protect the US civil aviation system from hijackings (National Commission on 
Terrorist Attacks upon the U.S. 2004, 4). Hijackings in previous decades were 
usually followed by demands, as seen in the 1960s and 1970s requests for the 
release or exchange of prisoners, for example. It is believed that the al-Qaeda 
leadership rejected plans for conventional hijacking operations aimed at securing 
the release of imprisoned comrades due to their inherent complexities (National 
Commission on Terrorist Attacks upon the U.S. 2004, 153). These operations 
were concluded to be too difficult to conduct, due to the problem of finding 
‘friendly’ countries in which to land the aircraft for negotiations (National 
Commission on Terrorist Attacks upon the U.S. 2004, 153). However, Operation 
Bojinka, which is believed to have been the precursor to the September 11 
                                               
76
 See the National Consortium for the Study of Terrorism and Responses to Terrorism and 
Mickolus (1993 and 1997). 
77
 Despite female participation in suicide bombings previously, particularly by the LTTE, this 
incident received notoriety. In 2002, Wafa Idris, became the first accredited female suicide 
bomber in the Israeli-Palestine conflict, after detonating a bomb in a shopping precinct in 
Jerusalem (Herman 2010, 260). 
110 
 
attacks, could be seen as having indicated that the reasoning behind conducting 
hijacking operations had altered, yet the counter-terrorism community failed to 
react to this , and, as noted by Cid (2008, 1), to indicators from the 1993 WTC 
bombing. The traditional mindset has been changed such that aircraft hijackings 
no longer automatically lead to negotiations. Further, Riedel (2008, 3-4) notes 
that the tactics of the September 11 attacks could have been inspired by the foiled 
attack by Algerian terrorists on December 24 1994 on an Air France flight with 
the intention of crashing the aircraft into the Eiffel Tower. In Operation Bojinka 
al-Qaeda sought to hijack several US passenger aircraft and then to either destroy 
them en route over the pacific or, like September 11, by flying them into various 
targets (Smith 2008, 169). The September 11 attacks demonstrated the use and 
advancement of various tactics, several established prior to the 1970s, indicating 
the likelihood that terrorists’ tactics will continue to change. Challenging this 
expansion of terrorists’ tactical repertoire presents a significant task for counter-
terrorism strategists. 
 
Weapons 
 
“As the September 11, 2001 attacks demonstrated, choices in weapons and 
tactics by terrorists are perhaps the most difficult aspects of the terrorism 
problem to assess or predict” (Center for Counterproliferation Research National 
Defense University 2002, 10). The conservative tactical characterisation 
provided by Pillar (2004) can also been applied to terrorists’ weapon choices due 
to their demonstrated reliance on “traditional weapons”. The U.S. Army 
Intelligence Center and Fort Huachuca (1998a) notes that traditional weaponry 
(the sword, bow and arrow, and poison, for example) has advanced as a result of 
various inventions, such as gunpowder and dynamite. Advancement can now be 
viewed in terms of alternate delivery mechanisms, for example improvised 
explosive devices (IEDs), and the potential for WMDs to be realised. As with the 
range and diversity of tactics, the reviewed literature also refers to the vast range 
of conventional and non-conventional weaponry available; a range which 
continues to increase (Australian Government 2004, 14). This trend highlights 
the importance of grasping the trends of the past, present and possible future 
natures of the weaponry of terrorism. 
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Various sources, including Crenshaw (1990); Jackson (2001); Laqueur (2001a) 
and Parachini (2001) examine the factors deemed to affect the general uptake, 
and subsequent use, of weapons by terrorists. These include, for example: the 
risk of failure in adopting new weapons technologies; the effect of counter-
terrorism operations and policies; the structure of the terrorist 
organisation/network (Jackson 2001, 194-201); availability and expertise 
(Jackson 2001, 201; Parachini 2001, 400), and; the potential the weapon/s have 
to contribute to achieving the terrorists’ goals (Parachini 2001, 400). The 
Canadian Security Intelligence Service (1999), Enders and Sandler (2002) and 
the National Commission on Terrorism (2000) note that conventional explosives 
and firearms have remained the favoured weapons of many terrorist operations. It 
is thought that explosives are appealing to terrorists because of: 
 
…the shock, drama, and cathartic effects of the explosion. 
Chemical and biological weapons, in contrast, are generally 
invisible, odourless, tasteless, silent, and insidious…[and] instil a 
qualitatively different type of terror (Tucker and Sands 1999). 
 
As noted by Kortepeter and Parker (1999), the use of unconventional weapons, 
particularly biological weapons, has occurred sporadically for centuries. 
Bowman and Barel (1999, 5) and Parachini (2001, 401) each provide a 
comparison of the property damage and casualty rates between attacks involving 
conventional and unconventional weapons, concluding that higher levels of 
destruction have resulted from attacks using conventional weaponry. The issue 
here is that there exists potential for change under certain circumstances, 
including increased familiarity (and expertise) with WMDs. However, “[m]erely 
claiming that terrorists could perform an act of super-terrorism because the 
means for such an act (e.g., weapons and biological pathogens) are available is a 
truism, not a threat assessment.” (Wolfendale 2007, 79) 
 
Koblentz (2011) highlights the subjective nature of CBRN risk assessments, 
identifying three schools of thought in the CBRN debate: optimists, pessimists 
and pragmatists. Optimists view CBRN terrorism as low probability and low 
consequence, noting technical hurdles, historical weaponry preferences, and that 
escalation is not required to achieve terrorism objectives (Koblentz 2011, 503). 
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Pessimists assess CBRN terrorism as of low but growing probability and high 
consequence, citing technical capability changes, the availability of required 
materials, and the erosion of targeting constraints accompanying increased 
lethality, particularly for religiously motivated groups (Koblentz 2011, 503). 
Pragmatists characterise the CBRN risk as currently of low probability and low 
consequence and are more concerned about the potential emergence of new 
groups specifically interested in CBRN and inflicting mass casualties, and, 
consequently, pragmatists are also interested in formulating an understanding of 
how and why such intent develops (Koblentz 2011, 503-504) (as it did in Aum 
Shinrikyo, for example).  
 
Regardless of the school of thought, there is a feeling of concern and anxiety 
throughout the official and academic literature on the use of CBRNs and WMDs 
by terrorists (Dolnik 2003; Jackson 2001; Jenkins 2001a; Johnson 2000; Merari 
2000; Morgan 2004; National Intelligence Council 2008; Simon and Benjamin 
2000, cited in Parachini 2001; U.S. Army Intelligence Center and Fort Huachuca 
1998a; 1998b; the U.S. Department of State 2004). It is believed that this 
awareness has led to a surge in studies examining CBRN weapons. The 
characterisations usually detail what substances could, and which are most likely 
to, be used and by whom – and what can be done to prepare for or prevent such 
an attack (Laqueur 2001a). The Center for Counterproliferation Research 
National Defense University (2002, 10) notes that researchers seem to be 
reluctant to specifically identify one substance or weapon as presenting the most 
pressing threat; instead providing comparisons which show one class of weapons 
to be a more likely threat than another (for example biological being more likely 
than nuclear – but these comparisons typically stop short of considering the 
urgency or severity of one kind of threat over another (Koblentz 2011, 502)).  
 
Official literature examining WMDs and CBRN has a focus on who has the 
capability, who is seeking to acquire weapons or materials, and the role of state 
sponsors (Center for Counterproliferation Research National Defense University 
2002; Helgerson 2002a; Perl 2003). This is also the focus of academic sources, 
but these seem, in general, to fall more in line with the pragmatist school of 
thought (refer to Dolnik 2003; Flournoy 2002; Garrett 2001; Jenkins 2001a; 
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Johnson 2001; Laqueur 1996a; 2001a; Laqueur 1998, cited in Bowman and Barel 
1999; Marsella 2002; Merari 2000; Morgan 2004; Schmid 2000; Skordas 2001; 
Tucker and Sands 1999; Weinberg and Eubank 2000; Whittaker 2002), usually 
by examining the characteristics of terrorists and, thereby, seeking to understand 
who would utilise WMDs and why, rather than simply identifying participating 
parties. Al-Qaeda appears to dominate discussions in both official and academic 
sources in which the use of WMDs is considered, particularly the post-September 
11 literature (Central Intelligence Agency 2003a; Dolnik 2003; Flournoy 2002; 
Perl 2003; Telhami 2004; U.S. Department of State 2004). 
 
The uses of WMDs most discussed in the literature are the 1995 sarin gas attack 
on the Tokyo Subway by Aum Shinrikyo (Jenkins 2001a; Johnson 2001; 
Laqueur 1996a; Morgan 2004; National Commission on Terrorism 2000; 
Parachini 2001) and the 2001 anthrax attacks which occurred in the wake of 
September 11 in the United States (Koblentz 2011). Relatively few sources refer 
to attacks involving WMDs prior to these. The most prominent examples from 
outside the 1990s-2000s time frame are: the 1979 poisoning of orange exports 
with mercury by Palestinian terrorists (Kuhr and Hauer 2001; Merari 2000); the 
use of salmonella typhimurium in Oregon in 1984 by the Rajneeshee religious 
cult in an attempt to influence the result of the local election (Carus 1997; 
Parachini 2001); the use of chlorine by the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (the 
LTTE, also called the Tamil Tigers) (Parachini 2001), and; previous attacks by 
Aum Shinrikyo (Karmon 1999; Monterey Institute of International Studies 2001; 
Olson 1999; Pangi 2002; Tucker and Sands 1999).  
 
Schmid (2000) provides the most detailed account in the literature of why 
WMDs have been ‘under-utilised’ by terrorists. The reasons cited include: a 
general reluctance to experiment with unfamiliar weapons; a lack of familiar 
precedents; fear that the weapon could harm the user or producer; fear of 
alienating supporters on moral grounds; fear of retaliation, and; financial 
constraints (Schmid 2000, 120). Several other variables may be at play, 
including: problems associated with delivery and weaponisation (Laqueur 2001a; 
Merari 2000; National Commission on Terrorism 2000; Pillar 2004; Tucker and 
Sands 1999; U.S. Department of State 2004); moral constraints or the lack of 
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motivation (Ditzler 2004; Hudson 1999; Jenkins in Morgan 2004; U.S. Army 
Intelligence Center and Fort Huachuca 1998b), and; availability problems, even 
where there is no lack of motivation (Merari 2000; Pillar 2004). 
 
A more recent development in the weapons debate is the possibility of cyber-
terrorism. Cyber-terrorism is seen as a growing threat, widely recognised in both 
official (Caruso 2002; National Commission on Terrorism 2000; U.S. Army 
Intelligence Center and Fort Huachuca 1998a) and academic literature (Albini 
2001; Church 2000; Devost, Houghton and Pollard 2000; Dunnigan 2003; 
Flournoy 2002; Holt 2012; Laqueur 2001a; Pillar 2004). There is substantially 
less literature on this topic than on the use, and potential use, of WMDs; it has 
therefore been concluded that cyber-terrorism is a developing research area in 
which new ideas, and new threats, are continuing to emerge. This is an area of 
Terrorism Studies where a growth in interest (in both academic and official 
sources) is expected to coincide with changes in the threat as a result of cyber-
terrorism’s minimal cost and high anonymity (Holt 2012). Dunnigan (2003, 89), 
whilst acknowledging that, to date, no terrorist entity has successfully conducted 
a major cyber-attack, also discusses unsuccessful attempts that have been made. 
These include an incident in 2000 in which two Russian university students 
attempted to launch Russian nuclear missiles into Western Europe, and the 
Swedish hacker (also referred to in Church 2000) who turned off the emergency 
call system in Florida. These incidents have not, however, been classified as acts 
of terrorism due to their lack of political motivation. Nonetheless, such incidents 
are valuable in demonstrating the potential for such attacks in the future. 
 
Potential acts of cyber-terrorism have been referred to as an ‘Electronic Pearl 
Harbor’ (Devost, Houghton and Pollard 2000, 49). Works on cyber-terrorism by 
Albini (2001) and Pillar (2004), acknowledge that known terrorists do possess 
the capacity to conduct cyber-attacks. Dunnigan (2003) provides a 
comprehensive examination of cyber-terrorism, including consideration of the 
means to conduct a cyber–attack, the required tools, and also a range of possible 
scenarios. Popular scenarios in the literature include: accessing classified 
material (Dunnigan 2003); damaging infrastructure (Devost, Houghton and 
Pollard 2000; Dunnigan 2003; Flournoy 2002); interfering with automated 
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functions in laboratories, dams, and factories (Dunnigan 2003), and; the 
disruption of networks that support day-to-day social processes (including air 
traffic control systems, electricity grids and stock markets) (Church 2000; 
Devost, Houghton and Pollard 2000; Dunnigan 2003; Jenkins 2001a).  
 
Discussions in the literature analysing the utilisation of cyber-terrorism 
techniques generally hold that terrorists will not employ cyber-terrorism because 
of the current interest in destruction, rather than disruption (Arquilla, Ronfeldt 
and Zanini, cited in Morgan 2004, 40), illustrating the difficulty of linking the 
objectives and motivations of terrorists with cyber-attack strategies (Devost, 
Houghton and Pollard 2000; Flournoy 2002; Pillar 2004). It is thought that for 
there to be a transition to cyber-terrorism, terrorists will first have to develop a 
level of understanding and trust in the “weapons”, and that terrorists’ present 
level of understanding rests on the presumption that terrorists only trust weapon 
systems they are knowledgeable of and experienced with (having often built and 
tested their weapons themselves) (Church 2000, 52). The options and sources of 
terrorist weaponry are varied and, in some instances, subject to lapses in 
availability and/or reliant for their effectiveness on the knowledge and expertise 
of personnel. The following decade characterisations will demonstrate aspects of 
the reliance on traditional weaponry, and reveal a trend of weaponry 
advancement.  
 
 
1960s 
‘Traditional’ weapons, as they are described by the reviewed literature 
(explosives, knives and firearms), were the dominant tools of terrorism in the 
1960s. Weapons technology of the 1960s appears to have been similar to that 
employed previously, showing little deviation from established weapon choices. 
Research into the details of the PFLP hijacking of 1968 failed to reveal any 
irrefutable details relating to weaponry that was used in the attack. It is 
suspected, on the basis of the foregoing characterisations of the 1960s, that, if 
weapons were used, they would most likely have been knives, firearms and/or 
hand-grenades, as opposed to explosive devices (use of which could have led to 
the destruction of the aircraft). Nonetheless, an array of weapons was available 
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to, and utilised by, terrorists in the 1960s, forming the basis not only for 
comparisons with other decades, but also for the development of a 
comprehensive understanding of weaponry-related advances. 
 
1970s 
The 1970s witnessed a continuation of reliance on traditional weaponry.78 
Despite this continued reliance, there was a marked tendency to experiment with 
and diversify delivery systems. For example, the July 1972 incident involving a 
letter-bound explosive device combined a traditional explosive with a novel 
delivery mechanism. The 1970s also saw the use of biological weapons, which 
not only expanded the spectrum of potential terrorist weapons, but broadened 
discussions of WMDs.  
 
The greatest fear of escalating terrorist violence concerned the broadening 
availability of fissile material (in other words, material which could be used to 
construct a nuclear bomb) (Laqueur 1996b, 17; 2003, 154). It is important to 
acknowledge that attacks involving WMDs in the 1970s, and prior to the 1970s, 
created limited destruction when compared to other, conventional weapon attacks 
of the same decade. The ongoing threat posed by conventional weapons 
highlights the importance of continuous evaluation of the transformation or 
improvisation of such weapons for use in terrorist acts.  
The continued importance of traditional weapons can be inferred from the attack 
conducted by the BSO at the 1972 Munich Olympic Games. The perpetrators 
used firearms, which were concealed in an athletics bag as the operatives scaled 
the fence (Bard 2004), in the attack. This event showed that the weapons to be 
used must be suitable to the particulars of the operation: the target, the mode of 
attack etc. Despite advances in weapons technology, the threat posed by 
traditional weapons in the 1970s remained significant and demonstrated the 
propensity and likelihood that terrorist objectives would be advanced through 
tactical diversification using existing technologies. 
 
                                               
78
 See the National Consortium for the Study of Terrorism and Responses to Terrorism and 
Mickolus (1980 and 1982). 
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1980s 
Debate concerning terrorists’ potential use of CBRN weapons continued in the 
1980s, and may have been reinvigorated by the incidents in 198479 and 1986.80 
Jenkins (2001a, 322) believes that nuclear terrorism was an unlikely event during 
this period due to the apparent unwillingness of terrorists to escalate their 
violence to such proportions. The anticipated loss of support in previously 
friendly populations as a result of conducting such an attack was assessed by 
terrorists to be counter-productive to the cause (Hudson 1999, 9). This mindset 
perhaps lay behind the continued reliance on traditional weaponry. Veness (2001, 
409) for example, describes the 1980s as a period in which firearms and 
explosives continued to dominate. The diversification of explosives delivery 
systems continued during the 1980s, exemplified by car and truck bombing 
incidents, such as the June 1987 car bombing of the US embassy in Rome, the 
April 1988 car bomb at an United Service Organizations club in Naples, and the 
assassination of US defence attaché William Nordeen. The sophistication of 
explosive devices increased significantly during the 1980s, as the Lockerbie 
bombing shows.  
 
The Lockerbie bombing was achieved by a sophisticated bomb, purpose-built to 
destroy an aircraft (Duffy 1991, 24). This attack changed the commonly held 
perception (and belief) that substantial amounts of explosive material would be 
required to cause the destruction of an airliner (Schwartz and Bayer 1992, 62). It 
took only about 200 grams of semtex to destroy the aircraft (Schwartz and Bayer 
1992, 62). The explosive device was hidden inside a Toshiba RT-SF 16 BomBeat 
radio cassette player, itself in a Samsonite suitcase (Anderson 2001, 221; Church 
and Gibson 1991, 62; Murphy 2001, 405). The explosive contained an altimeter 
switch, which ensured that the device would only explode at a cruising altitude; 
security checks and screening procedures at the airports, and changes in pressure 
during take-offs and landings would not trigger detonation prematurely 
(Anonymous 1991, 858). This particular attack highlights the effectiveness of 
                                               
79
 Members of the Rajneeshee cult poisoned salad bars in Dallas restaurants with salmonella in an 
attempt to affect the number of voters in an election. 
80
 Covenant, a Caucasian supremacist Christian group, attempted to acquire potassium cyanide to 
poison water supplies. The group believed that God would kill only the ‘non-believers’, in 
particular people of African and Jewish ancestry. 
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advancing the manner in which ‘traditional’ weapons are utilised (in conjunction 
with tactics) to achieve an objective. Schwartz and Bayer (1992, 61) note that the 
device was intended to destroy the aircraft while it was over sea, not land, where 
less evidence, if any, could be recovered.81 Advances in traditional weaponry, in 
this case the timing device and altimeter switch, enabled terrorists to increase the 
potential destructiveness of attacks without requiring the use of unfamiliar or 
non-conventional weapons (U.S. Army Intelligence Center and Fort Huachuca 
1998a). 
 
1990s 
The 1990s witnessed the continued diversification of the terrorist arsenal; a 
progression from the past, and an indication of future escalation. Additional 
categories of weapons were used by terrorists during the 1990s, including: fake 
explosives; aircraft82, and; missiles and rockets. The use of traditional weapons 
was maintained, evident in the use of firearms and a range of explosive delivery 
methods, especially car and truck bombs. The potential use of WMDs received a 
renewed level of attention following the attack on the Tokyo subway system in 
1995 (Quillen 2002, 280).83 The above examination of the 1995 attacks by Aum 
Shinrikyo in Tokyo illustrates the use (and challenges of that use) of non-
conventional weapons by terrorists, and is an important example in developing 
understanding of the range and diversification of terrorist weaponry, and of the 
propensity for this change to continue. 
 
Aum Shinrikyo actively sought and experimented with a variety of CB agents, 
including: botulin toxin; anthrax; cholera; Q fever and the Ebola virus (Olson 
1999). Despite Aum Shinrikyo’s extensive financial resources and access to 
scientific aptitude (Kaplan and Marshall 1996, cited in Morgan 2004, 33), the 
group was unsuccessful in its attempts to overcome the hurdles associated with 
the acquisition and cultivation of CB agents, and with the manufacture of 
efficient delivery systems for them (Tucker and Sands 1999). This failure was 
revealed in the 1995 attack. Aum Shinrikyo’s scientists were unable to construct 
                                               
81
 This element of the plan may have been successful, had the flight not been behind schedule. 
82
 Operation Bojinka was to involve the use of several aircraft. The case will be examined in 
further detail, particularly with regard to its connections to September 11. 
83
 This attention was also in light of the rise of “Christian Identity violence” in the USA. (Quillen 
2002, 280). 
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an effective aerosol delivery vehicle to disperse the sarin, and instead resorted to 
pouring the sarin into plastic bags, which were then wrapped in paper (for 
concealment purposes) and placed on the floors of the selected subway carriages 
(Olson 1999; Pangi 2002, 424). Once on the floor, each bag was punctured with 
a sharpened umbrella tip, allowing the material to seep out and spread through 
the carriage (Olson 1999). This technique was ineffective as most of the sarin 
was not released into the air as breathable droplets, and hence only those in the 
immediate vicinity of the bags suffered severe injury or death (Pangi 2002, 425). 
Furthermore, the sarin was only 30 per cent pure, meaning that it produced an 
odour that alerted passengers (Pangi 2002, 424).  
 
Bowman and Barel (1999) point out the importance of examining the level of 
destruction from the Tokyo attack in comparison to that achieved in other 
prominent attacks. For example, the two researchers (1999, 5) note that the attack 
killed twelve people, compared to over 300 in the bombings of the US embassies 
in Kenya and Tanzania that same decade. Despite this, the audacity of Aum 
Shinrikyo’s act, and the potential for future attacks involving non-conventional 
weapons, must be acknowledged and considered. Aum Shinrikyo, the Anti-
Defamation League Law Enforcement Agency Resource Network (2004) argues, 
gave an effective ‘wake-up call’ that terrorists were now going to use non-
conventional weapons in the future. Aum Shinrikyo, to some extent, had “created 
a precedent, opening, as it were, a Pandora’s box” (Schmid 2000, 120), whereby 
the use of WMDs was no longer a taboo restraining terrorists from the pursuit 
and use of such technology (Canadian Security Intelligence Service 1999; 
Jackson 2001, 204 and Merari 2000, 64). Aum Shinrikyo’s attack highlighted a 
few key considerations both for terrorists interested in using WMDs, and also for 
counter-terrorism strategists. The difficulties involved, and resources required, in 
the successful use of WMDs were clear ‘lessons’ for terrorists and their 
opponents. For counter-terrorism strategists, the Tokyo attack laid the foundation 
for such attacks to be emulated or surpassed in the future. 
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2000s 
Discussions of the use, or hypothetical use, of WMDs continued in the literature, 
and appear to have remained an issue of intense debate in the first decade of the 
21st Century. A contributory factor to this heightened level of discussion may be 
the anthrax attacks that occurred shortly after September 11.  
 
Another concern of the decade was the growth of fanaticism and the weakening 
of terrorists’ self-restraint. Previous restraints felt or followed by terrorist groups 
may have weakened or disappeared as a consequence of fanaticism (Laqueur 
2004, 227). The distinction between those who are considered to have no, or little 
interest in acquiring or using WMDs and those who may seek and use such 
weapons has remained a dominant matter of research (Laqueur 2004, 227). This 
distinction (between terrorist entities which do and do not desire certain 
weapons) has also been applied to traditional weapons, arguably because of the 
ongoing dependence on, or diversification of, such weapons. Diversification of 
conventional weapons and delivery systems is illustrated by several incidents, 
including the use of a boat in the bombing of the U.S.S. Cole in October 2000, by 
the now infamous “shoe bomber”, Richard Reid (now known to be one of two 
operatives), who attempted to explode a bomb aboard American Airlines Flight 
63 in 2001, and Umar Farouk Abdulmutallab, who, on Christmas day in 2009, 
while aboard a flight en route to Detroit, tried to detonate plastic explosives 
hidden in his underwear. A similar explosive mix to that used by Abdulmutallab 
was employed in the unsuccessful October 2010 cargo plane printer cartridge 
bomb plot by al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP).  
 
Kushner (1998, 15) discusses the implications of weapons technology 
diversification, including the difficulties faced by counter-terrorism forces as a 
result of terrorists’ ability to use readily available products and services which 
are innocuous. For example, in response to the October 2010 printer cartridge 
bomb plot, Britain sought to ban printer cartridges from hand luggage. AQAP 
responded: "[w]ho is the genius who came up with this suggestion? Do you think 
that we have nothing to send but printers?" (AQAP statement, quoted in Leppard 
2010). This example highlights the risk of being preoccupied with 
unconventional weapon delivery systems at the expense of other threats; a risk 
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also plainly demonstrated by September 11. A brief examination of the attacks 
on September 11 2001 will reveal other significant and important characteristics 
of the weaponry used by terrorists in the first decade of the 21st Century.  
 
The September 11 attacks are important to examine, not only because the events 
of that day illuminate the diversity of terrorists’ weapons, but also because the 
attacks may establish the foundation for future changes. It is believed that the 
operatives were deliberately equipped with weapons that would remain 
undetected by airport security (National Commission on Terrorist Attacks Upon 
the U.S. 2004, 84). The operatives used knives, the blades of which were less 
than four inches long, and the threat of a concealed explosive device on Flights 
11, 175 and 93 (The 9/11 Commission: Staff Statements and Testimony, cited in 
Strasser 2004, 54). They also used of box-cutters (on Flight 77), twine (Gaddis 
2001, 9) and pepper spray (on Flights 11 and 175) (The 9/11 Commission: Staff 
Statements and Testimony, cited in Strasser 2004, 54). Investigations into the 
alleged use of a firearm on Flight 11 continued at the time of writing (The 9/11 
Commission: Staff Statements and Testimony, cited in Strasser 2004, 54)84. It 
was known from the foiled Operation Bojinka that there was potential for 
terrorists to use an aircraft as a weapon (Miller, Stone and Mitchell 2002, 176). 
Although the plan, developed by Ramzi Yousef, for Operation Bojinka involved 
flying aircraft laden with explosives into various targets (Miller, Stone and 
Mitchell 2002, 176), the September 11 plot expanded on that foundation to 
achieve maximum levels of destruction: commercial airliners (Boeing 757’s and 
767’s) that were fully fuelled for transcontinental flights were selected as a way 
to maximise the destructiveness of their impact (The 9/11 Commission: Staff 
Statements and Testimony, cited in Strasser 2004, 49). Despite the warning that 
Operation Bojinka could arguably have provided, the greatest domestic threat to 
America, as detailed by the National Commission on Terrorist Attacks Upon the 
U.S. (2004, 17), was assumed to be from cruise missiles, and attacks involving 
the use of aircraft were usually anticipated to use the aircraft as a delivery vehicle 
for a WMD. The use of a commercial airliner as a suicide missile was not 
anticipated.  
                                               
84
 Debates have also surfaced surrounding the use of explosive devices. These debates usually 
surface in regards to ‘conspiracy’ theories for the events.  
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Logistics 
 
There are several other tactical matters relating to the preparation for, and 
commission of, an attack that have advanced over time. Examples range from: 
the ability to operate within the target nation and/or abroad; logistical and 
funding networks that function independently of state sponsorship and therefore 
of any diplomatic or government sanctions imposed for counter-terrorism 
purposes; the sophisticated use of a range of technologies, particularly in 
communications, and; apparent aspirations to greater lethality of attacks 
(National Commission on Terrorism 2000, 6). In the interest of producing a 
comprehensive understanding of the past, near-present and future natures of the 
terrorist threat, logistical arrangements demand a characterisation-based 
assessment.  
 
This section will provide an integrated discussion of the literature with event 
analyses detailing broader tactics and specific logistical arrangements for the 
purpose of trend analysis. Aside from logistics, these analyses will consider: 
communications; financing; group structure and recruitment, and; general 
behavioural issues. These discussions are presented in a different format from 
those above (mindset, tactics and weapons) in that decade-specific 
characterisations will not be given.  
 
The strongest description of these tactical elements is evident in literature 
focused on the events of September 11; though elements from previous incidents 
are integrated, too. From the terrorist’s perspective, the September 11 attacks 
were a “perfectly choreographed production” (Nacos 2003, 3). As such, the 
tactics employed in the September 11 attacks warrant a broad but specific 
examination. This has two purposes: 1) to determine when logistic trends began; 
and 2) whether foundations for future terrorist activity or adaptations can be 
identified.  
 
The increasingly complex coordination of terrorist actions can be discerned from 
the literature and from the decade reviews above. Forms of pre-attack 
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coordination include: reconnaissance; identification and selection of targets; 
acquisition of and familiarisation with weapons; transport, and; planning, where 
necessary, of escape routes (Laqueur 2001a, 40).  
 
The increasing coordination terrorists have displayed is perhaps most clearly 
shown in simultaneous attacks. In the 1970s, simultaneous attacks often involved 
multiple hijackings. As terrorists’ targeting strategies and modes of operation 
have advanced and diversified, so too have the goals and features associated with 
their simultaneous operations. For example, coordinated simultaneous attacks 
may arise from the desire to amplify the attacks’ psychological impact (Ditzler 
2004, 190; the National Commission on Terrorist Attacks Upon the U.S. 2004, 
156), while at the same time also increasing the likelihood that one or more of 
the planned attacks is successful; i.e. that the capture of one of the operatives will 
not necessarily lead to the entire operation being dismantled or thwarted. This 
“bet-hedging” rationale is most noticeable in the attacks by Aum Shinrikyo and 
by al-Qaeda on September 11: all five perpetrators of the Tokyo attack used 
separate vehicles to reach their respective subway stations (Pangi 2002, 424); 
similar tactics were also used by the four terrorist cells which undertook the 
September 11 attacks.  
 
The ability of terrorists to travel to, enter and remain in target countries without 
being hindered, raising suspicion or being captured appears to be a vital element 
in the commission of terrorist attacks against foreign targets (The 9/11 
Commission: Staff Statements and Testimony, cited in Strasser 2004, 3). The 
National Commission on Terrorist Attacks Upon the U.S. (2004, 234) notes that 
the selection of an individual as an operative is connected to their ability to travel 
globally. Intelligence sources suggest that the ideal operative, from al-Qaeda’s 
perspective, may be in his or her late twenties to early thirties; they may even 
travel with family members to allay suspicion (Ashcroft 2004). Here it is 
important to note the impact of profiling for counter-terrorism purposes, as such 
profiling, when its criteria are publically known, can be exploited and 
circumvented (Kydd 2011, 459). The importance of an operative’s ability to 
travel was demonstrated by the 1988 Lockerbie bombing and the September 11 
attacks, each of which contained an integral international element. 
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Adbel Basset ali al-Megrahi (the Libyan intelligence officer) entered Malta using 
a false passport (Murphy 2001, 405), while the September 11 perpetrators 
obtained new passports as a way of avoiding attention and suspicion surrounding 
their previous travel – particularly their visits to Afghanistan (National 
Commission on Terrorist Attacks upon the U.S. 2004, 234). Each of the 
September 11 operatives entered the United States legally (Gaffney 2001, cited 
in Beeson and Bellamy 2003, 342, and The 9/11 Commission: Staff Statements 
and Testimony, cited in Strasser 2004, 14). Furthermore, points of entry can be 
strategically selected. For example, California was chosen as the entry point for 
the September 11 operatives travelling from Asia, for simplicity’s sake and for 
the added benefit of its distance from the intended targets (National Commission 
on Terrorist Attacks upon the U.S. 2004, 215).  
 
Once having reached and entered the target country, operatives are required to 
perform their operational duties while continuing to avoid suspicion. This can be 
achieved by the terrorists camouflaging themselves as ordinary citizens (Black 
2004, 17). All of the September 11 operatives had arrived and were living in 
America by January of 2000 (National Commission on Terrorist Attacks upon 
the U.S. 2004, 215), demonstrating the long-term need to maintain inconspicuous 
behaviour patterns and personas. The operatives successfully prepared for the 
attacks while living in the United States and managed to remain undetected. The 
operatives “moved, stored, and spent their money in ordinary ways, easily 
defeating the detection mechanisms in place at the time” (National Commission 
on Terrorist Attacks Upon the U.S. 2004, 169). Some of the operatives were 
instructed to stay away from mosques and to avoid making personal contacts 
(National Commission on Terrorist Attacks upon the U.S. 2004, 215), while two 
of the operatives, Hazmi and Mihdhar, presented themselves as foreign students 
(National Commission on Terrorist Attacks Upon the U.S. 2004, 220). 
September 11 demonstrated the necessity of patience for the architects of the 
attacks, and the operatives. The idea that “[t]here may be years between 
conceiving and conducting a major attack” (Australian Government 2004, 13) is 
a more recent one, and provides opportunities to the counter-terrorism 
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community while challenging operatives to maintain operational security for 
long periods of time. 
 
Appropriate and effective preparations enable operatives to circumvent security 
measures and also increase the chance that they will conduct their operation 
successfully. The importance of good preparation can be inferred from the 
Munich Olympics attack, the 1988 Lockerbie bombing and the attacks of 
September 11. For example, three of the eight BSO members involved in the 
Munich Olympics attack gained access to the Olympic Village, presumably by 
obtaining and presenting appropriate credentials (Calahan 1995). The remaining 
five operatives entered the village by scaling the perimeter fence (Calahan 1995). 
This was deemed to be an acceptable, ‘calculated’ risk, as the men were in fact 
seen by several people – no one thought anything of it, as athletes routinely 
entered and exited the village by climbing the fence (Bard 2004). The parties 
responsible for the bombing of Flight 103 effectively circumvented the airports’ 
luggage screening security procedures. 
 
The attacks of September 11 displayed a significantly higher level of 
organisational skill. While reconnaissance of targets is not a new phenomenon, 
the September 11 operatives conducted several reconnaissance missions to test 
airport and aircraft security and layouts (Miller, Stone and Mitchell 2002, 295 
and the National Commission on Terrorist Attacks upon the U.S. 2004, 242). 
Specific examples include their selection of seats on the aircraft (The 9/11 
Commission: Staff Statements and Testimony, cited in Strasser 2004, 49); the 
testing of security to find out whether or not a person without pilot credentials 
could access the cockpit (Miller, Stone and Mitchell 2002, 296), and; the best 
time to seize control of the aircraft during flight (National Commission on 
Terrorist Attacks Upon the U.S. 2004, 242). The details of the September 11 
attacks were the product of several years of preparation and planning, beginning 
in late 1998 or early 1999 (Miller, Stone and Mitchell 2002, 255; the National 
Commission on Terrorist Attacks upon the U.S. 2004, 150). This reveals the onus 
on planners and cell members of maintaining constant devotion, concentration 
and, possibly, significant levels of funding. 
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Terrorist entities are known to accrue funds from a variety of legal and illegal 
sources (Whittaker 2002, 146). Formal state sponsorship has declined and 
support is now largely from sympathisers, who assist in raising funds, procuring 
weapons and finding recruits (Wilkinson 2003, 124). For example, Aum 
Shinrikyo required extensive funds to enable its continual manufacture and 
experimentation with chemical and biological weapons. It is known that Aum 
Shinrikyo collected monetary donations, sold religious paraphernalia and books, 
held training courses and seminars for members, profited from a chain of 
restaurants and the manufacture of computers, and also from various criminal 
activities (including fraud, extortion and murder) (Olson 1999 and Karmon 
1999). It is thought that Osama Bin Laden, in addition to financing al-Qaeda, was 
also providing ‘start-up’ funds to selected new terrorist groups, and for specific 
terrorist operations, such as the September 11 attacks (National Commission on 
Terrorist Attacks upon the U.S. 2004, 171). Such activities inevitably led to 
alliances with other terrorist groups, enabling al-Qaeda to continue to expand, 
enhance and diversify its operations. The deaths of key al-Qaeda personnel, 
including Bin Laden, is unlikely to negate the spread of al-Qaeda affiliation 
“branding”, but may affect the ability of organisations to achieve terrorist 
spectaculars comparable to September 11 in the future.  
 
As previously noted, terrorist identities are quite flexible in terms of their 
operating environment and adapt to changes in political and security 
arrangements. This ability not only illustrates these groups’ knowledge and 
understanding of their operating conditions, but is also enhanced by their 
networked structure (Australian Government 2004, 18).  
 
The internal dynamics of such groups have undergone some profound 
adjustments. Those groups that are able to adapt to changes to their operating 
environment through flexible structures are expected to survive, potentially 
posing the greatest threat by continuing to “professionally develop” over time 
(Tucker 2001, 13). Networked structures facilitate this development and 
demonstrate the reason for the vulnerability of the traditional hierarchical 
organisations of the 1960s to 1980s (Bergesen and Lizardo 2004, 42) to detection 
by the authorities; centralised control (Cralley, Garfield and Echeverria 2004, 
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ES-4). Easier detection and dismantling of centrally controlled organisations has 
forced the evolution of terrorist groups into non-hierarchical, networked 
structures.  
 
While terrorist networks have existed before, including in 1940s Iran (Tucker 
2001, 4), and as evident in the extensive Palestinian networks (Tucker, cited in 
Zimmermann 2003, 37), the 1990s are generally seen to mark the rise of 
amorphous and networked terrorist ‘organisational’ structures (Harmon 2000; 
Shultz and Vogt 2003, 4). These structures have commonly been: chain-like 
network;85 arranged in a hub and spoke manner86, or; or on an “all channel” 
basis87 (Arquilla and Ronfeldt 2001, cited in Jackson 2006, 245). Crenshaw 
(2007, 27) argues that there is no single ‘terrorist organisation structure’, noting 
that groups are adaptive and flexible. The adaptations evident in the 
organisational structure of terrorist groups are thought to reflect and follow 
changes in private and public sector businesses (Morgan 2004). It can be argued, 
therefore, that terrorist networks have developed for the same reasons that 
businesses do: to increase responsiveness, flexibility, and resilience (Tucker 
2001, 1-2). Networked structures also facilitate and enhance the learning process 
and the transfer of expertise and knowledge. Despite some risks and 
disadvantages, it is generally thought that networks built up of a number of 
“cells” are more secure from infiltration by counter-terrorist forces (Cralley, 
Garfield and Echeverria 20004, III-14). Morgan (2004, 38) supports this 
conclusion by noting that advances in organisational practices have been linked 
to increased lethality.  
 
The current concern over so-called ‘sleeper cells’ is likely to continue, not only 
due to terrorists’ success with this strategy, but also because of the additional fear 
the concept generates in many Western communities. Sleeper cells, are ready to 
be “awakened”, or activated, at any time to carry out terrorist acts (Nacos 2003, 
13). The attacks in Madrid (2004) and London (2005) threw light on the use of 
sleeper cells. These networked structures and operational tendencies pose 
                                               
85
 In which members are linked sequentially in a single line. 
86
 In which individual links radiate outward from a central node. 
87
 In which each member is directly connected to every other.  
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difficulties in identifying terrorist threats and indicators which could be acted 
upon to pre-empt attacks (Australian Government 2004, 11).  
 
These relatively new, diffuse organisational structures contain “universes of like-
minded fanatics in which there [are] galaxies and constellations from which ad 
hoc conspiracies and individual actors [emerge]” (Jenkins 2001c, 11). 
Individuals not strictly connected to a terrorist organisation have also appeared, 
and have been classified either as amateurs or freelance professionals; both kinds 
of operative present a significant challenge for the counter-terrorism community. 
Amateurs represent another stage in the life cycle of terrorism (Tucker 2001, 5). 
The challenge they pose stems from their lack of identification with, or 
permanent attachment to, a terrorist organisation (Tucker 2001, 11). Despite the 
reduced capacity of amateurs to learn and develop skills (Tucker 2001, 11) they 
have been linked with the increasing-lethality trend (Hoffman 1999, 20). 
Hoffman (1999, 25) identified the ‘professional’ terrorist, also referred to as a 
‘freelancer’, who often boasts an increased level of operational competence over 
the amateur operative. Freelance actors not only enhance the amorphous nature 
of the threat (Wilkinson 2003, 134), they are also considered to increase its 
overall level of danger (Kushner 1998, 17).  
 
 
 
3.4 Evolving Nature of Terrorism 
 
The bulk of this chapter has been a combined discussion of the literature with an 
examination of terrorist incidents to discern characteristics of the past and near-
present natures of the terrorist threat. The following section provides a summary 
of the four variables discussed above (mindset, tactics, weapons and logistical 
arrangements) as a precursor to identifying the litany ‘tsunamis’. The 
characterisations reached above support conclusions on the changing nature of 
the terrorist threat alluded to in the reviewed literature. Vast changes have 
occurred in terrorists’ mindsets, tactics, weapons and logistical arrangements 
since the 1960s. Having revealed that the dominant trend of the past and near-
present nature of terrorism is one of continued adaptation to changing conditions, 
129 
 
there is no reason to think that this trend will not continue into the futures, 
particularly if the necessity of adaptation itself remains unchanged. 
 
Another major trend pertains to the escalation of violent or destructive 
objectives. The general trend of decreasing incidence and increasing lethality is 
noted widely in the literature (see, for example, Hoffman 1999, 2000, 2002a; 
Johnson 2001; Morgan 2004; U.S. Army Intelligence Center and Fort Huachuca 
1008a; and Whittaker 2002). This trend has been traced back as far as the 1990s 
(Hoffman 1999, 2000; Johnson 2001). The lethality objective was demonstrated 
by events such as the first WTC attack and the Tokyo subway incident. Both 
attacks showed the willingness of terrorists to increase levels of damage and 
destruction, a trend which possibly reached its height on September 11 2001.  
 
September 11 is the most destructive terrorist attack to date, when considering 
fatalities, casualties, and flow on effects to the economy and particular industries. 
September 11 highlighted a number of threat adaptations that can be mapped to 
progressive precursors. The previous sections illustrated the increasingly lethal 
and indiscriminate nature of terrorism and also several pertinent mindset and 
operational factors, as well as tactics and weapons. 
  
The modern terrorist threat is commonly perceived to pose a greater threat than it 
has previously (Jenkins 2001a, 325). This conclusion is arguably primarily based 
on incidence and lethality rates. The decrease in incidence, which began during 
the 1980s, coincided with an increase in the amount or degree of destruction 
achieved and an elevation in the number of casualties and fatalities (Johnson 
2001, 894). For example, Johnson (2001, 905) notes that, of the recorded 
incidents in the 1990, 70% of injuries and 19% of deaths resulted from less than 
1% of attacks.88 These trends, of decreasing incidence and increasing lethality, 
suggest a new kind of terrorist act, one which has been referred to as a “mass 
casualty attack” (Parachini 2001, 389). However, characterisation of the threat as 
more likely to cause mass casualties has not been supported by Tucker (2001, 5). 
                                               
88
 The five key attacks in the 1990s attributed to these statistics are the: 1993 bombing of the 
WTC; 1995 sarin attack in Tokyo; 1996 bombing of the Khober Towers in Saudi Arabia; a truck 
bomb in Sri Lanka; and the 1998 bombing of the US embassy in Kenya (see Johnson 2001, 905).  
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The diversification of terrorism’s overarching strategies, motivating factors and 
objectives illustrate the vast range of terrorists’ mindsets, and this full range 
requires conceptualisation in order to address the possible futures. Despite the 
current perceived monopoly of Islamic fundamentalists on terrorism (Walton 
2007, 28), the terrorist mindset can reflect a nationalist, ethno-centric, non-
Islamic religious, secessionist or other issue-specific (political) orientation. 
Attacks may be undertaken for a variety of reasons, ranging from revenge and 
retaliation to achieving the exchange or release of prisoners – or even simply for 
experimentation with weapons or techniques. The reduction in prisoner release 
and exchange events may be related to the trend to conceal involvement, claims 
of responsibility no longer go hand in hand with terrorist acts. Experimentation 
may become more frequent in light of anticipated further diversification of 
tactics and weaponry. Establishing a comprehensive understanding of the nature 
of the terrorist mindset is particularly pertinent due to the interconnected 
relationship between terrorists’ mindsets and tactical and weaponry decisions; 
“[t]he tactics and targets of various terrorists’ movements, as well as the weapons 
they favour, are […]ineluctably shaped by a group’s ideology” (Hoffman 1998, 
157). 
 
The changing nature of terrorists’ tactics, in both mode of operation and target 
selection, challenge Jackson (2001, 192) and Pillar’s (2004, 31) prediction of 
operational conservatism. While traditional, and largely tried and proven, 
methods (such as hostage-taking, bombing campaigns and suicide operations) 
remain popular, striking levels of diversification have been evident during the 
modern phase of terrorism. Targeting strategies have expanded to include, and 
arguably favour, places frequented by civilians, including tourist attractions and 
public amenities like transportation hubs and shopping precincts. This 
diversification has challenged some traditional conceptions of the threat and 
views of the so-called ‘constraints’ that had seemingly confined it. For example, 
the presupposition of terrorists’ intentions surrounding some modes of operation, 
and the intentional and indiscriminate targeting of civilian populations, has been 
challenged – changes to hijacking tactics are possibly the best example of this.  
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Extensive conventional and non-conventional choices of weaponry are available 
to terrorists. This selection has been steadily expanding since the 1960s, aided by 
various modifications to traditional weapons and delivery systems. The modern 
phase of terrorism has also highlighted that technologically sophisticated 
weapons systems, such as those of the traditional range of WMDs, are not a 
prerequisite for achieving mass destruction (Schmid 2000, 109) or instilling fear; 
significant damage has been achieved by traditional explosives delivered using 
improvised means. This is demonstrated by the attacks against the USS Cole, 
Richard Reid’s liquid explosive shoe bomb attempt, and Umar Farouk 
Abdulmutallab’s failed underwear bomb. Difficulties with the weaponisation of 
certain materials appear to have remained a significant hurdle to terrorists who 
wish to use biological and chemical weapons. Evidence supporting this claim is 
drawn from the 1995 Tokyo subway attack conducted by Aum Shinrikyo, who, 
despite their resources and technical abilities, failed to weaponise the materials 
they had acquired. Changes in group mindsets, and the pursuit of the required 
technical abilities, could see the successful use of hazardous materials in some 
futures. Expertise in current groups appears to be concentrated in engineers and 
until the focus shifts to scientists the use of WMDs may be limited, with 
terrorists giving preference to known and trusted weaponry. 
 
The increased levels of complexity and unpredictability of terrorist incidents 
(Veness 2001, 409) may be attributable to the amorphous nature of terrorism 
stakeholders. Terrorism is increasingly well-organised and calculated. Terrorists’ 
tactics and skills have advanced over time, and such advances are most visible in 
group dynamics and pre- and post-attack logistical arrangements. The flexibility, 
resourcefulness and devotion to conducting more attacks (Australian 
Government 2004, 76) which terrorists show reveals the modern terrorist as a 
“calculating, responsive, and innovative being” (Harmon 2000, 121). A number 
of high profile terrorist events demonstrate this: September 11 clearly showed 
increased levels of sophistication and planning. Terrorists’ ability and desire to 
learn from their own successes and failures and the experiences of others, 
signifies to the counter-terrorism community that the trend of advancement and 
adaptation through experimentation is likely to continue.  
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The modern terrorist threat has been characterised by a number of high profile 
incidents, particularly the five attacks examined in this chapter – Johnson (2001) 
suggests that some of these incidents are indicative of the changing nature of the 
terrorist threat. The 1990s witnessed a series of such events, from the 1993 attack 
on the WTC to the 1995 Oklahoma City bombing and Tokyo subway incident 
and the 1998 attacks on the US embassies in Kenya and Tanzania; this has 
continued into the 2000s with the attack on the USS Cole, September 11, the 
2002 and 2005 Bali bombings, the 2004 Madrid station bombing, the 7/7 attack 
in London and the 2008 hotel attack in Mumbai. Interestingly, although terrorist 
entities learn from previous experiences, the saturation of the media with terrorist 
event images may have inadvertently raised the ‘bar of destruction’ required to 
attract attention (Morgan 2004, 31). This conclusion is often thought of in 
regards to the precedent set on September 11, and the supposed need for 
terrorists to match or surpass this level of destruction – to achieve their own 
‘spectacular’. 
 
The debate in recent literature regarding the lifespan of al-Qaeda, and its Arabian 
Peninsula affiliate, should be borne in mind. Al-Qaeda demonstrated its power 
and ability to ‘awaken the masses’ by using small, hierarchical frameworks to 
spur mass movements (Ganor 2007, 52). Metaphorically, al-Qaeda’s Islamic 
fundamentalism has the monopoly on the ‘jihad enterprise’ (adapted from 
Jenkins 2007, 6). Al-Qaeda and its global network (or ‘jihad enterprise’, as 
Jenkins (2007, 6) calls it) is thought to pose a more significant threat than any of 
its more localised predecessors (Ganor 2007). This characterisation should be 
extended to AQAP, which has been viewed as a more dangerous threat even than 
al-Qaeda in light of the group’s sophistication and creativity (Sean Joyce, head of 
National Security at the FBI, 2011, in Jones 2011, 909).  
 
The National Intelligence Council (2008, 61) believes that the appeal of al-Qaeda 
and other international groups will wane over the next 15-20 years, with the 
threat such groups present remaining in small pockets. This is because al-Qaeda 
is an aging group, demographically, and has unachievable strategic objectives, 
prioritising terrorism over transforming into a political movement (National 
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Intelligence Council 2008, 69-70) and, furthermore, is lacking a coherent global 
strategy and vision (Crenshaw 2007, 19).  
 
But the question of lifespan extends beyond the core of al-Qaeda and AQAP. 
Helfstein and Wright (2011, 376) point out the biggest ongoing uncertainty: the 
role of al-Qaeda’s core versus that of unaffiliated individuals and groups 
motivated by al-Qaeda’s message of international jihad. Al-Qaeda and AQAP’s 
communication and marketing strategy has made full use of the Internet as a 
means of outreach and messaging control (Page, Challita and Harris 2011). 
However, this too must be assessed in terms of declining support for al-Qaeda in 
many countries89 (Helfstein and Wright 2011, 376; Department of Homeland 
Security 2008, 19). In other words, we need to remain mindful that al-Qaeda, and 
arguably AQAP’s, monopoly on the jihad enterprise may not last forever, 
highlighting the value of Weinberg’s (2007) strategy of identifying broad social 
trends affecting large numbers of people and increasingly anti-Western attitudes. 
The systemic causes will be examined in more detail in the following chapter and 
in the concluding remarks.  
 
The terrorism litany highlights two key ‘tsunamis’ that are not only a 
continuation of the past into the present, but also appear likely to impact or drive 
the terrorism litany in some futures: these are the amorphous nature of the 
terrorist threat and the trend of increasing lethality. If September 11 is seen as the 
pinnacle of these two trends, surpassing September 11 would have to be 
considered in light of the continuation of other forms and levels the threat has, 
currently is, or could, in one or more futures, pursue. Two variables have been 
selected to formulate four terrorism litany futures: first, the level of destruction 
(which encompasses both property damage and human casualties), and, second, 
sophistication. The second variable was selected because the high profile events 
of the recent past have shown increasing levels of sophistication, coordination 
and preparation by terrorist entities, many of which have had the intent of, or 
                                               
89
 While based on American government statistics, The Department of Homeland Security (2008, 
19) reported that in Saudi Arabia bin Laden’s ‘approval’ rating was below 50%, and that only 5% 
wished to live in a bin Laden style government.  
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have succeeded in, producing mass destruction. Sophistication and pre-attack 
organisation also facilitate the terrorist’s tendency to innovate and experiment.  
 
3.5 Terrorism Litany Scenarios 
 
The understandings derived from terrorism’s litany, as characterised in the 
‘evolving nature of terrorism’ section above, will now be presented as part of 
meta-level terrorism litany futures in the form of a scenario matrix (see Figure 
Three below). The scenario matrix is generic in nature as it is against the purpose 
of these litany futures to limit their application to a specific terrorist entity or 
geographic location. The intention of this process is to create alternative 
terrorism futures, at the different levels of knowledge, that can serve a practical 
purpose in discussions about the futures of terrorism, and linking these 
discussions, as required, to counter-terrorism activities. The litany scenario 
matrix provides scope for future terrorist activity based on the identified 
‘tsunamis’ of change which characterised and characterise the litanies of the past 
and near-present nature of terrorism.  
 
Terrorism’s litany will be represented by four scenarios, based on the “double-
driver” scenario construction approach offered by Futures Studies practitioners 
Galtung and Schwartz. The selected variables, as stated above, are: 
destructiveness (property damage and human casualties), chosen because of the 
increasing lethality of terrorist attacks, and; sophistication (the level of pre- and 
post-event preparation and co-ordination, and also innovative tendencies). These 
variables will be assessed on high- and low-value levels; that is, high versus low 
levels of sophistication, and high and low levels of destruction. These 
measurements of the variables are used in formulating the matrix. Each quadrant 
(scenario) is discussed in terms of the type of terrorist activity that could 
reasonably be anticipated to characterise that future. The implications of the 
terrorism litany futures for counter-terrorism will be discussed in the concluding 
chapter. 
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Figure Three: Terrorism Litany Futures Scenario Matrix 
 
 
 
Low Destruction and Low Sophistication: Traditional 
 
This future is referred to as the “traditional-type attack future”. It is characterised 
by the continued use of existing and proven methods, as was exhibited in the 
past. Acknowledging a continuing trend in the nature of the past and near-present 
terrorist threat, this possible future involves low levels of innovation and low 
levels of destruction. Such a future would be characterised by the continual use, 
and dependence on, tactics and weaponry that have been employed historically; 
“traditional” terrorism does not cause destruction of a degree that exceeds, or of a 
kind that deviates, from that of previously established attacks. Terrorism, in this 
future, will present no further deviation from presently existing modes of 
operation, target selection strategies, objectives or weapons systems employed. 
Some terrorist entities have shown their willingness (and tendency) to depend on 
traditional methods, demonstrating operational conservativeness. However, this 
tendency, of some terrorists, should not be thought to reduce the potential of 
these existing methods to cause substantial damage, as has been made clear in 
this chapter. 
 
High Destruction and Low Sophistication: Spectacular Repeat 
 
Attacks achieving high levels of destruction with low levels of sophistication are 
another likely terrorism future, derived from the observed characteristics of the 
136 
 
past and present. The traditional attacks of the low sophistication futures are 
anticipated to be the same in this future, and to operate independently from the 
level of destruction. The selected weapons may differ in power, and the targets 
may contain a denser population (or take place in a “target rich” environment), 
but the main difference between the “low destruction and low sophistication” 
traditional future and this quadrant, is the achievement of significantly higher 
levels of destruction. Attacks characterising this future space are anticipated to 
display the kind of destruction of the September 11 attacks, without exceeding 
that level of innovation and sophistication.  
 
Future terrorist acts which equal or surpass the level of mass destruction of the 
September 11 attacks appear to be a possible objective of terrorist entities, given 
their apparent preference for causing mass casualties. It may be argued that the 
September 11 attacks constitute high-tech aspects (sophisticated logistics, 
financial arrangements and organisation were present), however many tactical 
and weapon choices of the September 11 attacks had been used prior to the attack 
and if replicated in the futures would not represent innovation. This is evident 
from the examination of the tactics and weapons which were to be used in the 
foiled Operation Bojinka. As demonstrated by the characterisations provided in 
this chapter, future escalations of terrorist activity are expected.  
 
Low Destruction and High Sophistication: Experimental 
 
Terrorism exhibiting a low level of destruction and a high level of sophistication 
is a likely future, given terrorist entities’ propensity for change and escalation, 
and the difficulties involved in developing some kinds of weaponry. The “low 
destruction, high sophistication” quadrant represents an experimental phase, 
involving new tactical arrangements, and weapons or delivery systems. For 
example, this terrorism litany future may encompass the use of weapons outside 
the established, ‘traditional’ arsenal without the actual, desired or possible 
maximum destruction being achieved. This failure may be a direct result of 
unfamiliarity with the weapon system, or of the need for technological 
improvements or additional expertise to be gained by the terrorist actors.  
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It could be argued that some kinds of WMDs are not new technology and 
therefore do not represent high sophistication, as various substances, particularly 
in CB weapons, have been used previously. New delivery mechanisms, however, 
could fulfil the sophistication criterion. Future attacks included in this future will 
not achieve their full destructive potential. Experimentation with, for example, 
delivery systems for CB weapons, unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs), and even 
3D-printers, could be undertaken by terrorist entities in the future, particularly as 
impediments to access (such as cost) are reduced over time. Experimentation of 
this sort appears possible on the basis of further technological advances and 
because of the interest demonstrated by some terrorist actors in obtaining, and 
using WMDs.  
 
The experimentation phase will not be limited to WMDs; threats of cyber-
terrorism and agro-terrorism (deliberate threats to agriculture) are also increasing 
in stature, according to the terrorism literature, and provide avenues for 
diversification. The process of experimentation may increase the effectiveness, 
and achieve the full potential, of various threats, leading to mass casualties and 
longer lasting implications.  
 
High Destruction and High Sophistication: Spectacular  
 
High levels of destruction are an anticipated result of terrorist actors achieving 
significant levels of attack sophistication that exceed the characterisations of the 
past and near-present threat: these will be the future terrorist spectaculars. The 
full potential of, for example, certain weapons systems could be realised and 
utilised accordingly, possibly assisted by lessons learnt during an 
experimentation phase.  
 
Attacks characterising this terrorism litany future play on the fear and concern of 
the public regarding the use of WMDs and, potentially, cyber-terrorism. The 
level of destruction may equal or surpass that achieved in the September 11 
attacks, not only in terms of casualties, but in economic, social and political 
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terms as well. The notions that an entire race could be eliminated through the use 
of the Human Genome Project in combination with biological weapons (Arthur 
1999, cited in Schmid 2000), or that critical infrastructure supporting a variety of 
domestic and global functions could be crippled, (Dunnigan 2003) provide 
examples of the range of potential threats which might characterise this “high 
destruction, high sophistication” spectacular future. It should be acknowledged 
that this characterisation of the future tacitly implies that successful attacks 
involving the use of new tactics and weapons technologies (beyond the 
experimentation stage) will achieve significant levels of destruction; a turn of 
events which would amount to a continuation of the established trend for 
terrorism to escalate.  
 
 
3.6 Concluding Remarks 
 
Table One below provides a summary comparison of the characterisations of the 
four meta-level litany futures in terms of the four variables: terrorists’ mindset, 
tactics, weapons and logistical arrangements. 
 
Table One: Litany Futures Matrix Variable Characterisation 
 
Scenario Variables: Mindset, Tactics, Weapons and Logistics 
Low sophistication, 
low destruction 
Traditional: no significant departure 
High sophistication, 
low destruction 
Experimental: evolving and diversifying under testing 
High sophistication, 
high destruction 
Spectacular: potential of advances realised 
Low sophistication, 
high destruction 
Spectacular repeat: no significant departure  
 
From the four terrorism futures detailed in the litany scenario matrix, a cycle of 
innovation that bridges the four scenarios into one evolving, cyclical terrorism 
future emerges, blurring the lines of the futures the matrix depicts. The cycle can 
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be demonstrated by the introduction, familiarisation, and use of new 
technologies; that is, as the potential of new technologies is realised and achieved 
(through the experimentation phase), and proficiency is demonstrated in attacks 
(perhaps achieving mass destruction), these tactics and weapons will fall into the 
low sophistication quadrants in light of their familiarity and the loss of the ‘shock 
and awe’ factor – this demotion will be compounded by newer, more advanced 
threats. It is arguable that this cycle will flow from the experimental phase (low 
destruction, high sophistication) to the successful utilisation of the new advances 
achieved (high destruction, high sophistication), to repeats of terrorist 
spectaculars like September 11 (low sophistication, relatively speaking, and high 
destruction), and perhaps, dependent upon the nature of future terrorist incidents, 
to ‘traditional’ attacks (low destruction, low sophistication).  
 
In such a future, new adaptations and technologies will make past and present 
means of attack appear out-dated and less sophisticated or powerful by 
comparison. It is therefore anticipated that we will ‘surf the technological 
tsunami’ – terrorists’ repertoire of tactics and weapons will continue to expand 
on both the high and low spectrums. Furthermore, the level of destruction that is 
currently deemed “high” may, in light of future events, come to be considered 
“low”, especially when considering that additional escalations could exceed 
those established by the September 11 attacks. The recalibration of high to low 
can emerge because the shock produced by attacks decreases with familiarity 
(U.S. Army Intelligence Center and Fort Huachuca 1998a). This recalibration is 
not anticipated to eventuate in the immediate future, as several significant 
technological advances, and changes in audience and terrorist mindsets, would be 
required to affect the cycle. However, acknowledgement of the effects of 
audience and attack recalibration may enhance preparedness, and the overall 
approach to counter-terrorism. 
 
Understanding the push and pull factors of terrorism is vital, particularly from a 
counter-terrorism perspective, if efforts to curb future developments in the 
terrorist domain are to enable positive futures manipulation. But which future is 
to be manipulated? And further, who owns that future? It is also necessary to 
identify and understand the role past and near-present drivers have had in the 
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emergence, escalation and diversification of terrorism. As noted above, we need 
to determine the broad social trends affecting terrorist recruits and the sources of 
the masses and the sources of anti-Western attitudes (Weinberg 2007). This 
understanding will provide the context for drivers of the litany futures. The litany 
of terrorism has presented a future that involves further diversification and 
escalation of the terrorism threat, and this highlights the need, and provides a 
context, for examining past, present and future drivers. While the public 
perception and current media portrayal of terrorism do not necessarily mimic 
attitudes in the reviewed literature, developing and maintaining a well-informed 
citizenry, which views terrorism as one of a number of personal, societal, global 
and environmental risks, will aid futures planning and counter-terrorism 
preparedness.  
 
The infamous observation by Brian Jenkins (1975, cited in Hoffman 2002a, 19) 
that “[t]errorists want a lot of people watching and a lot of people listening and 
not a lot of people dead” has been re-evaluated in light of the level of destruction 
of various attacks (Hoffman 2002a, 19). For Weinberg and Eubank (2000, 94), 
Jenkins’ observation would now be that “[…terrorists] evidently want both, or so 
it is widely believed”. The inflicting of substantial damage and casualties to 
achieve ideological, vengeful or religious goals are often difficult for victims and 
the global community to comprehend (Carus 1997) and are subject to issue 
framing. Regarding this framing, two key metaphors have been identified at the 
litany level: 1) political Islam is the new Soviet Union (Mostafa and Al-Hamdi 
2007, 725), and 2) al-Qaeda’s Islamic fundamentalism has the monopoly on the 
jihad enterprise (adapted from Jenkins 2007, 6). Both metaphors match the 
sentiment of those in the introductory chapter (September 11 was a ‘wake-up 
call’ (Wulf, Haimes and Longstaff 2003, 429) and we are ‘playing catch up’ with 
the terrorists (Sealing 2003)) in terms of capturing the nature of the terrorist 
threat, and of the need to prepare.  
 
Interpreting terrorist actions remains a complex task. Previous notions that 
terrorists used violence to gain power in negotiations appear to be in turmoil as 
“[t]heir violence is not designed to get a seat at the negotiating table” (Australian 
Government 2004, viii), instead “they want to destroy the table and everyone 
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sitting at it” (Woosley, cited in Morgan 2004, 30-31). Comprehension requires 
not only understanding of the act itself, but also of the terrorist actors and their 
episteme. As Dostoevsky wrote (cited in Marsella 2002, 11) “[w]hile nothing is 
easier than to denounce the evil doer, nothing is harder than to understand him”. 
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Chapter Four: Systemic Causes  
 
Terrorism has causes; ex nihil fit – nothing comes out of nothing.  
(Laqueur 2004, 22) 
 
The Terrorism Studies community assumes that the causes of terrorism can be 
determined. Theoretical insights into the causes of terrorism have been sought by 
political scientists, psychologists and sociologists alike, exploring why terrorism 
emerges and the range of personal and societal factors that create recruitment 
pools and enable radicalisation. The decision to resort to terrorism can be 
interpreted as a reasonable and calculated response given personal conditions and 
experiences (Crenshaw 2004, 55). It is therefore not useful to characterise 
terrorism as a merely irrational act, nor should the quest for understanding be 
mistaken for supporting or sympathising with any given terrorist cause.  
 
Understanding the systemic causes of terrorism is a key component in 
establishing a comprehensive understanding of terrorism and its possible futures. 
Thorough investigation is required to understand the nature of the historical and 
current conditions that have resulted in terrorism. Examining how and why 
terrorism has emerged is critical, and it is likely that the process differs between 
entities, societies and times. Understanding terrorism’s origins could potentially 
provide the bridge required to link terrorism with effective counter-terrorism 
strategies (Butler 2004, 291). The litany has revealed some significant 
characteristics of the past, near-present and possible terrorism litany futures: 
namely the tendency for adaptation and for the escalation of violence. Identifying 
and understanding the drivers of the existing conditions, combined with the 
expected adaptation and escalation, is pivotal if positive futures manipulation is 
to be enabled.  
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This chapter addresses the following research objectives: 
• Objective One: to identify a range of meta-level terrorism futures that 
represent a different level of terrorism knowledge; 
• Objective Two: to apply the Futures Studies theory and method of CLA 
and Scenarios, demonstrating the value of applying non-traditional 
methodological approaches to Terrorism Studies; 
• Objective Three: to utilise CLA to develop a comprehensive 
understanding of the systemic causes of terrorism, facilitating the 
construction and deconstruction of terrorism futures, and 
• Objective Four: to use Scenarios to capture understandings of the past 
and near-present in combination with ‘drivers’ for the production of the 
systemic causes scenario matrix, presenting a range of futures of the 
systemic causes of terrorism. 
The scenarios presented at the end of this chapter is informed by the 
characterisations that the application of the second layer of CLA, systemic 
causes, produce. This application of CLA’s second layer facilitates assessment of 
the causal drivers which lead to the emergence of, or the resort to, terrorism, and 
the relationship of those drivers to terrorism’s litany – specifically whether there 
is any link to, or disconnect from, the litany futures.  
 
This chapter reveals a range of environmental factors and personal dynamics that 
influence terrorism. Identifying and understanding the roles (and 
interconnectedness) of the systemic causes of terrorism, and the relationship of 
those causes to the past and near-present is important for consideration of 
possible futures. Enquiry into the ‘root causes’ of terrorism, rather than its 
manifestations, is a level of inquiry that is widely supported in the Terrorism 
Studies community (Weinberg and Eubank 2000, 94). For example, Laqueur 
(2004, 11) supports investigations into root causes so that arrangements can be 
made to counter the threat itself, rather than its manifestations (i.e. attacks). 
Arguably, over the last few years the root causes literature has changed slightly, 
becoming focused on the causal factors of discrete subsets of terrorism, for 
example: Campana and Lapointe’s (2012) study into the root causes of non-
suicide terrorism, and Cottee’s (2011) research exploring the attraction of al-
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Qaeda-inspired groups for Muslim youth in Western, secular societies. 
Additionally, there has been an increasing focus on radicalisation processes (Aly 
and Striegher 2012, 849), including models of radicalisation for home-grown 
terrorism (King and Taylor 2011) and of the role of religion (Aly and Striegher 
2012). McBride (2011, 569) suggests that “[while] the causes of terrorism may 
be universal, its justifications are culturally and religiously specific. Thus the 
question of why an individual might choose a radicalized, violent ideology 
instead of a more moderate ideology is infinitely complex”. The factors leading 
to terrorism are difficult to research, as no single cause can be postulated 
(Mickolus 1992).  
 
Kruglanski and Fishman (2006, 197) offer a different approach to the ‘root 
causes’ problem, introducing the concept of ‘contributing factors’. Although 
Kruglanski and Fishman (2006) apply this idea to an individual’s decision-
making process, it has value in interpreting the picture, and emergence, of 
terrorist violence more generally. These contributing factors are potentially 
limitless, and can range from religious and/or class conflicts (Oberschall 2004) 
and social justice issues (Oberschall 2004) to cultural, political or technological 
factors (Hudson 1999; Morgan 2004); from global issues, including unstable and 
rogue nations (Marsella 2002), to instances of racism and oppression (Marsella 
2002). Due to the broad range of contributing factors referred to in the terrorism 
literature, distinctions have been made between internal 
(intrapersonal/interpersonal) and external (environmental) causes, which have 
either led, firstly, to the emergence of or the resort to terrorism, and/or, secondly, 
to a changes in the nature of terrorism (as indicated by terrorism’s litany). 
Substantial cross-over is expected in the examination of the external causes in 
both the emergence and change sections. The understandings drawn from these 
examinations will provide the foundation for assessing possible future systemic 
‘tsunamis’ and the depiction of alternative meta-level futures of the systemic 
causes of terrorism. 
 
This chapter contains five discussion sections and, finally, concluding remarks. 
The sections deal with: CLA systemic causes; the emergence of terrorism; the 
drivers of terrorism’s litany; future systemic drivers, and; the systemic causes 
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scenario. The systemic causes layer will be re-articulated as will its connectivity 
to terrorism’s litany.  
 
The distinction between the internal and external drivers of terrorism in both the 
emergence and drivers sections has been described above. ‘Internal drivers’ refer 
to dynamics within individuals or groups, whilst ‘external drivers’ will examine 
the effects of societal forces, including the political landscape and the effects of 
counter-terrorism strategies. Internal and external causes will be examined in 
terms of how these have either led to the emergence of, or the resort to, terrorism, 
or led to the changing nature of terrorism (as the trends in the litany chapter 
described). 
 
The introductory section, below, on the emergence of terrorism leads into a more 
detailed examination of the internal and external causal factors that are most 
prevalent in the terrorism literature. The systemic causes leading to the 
emergence of, and changes in, terrorism dynamics are hugely varied. It should be 
noted that this chapter will not detail all causal relationships dealt with in the 
terrorism literature; such an analysis would represent a substantial task in itself 
and is outside the purpose of this thesis. Nonetheless, the level of knowledge 
provided by the more limited analysis still constitutes a vast contribution to the 
development of a comprehensive understanding of terrorism for the purpose of 
initiating and encouraging foresight and futures planning in Terrorism Studies.  
 
The relationship between the litany and the systemic drivers is examined in the 
lead up to the systemic causes scenario where, similar to the litany scenario, two 
key variables are selected and applied using the “double driver” approach to 
scenario construction. It should be borne in mind that the discussions in this 
chapter enter the worldview domain, because ultimately the content and theories 
at the systemic causes level exist within the worldview of the authors; that is, the 
worldview, largely, of psychologists and governments. These worldview factors 
will be examined in detail in the final content chapter examining the terrorism 
worldviews and myths futures. Additionally, this examination of worldviews 
could be bolstered by going deeper, analysing factors specific to a certain entity 
or geographic location. However, this level of detail is outside the scope of this 
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thesis and will remain, for now, a matter for future research. The detail given in 
this chapter is intended to provide “insight that takes us further along the path of 
understanding the social context, mindset, motivations…of these individuals” 
(Post, Sprinzak and Denny 2003, 184), but remains generic in terms of identity 
and location. 
 
4.1 CLA: Systemic Causes 
 
The systemic causes level of CLA, also referred to as ‘social causes’, examines 
the factors, past and present, which have contributed, and contribute, to the 
litany; that is, the causal relationship between the litany and the interpretations 
provided of it through forms of reasoning including: economic, political, social, 
historical, technological, environmental and cultural (Inayatullah 2004a, 12; 
Blass 2003, 1048). This second layer of CLA is concerned with the systemic 
causes of terrorism and its relationship with, or disconnect from, the trends 
revealed in the litany chapter. The systemic layer seeks to explore interpretations 
of the litany data (Blass 2003, 1048). The systemic causes layer enables 
assessments of the occurrence or development of a given phenomenon – in this 
case the conditions that give rise to the past and near-present terrorism 
environment and its possible futures. It has been established, through 
interpretations of the past and near-present that terrorism futures can be 
characterised by the level of destruction sought and the level of sophistication 
involved (particularly in the planning stages).  
 
The literature on the root causes of terrorism provides an excellent base for these 
discussions, and extends to investigating the connections/disconnections with the 
drivers of terrorism litany futures. However, as mentioned above, these 
investigations conform to existing knowledge structures and paradigms (Kelly 
2010, 1111) of, largely, psychologists and governments. Identifying and 
understanding the impacts of the relevant drivers and on the overall threat is 
imperative to effective futures preparations and a positive futures manipulation 
mindset. 
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4.2 The Emergence of, or Resort to, Terrorism 
 
“Terrorism, like revolutions, occurs not when the situation is disastrously bad but 
when various political, economic, and social trends coincide.” (Laqueur 2004, 
18) This section seeks to examine the underlying internal 
(intrapersonal/intragroup) and external (environmental) causes of the emergence 
of terrorism, or for terrorism being the selected method of obtaining reprieve. 
This is important at the systemic level because the distribution of terrorism 
around the world is not even, nor does it emerge randomly (Pillar 2004, 36). 
Despite the uneven geographical distribution, very few regions have been free 
from association with, or experience of, terrorist violence (Laqueur 2001a, 36). 
Societies with limited to no experience of terrorism have typically maintained 
their traditional community structures, possibly inhibiting the role, requirement 
or effectiveness of violence in political change (Laqueur 2001a, 36). 
 
The long history of terrorism within democratic societies demonstrates that the 
panacea for terrorism is not the development (or imposition) of democratic rule 
and institutions (Whittaker 2002, 86). Staub (2004, 161) supports Whittaker 
(2002), noting that democratic countries of Germany, Italy, Japan, Spain and the 
United States have all experienced acts of domestic terrorism undertaken by their 
citizens. The experience of terrorism, as indicated, is not, however, limited to 
liberal democracies (Crenshaw 1990, 13). The lack of terrorism in societies 
under dictatorships or other forms of totalitarian regime, is thought to be a result 
of governmental control of media reporting (Laqueur 2001a, 44), in other words, 
whatever acts of terrorism do occur go unreported. 
 
Black (2004) provides a uniquely geographical approach to understanding the 
decision to resort to violence, engaging the conflict model with geometrics. 
Black (2004, 20) notes that physical constraints, rather than social reasons alone, 
account for the distribution of terrorism. Black (2004, 21) specifies that 
“[t]errorism arises only when a grievance has a social geometry distant enough 
and a physical geometry close enough for mass violence against civilians.” 
Social geometry is considered by Black to be a key element in terms of 
grievances that lead, or escalate, into terrorism (Black 2004, 22). Social distance 
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is also a consideration; those physically close were not socially distant (with the 
notable exceptions of Israel, Northern Ireland and Sri Lanka) (Black 2004, 21). 
Hence Black (2004, 18) connects the existence of long-standing grievances, 
which are thought to underlie certain kinds of terrorism, to the availability of a 
social space, for the reason that grievances cannot explain terrorism on their own. 
Collective conflicts, as opposed to individual conflicts, emerge either in a 
downwards form (against social inferiors), or laterally (against equals) (Black 
2004, 19-20).  
 
Pillar (2004) uses the work of Gurr (1993, cited in Pillar 2004, 36) highlighting 
the need to better understand the occurrence of violence, particularly when and 
where violence occurs, by considering grievances which may lead to violence, or 
to the opportunity for a somewhat rebellious or nonconformist leader to emerge 
and mobilise the existing discontent in a community. On this basis, terrorism can 
also be viewed in terms of being resorted to or emerging from the escalation of a 
conflict (Merari 2000, 53). Internal factors that result in the emergence of, or 
resort to, terrorism, such as the existence of people who are predisposed to 
engaging in terrorist activity, or the impact of broader group and community 
cohesiveness, represent an important kind of knowledge to acquire.  
 
4.2.1 Emergence of Terrorism: Internal – Intrapersonal 
Causes 
 
Acknowledgement and comprehension of the role of dynamics within individuals 
are fundamental, given that the decision to engage in terrorism is not only a 
matter of ideological conviction, but also of personality more generally (Laqueur 
2004, 13). The notion that a “terrorist personality” could predispose a person to 
engage in terrorist activity is debated in several texts; it is a question usually 
approached by the disciplines of sociology, psychology and criminology 
(Whittaker 2002, 81). Despite the contentiousness of the idea of a “terrorist 
personality”, numerous attempts have been made to capture the seemingly 
illusive personality traits of the terrorist, though few definitive conclusions have 
been reached. Literature exploring the mindset of individuals who, or the 
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collective mindset of groups which, engage in terrorism is largely dominated by 
psychology (and their worldviews of psychologists). The psychological 
discussions and theories in the literature are diverse and often complex (Marsella 
2002, 320).90 Understanding the dynamics that produce recruits or motivate 
involvement will aid in the overall comprehension of terrorism (Combs 2003, 50) 
for the purpose of increasing knowledge for methodical engagement with the 
range of futures. 
 
This internal, personality dimension of terrorism also appears to be particularly 
emotive. A terrorist, then Prime Minister of Israel, Benjamin Netanyahu (1986, 
cited in Held 2004, 71) once said, is a “new breed of man which takes humanity 
back to prehistoric times, to the times where morality was not yet born.” 
Netanyahu’s statement illustrates the need to suppress, where possible, the 
emotive aspects of terrorism in order to facilitate a deeper understanding for the 
purposes of interpretation. Hudson (1999) and Laqueur (2001a) are two notable 
examples of academics who have demonstrated an interest in exploring the 
existence of a ”terrorist personality”, that is, whether an individual can be born 
with certain personality traits that effectively destine him or her to become a 
terrorist (Hudson 1999, 20). Hudson is clearly against the idea that there is a 
single and definable terrorist personality, refusing to view the terrorist identity as 
a diagnosable psychological or psychiatric condition (1999, 52). Nassar (2010, 
17) argues similarly: terrorism is neither a matter of genetics nor a disease. Silke 
(2003, cited in Kruglanski and Fishman 2006, 195) writes that “in the early 
1970s…it was widely believed that terrorists suffered from personality disorders 
and that there would be an exceptionally high number of clinical psychopaths, 
narcissists and paranoids in the ranks of the average terrorist group.” This is 
another example of how an area of the literature can be characterised by intense 
debate and divergent views, usually, in this case, becoming entangled with 
assessing “normality” and “rationality”. 
 
                                               
90
 Such theories include: Childhood Socialisation Theory (Staub 2004); Psychological Identity 
Theory (Taylor and Winnifred 2004), and; the Frustration-Aggression Hypothesis (based on Ted 
Robert’s Relative-Deprivation Hypothesis) (Gurr 1970 in Hudson 1999, 23). 
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Normality  
 
Crenshaw (1981, cited in Hudson 1999, 30) has concluded that the only common 
characteristic of terrorists is their normality.91 Hudson (1999) supports 
Crenshaw’s finding, arguing that there does not appear to be a single and distinct 
terrorist personality; the personalities of terrorists’ appear to be as diverse as 
those of the general population. Hudson (1999, 53) points out the lack of 
pathology among members of terrorist groups and attributes this to the selective 
nature of the recruitment process. Hudson (1999, 53) links this selective 
approach to recruitment to terrorist group’s operational requirements, particularly 
that their members act in a manner that does not arouse suspicion, and on the 
basis of the potential organisational difficulties caused by members with mental 
illnesses or other psychological disorders. 
 
Crenshaw’s conclusion of terrorist normality has been supported by various 
psychologists, including McCauley and Segal (1987, cited in Hudson 1999, 30). 
Whittaker (2002, 82) also identifies with the idea that terrorists are normal, 
suggesting that diverse personality types are attracted to terrorism, but arguing, 
too, that certain personality traits are common among terrorist group members. 
Whittaker (2002, 82) characterises the terrorist as usually being action-oriented, 
aggressive and young, seeking stimulating and exciting activities, and often 
experiencing a sense of belonging not felt prior to their involvement with the 
group. Post (1990, 31) notes that most terrorist entities do not display significant 
levels of psychopathology, and argues that whilst no single personality type 
characterises the terrorist identity, there is a disproportionate representation of 
persons who are: action-oriented, aggressive, and with a psychological focus on 
externalisation and splitting.92 Laqueur and Post (cited in Hudson 1999, 53) add 
excitement-seeking and stimulus-hungriness to the above-mentioned traits. Post 
(1990, 31) also adds the elements of an unsuccessful personal life, education and 
training. 
 
                                               
91
 Crenshaw’s (1981, cited in Post 1990, 26) study was based on members of the National 
Liberation Front (FLN) in Algeria during the 1950s. 
92
 Externalisation and splitting are psychological mechanisms in which individuals designate 
external factors as the source of their difficulties (Post 1990, 27). 
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Psychologists Jerrold Post, John Crayton and Richard Pearlstein produced the 
seminal work of the narcissism-aggression hypothesis, examining the linkages 
between terrorists and mental illness (Hudson 1999, 23). Hudson (1999, 29) 
argues that Jerrold Post (1990) is perhaps the leading advocate of the “terrorist as 
mentally ill” doctrine. Post (cited in Hudson 1999, 29) also suggests that 
terrorists’ decision-making and reasoning processes, also referred to as ‘terrorist 
psycho-logic’, are the direct result of psychological drivers, thereby providing a 
justification for the psychological compulsion to commit acts of terror. Hudson 
(1999, 29) notes that Post’s hypothesis fails to account for, or, indeed, 
incorporate, the various other drivers and motivations, especially the 
motivational power of ideological conviction. Hudson (1999, 28) cautions 
against applying the findings of Post’s study to the broader population. Hudson 
(1999) uses the example of David Hubbard’s 1971 study93 on the psychiatric 
assessments of aircraft hijackers, (1999, 28) commenting that their traits are also 
seen in people who do not hijack aircraft, and therefore that using psychiatric 
profiles to detect potential hijackers appears to be of little use. Franco Ferracuti 
(1971, cited in Hudson 1999, 26) noted the non-existence, for practical purposes, 
of the “lone terrorist”, and preferred to equate such solitary behaviour to 
psychological and mental imbalances.  
 
Rationality 
 
Acceptance that terrorists are not subject to psychological imbalances often leads 
to a debate about rationality. Taylor and Winnifred (2004, 169) demonstrate how 
terrorism participants are often characterised in terms of their calculated 
behaviours and tactical motivations to employ violent means. Wagner and Long 
(2004) support the view that terrorists are rational actors. This perspective was 
also acknowledged (but seemingly not advocated) by the U.S. Army Intelligence 
Center and Fort Huachuca (1998a). Whittaker (2002, 73), too, supports this view, 
noting that the actors’ beliefs and behaviours exhibit a degree of rationality. 
Crenshaw (1990, 8) extends rationality beyond the individual to describe the 
                                               
93
 Hubbard (1971, cited in Hudson 1999, 28) was able to show that such individuals possessed 
common characteristics, such as a violent father, religious mother, younger sisters to whom 
he/she acted as protector, tendency towards alcoholism, timid personality and an experience of 
poor levels of achievement and financial independence due to limited earning potential. 
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“collective rationality” of terrorism; that is, that terrorism, as an expression of the 
collective group’s preference, is selected above other options as the best course 
of action to achieve political goals (Crenshaw 1990, 8). In other words, 
individual irrationality can be collectively rational (Muller and Opp 1986, cited 
in Crenshaw 1990, 8). The rationality of acting in a terrorist manner is subject to 
debate (Zimmermann 2003, 16), and remains inextricably linked to mental health 
in psychology-oriented terrorism texts. 
 
Hoffman (2002a, 25) also enters the terrorist rationality debate by noting that it is 
often easier to dismiss terrorists as ‘irrational homicidal maniacs’, than to try to 
comprehend their aims and motivations. Post (1990, cited in Hudson 1999, 23) 
argues that terrorists suffer from mental illnesses (usually narcissism and/or 
borderline personality disorders) which produce psychological forces and 
imbalances, that act as drivers to commit acts of terrorism. Some academic 
sources, such as Stern (1999, cited in Hudson 1999) provide a more intense focus 
on the rationality debate. Stern (1999, cited in Hudson 1999, 10) argues that 
schizophrenics and sociopaths may have a desire to commit acts of mass 
destruction, but also that they are less likely to succeed, as a group approach is 
required to conduct such operations successfully; schizophrenics and sociopaths 
generally find functioning in group environments difficult. However, Hudson 
(1999, 25) also argued that attempts to explain terrorism in purely psychological 
terms ignore other contributing factors, including personality and biology 
factors.94 
 
Personal Characteristics 
 
Hudson’s (1999) study extended beyond psychological attributes to include 
sociological elements relevant to the terrorist identity, on the basis that that, as 
Hudson argues (1999, 15), terrorists share some traits and that these can be 
discovered through the analysis of their biographical data. Similar examinations 
are common in the terrorism literature, for example Bakunin (cited in Laqueur 
                                               
94
 Hudson (1999) also includes economic, political, and social factors in this list; these will be 
examined in further detail in section 4.2.2: Emergence of Terrorism: External Environmental 
Causes.  
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2001a, 15) describes the terrorist as a lost, nameless soul who feels no 
association or connection to family or friends. Sageman’s analysis of al-Qaeda 
members add consistency to the “no single profile” theory, but also found 
clustering according to country of origin and membership95 (in Cottee 2011, 
731). Hence, characterisations are generally made concerning age,96 gender,97 
family relationships98 including marital status,99 class status,100 education level101 
                                               
95
 Sageman’s findings from biographical information included that, of terrorist individuals 
surveyed: 75% were upper or middle class; 60% were college educated; were usually 
professional or semi-professional; had an average joining age of 26; were usually married with 
children; had a 1% mental disorder rate (notably below the world base rate); 66% had joined at 
the same time as friends, or had a long-term friend who was already a member, versus 20% who 
joined with, or because of, a close relative; and 70% had joined while living in a country where 
they had not grown up (cited in Cottee 2011, 731-732).
 
96
 Hudson (1999, 27) reveals the increasing recruitment of younger people as members of 
terrorist groups. Laqueur (2001a, 38) attributes the proportion of young people involved in 
terrorism to qualities that young people possess. Terrorism requires mental and physical strength, 
which young people possess, leading them often to approach their tasks with a higher level of 
enthusiasm than middle-aged or elderly people (Laqueur 2001a, 38). This analysis is supported 
by Hudson (1999, 53), on the basis of physical demands. Laqueur (2001a, 38) does draw a 
distinction between the age of those involved in the planning and/or training aspects of terrorism, 
and the age of field operatives, noting Islamic groups as a specific example of this.  
97
 Harmon (2000, 212) comments on the incorrect perception that terrorism is dominated by 
males. Hudson (1999, 47 and 53), too, acknowledges the participation of both genders, but 
maintains that terrorism is a male-dominated field. Fair and Shepherd (2006, 52) note that 
females are more likely than males to support terrorism, and the same point has been made 
concerning support by young people over that of the older population. Gonzalez-Perez (2010) 
identified a clear dichotomy evident between the involvement of women in domestic groups and 
those in international groups. Women in domestic groups are comparatively more ‘active’, 
participating in conflict and leadership positions (Gonzalez-Perez 2010, 287). This difference in 
role can be partially attributed to group objectives; domestic groups are focused on the opposition 
within their own state and social/political structures. As such, the group can be more likely to 
reject the conventional gender roles, providing women with a greater opportunity for 
participation (Gonzalez-Perez 2010, 288). Womens’ involvement in international groups is 
largely limited to support and logistics; typically coinciding with traditional gender roles in 
developing countries (Gonzalez-Perez 2010, 288). Further, Parashar’s (2011) study examined the 
role of women in Kashmiri violence, noting their participation in a range of militant activities 
including as suicide bombers, but that due to the male-dominant conflict discourse they had been 
excluded from political negotiations and peace talks (Parashar 2011, 295-296). Additionally, 
Eager (2010, 270) notes the tendency to delegitimise women’s participation in terrorism, linking 
the occurrence of involvement to emotions or relationships. However, the motivations to engage 
in terrorism are argued to be the same irrespective of gender (Eager 2010, 270). Similarly, there 
is no female terrorist profile, noting the diversification of religion, culture, education and 
socioeconomic backgrounds (Eager 2010, 270). 
98
 Post (1990) examined the links to family composition in terms of individuals’ involvement in 
terrorism. Laqueur (2001a, 38) argues that no clear link can be discerned between terrorism and 
family background and beliefs. 
99
 Studies of marital status have revealed some interesting trends. Fair and Shepherd (2006, 51) 
describe a mixed marital status, while Hudson (1999, 46) notes the involvement of unmarried 
individuals , a status usually regarded as a benefit due to its relative lack of restrictions on 
mobility, its simpler security and its greater flexibility, and also because being unmarried limited 
distractions and outside responsibilities. 
100
 Analyses of membership of terrorist groups, or involvement with terrorism, in terms of social 
class has revealed that members of the middle class feature more prevalently in left-wing-
oriented groups than in nationalist-secessionist groups (Laqueur 2001a, 36), a tendency that also 
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and socialisation102 and childhood experiences,103 and; comparisons of leadership 
traits.104 Characteristics displaying strong predictive qualities can be used for the 
purpose of profiling, but, as noted above, which characteristics are relevant for 
profiling are susceptible to change as a result of terrorists’ awareness.  
 
Profiling 
 
Profiling of terrorists can be a contentious matter. Personality traits have often 
been considered useless as predictors of individuals becoming involved in 
terrorism (Horgan 2003, cited in Kruglanski and Fishman 2006, 195). Combs 
(2003, 54), while arguing that attempting to discover a terrorist personality is a 
legitimate venture, also acknowledges the small likelihood of success: “[i]f one 
could identify the traits most closely related to a willingness to use terrorist 
tactics, then one would be in a better position to predict, and prevent, the 
emergence of terrorist groups.” (Combs 2003, 51) Interesting, and consistent 
with the intensifying focus on radicalisation, is research delving into whether 
there is any way to profile people who are prone to, or currently undergoing, 
                                                                                                                               
proved true of al-Qaeda’s membership (Sageman in Cottee 2011). Russell and Miller (cited in 
Hudson 1999, 45) also support the observation that people of middle, and even upper-class 
backgrounds are often involved in terrorist activity. Fair and Shepherd (2006, 52) suggest that 
nothing concrete can be concluded from the relative prevalence of different income groups. 
Smith (2008, 172), too, noted the absence of a direct link between poverty (or unemployment) 
and terrorism.  
101
 There is a broad consensus that the education level of terrorist actors is generally above 
average (Hudson 1999, 44). Hudson (1999, 54) studied the education levels of terrorist leaders, 
while also considering trends in age demography. Well-educated members use skills that enable 
efficient timing of operations, influence over the media, and often also assist with the political 
arm of their respective organisation (Harmon 2000, 187). Harmon (2000, 207) refers to evidence 
revealed in court proceedings to show “how well schooled many terrorists have been in such 
social sciences and professional fields [as] psychology, sociology, history, law and journalism.” 
Former, and now deceased, AQAP leader Anwar al-Awlaki had completed several higher 
education degrees, a number of these from American institutions.  
102
 For Rubenstein (2003, 140) there appears to be little logic in arguing that terrorism is the 
result of psychopathological forces or that it is a form of ‘acting out’. On the other hand, 
Kruglanski and Fishman (2006, 195) argue that the absence of psychopathology does not make 
personality characteristics irrelevant to the study of terrorism. For example, the examination of 
traits, attitudes and tendencies such as mortality salience, sensation-seeking and authoritarianism, 
as well as situational aspects, including experience of oppression and poverty may be 
contributing elements. 
103
 Another aspect that has been raised is the potential link to theories of childhood socialisation, 
insofar as those individuals deemed to have experienced suffering and callous treatment as 
children (Staub 2004, 167) may be disproportionately represented in terrorist activity. Hudson 
(1999, 26) describes how individuals who have experienced social alienation, often in 
combination with unemployment, are more likely to become involved in terrorist activity. 
104
 Hudson (1999, 33 & 44) characterises terrorist leaders as being older and usually male.  
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radicalisation (see King and Taylor 2011; Aly and Striegher 2012) or who are 
more easily recruitable (Kydd 2011). However, as with the opposition to 
profiling, Aly and Striegher (2012, 860) argue that there is no distinct pattern to 
profile in an individual’s journey through the radicalisation process, nor is there 
any single pathway to radicalisation. Identification of common characteristics of 
individual terrorists is arduous because of evidence suggesting that there exist as 
many differences between these individuals as similarities (Hudson 1999, 40). 
The difficulties of this task are further exemplified by the diversity of 
backgrounds, cultures, nationalities and levels of social standing exhibited by 
recruits (Post 1985, cited in Hudson 1999, 40). Indeed counter-terrorism efforts 
could be hampered and less effective if based on biases and false assumptions 
and perspectives about who terrorists are (Herman 2010, 260) and what 
motivates them. For example Herman (2010, 260) acknowledges the tendency to 
masculinise the counter-terrorism approach due to assumptions pertaining to 
male dominancy, at the exclusion of female involvement. None-the-less, 
governments have even funded computer simulations in an effort to improve the 
detection of potential terrorists.105  
 
Profiling attention has also, and infamously, been given to physical traits. Fiala 
(2003, 53) has demonstrated the ineffectiveness of profiling on the basis of 
physical traits, considering it an exercise in racism; it places undue emphasis on 
racial or ethnic traits:  
 
A person’s race or ethnicity has never been a good, or even 
adequate, predictor of behavior. Using a physical description prior 
to an illegal act serves only to reinforce prejudice and 
discrimination in the name of security. In law, one simply cannot 
convict first and then look for evidence of illegal behavior; [the] 
definition of crime require[s] an illegal act first. (Fiala 2003, 56) 
 
                                               
105
 The MATRIX (Multistate Anti-Terrorism Information Exchange) Program, an American 
attempt to create a profiling system, operates on a basis that appears to be specific to the 
September 11 attacks, and does not appear to be very broadly applicable (Bergstein 2004) – the 
system identifies persons according to a set of criteria (seemingly drawn from September 11 and 
various other attacks) who are then assessed across a database containing 120,000 people who 
have been determined to have a likelihood of being involved with terrorist activities (Bergstein 
2004). The process produces a score which, when applied to the general criminal population, will 
flag other persons who may have similar motives (Bergstein 2004). This result is derived from 
state records and is passed on to investigators (Bergstein 2004).  
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The limiting nature of profiling is highlighted by the inconclusiveness of 
identifiable characteristics and their production of negative labelling (Ward and 
Hill 2003, 107). Profiling’s ineffectiveness can, in part, explain why the reliance 
on an identifiable set of individual characteristics, rather than on a set of 
behaviours, failed to avert the events of September 11 (Dedman 2001, cited in 
Fiala 2003, 56). Hence, Rubenstein (2003, 140) diverges from individual factors 
to assess the feasibility of describing situations in order to uncover the strategic 
motivations that inspire individuals to participate in terrorism.  
 
Joining a Terrorist Organisation  
 
Bandura (cited in Whittaker 2002, 81) presents the view that the “choice” to 
become a terrorist, may be due to a ‘chance life encounter’, and hence that it is 
not always a careful consideration of benefits and risks that leads to the decision 
to join a terrorist organisation. Post, Sprinzak and Denny (2003, 177) identified 
in their study that the act of joining a terrorist group was often considered to be a 
natural event – “everyone was doing it”. An alternative theory presented by 
Zuckerman (2002, cited in Kruglanski and Fishman 2006, 198) proposes that 
sensations of danger and excitement often provide an attraction. Although such 
claims are yet to be supported by empirical data, Kruglanski and Fishman (2006, 
198) noted the tendency of researchers to argue “that it seems highly plausible 
that sensation seekers may be more likely to identify with an organization that 
uses violent tactics.” As could be expected to coincide with the increasing 
amount of literature on causal radicalisation, there has been an extension of the 
‘joining’ line of inquiry to include radicalisation theories106 (to explain the 
distinct phases in the process individuals undergo that legitimises violence as a 
justified mechanism to achieve the group’s objectives), and, secondly, the 
question of why people continue their involvement with, and embrace of, 
terrorist violence and its underlying ideologies.107 
                                               
106
 Theories include Silber and Bhatt’s (2007) ‘four phase’ model (these phases do not have to 
occur in sequence) consisting of: pre-radicalisation, self-radicalisation, indoctrination and 
jihadisation (in Aly and Striegher 2012, 851), and; King and Taylor’s (2011) ‘home-grown 
radicalisation’ model, which is based on three psychological factors contributing to 
radicalisation: group-relative deprivation, identity conflicts and personality characteristics.  
107
 McBride (2011, 560) proposes the ‘existential-terroristic feedback loop’, a theory underpinned 
by the notion that people support or engage in terrorism as a way to alleviate existential anxiety. 
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Internal, individual factors and circumstances have been examined above, but 
there is also value in extending this inquiry to the collective group identity and its 
role in the individual’s decision to become involved in terrorism, as Hudson’s 
(1999) acknowledgement of the difference between understanding individuals 
and understanding the collective group supports. This personal/collective 
distinction was also noted and briefly examined by Crenshaw (1990), as well as 
by Taylor and Winnifred (2004). Hudson (1999, 55) acknowledges that although 
it may not be possible to isolate the so-called “terrorist personality”, each 
terrorist group is thought to have its own distinctive mindset, and understanding 
these may be pivotal to futures preparations.  
 
Collective Identity  
 
Volkan (1997, cited in Marsella 2002, 44) explains the influencing role of the 
group over the individual in psychodynamic terms by noting that the group 
environment often provides a sense of security and belonging by enabling the 
relinquishing of individuality to the collective group identity. Post, Sprinzak and 
Denny (2003, 176) note that individuals often take on the persona of the group to 
which they belong, often leading to an individual’s failure to distinguish between 
the group’s agendas and their own. The success or failure of the group can also 
be transferred to the individual, becoming representative of their personal 
success or failure (Post, Sprinzak and Denny 2003, 176). Post, Sprinzak and 
Denny (2003, 176) add that “[b]y belonging to a radical group, otherwise 
powerless individuals become powerful.” Post (1990, 29) explains that, for some 
individuals, being part of a terrorist group may be the first time they truly 
experience a sense of belonging. 
 
Collective identity has also become a part of the rationality debate. While 
terrorism is not always a rational choice or decision on the part of individuals 
(Laqueur 1996a) a level of rationality can be deduced among those who make 
pre- and post-event preparations. Terrorism can be the determined course of 
                                                                                                                               
Participants remain involved with terrorism when the loop is closed, because anxiety has 
compelled them to reaffirm their support and extend their participation. 
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action following the consideration of goals and possible consequences (which 
Ditzler (2004, 200) describes as a cost-benefit analysis), or it can be a wilful 
strategic choice (Crenshaw 1990). Hence terrorism may be rational on a 
collective, group level. The decision to engage in or resort to terrorism can be the 
result of a rational choice based on a number of factors, including the availability 
of alternatives and the perceived effectiveness of the terrorism option.  
 
Terrorism may be the result of its perceived effectiveness in achieving a group’s 
political objectives. Terrorism may also be selected because other ways of 
introducing change have been judged to be ineffective for mobilising the 
required support (Crenshaw 1990, 12) or are considered to be too time 
consuming (Crenshaw 2004, 59). In these ways, terrorism may provide a solution 
that is not only a cost-effective (Kruglanski and Fishman 2006, 211; 
Zimmermann 2003, 19) and cheaper alternative (in absolute terms) to war 
(Laqueur 2004, 210), and one which is also ‘media-genic’ (Zimmermann 2003, 
19).  
 
For a group, resorting to terrorism because of a desire to take direct and 
immediate action rather than follow legally recognised but slower paths to 
change (Jackson 2001, 205). Terrorism may also aid by bringing attention to 
their cause enabling agenda-setting (Crenshaw 1990, 17; 2004, 60). The 
timeliness reasoning does not detract from the potential psychological or 
organisational pressures that the group may be experiencing, for example 
impatience (Crenshaw 2004, 57). 
 
The decision to engage in terrorism may also be the result of a real or perceived 
need to save or preserve the group’s identity or to emerge from repression. This 
kind of motivation can be closely linked with cultural or ethnic conflicts. 
Hoffman (1993, cited in Ditzler 2004, 203) discusses how the fear of 
extermination or loss of cultural identity can provide a powerful motivation for 
committing acts of terrorism. Hence the question of resorting to or using 
terrorism becomes one of how to use terrorism to save the group and maintain 
the cultural values that constitute the given nation-state or system of social norms 
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(which might govern conduct, individuals’ sense of purpose and, in some 
instances, the afterlife) (Ditzler 2004, 203).  
 
Crenshaw (1990, 10) distinguishes between reasons for resorting to terrorism 
and moral justifications. For example, terrorism has been used in attempts to 
challenge or alleviate oppressive government; in such cases terrorism is often 
considered to have a moral justification, not as a simple crime (Laqueur 2001a, 
9). The decision to use terrorism is thereby closely linked to the given group’s 
ideology; though it is also frequently influenced by strategic factors, including 
the failure of other means, and/or the state’s suppression of non-violent avenues 
of recourse (Drake 1998).  
 
Zimmermann (2003, 17) notes that resorting to terrorism may not represent an 
exclusive preference, but may instead be a result of a perceived necessity from 
the perspective of a capability assessment; a conclusion which may result from 
the perception that there are no normatively accepted means of introducing 
change available (Moghaddam 2004, 112). This reasoning takes into account the 
power imbalance between the government and the decision-making ‘challenger’, 
who/which is dependent on an ability to mobilise a support base (Crenshaw 
1990, 20) and on often limited resources. On the basis of this reasoning process, 
action may be forced to go beyond political means of redress, such as elections 
(at which more marginal worldviews are unlikely to gain sufficient support) 
(Taylor and Winnifred 2004, 170) or military challenge. Where a group’s 
military strength is inferior to that of the authorities, defeat is the almost 
inevitable outcome (Taylor and Winnifred 2004, 170), a conclusion for Fotion 
(1981, cited in Primoratz 1997, 223) which does not preclude targeting military 
installations. So, although the option of attacking targets traditionally regarded as 
legitimate, such as military installations, exists, this option may not always be 
most favourable, as the litany chapter showed. This, of course, does not provide 
justification for indiscriminate targeting for the purpose of achieving objectives 
(Primoratz 1997, 223). 
 
The decision to engage in terrorism may also be a last resort. Terrorism can be 
viewed as a political act by those who believe there are no other avenues of 
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redress (Rapoport 1984, cited in Flint 2003, 161). Power-struggles are often a 
consequence of a denial of adequate representation and of opportunities to make 
suggestions for change (Whittaker 2002, 78). A group may have reached a level 
of frustration that leads to the pursuit of any option that will achieve its goals 
(Canadian Security Intelligence Service 1999). Whilst terrorism has been used as 
a primary tactic by militant groups (Laqueur 2001a, 36), “terrorism 
practitioners”, as Crenshaw (1990, 10) calls them, claim to have no choice but to 
resort to terrorism; and evidence does indeed suggest that terrorism is often the 
final choice in a series of choices (Kruglanski and Fishman 2006, 209).108 
Engaging in terrorist activity can also represent a strategic choice, selected (as 
might a political party) from among several operational modes that can bring 
attention to a cause and, in time, lead to change.109 Terrorism is obviously not the 
only method of working towards a goal, and therefore it must be compared to the 
available alternatives to determine why it is attractive to some (Crenshaw 2004, 
55) and unattractive to others.110  
 
The decision to engage in or resort to terrorist means may be linked to a group’s 
conditions and to its need to act out:  
 
…for all sides – war may be an addiction that releases us from the 
humdrum of daily life and gives us a new sense of meaning and 
purpose. It becomes an elixir rooted in new sense of purpose that is 
perceived to be noble and just. (Hedges, cited in Marsella 2002, 27) 
 
Groups that engage in acts of aggression place a higher value on their power and 
ability to act out (Eckhardt 1965 and White 1949, 1970, cited in Smith 2004, 
431) while also attempting to dramatise their cause (U.S. Army Intelligence 
Center and Fort Huachuca 1998b). Oberschall (2004, 27) notes that for action to 
emerge, a shared group ideology which pinpoints the politics or leaders as 
responsible for the group’s negative conditions or experiences must be present. 
                                               
108
 Oberschall (2004) uses the example of the gradual transition by ETA, where Basque students 
became impatient with slow political progress, turning initially to nationalist graffiti and 
destruction of Spanish-owned property before beginning campaigns of murder against public 
officials (Oberschall 2004, 28). 
109
 Kruglanski and Fishman (2006, 209) provide the examples of Hamas, Hezbollah, and Sinn 
Fein to illustrate this. 
110
 Crenshaw (1990, 17) notes that terrorism can be unattractive because it may represent a 
harmful substitute for mass participation, noting the “elitist” associations and ability to prevent 
the people for taking responsibility for their own destiny. 
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In recent times the apportionment of blame or responsibility has arguably spread 
beyond government representatives and institutions to include the wider voting 
population, which can be deemed responsible for electing the representatives 
who are at fault.111 Because of this broadening of responsibility, from some 
groups’ perspective, it is important to examine how the group describes itself and 
its operational mindset to determine if it has a predisposition to engage in or 
resort to terrorism (Smith 2004, 431). 
 
The reviewed literature has arguably revealed that the decision to engage in, or 
resort to, terrorism to achieve political objectives is dependent upon a vast range 
of individual and group dynamics. For terrorist groups there may be a spectrum 
of options to consider, and terrorism may be a first or last resort, based on the 
group dynamics and mindset used to judge the effectiveness of terrorism 
compared to other strategies and ways of increasing issue awareness and 
achieving objectives. The internal causes discussed in this section are provided in 
the summary table below, Table Two.  
 
Table Two: Emergence of Terrorism Internal Causes Summary 
 
Intrapersonal Cause Summary Commentary 
Personal traits: normality; rationality Commonality. Group defines rationality 
and normality. 
Behaviours not characteristics as 
indicators 
Profiling should be of behaviours, not 
personal characteristics. 
 
 
4.2.2 Emergence of Terrorism: External – Environmental 
Causes 
 
Environmental factors can also have a profound effect on whether a group 
decides to resort to, or engage in, terrorism. The literature suggests a range of 
external factors that lead to terrorism by directly affecting a group’s decision to 
                                               
111
 Examples of this can be found in statements by Osama bin Laden who refers to the greater US 
population as legitimate targets because of their role in electing a government that represses 
Muslims. 
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engage in terrorist acts. Similarities can be seen between the factors which 
contribute to political violence and revolution, and those that contribute to 
terrorism (Paul Wilkinson 1977, cited in Hudson 1999, 19). The literature 
contains discussions of a wide range of international and domestic conditions 
that can lead to terrorism. International conditions, such as hegemonic decline, 
globalisation, imperial or colonial competition, and the existence of terrorist 
actors in autocratic, semi-peripheral nations, have been associated with the 
emergence of terrorism (Bergesen and Lizardo 2004, 47). A combination of 
international and domestic factors are usually referred to in the literature, 
including: religious, ideological and ethnic conflicts; economic and political 
inequality; globalisation and modernisation pressures; a lack of peaceful 
communication strategies (Hudson 1999, 19); population; the level of state 
repression; the structure of political governance; ethno-religious diversity (Piazza 
2006, 159), and; poverty (refer to Bensahel 2006; Laqueur 2004; Martin and 
Neal, cited in O’Hagan 2003 and Piazza 2006). Other contributing factors 
include the lack of religious understanding (Combs 2003, 277), which can be 
extended to include cultural distance, inequality, and de facto independence, 
which can lead to ‘social polarisation’ between populations (Senechal de la 
Roche 1996, cited in Black 2004, 18). The diversity of the potentially 
contributing drivers of terrorism, or the conditions that predispose groups or 
individuals to terrorism, draws attention to the role of economic, religious, 
political and sociological factors.  
 
Wagner and Long (2004) describe four motivational categories of ‘structural 
cause’ which either singly or, when present, in combination, can lead to terrorist 
violence. The four categories are: difficult life conditions (including illness, the 
gap between ‘haves’ and ‘have nots’ in a society, poverty and hunger) (Staub 
2001, cited in Wagner and Long 2004, 211); the need for security (the lack of 
which can often result in fear) (Christie 1997, cited in Wagner and Long 2004, 
212); self-determination, and associated issues of liberty, power and happiness 
(Wagner and Long 2004, 212), and, fourthly; the need for social respect and for 
the acknowledgement by others of ethnic, religious and cultural values and 
membership in a ethnically, religiously or culturally defined social group 
(Wagner and Long 2004, 213). Wagner and Long (2004, 214) describe how, in 
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the presence of all four conditions, the environment is ripe for the creation and 
nurture of terrorist ideology.  
 
Richardson (2006) offers the theory of the ‘three R’s’ to account for terrorism: 
revenge, renown and reaction. The desire for revenge is a powerful element and a 
recurrent theme in the terrorist mindset (Richardson 2006, 113). Revenge is not 
transferable, but is taken through reliance by an individual on him or herself, or 
on the group (Richardson 2006, 131). Revenge is a prevalent individual 
motivation to become and remain an active participant in a terrorist group 
“because of the growing number of issues to be avenged and the increased 
opportunities to claim [revenge]” (Richardson 2006, 131). Renown must be 
given by the adversary and is different from merely gaining publicity in that it 
imparts a certain implied glory to the individual and the group (Richardson 2006, 
120). “The desire for renown, over simply publicity, speaks to the desire to 
redress the perceived sense of humiliation at the hands of the enemy and is linked 
to the conviction most terrorists have that they are acting morally and on behalf 
of others” (Richardson 2006, 131). The action-oriented nature of terrorists 
inevitably leads to the final driver or desire: to elicit a reaction (Richardson 
2006, 127-8). By relying exclusively on the adversary for this reaction, a dual 
purpose is served because the reaction demonstrates the terrorists’ strength and 
also communicates a message (Richardson 2006, 131). “Terrorists appear more 
interested in the scale of the reaction than the details” however, the bigger the 
reaction, the more successful the individual or group is perceived to have been 
(Richardson 2006, 131). 
 
As indicated in the previous section, the availability of response or recourse 
mechanisms, such as political processes, is a key consideration. Staub (2004, 
166) notes, specifically as regards citizens of non-democratic societies, the 
absence of opportunities to actively improve their situation through political 
means. Staub (2004, 157) connects such absences to the suggestion that terrorist 
movements exist as a way of providing basic needs to their constituents or to the 
broader community, and that such movements bring a positive sense of identity 
and a feeling that there is work being done towards achieving a better future 
(Staub 2004, 157). This assortment of positive associations facilitates, and 
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perhaps reinforces, the tendency of members of such groups to view society 
through the lens of that groups’ ideology (Staub 2004, 157). Staub (2004, 160) 
compares such requirements to societies where values are varied, where terrorist-
promoting conditions and violence are less likely to emerge, due to the greater 
potential that exists for all individuals and groups to participate in societal 
processes and decisions.  
 
Staub (cited in Taylor and Winnifred 2004, 170) provides a succinct account of 
the interrelated conditions that are thought to lead to the emergence of terrorist 
groups; these are: where there is little power or few avenues of effective 
recourse; where economic conditions and political conflict pose threats to 
national interests, and; where social change often occurs rapidly (Staub, cited in 
Taylor and Winnifred 2004, 170). Taylor and Winnifred (2004, 170) extend this 
analysis of conditions by suggesting that feelings caused by experiencing such 
conditions are often exacerbated by exposure to global communications, which 
enable social and lifestyle comparisons to wealthier nations, arousing feelings of 
relative deprivation.  
 
In summary, the core assumptions repeated throughout the literature identify the 
causes of terror as revolving around poverty; the distribution (and deprivation) of 
goods, services and resources, as well as the authority structures that organise 
and/or provide avenues of redress (Piazza 2006, 159). The ability to participate 
appears to be central to alleviating the conditions that lead to terrorism, because 
political organisations emerge in response to perceived impingements or 
challenges to the values of groups in society (James Q. Wilson, cited in 
Crenshaw 1990, 16). It has also been demonstrated that the decision to engage in 
terrorist activity is generally rational, calculated according to opportunities and 
resources – it would seem reasonable to expect to see a similar dynamic at work 
in decisions to make changes to aspects of terrorist operations. The external 
causes discussed in this section are summarised in Table Three, below. 
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Table Three: Emergence of Terrorism External Causes Summary 
 
External/environmental 
characteristics 
Summary commentary 
Motivation Difficult life conditions, need for security, self-
determination, social respect of cultural identity and 
values. 
Participation Revenge, renown, reaction. 
 
4.3 Drivers of Litany 
 
The previous section has summarised the plethora of often interrelated factors 
that lead to terrorism. This section contains an examination of the elements that 
affect terrorists’ operational decisions, decisions which initiate changes in the 
nature of the terrorist threat. The threat characterisations in the litany chapter 
affirm the popular view that terrorism is amorphous in nature. In the interest of 
producing a comprehensive and layered understanding of the past, near-present 
and futures of terrorism, this section will explore the elements that have 
facilitated or aided in the threat’s progression. In other words, this section 
contains a possible answer to the question: what are the systemic causes of the 
amorphous nature of terrorism? The importance of generating this knowledge is 
revealed by the understanding that additional changes in the threat can occur, and 
are expected to according to the proposed futures of terrorism’s litany, and that 
comprehending the dynamics of change should assist in making effective 
preparations for those futures. This understanding, in combination with that 
established in the previous section, will provide for a more comprehensive and 
holistic knowledge-base to draw from when considering the meta-level futures of 
the systemic causes of terrorism.  
 
4.3.1 Interpersonal Drivers of Litany 
 
Similarly to the literature dealing with the internal factors in the emergence of 
terrorism causes, sources on interpersonal dynamics which cause change in the 
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nature of terrorism are also dominated by psychological perspectives. This 
section contains an examination of the internal workings of terrorist groups, 
including their composition and leadership, and the mindset of innovation, and 
how these factors can produce change, or create an environment that encourages 
and sustains threat adaptation. The ‘internal causal factors of terrorism’ section 
included an examination of a number of psychological factors, and other aspects 
relevant to profiling, that have featured in the decision to either engage in or to 
become (and remain) involved in terrorism. The examination of internal group 
dynamics can also reveal insight into factors to which the production or 
encouragement of change can be attributed. Terrorist groups’ maintenance of 
operational security has made gaining information and insight difficult (Combs 
2003, 54).112 However, details have emerged which show how several 
adaptations to appearance and behaviour have challenged the set profile of the 
‘21st Century terrorist’113 of a young Muslim male. This challenge can be 
demonstrated by the tactical inclusion of women and children. The 21st Century 
focus is on ensuring that operatives blend into the community; the September 11 
operatives are exemplars of this. Operatives travelling alone, whose status had 
traditionally been beneficial because of its mobility and flexibility (Hudson 1999, 
46), have now been replaced, at times, by operatives travelling in family units as 
a way to avoid attention and detection. Undistinguished facial features and 
appearance, including following standard dress codes, can also complicate the 
profile-dependent process of identification (Hudson 1999, 46). This is 
notwithstanding further complications when recruits come from within their 
target community (Helgerson 2002a). 
 
Profiling challenges like those mentioned can also be reflected in group-
controlled selection tendencies; groups may also morph in response to internal 
pressures. Individual members can undergo change, in response to undertaking 
successful or unsuccessful attacks, for example, that, as a by-product, increases 
strain on the group’s norms and capabilities which can lead to splintering (Staub 
                                               
112
 The emergence of this information represents a combination of openness by terrorist entities 
and a change of focus by authorities. The most notable example is Osama bin Laden, on whom 
there is now vast material seeking to understand him and the collective actions he advocated and 
inspired (Combs 2003, 54). 
113
 September 11 illustrates this. 
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2004, 156). This process is exemplified by the IRA, where pressures and internal 
splintering led to the formation of a new collective identity, the Provisional Irish 
Republican Army (PIRA). The desire of some members to become more violent 
is often linked to their feeling that progress by more moderate means is too slow 
(Staub 2004, 157). This could also be linked to the perceived need to innovate, 
referred to by Sandler (cited in Faria 2006, 48) as the ‘innovation effect’. The 
term ‘innovation’, in the context of terrorism, refers to the introduction of a new 
element, for example a mode of attack, kind of target, or weapon (Faria 2006, 
48). Innovation flows from two main sources: firstly, a desire to ensure 
appropriate media coverage and, secondly, learning from the past and present, 
whether from a group’s own experiences or from those of other terrorist entities: 
 
An almost Darwinian principle of natural selection thus seems to 
affect terrorist organizations, whereby every new terrorist 
generation learns from its predecessors – becoming smarter, 
tougher, and more difficult to capture or eliminate. Terrorists often 
analyse the mistakes made by former comrades who have been 
killed or apprehended. (Hoffman 1999, 25) 
 
Innovation can also provide a strategic advantage in attempts to ensure that one 
particular movement is not displaced by another competing for the same media 
attention. The litany of terrorism has provided a baseline characterisation, 
supporting Hoffman’s ‘non-innovative terrorist tendency’ conclusion (1993, 
cited in Quillen 2002, 289). Hoffman (1993, cited in Quillen 2002, 289) argued 
that terrorists’ continuing preference for traditional weapons, such as firearms 
and explosives, represents this non-innovative tendency. Consistent with the 
conclusions drawn from terrorism’s litany, Hoffman suggests that innovation is 
exhibited in the use of weapon delivery systems, particularly in terms of the 
concealment and detonation of explosive devices (Hoffman 1993, cited in 
Quillen 2002, 289). For Hoffman (1993, cited in Quillen 2002, 289) terrorist 
innovation does not extend to the area of tactics or to the use of non-conventional 
weaponry. The litany of terrorism partially supports this assessment, with the 
notable exception of tactical and logistical adaptations and the potential for 
escalating lethality in a number of the litany’s futures. The events of September 
11 provide an excellent example, and substantiation, of Hoffman’s conclusions 
and of the systemic causes of terrorism’s litany. September 11 demonstrated the 
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use of conventional technology (as opposed to CBRN weapons) to kill on a scale 
previously unmatched by terrorists (Quillen 2002, 290). The innovation lay in the 
planning and coordination required to simultaneously hijack multiple aircraft for 
the purpose of using them as weapons. These advances represent an internal 
change in group mindset but are also linked to the external surroundings of the 
group and to its operating environment by societal, political and technological 
changes. The interpersonal drivers of the litany which have been discussed in this 
section are summarised in Table Four, below. 
Table Four: Interpersonal Drivers of Litany Summary 
 
Interpersonal Driver Summary Commentary 
Divergent group dynamics and 
group splintering 
Divided support for operational policies (e.g. 
increased violence or innovation) can lead to 
splintering. 
Professionalisation Terrorists aware of profiling, learn from 
successes and failures, value of media, 
education, seeking expertise for innovation. 
 
4.3.2 External Drivers of Litany 
 
Just as international and domestic conditions can lead to the decision to resort to 
or engage in terrorism, these conditions can also drive the amorphousness of 
terrorism, as was depicted at the level of its litany. These conditions range from 
the political landscape and world order and issues of global security, to counter-
terrorism arrangements and the effects of globalisation, modernisation and 
technological development. Wulf, Haimes and Longstaff (2003, 438) draw 
attention to the ‘elusive’ role of the geopolitical environment in cultivating and 
sustaining terrorism. It is the purpose of this section to examine the drivers in the 
external environment in which terrorism operates and their linkage with 
terrorism’s amorphous nature. These discussions are not about finding fault or 
attributing blame for present conditions, but rather for examining the wide array 
of dynamics that can affect the nature of terrorism’s litany, so that drivers of the 
futures of that litany can be factored into preparations for those futures. 
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Political Landscape 
 
Conditions relating to global stability are of increasing significance. The reasons 
for including these conditions in the stability framework are not limited to the 
propensity of various actors for committing acts of aggression, but extend to 
questions of economic or political power. Those nations included on the 
infamous “state sponsorship list”, as defined and maintained by the United 
States, remain of concern in a global sense, particularly North Korea and Iran 
(Helgerson 2002b). The potential economic and military dominance of China can 
also be seen as alarming to the West, and as a potential political and security 
challenge. Programs dedicated to advancing technology, weaponry and overall 
strategic direction have been bolstered by China’s growing economic and 
military strength – and highlight China’s status as a potential security challenge 
(Helgerson 2002b). Jones and Johnston (2013, 1) even note the possibility that 
China may become increasingly involved in supporting both insurgencies and 
counter-insurgencies if their global sphere of interest expands and their economic 
and military power continues to increase.  
 
Although developing nations can present a challenge to global stability, so too 
can states in decline. So-called “failed states” are the end result of a fatal 
deterioration of state or government power (Kegley and Raymond 2002, cited in 
Morgan 2004, 37). Failed states, or otherwise ungoverned regions, are attractive 
bases of operation for terrorist groups (Bensahel 2006, 41).114 The variety of 
weaknesses that emerge in under-governed regions, including, and in no way 
limited to, poor border controls, the existence of ethnic, religious and/or cultural 
tensions, and a fragile economy, all present opportunities and vulnerabilities that 
terrorist entities can exploit (Central Intelligence Agency 2003b; Helgerson 
2002a). The National Intelligence Council (2008, 61) draws attention to the 
‘great arc of instability’, comprised of states thought to be susceptible to conflict, 
which stretches from Sub-Saharan Africa through North Africa and into the 
Middle East, and also into pockets of South, Central and Southeast Asia.  
                                               
114
 Afghanistan and its use by the Taliban and al-Qaeda provide a good example of this. 
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It is also important to acknowledge the current world order and the global 
position of the United States in terms of that country’s effects on global stability 
and anti-Western sentiment. Tow (cited in O’Hagan 2003, 337) notes that the 
way in which the US uses its ‘capacity and influence’ can generate 
global/regional stability or instability. State sponsorship by the US was 
considered an instrument of foreign policy during the Cold War to contain 
communism (Byman et al. 2001, 1). During the 1970s-1980s, the US backed 
anti-communist groups in Afghanistan, Angola, Nicaragua, Albania, Laos and 
Tibet (Byman et.al. 2001, 39). The US provided billions of dollars to the Afghan 
Mujahedin (Byman et.al. 2001, 17), giving rise to the ‘blowback’ theory where 
US-Saudi created/funded Arab-Afghans, by extension Al-Qaeda, later turned 
against the US (Johnson 2004). 
 
Honderich (2002, cited in Held 2004, 61) considers the US to be partly 
responsible for the terrorism perpetrated against it. The title ‘world’s only 
superpower’ triggers feelings of resentment and, in turn, the view that the United 
States would make an appropriate target (Flint 2003, 162; Jenkins 2001a, 324). 
Despite this label, the US continues the pursuit of what Marsella (2002, 35) 
believes to be political, economic and cultural interests, that cause conflict, 
particularly in the Middle East. “For Osama bin Laden the kernel of conflict with 
Western nations and their allies is based on a “symbolic hegemony” in which the 
West is perceived as having usurped Islam from its rightful position of 
dominance.” (Saniotis 2005, 535) The distain felt by non-Western 
individuals/communities/civilizations for the United States is unlikely to peter 
out quickly (Hoffman 2002a, 25).  
 
The other side of the US presence relates to the vulnerabilities it exhibits, and to 
the following historical observation:  
 
[T]he great empires of the past, whether Persian, Roman, Chinese 
or British, were as long as their power lasted, able to keep their 
major cities safe from threatening barbarians on the frontiers of 
their far-flung realms. In the twenty-first century the greatest 
superpower in history was unable to keep the self-appointed 
warriors of a different world-view from attacking both its greatest 
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city and its capital (Peter Singer 2002, cited in Sealing 2003, 347-
348). 
 
For Simon (2003, 21) the United States is now limited to defence, deterrence and 
pre-emption as ways to address the conditions that may be motivating individuals 
and the greater global terrorism movement, including jihad. Nonetheless, 
advocates of the idea that the US remains strong, and aided by its allies (Simon 
2003, 24; Telhami 2004, 303), will continue their debate with those who believe 
that US dominance will be (or has already been) superseded by another (Albini 
2001, 258). 
 
Counter-terrorism Arrangements 
 
Counter-terrorism115 strategies have an important role in the action-reaction 
dynamics of terrorism, and in the amorphous nature of the threat. “Terrorists and 
counterterrorists are two creative agencies competing with each other to develop 
functionally creative products that out perform their opponents’ products, add 
value to their own products, or subtract from their opponents’ products.” (Hari 
2010, 332) Crenshaw (2007, 26) warns governments against relying on ‘rigid 
preconceptions’ about the nature of terrorism. Terrorists by nature seek to 
identify and exploit weaknesses and vulnerabilities, and are aided in this by the 
willingness to review operational decisions in light of security implications 
discovered either in pre-incident reconnaissance and/or in post-incident reviews. 
The seeking nature of terrorism stresses the importance of understanding the 
action and reaction dynamics of terrorism and counter-terrorism as a way to 
increase the effectiveness of counter-terrorism initiatives. This process of 
understanding could see a reversal of the view that the “odds that terrorists will 
succeed in launching an attack are slightly greater than those of serendipitous 
interception.” (Buerger and Levin 2005, 6) Intercepting future attacks is best 
achieved by incorporating a degree of foresight and strategic futures 
manipulation; it could also alleviate the lag time experienced by governments 
responding to terrorists’ adaptations (Faria 2006, 48). 
 
                                               
115
 For the purposes of this thesis, the distinction between counter- and anti-terrorism is not 
relevant. 
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Enders and Sandler (2000, 320) describe how the authorities, like terrorist 
entities, continuously alter existing arrangements and adopt new ones. 
Adaptations by terrorists result in previously successful counter-terrorism 
strategies becoming less effective (Enders and Sandler 2000, 312). These 
changes are designed to circumvent existing systems and tactics or, at times, can 
lead to the temporary displacement of a particular threat – target-hardening 
provides a good example of this on the counter-terrorist side.  
 
Target-hardening makes use of available intelligence to adjust the operating 
environment, making some operations more difficult or increasing the resource 
requirements and cost to terrorists (Crelinsten 2002, 94). This increase in cost 
can be demonstrated by the example Jackson (2001) explores regarding 
responses to the threat of hidden weaponry, in particular, the installation of 
detection devices, such as metal detectors and x-ray machines at a range of 
locations (Jackson 2001, 184) especially airports. Jackson (2001, 184) 
emphasises the need to continue the development of detection devices, 
particularly those capable of finding traces of CBRN weapons. Aircraft provide 
another example of adjustment and counter-adjustment. 
 
The traditional and long-standing terrorist tactic of aircraft hijacking arguably led 
to the production of a respondent mindset in which such hijackings were 
anticipated to be followed by a set of demands leading to negotiations, as 
opposed to the unconventional methods of September 11 where hijacked aircraft 
were utilised as a suicide weapon. Hoffman (2002a, 18) noted that the decline in 
policy specific to aviation terrorism in favour of other, less conventional threats, 
allowed scenarios similar to September 11 to be ignored. 
 
One of the most challenging issues for counter-terrorism preparations lies in 
identifying those entities which pose a security threat (Crelinsten 2002, 93). 
Whilst the importance of taking a case-by-case approach should be acknowledge, 
it is also important that this approach does not negatively affect nations’ ability 
to identify new adversaries. This risk is exemplified by Japan, where, in the 
1990s, the counter-terrorism focus remained fixed on the Japanese Red Army, 
failing to identify or challenge Aum Shinrikyo’s activities (Hoffman 2000, 22). 
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A similar policy-oriented mindset can be demonstrated by the locked perspective 
on WMDs in the ‘90s (Hoffman 2001c, 4); September 11 demonstrated that the 
use of WMDs (i.e. CBRN weapons) was not required to achieve mass 
destruction.  
 
Globalisation 
 
The impacts of globalisation are vast and have often acted as a catalyst for 
terrorism in terms of motivation, perpetration and innovation. Black (2004, 22) 
examines the shrinking of social space and physical distance as a result of the 
ease of modern communications and transportation systems. “In today’s 
globalizing world, terrorists can reach their targets more easily, their targets are 
exposed in more places, and news and ideas that inflame people to resort to 
terrorism spread more widely and rapidly than in the past” (Pillar 2001, cited in 
Morgan 2004, 38). Morgan (2004, 37) further emphasises this point by noting 
how the global diminution of technological, economic, cultural and political 
boundaries has affected traditional communities. These increased linkages and 
the ease of individual mobility and of the exchange consumer goods and 
services, can act as a catalyst for terrorist ideology, not only via this increased 
exchange and communications with other cultures (Black 2004), but also through 
the increased governmentality and political pressures that result from the 
reduction of traditional boundaries in the global economy.  
 
Additionally, as noted by Nassar (2010, 4), globalisation can contribute to 
homogenisation of peoples, technology and culture, leading, eventually, to 
hegemonisation. The metaphors ‘globalisation as universalism’ (Nassar 2010, 6) 
and ‘globalisation as Westernisation’ (Nassar 2010, 7) summarise these ideas 
about the hegemony that can be the result of globalisation. For example, 
“Muslim communities are finding themselves threatened, disadvantaged and 
marginalized by the processes of globalization, which they see as benefiting the 
West and harming vast segments of the Muslim world.” (Desker and Acharya 
2004, 67-68) 
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Technology 
 
Technology has contributed to changes in almost every aspect of modern human 
existence (Jackson 2001, 184). Its vast contributions have had positive and 
negative, intended and unintended consequences. Technology has created new 
vulnerabilities for industrialised countries, and incentives for their exploitation 
(Combs 2003, 278). There is debate as to the extent to which the increased 
lethality of terrorism has resulted directly from technological developments. 
Muir (2004, 80) claims that technology is the single most important 
developmental factor in modern terrorism.116 Enders and Sandler (2000, 311), 
however, argue that the temptation to attribute the increased lethality of terrorism 
to technological sophistication alone can be misleading, as there is also evidence 
that several high profile incidents involved the use of trusted techniques, 
‘improved’ by the optimisation of explosive detonation117 instead of new 
technologies. 
 
Hoffman (1998, cited in Jackson 2001, 184) describes the notion of the 
‘technological treadmill’, by which those groups who continue to engage with 
developments will, in theory, remain a step ahead of the authorities, whilst those 
electing not to innovate will be overtaken. Terrorists pursue new technologies 
due to their belief that, in doing so, they will obtain an advantage; for this reason 
technology should not be viewed as an end state, but rather as a means of 
achieving goals (Jackson 2001, 189).  
 
Technology has also facilitated developments within terrorist group structures. 
Perhaps the most notable of these concerns communications technologies 
facilitating ‘horizontal’ group structures (Stohl 2003, 90). The Internet and social 
media, for example, have also had an impact on a range of terrorist activities, 
including the spread of propaganda having been used for recruitment and 
operations planning worldwide (Helgerson 2002a; Jones and Johnston 2013). 
Prior to the Internet, these activities relied predominantly on telephone and 
                                               
116
 Increases in violence and destruction have been attributed to technological advances since at 
least the invention of dynamite in 1867 (Schweitzer and Schweitzer 2002, 27). 
117
 Increasing lethality can also be attributed to, for example, operational decisions, such as attack 
timing (during peak hours, when more fatalities or casualties can be expected).  
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satellite technologies (Nacos 2003, 11). Technology has not only allowed for 
more effective operations, it has also created new societal vulnerabilities and 
additional opportunities for their exploitation. Morgan (2004, 40) notes that as 
society increases its dependence on technologically advanced infrastructure, 
further targets for terrorism will emerge. In addition to propaganda and 
recruitment, terrorist interaction with technology has so far been merely a 
contributing element to the planning and execution of attacks, rather than 
representing a target (Morgan 2004, 40). 
 
The structure of the organisation or group also influences its degree of 
technological sophistication, and hence its utilisation of technology and the 
likelihood of experimentation in some futures. Furthermore, the uptake of new 
technologies depends on the personnel and resources available to the group, 
whether internally, through partnerships with other groups (Jackson 2001, 201) 
or through the recruitment of new members with the required skills. Training 
personnel, as in legitimate businesses, often requires face-to-face interactions, 
though these may significantly compromise the security of the group. 
Technology transfer and training can be difficult in cell-like structures because 
communication between each cell can be inhibited (Jackson 2001, 200). A flow-
on effect of this inhibition is a further reduction in internal technological 
advances, leading to dependence on securing new technologies (such as weapons 
systems) from external sources118 rather than developing and building them in-
house (Jackson 2001, 196). The rate of technological acquisition and absorption 
varies significantly between terrorist entities (Jackson 2001, 186).  
 
Sealing (2003) uses the metaphor of the counter-terrorism community ‘catching 
up’ with terrorists. The ‘balance of power’ (Jackson 2001, 185) between terrorist 
entities and counter-terrorists has changed in response to technological advances. 
Exclusively focusing on groups which have demonstrated technological 
                                               
118
 Just as international law-enforcement and intelligence agencies are encouraged to co-operate 
with one another in the ‘war on terrorism’, a similar reciprocal relationship between terrorist 
groups can also be expected. For example, al-Qaeda and its affiliates: Jemaah Islamiyah (JI, 
Indonesia), the Islamic Group for Al Jihad (Egypt), the Armed Islamic Groups and the Salafist 
Group for the Call and Combat (Algeria), Asbat al-Ansar (Lebanon), the Libyan Islamic fighting 
groups and Kashmiri militant groups operating in Pakistan, including Lashkar-e-Tayyiba and 
Harakat ul-Mujahedin (Katzman 2005, 7-8). 
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innovation will not provide a comprehensive approach to counter-terrorism. 
Terrorism’s litany has highlighted the danger posed by apparently un-innovative 
operations and thus a balance between these two approaches must be sought. 
Whilst technology appears to be a component of the terrorism problem, it is also 
part of the solution (Wulf, Haimes and Longstaff 2003, 431). The external, 
environmental drivers of the litany discussed in this section are summarised in 
Table Five, below. 
 
Table Five: External Drivers of Litany Summary 
 
Environmental Driver Summary Commentary 
Operating environment Availability and impact of failed states. Capacity, 
influence and intentions of nations to generate global 
security. Action-oriented: defence, deterrence and pre-
emption. 
Counter-terrorism Action-reaction dynamic between terrorist entities and 
governments seeking strategic advantage. 
Societal advance Traditional boundaries are challenged by globalisation. 
Technological advances create new vulnerabilities and 
opportunities, however acquisition, absorption and 
utilisation of technology varies. 
 
 
 
4.3 Future Drivers: Relationship Between Litany 
and Systemic Layers 
 
This chapter has uncovered two distinct dynamics that cause and drive terrorism. 
The first contains those personal and societal factors that lead to the emergence 
of terrorism. The ‘root causes of terrorism’ hypothesis suggests that terrorism 
exists under relatively specific personal and societal conditions, and that it may 
be part of the cyclical rhythms of the global system (Bergesen and Schoenberg 
1980, cited in Bergesen and Lizardo 2004, 47). The second dynamic contains the 
interpersonal and environmental factors that contribute to the litany of terrorism, 
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and, namely, to the tendency for the nature of terrorism to be amorphous. Threat 
adaptations, as part of terrorism’s litany, could also be described as 
manifestations of changes in the global system. Hence, the systemic causes of 
terrorism can be best characterised in terms of an action-reaction dynamic. 
 
Sinai (2004, 531) suggests that to stay ahead of the threat adaptation process and 
maintain an advantage over terrorists, “we need to utilize leading edge and 
innovative conceptual methodologies and software-based systems that are 
grounded in the social and behavioral sciences.” The application of CLA in this 
thesis demonstrates the power that innovative theories and methods can give 
Terrorist Studies. CLA has enabled the uncovering of a disconnect within 
systemic level knowledge between the causes of terrorism and the drivers of its 
litany; one is the cause, the other is the effect – the manifestation or symptom.  
 
Terrorism will continue to emerge in response to predominantly societal factors, 
as summarised in Table Three, above. These societal causes include life 
conditions, and limited or failed avenues of redress and change. The problem of 
sustainability, potentially leading to ‘resource wars’ (Lichterman 1999, 593), 
may also be a dynamic of future conflicts. A continuation of the global causal 
conditions of terrorism, such as poverty, the increasing and well-publicised gap 
between the haves and have-nots, and anti-Western sentiment will continue to 
enrage/disengage disaffected populations desiring change, thereby potentially 
expanding the pool of terrorism recruitment and radicalisation.  
 
Identifying those groups and individuals that are at risk of resorting to terrorism 
(Pillar 2004, cited in Mueller 2005b, 525) or of radicalisation in some futures has 
long-term value. According to the systemic layer, the existence of disaffected 
populations, and the potential for these to expand, facilitates the continuation of 
terrorism in very many futures. 
 
The ‘drivers of litany’ section contained discussion of multiple interpersonal and 
environmental factors which promote the continuation of the amorphous nature 
of terrorism. These drivers of change include: the political landscape, counter-
terrorism, globalisation, and technological advancement. Future large scale 
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terrorist attacks are a reality likely to occur in response to the expansion, and 
increased density, of the built environment (Lichterman 1999, 593). This notion 
is consistent with the terrorism litany findings in that additional threat adaptation 
can be expected to expand the scale of destruction and the level of sophistication 
and that this will result from a meeting between societal advances and a 
destructive mindset. It is acknowledged that certain groups may be more inclined 
than others to exhibit weaponry and tactical innovation and risk-taking (Center 
for Counterproliferation Research National Defense University 2002, 3).  
 
Technology is perhaps the most visible driver of terrorist innovation. Harmon 
(2000, 124) notes that the technological driver does not just include the 
incorporation of technical skills, but also elements of flexibility and imagination. 
The societal drivers affecting change have presented the potential of 
technological advances to be used within both the action (terrorism) and reaction 
(counter-terrorism) phases.119 Science and technology-related advances have 
been central to efforts at resolving terrorism (Wulf, Haimes and Longstaff 2003, 
431), and to understanding the potential follow-on effects of introducing new 
counter-measures into any futures preparations. 
 
In acknowledging the threat’s ‘cause versus manifestation’ characterisations, 
there is a disconnect in the counter-terrorism response: the immediate 
prioritisation of treating the symptoms. The metaphor here is ‘treat the 
manifesting symptoms’, and ignores that it is societally caused. Target-hardening 
is a prime example of a traditional response that, when applied to terrorism, can 
lead to the displacement of threat outputs, while completely failing to alleviate 
the conditions that lead to its emergence in the first place. Gunaratna (2007, 63) 
criticises the counter-terrorism strategy as being overly focused on operational 
counter-terrorism (capture, eliminate, disrupt) and the need to expand this focus 
onto the environmental factors driving radicalisation and recruitment. Wulf, 
Haimes and Longstaff (2003, 429) question whether levels of ‘hatred’ could be 
reduced by initiatives aimed at improving the quality of life of individuals whilst 
also respecting cultural values and needs. 
                                               
119
 It should be acknowledged that terrorism may also occur as a reaction to counter-terrorist 
action(s).  
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Critical to this level of understanding, and success of policies, is a case-by-case 
examination designed to determine issues specific to each group or motivation. 
Whittaker (2002, 20) argues that the effectiveness of a counter-terrorism strategy 
depends on its specificity to individual terrorist entities, whether individuals or 
collective groups. This is because, as indicated by the systemic causes analysis, 
terrorism emerges in response to a range of issues and conditions, only some of 
which partially feature as drivers of its litany, which arguably represent the focus 
of counter-terrorism initiatives. Therefore, concern revolves around applying 
initiatives created for specific nations, times and entities to other situations 
(Laqueur’s 2004, 139) and the requirement to review counter-terrorism strategies 
according to true divisions between causes and manifestations.  
 
Conditions that give rise to terrorism, including the motivations and sources of 
potential recruits, in combination with conditions that produce change, highlight 
the expected continuation of the terrorist threat in a manner consistent with the 
terrorism litany futures. Terrorism futures are no longer thought of as merely 
theoretical, but, now, as possible or even probable (Pettiford and Harding 2003, 
179). For example, continued dependence on traditional weapons is probable, as 
are future adaptations to the threat. These probable future events highlight the 
need to understand the action-reaction dynamics of the litany drivers, but not at 
the expense, or to the exclusion or isolation of the causes of terrorism and 
radicalisation. If drivers can be correctly associated with their positive and 
negative impacts, and their intended and unintended consequences, there is an 
opportunity to negate or limit the causes and manifestations of terrorism. While 
negating all drivers or contributory elements does not appear to be a realistic 
goal, because it is the nature of terrorist activity that no matter how “vigilant, the 
disaster will be the work of the “one that got away”” (Imai 2002, 99), generating 
this knowledge will add focus to those counter-terrorism efforts which are 
practicable. 
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4.4 Terrorism Systemic Causes Scenarios 
 
The systemic causes level of CLA clearly demonstrates Laqueur’s (2004, 22) 
statement, quoted at the start of this chapter, that, with terrorism as more 
generally, “nothing comes out of nothing”. The understanding formulated from 
discussions examining the causes of terrorism and the drivers of threat adaptation 
are encapsulated in a scenario matrix below. The purpose of these scenarios is to 
illustrate the meta-level systemic causes of terrorism’s futures. Similarly to the 
litany scenarios above, the scenarios are generic in terms of terrorist groups and 
geographical location. The objective of producing alternative meta-level futures 
at different levels of knowledge is to aid futures discussions and preparations 
through proactive, effective and long-term counter-terrorism initiatives. The 
challenge of the systemic scenario is found in the disconnect that exists between 
the factors leading to the emergence of terrorism (its causes), and the drivers of 
change (the symptoms or manifestation) – both of which involve intrapersonal, 
interpersonal and environmental causes and drivers.  
 
In attempting to identify and positively manipulate present or future drivers of 
terrorism, one must also acknowledge and include the grievances with which it is 
associated. The need to acknowledge and include these grievances results from 
the understanding that the causes of terrorism can be attributed to, and located 
within, environmental influences and factors, and that, furthermore, these can 
(theoretically) be addressed (Hudson 1999, 20). The hypotheses of the existence 
of a ‘terrorist personality’ or gene which destines a person to pursue a terrorist 
career are inextricably reliant on that person’s environmental surroundings and 
the experience this brings. Similarly, drivers attributing change to terrorism 
dynamics can also be addressed through pre-emptive identification so as to limit 
or reduce the tendency of the destructive potential futures described in the litany 
section above. 
 
The action-reaction dynamic, or ‘tsunami’, is central to the lens used to examine 
terrorism’s systemic causes. Two variables that together describe the action-
reaction ‘tsunami’ at the systemic level have been selected. These have been 
selected because of the requirement that the involvement of intrapersonal, 
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interpersonal and environmental societal causes and drivers be reflected. The 
manner of reactive force, and of identification, determines the redress of societal 
and personal ills. Four of the possible futures of the systemic causes of terrorism 
will be represented by a scenario each of which will be produced by the double-
driver scenario-construction approach.  
 
The selected variables are ‘identification’ and ‘reaction force’. The 
‘identification’ variable allows for the incorporation of personal elements that, in 
combination with societal grievances, lead to the decision to resort to terrorism. 
It provides a ‘voice’, per se, for the inclusion of the myriad of factors leading to 
terrorism. The high or low level of ‘identification’ is reflective of the extent of 
engagement with the terrorist entities in terms of their personal and societal 
conditions. The ‘reaction force’ variable encapsulates the action-reaction 
dynamic that is central to the lens of terrorism’s systemic causes. ‘Reaction 
force’ mainly represents the role of counter-terrorism responses in changing the 
nature of terrorism, as well as the importance of proportionality and of 
addressing both causes and manifestations of terrorism. This variable, too, is 
assessed at high and low value levels; high versus low levels of applied 
reactionary force. These high and low measures of the chosen variables are used 
in formulating the matrix that describes four scenarios for meta-level futures of 
the systemic causes of terrorism. Refer to Figure Four below for the matrix. Each 
scenario is discussed in terms of the qualities anticipated to characterise its 
respective future (represented by a quadrant). The implications of these terrorism 
futures for counter-terrorism preparations will be discussed in the concluding 
chapter.  
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Figure Four: Systemic Causes Terrorism Futures Scenario Matrix 
 
  
 
Low Identification and Low Reaction Force: Targeted Evil-
Healing 
 
The low identification and low reaction force future is one that involves 
advocacy for the healing of the terrorist entity. Low identification denotes the use 
of profiling and labelling to discern between good and evil in order to identify 
terrorists. Identification of terrorist entities is based on intrapersonal 
characteristics to the exclusion of societal causal factors. For example, the 
current stereotype of young, ‘Middle–Eastern’, ‘Arab’ or Muslim male wearing 
the traditional turban head-dress (Englert 1997, 3) identifies a subset of the 
population supposedly requiring ‘evil-healing’. The low level of reaction force 
indicates a healing mentality, similar to the identification of and treatment of an 
illness. In this future, the identification and treatment of would-be terrorists 
solves the terrorism problem. An adversarial approach is taken in this future, one 
which contextualises the terrorism problem without accounting for the role of all 
stakeholders or the environment involved in producing, contributing to or 
alleviating its causes. Indeed this future represents an ignorance of the 
environmental factors leading to terrorism. This future will depend on studies 
continuing to inform and prosecute the so-called “terrorist profile” for the 
purpose of identifying terrorists and the means of treating their terroristic 
attributes.  
 
183 
 
High Identification and Low Reaction Force: Dialogue of 
Healing 
 
The high identification and low reaction force terrorism future involves empathy 
and dialogue aimed at healing. The high level of identification with terrorist 
entities (organisations or individuals) involves a holistic review of systemic 
causes to facilitate the identification of all dynamics – intrapersonal, 
interpersonal and environmental – that have resulted in the emergence of 
terrorism. The high identification component incorporates the need to know your 
‘enemy’, the need to engage with them and truly understand their grievances. In 
this future it is acknowledged that the winning of hearts and minds is imperative, 
as improving security measures alone is ineffective (Clarke and Newman 2006, 
3). The low reactionary force, while remaining capable of reaction, can also be 
pro-active in the sense that the objective of the use of force is to address the 
issues: for example, societal ills and access to political opportunities, in the 
interest of providing sustainable, long-term solutions that reduce the occurrence 
of radicalisation or of the resort to terrorism. The effectiveness of these policies 
is dependent on engaging with the stakeholders and their broader communities, 
versus the low identification approach of proscribing a set of characteristics as 
‘evil’ and therefore requiring redress. This future will see all stakeholders 
engaged in dialogue to identify the intrapersonal, interpersonal and 
environmental causes and drivers of terrorism, with the intention of finding 
cooperative mechanisms through which to address them – many governments 
have successfully engaged in dialogue with terrorist entities; the UK 
government-IRA negotiations, for example. As with the UK government-IRA 
experience, secret talks can take place despite the official government policy 
being either to refuse to negotiate, or even communicate with terrorists 
(Richardson 2006, 259).  
 
High Identification and High Reaction Force: War and Dialogue 
 
The high identification and high reaction force terrorism future sees dialogue 
accompany war. As in the previous future, high identification with the 
organisation or individual terrorist entity involves the consideration of all 
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personal and societal causes and drivers that have contributed to the present and 
future situation; the primary difference from the preceding future is what is done 
with that knowledge. A high reactionary force response mechanism denotes, for 
example, the demonstration of military strength and global condemnation despite 
possessing knowledge of the array of factors that led to the act. Reactionary force 
may not be limited to the use of military power; it may also include the creation 
of reactionary and aggressive policies and legislation. Essentially, this future 
involves the mismatching of knowledge and the mode of redress: only the state 
can solve the problem of terrorism by applying immediate and forceful counter-
measures. Consensus of the fix is not sought, it is imposed. While the 
contributing factors have been identified, there is a predetermination regarding 
how best to achieve change in those factors; the dominant view in this future is 
that the best way is to maintain and apply overtly austere, highly reactionary and 
forceful measures. Dialogue regarding how to alleviate the causes appears one-
sided, enabling the adversarial application of reactionary force. This future also 
witnesses the exploitation of high levels of identification as a way of casting in 
and out groups.  
 
War has always been accompanied by the exchange of dialogue between 
belligerents. Examples include the Iraq and Afghanistan wars, where a level of 
dialogue was initially, and continues in some instances to be, exchanged between 
foes. In this future of war and dialogue, a consensus on the best strategy is not 
sought by the parties, it is already known: the application of force.  
 
Low Identification and High Reaction Force: Hunt, Capture and 
Kill  
The low identification and high reaction force terrorism future is characterised by 
the ‘hunt, capture and kill’ mentality. As Clarke and Newman (2006, 3) put it, 
this mentality reflects the ‘take-them-out’ mindset. Low identification again 
results in a focus on profiling (at the expense of identifying underlying 
grievances) and, secondly, the use of terrorist labelling. Combined with high 
reactionary force, this leads to a ‘no negotiations’ policy – it is only through the 
identification and extermination of evil that the problem of terrorism will be 
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solved. This future may witness the adoption of terrorist profiling to identify and 
remove persons considered to be susceptible to radicalisation or terrorist 
recruitment. It could seek to change the make-up of specific gene pools to 
remove the so-called “terrorist identity”, again without regard to the 
environmental influences at work. Furthermore, each side will continue 
demonising the other while adopting what counter-measures they can (Jasper 
2010, 110). 
 
4.5 Concluding Remarks 
 
The futures of terrorism’s systemic causes paint a different picture from those 
described in the litany – yet these are not unrelated levels of knowledge. The 
systemic layer details various action or reaction plans of relevance to the litany 
layer. For example, would a high or low identification level provide a better 
chance of counter-terrorism success in the experimentation future of the litany? 
The systemic futures draw an arbitrary dividing line between either working with 
terrorist entities as active participants and stakeholders to identify and possibly 
address the causes and drivers and applying mechanisms against those same 
populations to eradicate either the individuals or the symptoms they possess. The 
processes of redress are reactive, however scope exists for the creation of pro-
active, inclusive futures where identification is high and reactionary force is low. 
In this kind of future space, questions pertaining to the systemic causes inquiry 
and the meaning of terrorism’s litany are governed differently from those spaces 
in which identification is low. The futures with high identification can reasonably 
be anticipated to be the only ones where the distinction between causes and 
symptoms will be made, and perhaps even the angst driving anti-Western 
sentiments ‘globalisation as universalism’ (Nassar 2010, 6) and ‘globalisation as 
Westernisation’ (Nassar 2010, 7) will be superseded.  
 
While the drivers of the litany of terrorism’s amorphous nature identified at the 
systemic causes level appear to be consistent with elements of the litany scenario 
matrix (technology, for example), the systemic layer widens the focus to consider 
intrapersonal, interpersonal and environmental factors that lead to the emergence 
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of terrorism: the entry points, or gateways, to terrorism. An examination of 
counter-terrorism policies and initiatives focused on the litany-systemic 
connection/disconnection between countering the occurrence of the threat and its 
amorphous nature by treating its manifestations rather than removing terrorism 
gateways could prove interesting.  
 
Aggressive strategies which act as social control mechanisms (Black 2004, 14) 
receive mixed responses from the public. The purpose of such aggressive 
strategies, according to Jenkins (2001b, 1), is to avoid a return to a sense of 
complacency. Fear is sustained, and complacency kept at bay, by the metaphors 
‘political Islam is the new Soviet Union’ (Mostafa and Al-Hamdi 2007, 725), 
‘September 11 was a wake-up call’ (Wulf, Haimes and Longstaff 2003, 429), and 
‘we are playing catch-up with the terrorists’ (Sealing 2003). Language is central:  
 
If terrorism is condemned partly because it attempts to spread fear 
and anxiety throughout a target population, then this gives reason 
to condemn counterterrorism rhetoric that does exactly the same 
thing. If states have a duty to protect their citizens from the threat 
of terrorism, then the correct response to terrorism is not to issue 
“blanket alerts” or statements that the terrorist threat “knows no 
boundaries” but to explain the nature of the threat and the 
likelihood of attack; to aid the population in gaining a realistic 
understanding of the threat (Wolfendale 2007, 87). 
 
It is important that this level of understanding also goes beyond the superficial 
treatment of symptoms and into the domain of real and actual societal grievances 
– the gateways to terrorism. To achieve this, the governing knowledge frames 
that support or constitute problematic and inaccurate communications need to be 
identified and countered with new, shared metaphors.   
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Chapter Five: Worldviews and 
Myths  
 
 
Images are powerful. They speak for us and about us. Unquestioned, 
they maintain the status quo and give credence and respectability to 
what are unsustainable visions.  
(Kelly 2002, 569)  
 
 
The meaning ascribed to images, people and objects is contained in the nature 
and organisation of grammatical, rhetorical and narrative structures (Shapiro 
1985-6, cited in Carver and Chamber 2012, 17). Metaphors provide a textual 
mechanism for creating meaning and value (Shapiro 1985-6, cited in Carver and 
Chamber 2012, 20). But what of the relationship between metaphors and history 
in the formatting of knowledge, particularly in light of the authority the 
Terrorism Studies community gives to history? “[H]istory is the unacknowledged 
scripture of the moderns” (Lal and Nandy 2005, xii). The values that guide our 
collective choices are supposed to be supplied by history, however “we choose 
[those values] according to the parameters of history not because we are 
immersed in history but because history is the last recourse of those rendered 
socially and politically rudderless and looking for something authoritative or 
canonical.” (Lal and Nandy 2005, xii) Furthermore, “[t]he truth of the past is a 
construction. All history is ultimately a construction” (Nandy 2006, 90). This 
construction can not only set the parameters for knowledge and understanding, 
but can shape the dominant views and direction of problem-solving. The 
Terrorism Studies community has largely failed to identify the governing 
metaphors of terrorism and to assess their impact on knowledge-shaping and 
problem-solving (counter-terrorism). Furthermore, the Terrorism Studies 
community has failed to generate new metaphors to steer humanity towards 
preferred terrorism futures through positive futures manipulation.  
 
This chapter is concerned with exploring, and deconstructing, terrorism framing: 
what terrorism worldviews and myths led to the construction of the terrorism 
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knowledge and futures that were generated at the litany and systemic causes 
levels? CLA contends that there are four levels (or layers) of reality: the litany, 
systemic causes, worldviews and myths. Worldviews are an actor and a system-
invariant mechanism: “we inhabit the theoretical frameworks we employ to make 
the world intelligible to us.” (Inayatullah 2010b, 101) Worldviews frame issues 
in a particular manner so as to prescribe a solution or explanation (Fricker 2002, 
537). The importance of understanding worldviews has been summed up by 
Milojević (2004, 264-265), who states that examinations of worldviews and 
myths enable us to:  
 
…see how deep beliefs, such as the belief that humans are inherently 
competitive and selfish, create a worldview that informs discussions 
that in turn formulate policies that determine actions… Or, how these 
actions and policies differ from those that are formed by the 
worldview that emphasise the role of communication, cooperation, 
altruism, caring and nurturing as the main themes in human evolution. 
(Milojević 2004, 264-265) 
 
Beneath the reality governed by a given worldview, there is a fourth level of 
knowledge-framing, informed by grand myths or metaphors. This level of reality 
is concerned with visual images generated within the deep unconscious. 
 
CLA provides a powerfully logical and intuitive system with which to examine 
the connections and disconnections between terrorism’s litany and its systemic 
causes by actively exploring the governing worldviews and myths. One such 
disconnect exists between popular opinion and the accurate representation of 
terrorism trends, particularly concerning the likelihood of becoming a direct 
victim of a terrorist attack. Despite the reduction in the frequency and increased 
lethality of terrorist events, there is an overwhelming fear of being a victim, 
despite statistical comparisons to everyday activities which should mitigate 
public fears.120  
 
There is also a significant disconnect evident between the litany and systemic 
causes pertaining to what should be done regarding gateways to terrorism. The 
systemic largely reacts to the litany: at the litany level, terrorism presents a 
                                               
120
 As noted above, in the post-September 11 environment there was a greater likelihood of dying 
of a bee sting allergy, lightning strike or DIY accident than from terrorism (Jackson, cited in 
Wolfendale 2007, 77). 
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constantly evolving and ever-present threat in the 21st Century, with amorphous 
terrorism futures anticipated to contain a highly capable threat requiring 
containment to curb the continuous targeting of innocent civilians across the 
globe. Whilst academics, think-tanks and governments alike have identified the 
types of threats posed by various terrorist elements and have characterised their 
evolution, initiatives have largely remained centred on threat displacement 
(airport security measures being a prime example), and the abovementioned 
difficulties in profiling (most terrorists appearing to be “normal”), despite 
accepting that assisting disaffected communities, particularly young people, and 
winning the battle of hearts and minds are key policies. And yet the approach 
seen at the systemic level exhibits the continued imposition of the ‘good and 
evil’ dichotomy. Hence, there is a prioritisation of engagement with trends rather 
than with the stakeholders and with attempts to address the gateways to terrorism 
– enter the terrorism industrial complex. Similar to Inayatullah’s (2003b) 
challenge to the idea that war is here to stay, we need to challenge the aspects of 
terrorism’s litany and systemic causes that support the threat, specifically by 
challenging the underlying worldviews and metaphors that perpetuate it.  
 
Another example of the disconnect between terrorism knowledge generated at 
the litany and systemic levels is the implicit policy preference for providing 
distance from the subject, an effect achieved by maintaining low levels of 
identification with the other. An interesting and positive adjustment observed in 
the Iraq and Afghanistan war strategies was the acknowledgement and 
incorporation of dialogue. The importance of engaging in dialogue as a means of 
achieving or promoting national security was also demonstrated by President 
Barack Obama, first in his message to the Iranian people in March 2009, and 
then in mid-2011 with his confirmation that the United States was seeking to 
engage in dialogue with elements of the Taliban. The use of dialogue as a 
strategy, as opposed to a reliance on aggressive military action, raises the 
question of whether we have witnessed a transition away from the infamous 
‘non-negotiation’ policies.  
 
Analysis of the worldview and myth levels of knowledge seeks to enable the 
discovery of revelations from the unconscious mind. The worldview can be 
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examined from four different vantage points of knowledge: stakeholders, 
ideology, civilisation, and the episteme; while myth identification may uncover 
particular ingrained, unconscious images. This is a level of knowledge and 
research that is yet to emerge in Terrorism Studies. It is hoped that by 
incorporating these elements into Terrorism Studies not only can a more 
comprehensive understanding of terrorism be established, but that the 
effectiveness and longevity of counter-terrorism strategies will be increased, by 
challenging and re-ordering knowledge in a manner that enlightens policy and 
creates opportunities for shared positive manipulation of the futures. 
 
This chapter addresses the research objectives of this thesis: 
• Objective One: to identify a range of meta-level terrorism futures that 
represent different levels of terrorism knowledge; 
• Objective Two: to apply the Futures Studies theory and method of CLA and 
Scenarios, demonstrating the value of applying non-traditional 
methodological approaches to Terrorism Studies; 
• Objective Three: to utilise CLA to develop a comprehensive understanding of 
terrorism, facilitating the construction and deconstruction of terrorism 
futures; and 
• Objective Four: to use Scenarios to capture the constructing and 
deconstructing nature of terrorism worldviews and myths for the purpose of 
creating a scenario matrix presenting a range of alternative terrorism futures. 
 
The central objective of this chapter is to identify the dominant discourses and 
ingrained metaphors that frame terrorism and, therefore, also frame the 
knowledge generated at the litany and systemic causes levels. This emphasises 
the point that “one cannot discuss ‘world problems’ without giving due weight to 
the traditions, epistemologies and communities of discourse which arguably gave 
rise to these problems in the first place.” (Slaughter 1996b, 21) The worldview 
layer reveals different vantage points, while the myth layer of CLA provides the 
means by which to identify and challenge traditional conceptions and 
understandings of the past and present through the identification and 
deconstruction of terrorism myths, also referred to as metaphors. The following 
myths/metaphors have already been identified above: 
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- September 11 was a ‘wake-up-call’ (Wulf, Haimes and Longstaff 2003, 
429); 
- we are ‘playing catch-up’ with the terrorists (Sealing 2003); 
- political Islam is the new Soviet Union (Mostafa and Al-Hamdi 2007, 
725); 
- al-Qaeda’s Islamic fundamentalism has the monopoly on ‘the jihad 
enterprise’ (adapted from Jenkins 2007, 6); 
- counter-terrorism is treating the symptoms, not the causes; 
- ‘globalisation as universalism’ (Nassar 2010, 6); and 
- ‘globalisation as Westernisation’ (Nassar 2010, 7).  
 
This chapter provides a fused analytic picture informed by the understandings 
and characterisations which emanate from conducting analysis through CLA’s 
different lenses: litany, systemic causes, worldview/discourse, and 
myth/metaphor. Whilst the scenarios drawn at the litany and systemic levels can 
assist in informing counter-terrorism initiatives, the futures depicted through the 
analysis of worldviews and myths (fused with and informed by knowledge 
generated at the litany and systemic levels) provide a solid foundation from 
which to truly engage with alternative terrorism futures and for directing and co-
ordinating the overarching counter-terrorism approach. The adapted ‘CLA 
iceberg’ chart in Figure Five below demonstrates the counter-terrorism focus at 
the respective levels. 
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Figure Five: Adapted CLA Iceberg with Counter-terrorism Focus 
 
 
This chapter provides an integrated discussion of terrorism’s worldviews and 
myths. The differences between the third (worldview) and fourth (myth) levels of 
CLA will be spelled out, but for the sake of the flow of argument, and due to the 
inter-connectedness of these two levels, separate chapters have not been required. 
From the thesis thus far, terrorism can be characterised as an amorphous and 
escalating threat with various causes and contributing factors that are approached 
in a highly subject-focused and reactive manner. The purpose of this chapter is to 
find the unconscious dimensions of terrorism that have built or sustained the way 
the threat is viewed, constructed, understood and countered. In essence:  
 
We are interested in identifying and understanding the many different 
images of the future that exist, understanding why certain people have 
certain images rather than others, how their different images of the 
future lead to specific actions or inactions in the present, and how 
present actions or inactions themselves create certain aspects of the 
future. (Dator 2002, 7) 
 
This chapter is structured according to Inayatullah’s (2004, 541-542) conceptual 
framework, which identifies that discourse is produced by the combination and 
interaction of four levels: stakeholders, ideology, civilisation, and the episteme. 
Each level demonstrates a different worldview or way of knowing or securing 
knowledge, because issue analysis is not independent of an observer’s episteme 
and ontology (Inayatullah 2004b, 57; Ramos 2010, 296). For Paz (2012, 207) 
“[f]uture facts are created twice, first on the mind and then in reality.”  
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Due to the interconnectedness of the worldviews and myths of terrorism, the 
metaphor representing the assumptions made about terrorism and its possible 
futures will be presented for each of the four worldview groupings. As in 
previous chapters, these understandings will go into creating a scenario matrix. 
The worldview/myth scenario matrix is fundamentally different from that at the 
litany and systemic causes levels (which describe alternative futures) because its 
purpose is to capture what alternative terrorism futures would evolve as a result 
of the dominating episteme. The terminology and methodological conceptions 
key to this chapter will now be explained; that is, what is meant by worldviews 
and myths, and the roles of the stakeholders, ideology, civilisation and episteme. 
 
5.1 CLA: Worldviews and Myths 
 
The worldview and myth levels (the third and fourth levels of CLA respectively) 
operate on the premise that there are different levels of reality and different ways 
of knowing (Inayatullah 1998, 392) and hence seek to identify and uncover 
different kinds of knowledge. The worldview level is concerned with the 
structure of interactions, commonly referred to as the discourse. The worldview 
examination demonstrates how different discourses can structure the way in 
which a subject is understood or conceptually framed (Inayatullah 1998, 393; 
Kelly 2002, 565). Generally, an individual’s images of the futures are dependent 
on their ability to create images according to their values and concepts of a ‘just’ 
and ordered society (Inayatullah 2005, 29). These value systems exist within 
structures, ranging from epistemological to biological, technological, social and 
economic (Inayatullah 2005, 29-30). Each value system can support a different 
reality. Hence, for Inayatullah (2004a, 12), discourses that emerge from 
worldviews are perceived in terms of constituting the relevant problem, rather 
than the causes of that problem. As such, differing worldviews can contribute to, 
or be used to determine, the in- and out-groups: the battle lines. The 
myth/metaphor level represents the unconscious aspects of a problem, which 
may have supported or developed the perspective and therefore implicitly shaped 
actions and inactions according to the worldview (Blass 2003, 1048). The 
worldview level enables researchers to see the problem differently by identifying 
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the key assumptions behind it (Kelly 2010, 1111), by asking, for example: who 
are the stakeholders and what are their ideological positions on how the world 
should be? (Kelly 2010, 1111). Metaphors are useful tools for interpreting how 
we frame certain issues (Wright 2010, 91). Myths can contain the emotive 
dimension of a larger problem (Inayatullah 2004a, 13) and are located or 
embedded in life structures, that is in cultural and social institutions (Turnbull 
2004, 174) or, in the case of terrorism, in the ‘terrorism industrial complex’. For 
Kelly (2006, 141) metaphors can offer a lens that is different from the dominant, 
Western, rational way of thinking – an important feature to include in terrorism 
research because of the sheer volume of Western-authored material and the lack 
of inclusive and shared metaphors. 
 
Reaching this level of knowledge is an important achievement for the Terrorism 
Studies community as these worldviews and their governing metaphors are the 
“mental structures that shape the way we see the world.” (Lakoff 2005, xv) As 
such, goals, visions, policies and institutions are already shaped according to 
these governing metaphors (Lakoff 2005, xv). It is arguable, therefore, that any 
research intent on contributing to counter-terrorism policy and initiatives must 
acknowledge, understand and challenge these metaphors. In this thesis, the 
worldview and myth levels provide the bridge required to examine how and why 
the present has unfolded the way it has, and also provide the means to engage the 
future as a space that is susceptible to positive and shared manipulation, 
generating new metaphors. Understanding the presence of different terrorism 
worldviews and metaphors enables us to “discern the wider ground from which 
images are constituted so as to take an active part both in creating and nurturing 
those which seem worthwhile.” (Slaughter 1991, cited in Hicks 1994, 15) For a 
subject such as terrorism, the full exploration of its myriad issues and 
perspectives must be broad and involve dialogue – this thesis merely touches the 
surface in this regard, but does provide the foundation and direction for deeper 
examinations and methodical exploratory research on the construction and 
deconstruction of terrorism futures. 
 
As previously noted, this chapter is structured according to the four worldview 
groupings: stakeholders, ideological, civilisation, and episteme. As per Figure 
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Six below, each of these categories contains multiple subgroups – whether these 
represent groupings of people or of thought – that can have shared or divergent 
knowledge frames. That is, for a subject such as terrorism, there may be 
numerous subgroups of stakeholders, e.g. terrorists, victims, governments, 
sympathisers, the media. No two subgroups are likely to share the same 
worldview on terrorism. It is also hypothesised that in addition to non-consensus 
within stakeholder subgroups there are likely to be different viewpoints across 
the worldview level; this highlights the different levels of knowledge and how 
these are supported, governed or ingrained by metaphors. It is also important to 
acknowledge that the myth level is based on the author’s interpretation and as 
such is subject to the author’s epistemic schemas. Nonetheless, incorporation of 
the episteme is important given that reactions to events are determined by how 
actions are initially interpreted (Harré 2004, 91). 
 
Figure Six: Terrorism Worldview Categories and Subgroups 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
5.2 Stakeholder Worldview 
 
Knowledge about the future is particular to individuals (Dator 2002, 10) and 
should be conceptualised with regard to their worldview. These worldviews can 
provide a source of difference and, perhaps, of tension. For Turnbull (2004, 167) 
tension can exist between individuals, between individuals and the community or 
between communities. Turnbull alludes to the fact that knowledge about issues 
and their futures is largely identity-based, whether at an individual level, or at the 
level of collective groupings of communities or organisations: 
 
Stakeholder  Ideological  Civilisation  Episteme 
Terrorist  Political  Confucian  Language & dialogue 
Government  Religious  Islamic  Discourse 
Media      Hindu    
Victim      Latin American   
Community     Japanese 
      Western  
      African 
      Slavic-Orthodox 
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The human idea of the future is not only based on a sharp analysis of 
a single moment or action and its varying factors; it is also affected 
by emotions, fears, hopes, personal history, and experiences, as well 
as by the general views, values, and opinions shared by society and 
the environment. The orientation toward the future is based on how 
these images become parts of a person’s reality and thus also how 
they become determinants of his or her behavior and decision 
making. (Rubin 1998, 498) 
 
Hence, individual stakeholders’ perceptions of terrorism and its possible futures 
differ according to their experience, and environment, and it is those very factors 
that can inform their membership of a particular collective group. It is important 
to explore difference in stakeholders’ viewpoints. Identifying the range of 
stakeholders in any particular problem or issue enables the formation of a more 
robust understanding of the interrelated dynamics at play in that problem or 
issue, including personal and community biases, perceptions and driving values. 
Stakeholder identification is important given that “no man looks at the world 
through pristine eyes. He sees it edited by a definite set of customs and 
institutions and ways of knowing.” (Ruth Benedict 1961, cited in Slaughter 
1996a, 110) 
 
The process of identifying the full range of terrorism stakeholders and engaging 
with the differing perspectives is not to be confused with sympathy for a terrorist 
cause. As indicated in the methodology chapter, the inclusion of terrorist 
perspectives has been attempted by reviewing texts and other materials authored 
by terrorist entities. Including every terrorist entity or organisation is beyond the 
scope of this research, so the application of CLA to specific terrorist 
organisations would be a worthwhile endeavour for later researchers. For the 
purposes of this section, only generic stakeholder groupings will be discussed, 
with case-specific examples used to illustrate certain points. The included 
stakeholders are: terrorist actors, government actors (including police, the 
military, intelligence agencies and political parties)121, the media, direct and 
indirect victims, and the community. A summary of stakeholders’ generalisations 
about themselves, the other, terrorism and terrorism futures will now be given 
                                               
121
 Which, in their own ways, have competing viewpoints regarding the threat of terrorism – 
especially intelligence and law enforcement stakeholders. 
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before a more detailed look at the two key diametrically opposed stakeholders is 
taken. 
 
Terrorist Actors 
 
Encapsulating the terrorist identity is difficult as participants range from 
individuals, leaders and recruits to the community and other supports, such as 
state sponsorships or other avenues of direct government involvement. For the 
purposes of this section, the terrorist entity will be treated as collective, divided 
according to which groups can be identified as being inspired by an over-arching 
political ideology. Ideology is important because it provides a basis of meaning 
and purpose (Marsella 2002, 41). In terms of constituting an overarching 
ideology, the list in Chapter Three: Litany of nationalism, secessionism, ethno-
centrism, religious fundamentalism and extremism, cults and apocalyptic visions 
provides a consistent base. It is hypothesised that while each organisation or 
entity differs according to its individual worldviews, internally, its views of 
itself, of the other and of terrorism are likely to share similarities, unless there is 
significant splintering within the group that has either been caused by or has led 
to competing worldviews within the group.  
 
As discussed in Chapter Four: Systemic Causes, the act of terrorism is justified 
by terrorist actors (whether representing a last or first choice) as an effort to 
actively correct or adjust their circumstances or redress their grievances. The 
actors view of itself is therefore one of correctness, one of authority in terms of 
justly committing acts against the ‘other’ which may, in the target selection 
process, have been identified as complicit in some grievance, and therefore as a 
legitimate target.122 Individual identity can also, to a great extent, be transferred 
to the group.123 The importance of the endeavour and of the collective group is 
derived from the understanding that “[t]he limited life-span of the individual 
means that all must face a personal extinction. But the knowledge of death may, 
                                               
122
 The spectrum used in determining innocence varies. For George Habash there are no innocent 
victims (Catignani 2005, 248). This sentiment is similar to that expressed by Osama bin Laden, 
who viewed the American public as responsible through their voting power. 
123
 Refer to earlier section on collective identity within the discussion of the emergence of 
terrorism in Chapter Four: Systemic Causes. 
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to some extent, be offset by knowing that the social collectivity will continue.” 
(Slaughter 1996b, 138)124 This is an important point in terms of achieving 
objectives in the futures or arriving at a desired future. The terrorism literature 
shows that terrorists often do not have a predefined image of the future world 
that they are working towards. Images of a future Islamic state (in which Western 
forces have been expelled and Islamic law (Shariah) has been reinstated), as 
described by extremists such as Bin Laden, represent the desire to return to an 
earlier time (to go ‘back to the future’, as it were) and lack the engagement with, 
and review of, causal factors that have led away from that past. Is this desire to 
return the past truly the preferred future?  
 
Whilst this section is concerned with identifying stakeholders and their 
perceptions of the self, the other and the act of terrorism, ideology is deeply 
entrenched in these matters and will therefore be briefly introduced at the 
stakeholders’ worldview level, with more detail to follow in the next section. 
Ideology can provide the “blind commitment that offers the comfort of knowing 
one is “right”” (Marsella 2002, 42). Ideology can also offer the vision or 
inspiration for violence which shapes a person’s view of the world and which 
determines how people and institutions are perceived and, therefore, adjusted 
(Drake 1998). A flow on from this is the identification of difference and, thus, 
the selection of targets and the dehumanisation that allows for the doing of harm 
and the displacement or transfer of blame for a person’s actions, situation or 
experience onto another (Drake 1998).  
 
Government Actors 
 
Government actors vary according to the governance structure, for example: 
democratic, plutocratic or autocratic. In addition to structural differences, a 
government can be comprised of sub–components, for example: intelligence 
agencies, the military, police forces, welfare agencies, and political parties at 
local, tribal, state and/or federal levels. The existence of separate government 
actors invariably means the existence of competing mindsets.  
                                               
124
 Those involved in suicide attacks demonstrate this concept.  
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Government actors assume a position of authority and view themselves as 
representing what is true, right and correct for society, while the other, terrorist 
actors, for example, are wrongdoers who engage in atrocities, which, depending 
on the specific government entity’s role, are to be prevented, thwarted or 
prosecuted. This focus on prevention is emphasised by Richardson’s (2006, 261) 
characterisation of post-September 11 American policies which arguably focused 
on stopping terrorism to the detriment of assessing and alleviating the sources of 
motivation. Governmental perceptions of terrorism are largely based on the 
systemic action-reaction dynamic, starting with the condemnation of the terrorist 
event and followed by what Richardson (2006, 276) refers to as “severe security 
measures” and/or the introduction of “draconian counter-terrorist legislation”. 
The view of the government stakeholder is that of the self-assertive authority of 
correctness, which extends to the role of protecting the community from the 
terrorist other – whose acts are to be prevented, interrupted and, where possible, 
prosecuted so that ‘justice’ will prevail and a utopian future of less violence for 
conforming members of society will result. This analysis reveals a strong but 
unsurprising dichotomy, placing government and terrorist actors in direct 
opposition to one another. 
 
Media 
 
The mass media is a primary source of public knowledge about political and 
social problems (Crelinsten 2002, 100) and as such provides an effective means 
of portraying a cause to a target audience (U.S. Army Intelligence Center and 
Fort Huachuca 1998a). While the media is theoretically free, it is not free of bias 
or of the influence of pre-existing worldviews; “[t]he media agenda is strongly 
influenced by political events, disasters, commercial imperatives and short-term 
thinking. It seldom looks at processes, good news, non-commercial values or 
long-term thinking.” (Slaughter 1996b, 86) In terms of terrorism, the media is an 
important stakeholder. Former Prime Minister of the UK, Margaret Thatcher 
(cited in Englert 1997), emphasised that the media is the “oxygen of terrorism”. 
The vast array of communications technology available (Nacos 2003, 5) coupled 
with the real-time impact of those technologies (Rubin 1998, 497) has aided in 
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the communication of terrorism, whether it be in coverage of events or in the free 
dissemination of terrorist propaganda.  
 
In addition to deciding what and whom to present (Nacos 2005, 436), media 
coverage remains interesting in terms of the way in which it places the relevant 
events, issues and actors into contextual frameworks of reference for the 
audience (Morris 1997, cited in Nacos 2005, 436). Again there exists a sub-
group, media depictions of which would align or vary depending on the audience 
or market. For example, Australian coverage of terrorism would differ from that 
of the Arabic Aljazeera network, which would differ in turn from that of the 
English-language Aljazeera network. The inclusion of the media as a stakeholder 
is an acknowledgement of the important role that the media plays in shaping the 
individual, community and national epistemes of an issue (as the litany chapter 
made clear). This shaping can be demonstrated by the apparent, and significant, 
lack of reporting on contextual or thematic aspects that would increase public 
understanding and awareness of why terrorism occurs (Iyengar, cited in Nacos 
2005, 437), as per the litany-systemic disconnects discussed briefly in the 
introduction to this chapter. 
 
From a stakeholder perspective, the media views itself as performing a job, or 
fulfilling a duty, to impartially inform the community of ‘newsworthy’ events. 
Hence, the view of the other, whether it be terrorist or government actors, is of a 
character in a story; presented to inform while securing sales and ratings for the 
business. September 11 is almost certainly the most watched terrorist incident 
(Nacos 2003, 5) ever to have occurred and sufficiently demonstrates the media’s 
power, and the use of that power by terrorist stakeholders; modern terrorists have 
learnt that the media provides the necessary link between themselves and their 
audience (Combs 2003, 137). That is, terrorists are thought to calibrate their level 
of violence as required to secure, and possibly sustain, media attention (Nacos 
2003, 4) for their cause as an effective way to magnify audience size (Traugott 
and Brader 2003, 183). This use of the media by terrorist actors reinforces the 
need for journalists and editors to establish a proactive information strategy that 
departs from the tendency to allow terrorist-related events to dominate the news 
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(Cralley, Garfield and Echeverria 2004, II-16), and that accurately informs their 
audience beyond the confines of ‘here and now’ storytelling. 
 
Direct and Indirect Victims 
 
While terrorist stakeholders would argue that there are no innocent victims,125 a 
population does exist which has directly or indirectly experienced terrorist 
violence. This subset’s identification may be intrinsic to Western culture, as so 
potently illustrated by recurring interviews with survivors of the Bali bombings 
or of their families and those of victims following the high profile prosecutions 
of the bombers in Indonesia. Direct and indirect victims are an important 
stakeholder in terms of their ability to mount pressure on governments. This 
section identifies those persons considered to be victims of terrorism, whether 
directly (through injury or loss of life) or indirectly (as part of a broader 
community experiencing fear, or financial hardship connected with an incident). 
The victims deserve consideration because the terrorism does not seek specific 
victims (it is indiscriminate by nature) (Garrison 2003, 43) except where the 
individuals affected are the primary target, as political figures have been. A 
victim’s understanding of terrorism is determined by experience and information 
provided by governments and the media. On the basis of this combination of 
experience and information, the victim stakeholder would identify themselves as 
a person who has experienced, or fears, harm and adversity, who views the other 
(the terrorist wrongdoer) as having committed unjustified acts of horror against 
innocents. In other words there is a very strong oppositional dichotomy between 
the victim and the terrorist, similar to that between government and terrorist 
stakeholders. 
 
Community 
 
Broadly speaking, two distinct community-based groupings can be drawn with 
regard to terrorism: those that fall within the indirect victims sub-group, and 
those that may be more closely aligned, or can identify, with a terrorist cause, 
                                               
125
 This point goes back to the voting power justification used by bin Laden. 
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particularly active sympathisers and supporters. Whether the stakeholder is 
identified as a supporter or as a member of the broader global community 
determines that stakeholder’s view of itself, the other and the act of terrorism.  
 
Table Six below provides an overview of the stakeholder worldviews, 
summarising this section so far: views of the self, the other and the act of 
terrorism according to stakeholder subgroup. 
 
Table Six: Stakeholder Worldviews Summary 
 
Identity View of Self View of Other View of Act 
Terrorist Right Complicit in 
wrongdoing; 
legitimate target 
Justified means of 
change; of gaining 
attention, support and 
fear 
Government Authoritative, 
correct 
Criminal; a security 
threat 
Criminal act that is to be 
prevented (intelligence), 
interrupted 
(intelligence/military/ 
police), and prosecuted 
(military/legal) 
Media Impartial, 
‘job/duty’ to 
inform  
An actor that 
produces a story, 
headline, and 
ratings/sales 
Powerful images and 
stories of the immediate 
present, largely 
disconnected from the 
past and possible futures 
Direct and indirect 
victims 
Suffering, 
comprehension is 
difficult 
Wrongdoer Unjustified act of horror 
against innocents 
Community: 
broader global 
community 
Innocent and not 
connected 
Fearful  Unjustified act, lack of 
understanding and 
comprehension 
Community: 
terrorist supporter 
or sympathiser 
Supportive to the 
terrorist cause 
Proud to assist Necessary and required 
contribution  
 
 
Stakeholder Worldview Characterisations 
 
The stakeholder worldviews display the existence of three broad, alternative 
views of the self, the other and the act of terrorism. These three positions are 
either in diametric opposition or represent a mixture of positions that potentially 
counter-balance one another to settle at a neutral middle-ground. Whilst the 
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media operates from a different motivation, arguably reflective of its 
‘responsibilities’ and the demands of its market (the audience), terrorist and 
government stakeholders appear to be complete opposites and have directly 
competing worldviews. (Note that the position held by victim stakeholders is 
aligned with the government stakeholder worldview.) The direct opposition 
between terrorist and government/victim stakeholders determines the boundaries 
of right and wrong and places these stakeholder groups in direct conflict with 
each other. Additionally, this conflict could be strengthened further by the 
narrative of blame between terrorists and their audience that Richardson (2006, 
277) describes.  
 
As the brief descriptions above show, media and community stakeholders have a 
mixture of viewpoints that, pending the dominating viewpoint, can shift their 
association from one side of the dichotomy drawn between terrorist and 
government stakeholders to the other. The media is on the ‘middle-ground’ due 
to the onus it bears of reporting ‘fact’ (through text, sound and images). Bias in 
media reporting could also be considered a natural factor, resulting in the 
tendency shown by particular media representatives to align more closely to one 
end of the spectrum. Western-oriented media sources, for example, will be 
implicitly closer to their aligned audience. Due to existence of opposing 
community stakeholder subgroups (community versus sympathiser) this 
stakeholder group has also been positioned mid-point between the opposing 
stakeholders, but can also slide closer or further away depending on the nature of 
its associations. These characterisations have been condensed in Figure Seven, 
below, demonstrating the linearly dichotomous relationship of stakeholders 
developed from the fusion of viewpoints of the self, the other and acts of 
terrorism. 
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Figure Seven: Linear Dichotomy Stakeholder Relationship 
 
 
 
For the purpose of this section, ‘government actors’ does not include those 
governments designated as terrorist organisations, such as Hamas. Figure Seven 
above displays the characterisation of diametric opposition between terrorist and 
government stakeholders. The existence of such a dichotomy can lead to 
dangerous assumptions.126 The media and community stakeholders are situated in 
the middle, reflecting their mixed nature, the potential bias or identification with 
either side and the potential for this bias or identification to shift over time. 
Victim stakeholders are aligned with the government in calls for immediate 
action, or reaction in the form of retaliation:127  
 
Certainly the Bush administration felt compelled to take immediate 
action in response to the attacks of 9/11 rather than wait for the 
Pentagon to produce carefully calibrated war plans. But the 
experience of other countries in combating terrorism makes 
abundantly clear that successful counter-terrorist campaigns require, 
above all, patience and a long-time horizon. (Richardson 2006, 218) 
 
 
 
Individual and, arguably, group perception is significant in terms of interpreting 
and understanding terrorism and terrorism futures; “[i]t [perception] influences 
your action in the present which sets your course into the future, it is the 
mindscapes of today that will create the realities of tomorrow.” (Scheel 1988, 7) 
Deeper examinations are required to determine how the dichotomy 
characterising stakeholder worldviews has created terrorism knowledge and 
                                               
126
 Take, for example, the opinions that surfaced in a study conducted by the Pew Research 
Centre which found that Westerners view Muslims as violent and fanatical while Muslims see the 
West as having aggrieved them (Jackson 2007, 422). 
127
 The UK-IRA conflict provide an excellent example of the reaction time-frame (Richardson 
2006, 218). 
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viewpoints, and such examinations could be deepened further by intentionally 
applying group- or country-specific lenses.128 With regard to the litanies and 
systemic causes of those stakeholders that are in direct opposition, broadly 
speaking the characterisations are consistent with that contained in the previous 
two chapters. Table Seven below details the litany, systemic and stakeholder 
metaphors for the terrorist and government stakeholders. Interestingly, despite 
the collective differences at the litany and systemic levels, a shared worldview 
metaphor has emerged: ‘us versus them’. 
 
Table Seven: Terrorist and Government Stakeholder Worldview Summary 
of Litany and Systemic Causes  
 
Terrorist Stakeholder 
Worldview 
Government Stakeholder 
Worldview 
Litany Terrorism is a means to an end Terrorism is an ever present, 
constant and evolving threat 
Systemic Terrorism gateways Threat detection and 
prevention by treating 
“symptoms” 
Stakeholder 
Metaphor 
Us versus them Us versus them 
 
5.3 Stakeholder Myth 
 
Opposing dichotomies can cause knowledge and interests to become fixed; 
“those opposed to the status quo [are regarded] as the problem, without 
considering whether the status quo is part of the problem” (Gunning 2007, 372, 
emphasis added). There is an overarching presumption that “your side” of the 
terrorism debate – regardless of majority opinion – represents what is 
fundamentally right, true and correct, pre-empting any self-blame. Additionally, 
fault-finding and finger-pointing is part of the narrative of blame between 
diametrically opposed stakeholders. Richardson (2006, 3) alludes to this with 
regard to perspectives on terrorism; but whose version of what is ‘right’ is 
actually true and correct? This paradigm, in which there are definitive right and 
wrong sides, encourages the use of ‘us versus them’ rhetoric that defines and 
                                               
128
 The unintended influence of the Western civilisation and frameworks are acknowledged.  
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reinforces “good” and “evil” thought patterns and promotes these as the 
mechanism for determining battle lines. This ‘us versus them’ metaphor, 
identified in Table Seven above, guides how particular stakeholders (including 
governments, victims and possibly elements of the media and community, 
depending on their location on the continuum in Figure Seven) build and develop 
their knowledge of terrorism. This affects stakeholders’ thoughts and feelings 
about terrorism futures and decision making processes: for example, the ‘us 
versus them’ metaphor underpins terrorism futures at the litany and systemic 
causes levels. Gidley (2010b, 626) notes the inherent limitation of applying the 
“binary logic” of dualistic thinking to complex situations; the myth of terrorism 
necessitates low identification and strong response mechanisms, justifying the 
quest for profiling-related knowledge to aid in the ready identification and 
eradication/healing of the evil “them” – the terrorist stakeholder: 
 
The enemy of evil is good. If our enemy is evil, we are inherently 
good. Good is our essential nature, and what we do in the battle 
against evil is good. Good and evil are locked in a battle, which is 
conceptualized metaphorically as a physical fight in which the 
stronger wins. Only superior strength can defeat evil, and only a 
show of strength can keep evil at bay. (Lakoff 2005, 57) 
 
To unpack the impact of the ‘us versus them’ stakeholder metaphor, some key 
elements of it should be questioned and discussed. These include: 
− for any one side, who or what denotes ‘them’ and in what ways are they 
different from ‘us’?; 
− what determines the attribution of right and wrong?; and  
− can the divide between the two sides ever be bridged? For example, could 
a new shared metaphor challenge the existing one? 
Engagement between stakeholders would facilitate the unpacking of the myth 
and deconstruction of the litany and systemic causes levels of terrorism futures, 
and there is a requirement for carefully selected stakeholders and representative 
participation – but at what level and how is this achievable? The stakeholder 
worldview indicates that initiating dialogue at or through the media and 
community could be an effective way to reach each of the diametrically opposed 
sides and their supporters, because both the media and the community could 
provide an avenue of dialogue exchange. This is an important revelation because 
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the common problem-solving approach taken in Terrorism Studies identifies the 
terrorist as the other and seeks explanations for, rather than understanding of, that 
other through interpretive methods of inquiry (Gunning 2007, 371). Without 
achieving a level of understanding or knowledge, the traditional approach 
“divides the world sharply into dichotomies (for instance, between the legitimate 
and ‘good’ [nation-]state, and the illegitimate and ‘evil’ ‘terrorists’)” (Gunning 
2007, 371). This dichotomising lens is employed throughout the litany and 
systemic causes levels; alternatively, the ideological or civilisational worldviews 
could create a space where participatory engagement could occur. 
 
5.4 Ideological Worldview 
 
Because ideologies carry social meaning and symbolism (Clifford Geertz 1964, 
cited in Freeden 2003, 41), providing a belief system, ideology, like the 
stakeholder worldview, can frame the knowledge generated and sustained about 
a given issue. Ideology is a group product to the extent that it provides the basis 
of opinions, attitudes and theories that either defend or extend groups’ interests 
(Larrain 1992, 14). Ideologies contribute to individuals’ and groups’ social and 
political framework by providing a patterned system for interpreting and 
assigning meaning to facts (Freeden 2003, 2-3) and images of the world and of 
its possible futures. The examination of ideological issue framing in terrorism is 
important because of the meaning, purpose and direction ideological belief 
systems provide for advancing a political, religious or ideological cause. The key 
assumption being applied is that all terrorism ideologies contain a political 
element. Marsella (2002, 41) suggests that ideology provides a way to actively 
decrease uncertainty while also achieving change. Thus, consideration of the 
ideological level of worldview will assist in: 
− identifying and characterising the ideology of terrorism (is the ideology 
singular or layered, for example?); and  
− examining if there are any elements of ideology that are shared by the 
two diametrically opposed stakeholders, terrorists and governments? 
 
 
208 
 
Ideology and Terrorism 
 
Due to the beliefs, values, principles and aims ideology can provide, a terrorist 
groups’ identity, objectives and purpose are ultimately defined by, or derived 
from, an ideological base (Drake 1998). Because ideology can be used to 
determine and judge actions (Drake 1998) it can offer a moral and political 
vision that can be called upon for the purpose of inspiring violence: “[t]he 
ideology of a terrorism group identifies the ‘enemies’ of the group by providing a 
measure against which to assess the ‘goodness’ or ‘badness’, ‘innocence’ or 
‘guilt’ of people and institutions” (Drake 1998, cited in Zimmermann 2003, 60). 
Thus the stakeholder worldview’s ‘us versus them’ metaphor is reinforced by 
ideology. When this metaphor is followed strictly, the belief system can become 
dangerous when followed with blind commitment, or used as a basis for 
determining the meaning of life (Marsella 2002, 41-42). Ideology is central to 
terrorism because its political element provides a distinction between legitimate 
and criminal acts (Enders and Sandler 1999, 148). 
 
Understanding ideological worldviews enables a deeper examination of the 
futures, particularly of the roots and consequences of stakeholder images (Dator 
2002, 7) of terrorism. This section is predominantly concerned with the ideology 
of the two diametrically opposed stakeholders identified in the previous section: 
terrorists and governments. Ideology is a foundational aspect of each of these 
stakeholders’ perspectives, reinforcing the shared ‘us versus them’ metaphor and 
thus shaping the action and reaction dynamics of terrorism according to the 
adversarial relationship and the focus of identifying, countering and challenging 
the “evil other”. The action-reaction dynamic was characterised at the litany and 
systemic causes levels as often involving preventative counter-terrorism 
measures aimed at threat displacement, for example enhanced airport security. 
The action-reaction dynamic can also be demonstrated by the growing concerns 
surrounding feared threat escalation and the use of WMDs. Ideology provides the 
basis of terrorism and counter-terrorism action and reaction; both of which are 
inherently political in their conceptualisation.  
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This section approaches ideology as a meta-level, acknowledging that most 
terrorism is fundamentally political in purpose. It should also be acknowledged 
that the primary political ideology is often underpinned by religion, 
secessionism, ethno-centrism or similar worldviews; future research may provide 
scope for group-specific examinations of overarching political ideologies and 
their secondary influences. As alluded to in Chapter Three: Litany, terrorist 
actors129 can be categorised on the basis of their nationalist, secessionist, ethno-
centrist, and religious (Blass 2003, 1048) inspirations. Thus, within the 
overarching political frame secondary, accompanying ideologies specific to a 
group’s identity and causes emerge; for example, religion. The difficulty of 
pinpointing this concept of primary and secondary ideology may have 
contributed to the increased use (and confusion) of the terms ‘fanaticism’ and 
‘extremism’. Jackson (2007, 408-409), for example, comments that the ‘new 
terrorism’ threat is inextricably linked with fanaticism, extremism and the 
potential use of WMDs and will continue to target civilians because of religious 
inspirations, rather than the overarching political ideology. Yet the 
understandings derived from terrorism’s litany have established that the religious 
undertones of terrorist ideology are not new, and that the threat of terrorism’s 
underpinnings have undergone a gradual transformation that is likely to be 
sustained into a number of futures.  
 
Terrorist as Political 
 
Discussions in the terrorism literature describe ideology as a “monolithic, hostile 
force, an independent variable that is somehow beyond explanation.” (McAuley 
2005, 270). Whilst it has been argued that the political purpose of terrorism has 
become less clear or prominent (Combs 2003, 60), terrorism is political and is 
used in the pursuit of political objectives (Freedman 2007, 314; Catignani 2005, 
247; Oberschall 2004, 30). Terrorism is not senseless, it is a premeditated and 
calculated strategy (Raymond 2003, 72). This observation reflects knowledge 
uncovered at the litany and systemic causes levels. Terrorism is strategic in the 
sense that it aims to affect the target’s behaviour on a large scale (Freedman 
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 This categorisation according to ideology is not limited to terrorist entities; it also applies to 
governments and their institutions. 
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2007, 320); specifically, to initiate or create political change through 
psychological impacts (Freedman 2007, 320). The 19th Century Anarchists used 
assassination to directly target the government and recent history has shown that 
indiscriminate targeting of society can also be used as a way of targeting the state 
(Freedman 2007, 326). Society is targeted in order to affect a primary 
governmental target (Freedman 2007, 325), and the terrorist attack itself is the 
delivery system for the political message.130 This demonstrates that despite the 
changing nature of terrorism (depicted at the litany level) political objectives 
have remained central to addressing external problems (identified at the systemic 
causes level).  
 
An underlying ideology of nationalism highlights how the two diametrically 
opposed stakeholders, the government and terrorist actors, can share an 
overarching political ideology. Both terrorist actions (delivering a political 
message) (Whittaker 2002, 13) and counter-terrorism policies and initiatives 
(implemented by states)131 are undertaken to achieve their respective users’ 
desired objectives (Harmon 2000, 44). Thus counter-terrorism initiatives can also 
be examined in terms of their ideology. The nationalistic nature of US foreign 
policy, for example, was not commonly recognised by US nationals (Dyer 2006, 
148). The events of September 11, were interpreted as an attack on American 
ideals, not as a consequence of the country’s foreign policy (Dyer 2006, 148) 
despite numerous statements by Osama bin Laden specifically denouncing 
aspects of that foreign policy. Dyer writes: 
 
…as if Osama bin Laden gave a damn one way or the other about 
the political principles by which Americans run their own affairs. 
The particular character of American nationalism makes it easier for 
an administration to mislead people about “why they hate us.” (Dyer 
2006, 138) 
 
Rhetoric such as that from former President George W. Bush describing how the 
terrorist ‘they’ hate ‘our’ freedoms, strengthens the appropriateness of the ‘us 
versus them’ metaphor and maintains the focus on the impingement of American 
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 Counter-terrorism is the delivery system for expressions of disapproval against the political 
messages of terrorism. 
131
 Again, it is important to acknowledge that some governments have been proscribed as terrorist 
entities. Hamas provides an excellent example of a state-based terrorist actor which has counter-
terrorism policies of its own.  
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ideals instead of on US foreign policy. The stakeholders’ ‘us versus them’ 
metaphor also reinforces the identification of positive qualities in the self, and 
continues the diametrically opposed relationship with the other. The nature of 
issue-framing often moves discussions away from the adequate exploration of the 
true systemic and political problems by remaining entangled in the litany or 
character-attacking components of the systemic causes.  
 
Government as Political 
 
Terrorism is intended to influence governments (Ruby 2002, 10), just as state’s 
counter-terrorism actions are intended to influence the occurrence of, and 
potential for, terrorism. Traditional counter-terrorism responses often involve the 
economic, social, political and military arms of government (Freedman 2007, 
326). Governments, like terrorists, can be categorised according to their 
association with left- or right-wing political views, but also according to the 
mode of government, democratic or autocratic, for example. This section is 
concerned with the ideologies that underpin government institutions and 
stakeholders identified in the previous section, for example: intelligence 
agencies, the military and the police. Various skills, expertise and resources are 
required to combat terrorism, and hence the counter-terrorism effort involves 
cross-agency (Veness 2001, 409) cooperation at both the national and 
international levels. Typically counter-terrorism responses are not entirely 
political in nature, and this can be seen in the competing mindsets of government 
institutions such as the intelligence services, the military and law enforcement, 
all of which have had an increasing role in counter-terrorism.  
 
Just as terrorism is, metaphorically, a “multi-purpose tool”,132 so too are counter-
terrorism initiatives because their aim is to reduce, or displace, the threat of 
terrorism while protecting and reassuring the public. A popular criticism of 
counter-terrorism policies is that they politicise terrorism. Freedman (2007, 338) 
points out the preference for policies that actively promote the reassurance of an 
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 In that it creates fear amongst the public with the intention of producing political change and 
simultaneously communicates the terrorist entity’s message potential supporters and recruits. 
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anxious public. The continued political and public concern has ensured that 
terrorism has remained a government priority in the post-September 11 security 
environment. Media reporting also communicates and reinforces the need to 
remain vigilant against the threat posed by terrorism (Aly and Balnaves 2007, 
cited in Aly, Balnaves and Chalon 2007, 249). Media content analysis has 
revealed that security is featured prominently in initial reactions to terrorist 
attacks, progressing from a fear-based reaction to a state of assured confidence 
(Tootell 2007, 376), while issues of liberty and privacy appear to be disregarded 
(Tootell 2007, 377), albeit temporarily. The media’s reaction dynamic is 
important, given that higher assurance levels are thought to correlate with 
positive feelings about implementing additional security measures (Tootell 2007, 
376), traditionally thought to improve security and thus treating the symptoms.  
 
The construction of terrorist events through media and political discourses is 
important in terms of its impact on the community’s understanding and its fear-
based reaction. Fear can be thought of as a social force that affects behaviour, 
especially preventative and restrictive133 or protective and assertive134 behaviours 
(Aly, Balnaves and Chalon 2007, 250-251). September 11, for example, was 
followed by heightened levels of fear, which was exhibited through behavioural 
changes (Aly, Balnaves and Chalon 2007, 251). Heightened levels of fear may 
lead to an initial willingness of citizens to forego particular civil liberties in 
exchange for a safe and secure society. Such measures may initially seem 
disruptive, but often acquire a sense of normality over time (Freedman 2007, 
329).135 
 
Because there is no ultimate reality – we see what we want to see according to 
our conditioned worldview (Sardar 2004b, 234) – knowledge can be used to 
build and sustain a discourse. Arguably, the Australian Government’s ‘be alert, 
not alarmed’ campaign in 2002, whilst intended to be an education tool, 
                                               
133
 Preventative or restrictive behaviours are those that people self-impose to avoid situations and 
places that are perceived to be dangerous (Aly, Balynaves and Chalon 2007, 251). 
134
 Protective or assertive measures are those that are self-applied protective mechanisms on the 
basis of a perception of potential danger in a particular situation or place (Aly, Balynaves and 
Chalon 2007, 251). 
135
 Recent examples of responses to the threat posed to air travel by liquid explosives and sharp 
implements demonstrate four stages of the response: a heightened state of fear, the 
implementation of security procedures, initial disruption and, finally, normality of the procedures. 
213 
 
promoted the discourse of fear in the community. As described in the litany 
futures chapter, the public’s perception of terrorism, and of who stereotypically 
qualifies as a terrorist, is not confirmed, in reality by either terrorism’s litany or 
by the intrapersonal components of its systemic causes. According to Howie 
(2007, 75), the public stereotypically identifies a terrorist by their “race and skin 
color, accent, dress, country of origin, religious and political views, and the 
ability to speak a language other than English.” These criteria are divorced from 
the knowledge generated at the levels of terrorism’s litany and systemic causes, 
reflecting not only the indefinite nature of seeking identifiable personal traits for 
profiling purposes, but also of maintaining an accurately informed populous.  
 
The obscuring of our understanding of terrorism, whether that pertains to the 
identity of its actors, their methods or political objectives, affects not only our 
ability to envisage positive or preferred terrorism futures, but also those 
dynamics relevant to ensuring the long-term effectiveness of counter-terrorism 
measures. “[B]y locating the source of contemporary terrorism in religious 
extremism, the discourse works to deny and obscure its political origins and the 
possibility that it is a response to specific Western policies.” (Jackson 2007, 421) 
Counter-terrorism initiatives should be mindful of, and also tailored to, 
secondary motivations, but not at the expense of dealing with the primary 
political worldview and history of grievances. There is no doubt that elements of 
the secondary worldview have implications for policy effectiveness. The primary 
risk here revolves around counter-terrorism strategies becoming too immersed in 
the present, concentrating, for example, on the current globally dominant threat 
posed by Islamic extremists,136 such that the emergence of the next trend or 
threat is overlooked. While the overarching ideology of terrorism will remain 
political, the secondary ideology will change, consistent with litany mindset 
progression. At present we are arguably experiencing Rapoport’s religious 
wave.137 These waves are not endless and do subside and, as noted by Weinberg 
(2007, 41), could be interpreted to mean that the Islamic focus (secondary 
                                               
136
 A point reinforced by two metaphors identified above: political Islam is the new Soviet Union 
(Mostafa and Al-Hamdi 2007, 75) and al-Qaeda’s Islamic fundamentalism has the monopoly on 
the jihad enterprise (adapted from Jenkins 2007, 6). Both metaphors need to be challenged and 
removed from the time constraints of the immediate past and present.  
137
 Preceded, in reverse chronological order, by the new left, anti-colonial and anarchist waves of 
modern terrorism (Rapoport in Weinberg 2007, 41). 
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motivation) may eventually be superseded by a fifth wave. Therefore, policies 
enacted which focus on specific elements of the threat, including terrorism’s 
systemic causes, must remain flexible enough to detect and manage change.  
 
Convergence of Political Ideology  
 
It is evident that both the terrorism and counter-terrorism spheres have an 
overarching primary political ideology. The political usage of the terms, or 
labels, ‘terrorism’ and ‘terrorist’ by government actors reinforces the dichotomy 
characterising the stakeholder worldviews. The two dominant stakeholders not 
only appear to be diametrically opposed, but this opposition is reinforced by the 
selection of language and discourse, particularly in descriptions of the other. 
Given the fact that both stakeholders have been shown to share an overarching 
political ideology, questions emerge as to why this fact is not better reflected by 
strategies aimed at engagement with the other. From the litany and systemic 
causes future scenarios, the counter-terrorism strategy is overwhelmingly 
reactionary and focused on responding to the threat through largely detection–
based, preventative mechanisms, rather than utilising the shared overarching 
political ideology as a way to engage with the underlying causes – political 
grievances and terrorism gateways. This approach inadvertently discounts the 
plethora of knowledge generated at the systemic causes level, continuing the 
under-utilisation of knowledge of terrorism’s causes in addressing the grievances 
publicly communicated through terrorist acts. This under-utilisation indicates 
that knowledge generated at the systemic causes and at the ideological 
worldview levels is largely divorced in terms of its contributions to counter-
terrorism policies and initiatives. While exhibiting different levels of reactive 
force, both of the systemic causes futures scenarios within the ‘high 
identification’ quadrants (dialogue of healing and warring dialogue) at some 
stage involve stakeholder engagement through dialogue, indicating the potential 
for selective and participatory engagement to occur through the identification and 
discussion of political grievances. The question of what components make for the 
best counter-terrorism strategy will be discussed briefly in the concluding 
chapter. 
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Knowledge generated at the systemic causes level, in combination with the 
stakeholder and ideological levels of the worldview, indicates that there is a 
primary political objective common to the two opposing stakeholders (who hold 
disparate goals, desires and thoughts about the future). Figure Eight, below, 
depicts the shared political ideology sphere of the opposing stakeholders. While 
both actors share an overarching political ideology, their objectives are opposed 
and they each have alternate means of achieving change. Nonetheless, it is the 
convergence of ideology that could provide an opportunity to exchange dialogue, 
as per the potential highlighted in the two high identification quadrants of the 
futures scenario matrix for the systemic causes of terrorism. 
 
Figure Eight: Ideological Worldview 
 
 
 
Figure Eight illustrates the shared overarching political ideology, in which the 
‘us versus them’ metaphor is dominant in that it positions and sustains the direct 
opposition that exists between the two stakeholders. Knowledge, too, remains 
conditioned by the ‘us versus them’ metaphor. The fact that both stakeholders 
share an overarching political ideology provides a transformative space where 
the two diametrically opposed stakeholders can communicate and exchange 
dialogue specific to their grievances. This political space could also provide the 
stakeholders a medium through which to exchange thoughts, ideas and concerns 
about terrorism and its possible futures. The preconceived, and historically 
dominant, approach assumes negotiation to be inconceivable, an impossible 
strategy, and prefers the view that “justice can only take the form of extirpation – 
root, trunk and branch” (Barber, cited in Jackson 2007, 409). Terrorism is a tree 
requiring extirpation in this metaphor (adapted from Barber, cited in Jackson 
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2007, 409). This mindset is captured within the two ‘low identification’ 
quadrants of the systemic causes futures scenarios, which revolve around the 
labelling and eradication of the “evil” terrorist element. The narratives: 
 
…imply that because ‘Islamic terrorism’ is fanatical, religiously 
motivated, murderous and irrational, there is no possibility of 
negotiation, compromise or appeasement; instead, eradication, 
deterrence and forceful counter-terrorism are the only reasonable 
responses. (Jackson 2007, 409) 
 
The question that arises is how to engage in the systemic causes futures space of 
‘high identification’. Arguably, global policies and responses have been 
sustained by the ‘us versus them’ stakeholder metaphor. The situation with 
terrorism may be similar to Inayatullah’s (2009a, 100) findings on how to defeat 
the Taliban – the battle must be reframed. Reframing requires new shared 
metaphors, and these, in turn, require a space where identification, understanding 
and engagement are used to address the causes of terrorism. Recent changes in 
the Iraq and Afghanistan war doctrines show that changes of mentality are 
possible; and this is further illustrated by President Barack Obama’s 2009 
address to the people of Iran, and by the 2011 admission of the United States’ 
political engagement with the Taliban. What has been missing, to date, is the 
reframing element. 
 
The development and nurturing of a transformative space in the political arena 
where otherwise diametrically opposed stakeholders can engage with one another 
and discuss their viewpoints, concerns and desires for the future is necessary. 
“Exposing the ideological effects and political technologies of the discourse has 
the potential to open up critical space for the articulation of alternative and 
potentially emancipatory forms of knowledge and practice.” (Jackson 2007, 425) 
If terrorism is a political problem, it must have political solutions. If terrorism is 
viewed as a struggle for political objectives, and can be understood in terms of 
those objectives, it will be susceptible to political remedies (Sedgwick 2004, 
808). Ideology alone, as was indicated at the systemic causes level, does not 
explain the emergence of, or decision to resort to, terrorism (Merari 2000, 59). 
The political ideology shared by terrorist and government stakeholders provides 
the overlap at which stakeholder engagement can occur. This overlap is referred 
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to as the ‘transformative space’, the metaphorical common ground where 
stakeholders can engage with each other, their common issues, metaphors and 
possible futures. The objective of this space is, over time, to progress discussions 
towards shared futures, introducing the potential, and facilitating discussions, for 
collective positive manipulation of the futures of terrorism, including the 
reduction of terrorist attacks and of the forces that lead individuals to resort to 
terrorism. Figure Nine, below, represents this overlap (the green bubble at the 
meeting of the two stakeholders’ bubbles. 
 
Figure Nine: Ideological Worldview Transformative Space 
 
 
 
 
Progressing into this space is of strategic importance but the following point, as 
made by Lakoff (2004, 61), should be borne in mind: “[t]he West can make the 
suggestion and offer extensive resources, but we [the West] alone are powerless 
to carry it out.” Engagement with elders, respected community members and, in 
the specific case of Islamic fundamentalism, moderate and liberal Muslim clerics 
will be pivotal (Lakoff 2005, 61). This kind of engagement would require a 
change to end the marginalising role of ideology (McBride 2011, 574) and also 
in-depth, case-specific assessments to confirm its viability and practicality in 
terms of ensuring the safety of all participants. To demonstrate this theoretical 
political engagement, al-Qaeda may concede that its goal of restoring the 
Caliphate is unrealistic and regressive, just as the West may also through 
engagement, concede that its interaction with the Middle East has, historically, 
been insensitive and damaging. Engagement focused on the identification of 
societal grievance(s) can better enable policy to address those grievance(s) 
because “if the US does not even know what its enemies are fighting for” 
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(Richardson 2006, 253) they cannot conceivably be addressed. More detailed 
analysis of why and where terrorism has been successful,138 and why it has 
failed/ceased,139 and also the selection of conflicts (as it will not be safe, or 
perhaps even possible, to engage with all terrorist entities) will be required to 
determine how to use the transformative space most effectively.  
 
Additionally, this space may, for example, represent negotiation, a form of 
dialogue that has been largely removed from the action-reaction dynamics of 
terrorism and counter-terrorism. This is supported, and arguably reinforced, by 
the metaphor that “[t]oday’s terrorists don’t want a seat at the table, they want to 
destroy the table and everyone sitting at it” (J. Woolsey, cited in Morgan 2004, 
30-31). Not all terrorist conflicts are negotiable (Picco 2005, 13), and “terrorists 
who have political objectives and are prepared to negotiate these objectives at the 
end of the day and engage in some sort of dialogue and ultimately some sort of 
political or peace process” (Mandelstam 2001, cited in Harré 2004, 95) should be 
distinguished from those who do not and will not. 
 
Whilst government entities proclaim their zero-tolerance approach to terrorism 
through non-negotiation policies, terrorist identities themselves have, perhaps 
ironically, also taken a non-negotiation stance (Albini 2001, 256), one that is 
arguably visible in the various tactical changes alluded to in the litany chapter.140 
However: 
 
…regimes have often allowed their participation in peace talks to be 
importantly affected by terrorists. By stating that they will not 
negotiate as long as terrorist attacks continue, both the Israeli 
government and the British government (over Northern Ireland) 
effectively permitted individual terrorists to set their agendas. 
(Mueller 2005b, 526) 
 
                                               
138
 National liberation has been achieved in Algeria and Kenya through campaigns by, 
respectively, the Algerian Front de Liberation Nationale and the Mau-Mau (Stevens 2005, 517). 
Negotiation of cases in Colombia, Lebanon, Northern Ireland and Palestine also deserves 
attention. 
139
 The National Intelligence Council (2008, 70) notes that only 6% of terrorist groups active in 
the last 40 years achieved their strategic objectives. Examples of this type of research can be 
found in the work of Alonso (2011), Svensson and Harding (2011) and Waldmann (2011). 
140
 For example, the move away from hostage-taking and hijacking, which had traditionally 
allowed for some form of demand and negotiation process. 
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Nonetheless, negotiations are difficult and arguably the traditional mindsets and 
pressures not to negotiate remain, and most certainly are in effect until violence 
has ceased (Oberschall 2004, 31). Determining when violence has ended has 
become increasingly complex due to the emergence of factions, with affiliations 
to a central figure or organisation, which are merely acting as representatives of a 
broader movement without that movement being centrally controlled. This is 
exemplified by the IRA (Oberschall 2004), and by al-Qaeda.  
 
“Those holding that all terrorism is the same argue that the same 
countermeasures, such as military obliteration and preventive attack, should be 
used against all terrorists, and the same principles, such as “never negotiate with 
terrorists or with those who support them” should be applied.” (Held 2004, 60) 
Engagement can allow for different strategies for different conflicts, rather than a 
more or less “one size fits all” approach. Engagement may not be possible with 
every terrorist entity, and it places a requirement on governments to review the 
terrorist stakeholders’ position with respect to their motivation, objectives and 
means. Be that as it may, by thinking of terrorism as a tree requiring extirpation 
(adapted from Barber, cited in Jackson 2007, 409) there are a number of 
approaches available: a) maintains the attack and kill objective of detection and 
prevention (tree extirpation or “pruning”); b) pre-empts negotiation (engagement 
in “dialogue with the trees”), or; c) actively creates opportunities to adress 
terrorism gateways (which could “plant new trees”).  
 
5.5 Ideological Myth 
 
Despite religion providing the key to understanding, and arguably being 
responsible for shaping, ideological beliefs, the political (and politicised) nature 
of terrorism is also central to the ideological worldview level. Knowledge 
generated at the ideological worldview level indicates the existence of a narrative 
that enables preconceived notions reinforced by the stakeholders’ ‘us versus 
them’ metaphor, which hinges on the narrative ‘of a permanent foreign enemy’ 
(Chernus 2005, 102) to be challenged. Knowledge at the ideological worldview 
level begins to account for the similarities and differences between diametrically 
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opposed stakeholders – their similarity being a shared overarching political 
ideology, and their differences being the desire to achieve competing objectives 
and political futures. The metaphor at the ideological worldview level is of being 
‘politically engaged’.  
 
Ideology could guide stakeholders towards the discussion and achievement of a 
premise for a positive future: to live in a better world, with better conditions and 
where hopes, desires and dreams are realised, for example. There are numerous 
challenges surrounding the ‘politically engaged’ myth. The primary challenge 
lies in the initial requirement of having stakeholders capture their political 
visions and to engage with these visions and with one another’s futures. If 
engagement between stakeholders in not facilitated, the political vision of one 
collective stakeholder could be used to sustain and reinforce the dominant ‘us 
versus them’ stakeholder metaphor. “[P]olitics is always a matter of who controls 
the prevailing story, along with its component images, symbols, and 
interpretations.” (Chernus 2005, 102) If selective engagement between 
stakeholders is explored, facilitated through the transformative space (see Figure 
Nine), terrorism stakeholders may be able to discuss their respective political 
visions and futures. This process of discussion could provide stakeholders with 
the opportunity to engage with their futures and may assist with breaking down 
and countering the effects of the stakeholder worldview metaphor, challenging 
barriers to selective engagement within the political transformative space. The 
process could also enable the identification and discussion of undesirable futures, 
challenging the litany-level knowledge that worst-case scenarios are inevitable 
and must be prepared for.  
 
The ideological worldview leads to questioning of whether the pursuit of a 
shared political future is realistic or desirable. “[A]ll sides are assumed to be part 
of both the problem and the solution.” (Gunning 2007, 378)141 Selective 
engagement within the political transformative space must be done in a manner 
that is cognisant of, and courteous towards, different worldviews, and that assists 
in uncovering and challenging the underpinning myths of those worldviews. 
                                               
141
 As the substitution and innovation effects discussed in the systemic causes chapter illustrate.  
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These mythic structures underlying knowledge and society could hold the key to 
initiating more effective engagement and transformation, leading to the 
realisation of positive, shared manipulation of terrorism’s futures. 
 
5.6 Civilisational Worldview 
 
Taking civilisations as the unit of analysis (Galtung 1997, 121) provides another 
perspective from which to view the world and envisage possible, probable and 
preferable futures. It provides an alternative to the ‘straightjacket’ unit of the 
nation-state (Inayatullah 2007b, 92). How civilisations are identified or 
delineated can determine an individual’s views and, therefore, their experience of 
reality, thereby also providing force for uniting dividing humankind (Huntington 
1993b, 194). Civilisation membership is the broadest form of identifiable 
association for individuals within the human species (Huntington 1993a, 24), and 
can be used to assess how the civilisation worldview impacts on, or structures, 
terrorism knowledge. The litany and systemic causes levels revealed a tendency 
to categorise terrorism on the basis of culture; an element that is commonly 
interconnected with, or transferred to, religion. Civilisations are cultural entities 
(Huntington 1993a, 23) and the evident disparities between them “create 
differences over policy issues, ranging from human rights to immigration to trade 
and commerce to the environment.” (Huntington 1993a, 29) Note, however, the 
distinction between culture and civilisation; for Spengler (cited in Inayatullah 
1997a, 101) culture precedes and eventually degenerates into civilisation. 
Despite approaching the civilisation lens of terrorism at a meta-level, valuable 
revelations regarding how civilisation contributes to terrorism issue-framing also 
emerge, inevitably affecting thoughts of terrorism futures and security policies. 
 
Civilisations differ according to history, culture, traditions, language and beliefs 
(Huntington 1993a, 25). Fundamental differences can be exhibited:  
 
[t]he people of different civilizations have different views on the 
relations between God and man, the individual and the group, the 
citizen and the state, parents and children, husband and wife, as 
well as differing views of the relative importance of rights and 
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responsibilities, liberty and authority, equality and hierarchy. 
(Huntington 1993a, 25) 
 
These differences, Huntington (1993a, 25 and 1993b, 194) argues, are more 
substantial than matters of political structure and ideology or economic interest: 
“[f]aith and family, blood and belief, are what people identify with and what they 
will fight and die for.” (Huntington 1993b, 194) This partially accounts for 
terrorism issue-framing at the litany, systemic causes and ideological worldview 
levels in the dominant Western sources of terrorism literature. Thus, while there 
is a shared primary political ideology between terrorist and government 
stakeholders, the civilisation worldview may also assist in identifying the 
civilisational undertones at play in shaping terrorism and knowledge of its 
futures.  
 
Civilisation theory can be found in the works of Galtung, Spengler, Toynbee and 
Huntington. The most prominent civilisational theory evident in the terrorism 
literature is that provided by Huntington (1993a) and, as such, the civilisation 
worldview analysis, for deconstruction purposes, will concentrate on the 
application of Huntington’s theory. Huntington (1993a, 22) claims that fault lines 
exist between civilisations and that these draw the battlelines of the future. These 
fault lines override the political and other ideological margins created in the Cold 
War era (Huntington 1993a, 29). The period from the French Revolution to the 
end of the First World War witnessed the transition of the lines of conflict from 
“princes” (rulers) to nations (Huntington 1993a, 23). The aftermath of World 
War One led to the prominence of the political ideologies of communism and 
Nazism, democracy and fascism, which, during the Cold War period, fed into a 
battle between two superpowers of alternative and clearly-defined ideologies 
(Huntington 1993a, 23). The two sides were commonly referred to as the “free 
world” and the “communist bloc”; however there was a third “side”: the “third 
world” (Huntington 1993b, 187). “The collapse of the bipolar, communist-
capitalist world system has put an end to the homogeneous Eastern and Western 
social structures and the visions that were reliant on block security.” (Gáspár and 
Nováky 2002, 365) Huntington (1993b, 191) argues that after “the demise of the 
three worlds, nation states increasingly define their ideology and their interests in 
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civilizational terms”. The transition from concepts of Eastern and Western blocs 
to Islamic and Western civilisations can be illustrated by a metaphor used above: 
‘political Islam is the new Soviet Union’ (Mostafa and Al-Hamdi 2007, 725). 
Huntington’s (1993a) theory of clashing civilisations has been positioned as a 
potential central pillar or determinant of future global politics, as opposed to 
theories describing the pressures exerted by ideology, the economy or societal 
factors. Whilst the theory may not be universal in its applicability, it does 
provide a starting point for thinking about the dynamics that affect and frame 
international matters (Huntington 1993b, 187), such as terrorism – and this is 
particularly relevant to this discussion of civilisation worldviews.  
 
Huntington (1993a, 25) lists eight civilisations whose interactions, it is believed, 
shape the possible futures. These are: Western, Confucian, Japanese, Islamic, 
Hindu, Slavic-Orthodox, Latin American and African. Conflict is anticipated to 
occur between civilisations, at the so-called ‘fault lines’. Different cultures 
envisage different futures, creating the potential for those visions to conflict and 
lead to misunderstandings. Furthermore, dominant civilisations may ignore the 
thoughts and desired futures of others (Hicks 1994, 18) thus potentially realising 
Immanuel Wallerstein’s (1991, cited in Marien 1996, 164) projection that 
“culture [will be] the ideological battleground of the modern world.” With regard 
to violence, Huntington (1993a, 38) argues that violence between groups will 
remain, though it is anticipated to be less intense (Huntington 1993a, 38). The 
theoretical fault lines between the eight civilisations have been captured in 
Figure Ten below, based on the divisions and sub-divisions provided by 
Huntington (1993a). 
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Figure Ten: Interpretation of Huntington’s Civilisation Fault Lines 
 
 
There exist fundamental differences between Western concepts and those 
prevalent in, or important to, other civilisations. The global community is taken 
to be dominated by Western thought, knowledge and reasoning (Gáspár and 
Nováky 2002, 374) and this dominance can translate into a worldview of short-
term thinking and hegemony (Slaughter 1998, 375). “The worldviews of other 
civilizations and cultures are usually not considered as cultural assets or as 
central to understanding the future or even the present, but more often as 
obstacles to be overcome.” (Inayatullah 2004a, 46) Western society is associated 
with the ideals of individual freedom, human rights, and participatory 
government in which citizens have the power to elect and dismiss their 
representatives or leaders (Lewis 1997, 123). Further Western ideals of 
individualism, monogamous marriage and the nuclear family (Lewis 1997, 120) 
are at odds with non-Western notions of collective entities such as clans, tribes 
and strong extended family systems.142 As Huntington puts it:  
 
Western ideas of individuality, liberalism, constitutionalism, 
human rights, equality, liberty, the rule of law, democracy, free 
markets, the separation of church and state, often have little 
resonance in Islamic, Confucian, Japanese, Hindu, Buddhist or 
Orthodox cultures. (Huntington 1993a, 40) 
 
Metaphors like “economy as provider, science as the re-newer and healer, and 
ethics as guide” (Turnbull 2004, 163) and fanaticism as the “mortal enemy of 
                                               
142
 Osama bin Laden has used imagery of tribe and warriors as a way to portray a not-so-distant 
past; a tribal way of life. The September 11 hijackers identified themselves as coming from tribes 
(McAuley 2005, 277). Furthermore, AQAP actively seeks to maintain the support of Yemeni 
tribal leaders who see tribalism as the primary source of their social and political authority and 
whose allegiance is required to mount a defence against the United States (Jones 2011, 910). 
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democracy” (Schlesinger 1997, 10) have been used to describe the Western 
worldview. These metaphors position Western ideals and notions as the saviour 
of our time, the only things capable of achieving desirable terrorism futures; 
hence the ‘globalisation as universalism’ (Nassar 2010, 6) and ‘globalisation as 
Westernisation’ (Nassar 2010, 7) metaphors identified at the systemic causes 
level. 
 
In terms of the eight civilisation groupings, the post-September 11 literature 
focuses extensively on the battlelines between the Western and Islamic 
civilisations, which, as Morton and Bygrave (2008, 2) remind us, is often 
described as a clash of civilisations. Western and Islamic civilisational conflict is 
not a recent thing; it dates back some 1,300 years (Huntington 1993a, 31). The 
Islamic conflict focus is also problematic in that the Islamic world is or has been 
in conflict with the Hindu and African civilisations (Mostafa and Al-Hamdi 
2007, 725) and because terrorism is not the domain solely of Islam (Nassar 2010, 
17). Despite its longevity, the renewed focus is contributing to and reinforcing 
the ‘us versus them’ stakeholder metaphor.  
 
The terrorism discourse inevitably ends with the demand that an individual 
choose a particular side; as Huntington (1993a, 27) phrases it: “[w]hich side are 
you on?” or alternatively “[w]hat are you?” This thesis has previously discussed 
the dichotomous discourse reflected in much of the reviewed literature, which is 
not only reinforced by the stakeholder metaphor, where definitive sides, or 
battlelines, are created through the identification of the self and non-
identification with the other, but extends into the civilisational worldview. 
Huntington’s (1993a) clash of civilisations theory is not limited to the 
interactions of and between the Western and Islamic worlds; where Huntington’s 
theory indicates the existence of other fault lines, there is the potential for clashes 
in a number of futures – these clashes could take the form of a terrorist 
campaign. 
 
As a result of the current dominance of the Western-Islamic fault line, the futures 
could be presented in terms of a diametrical relationship of ‘the West versus the 
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rest’.143 The Western self-promotion of its civilisation as the “universal 
civilisation”, or of the idea that it “fits all men” (V.S. Naipaul, cited in 
Huntington 1993a, 40), demonstrates a sense of self-satisfaction or superiority. 
The very notion of a ‘universal civilisation’ is a Western one (Huntington 1993a, 
41). “In every era of human history, modernity, or some equivalent term, has 
meant the ways, norms, and standards of the dominant and expanding 
civilization. Every dominant civilisation has imposed its own modernity in its 
prime.” (Lewis 1997, 129). The Western conceptions of time, governance and 
economic prosperity demonstrate the philosophical link between Westernisation 
and modernisation. The division of time is dominated by the Western calendar 
system and the splitting of historical time into Christian and pre-Christian eras 
(Lewis 1997, 125). Democracy and globalisation have often been posited as 
ways of reducing gateways to terrorism – despite both forces being identified as 
systemic causes of terrorism. 
 
The West apparently believes in the superiority of its values and system of 
government, a superiority so self-evident that only the ignorant or the evil could 
reject it. Rather than using the shock of the September 11 attacks, and the thirst 
for explanation and understanding so visible among the US public and around the 
globe, to explore the complexities of the global position of the US, its 
vulnerability to terrorism and the best ways of countering it, the country instead 
declared that those who were not with them were against them (Richardson 2006, 
236). The good versus evil formula was reinforced at the expense of self-
examination (Richardson 2006, 237) and of challenging terrorism issue-framing. 
Terrorism issue-framing extends far beyond Huntington’s theory, and highlights 
issues of identification, of which side of the issue resonates with a given 
individual and, thereby, where the battle lines are to be drawn between “us” and 
“them”. The identification of the battle lines are also reinforced in the terrorism 
literature (which, again, is largely dominated by Western perspectives) and by 
knowledge uncovered at the systemic causes level (as the preference, in existing 
strategies, for reactive detection and prevention rather than identification 
revealed).  
                                               
143
 Originally phrased, by Mahbubani (1992), in terms of a conflict between ‘the West and the 
Rest’. 
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5.7 Civilisation Myth 
 
The overarching characterisation of the civilisation worldview of terrorism is the 
reinforcement and expansion of the ‘us versus them’ metaphor of the stakeholder 
worldview. Individuals’ affiliations are formed according to their identification 
with a civilisation above other group memberships. The civilisation worldview 
allows for meta-level distinctions to be drawn between parties, based not on 
beliefs or appearance, but on origins – a level at which identification cannot be 
changed, but which, however, may be challenged in futures of increased 
multiculturalism. If Huntington’s (1993a) theory of future fault lines existing 
between civilisations, and the current dominance of the West are taken into 
account, the current adversarial relationship with the Islamic civilisation could 
expand or shift to any of the other six civilisations in some futures. Furthermore, 
while the focus is currently on the West, the battle space could move beyond 
Western centrality. The dominance of the Western civilisation worldview within 
the terrorism conflict arena has created a ‘West is best’ rhetoric and ‘the West 
versus the rest’ metaphor.  
 
These knowledge frames resonate through US political speeches. For example, 
‘West is best’ rhetoric is clearly visible in the quote below (Chernus’ summary of 
Republican Party attitudes):  
 
[a] real Western hero needs no allies. He doesn’t ask permission 
from the UN, or a bunch of Europeans, or anyone else. Like the 
Lone Ranger, he knows evil when he sees it, and whenever he sees 
it, he destroys it – all by himself, by any means necessary. (Chernus 
2005, 98) 
 
Prior to his Presidency, George W. Bush (cited in Chernus 2005, 99) stated that, 
during his youth, despite the world being dangerous “you knew exactly who they 
were. It was us vs. them, and it was clear who them was. Today, we are not so 
sure who the they are, but we know they’re there.” The civilisation level builds 
on and reinforces the terrorism stakeholder worldview by broadening the ‘us 
versus them’ dichotomy to ‘the West versus the rest’ paradigm. This myth 
inevitably self-positions Western civilisation as highest, framing the 
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identification of threats and how those threats are understood and countered. “In 
post-9/11 America, it’s easy to believe that evil just springs up on its own, like 
the spawn of the devil.” (Chernus 2005, 99) Today’s evildoers are positioned as 
next in line to the Nazis and the Communists (Chernus 2005, 99); an attitude 
consistent with Mostafa and Al-Hamdi’s (2007, 725) ‘political Islam is the new 
Soviet Union’ metaphor. As such, al-Qaeda has been positioned as the next 
group of evildoers on this continuum, a point made by the metaphor that ‘al-
Qaeda’s Islamic fundamentalism has the monopoly on the jihad enterprise’ 
(adapted from Jenkins 2007, 6) – at least in the present time. Sardar (2004a, 137) 
argues that analysis of Islam must move beyond one-dimensional descriptions of 
clashing civilisations; the clashing civilisations theory warns against cultural 
diversity, placing responsibility for conflict on the people (Shapiro 1999, cited in 
Carver and Chamber 2012, 170), foreclosing and dismissing forms of otherness 
(Shapiro 1992, cited in Carver and Chamber 2012, 176). 
 
Huntington’s clashing civilisations theory positions civilisations as the dominant 
sources of conflict. If terrorism were the result of differences between 
civilisations, the causes of terrorism would obviously be found within those 
civilisational differences. This hypothesis (that terrorism’s causes are 
civilisational) negates the knowledge generated at the litany and systemic causes 
levels. Specifically, at the litany level it renders irrelevant the history of 
terrorism, and at the systemic causes level, it rejects the extensive knowledge of 
the root causes of terrorism and its prelude, radicalisation. Instead, the 
civilisation worldview complements knowledge at the stakeholder worldview 
level and positions itself as a means of conflict definition. The civilisation 
worldview also presents a powerful learning and engagement opportunity as 
provided by the ‘gaia of cultures’ (Nandy and Deshingkar 1993) or ‘global 
convivencia’ (the term used by Malaysian statesman Anwar Ibrahim, cited in 
Sardar 2004a, 137) theories which focus on globally shared and enriched living. 
While Huntington (1993a, 49) argues that the West should “develop a more 
profound understanding of the basic religious and philosophical assumptions 
underlying other civilizations and the ways in which people in those civilizations 
see their interests”, generating new metaphors that move away from ‘the West 
versus the rest’ approach is paramount. This thesis has shown that whilst the 
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ideological worldview of terrorism has created a shared political space for 
transformation, case-specific assessments need to be undertaken in order to 
examine how civilisational standpoints can be integrated with the ideological 
worldviews. These assessments are beyond the scope of this research, but 
represent a valuable path for further group- or country-specific research.144  
 
Thus, using this level to understand and engage with civilisations and cultures 
beyond the dominant and simplistic identification and labelling processes 
provides opportunities for exchanging dialogue and shared global futures – “[t]he 
West needs to develop a deeper understanding of the religious and philosophical 
assumptions underlying other civilizations, and the way other nations see their 
interests, to identify what we have in common.” (President of the European 
Commission Jacques Delors, cited in Huntington 1993b, 194) Acceptance of 
civilisational cultural differences and of other visions of the futures, with an 
openness to change, will be pivotal. Policies must be reinforced through 
interactions within communities, not just on the meta-national and international 
levels. Given the intimate link between civilisation and culture “what we need 
are new, culturally self-aware interpretations of the futures. The goal here is to 
discern how other cultures create the future, what they think the future will be 
like” (Inayatullah 2004b, 63) – this can be achieved by concentrating on shared 
elements rather than points of difference.  
 
5.8 Epistemic Worldview 
 
As quoted above, “no man looks at the world through pristine eyes. He sees it 
edited by a definite set of customs and institutions and ways of knowing.” (Ruth 
Benedict 1961, cited in Slaughter 1996a, 110) The present, for example, is not an 
element of the natural world but a social construction (Slaughter 1996b, 88) that 
can be ordered and re-ordered (Foucault 1970). So too, the past is also a 
construction (Nandy 2006, 90). Epistemology, the study of knowledge, refers to 
the unconscious structuring of knowledge at a given time and place (O’Farrell 
2005, 134). Knowledge is framed by boundaries, or ways of knowing, epistemes 
                                               
144
 The unintended influence of the Western civilisation and frameworks are acknowledged. 
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(Inayatullah 1998, 387), and this framing determines how people relate and react 
to one another, things, places and issues, including the futures – because 
“[a]ction is embedded in epistemology” (Inayatullah 2004a, 2). Knowledge can 
shape the world in ways that promote or constrain action (Healy 2003, 690), as 
has been demonstrated by the content of this thesis so far. Epistemology involves 
identifying systems of knowledge and understanding their role in shaping 
society’s views so that those views can be challenged and, where necessary, the 
traditional way of knowing altered (Inayatullah 1997, cited in Russo 2004, 508). 
“Values are not considered universal, as in the interpretive approach, or 
considered to be essentially vacuous statements, as in the empirical, but as 
historically derived and particular to social structure and practices that 
contextualize them.” (Inayatullah 1993, 239) Society’s dominant discourses 
define the order in which issues and concerns are framed (Slaughter 1996a, 91), 
therein affecting and even directing behaviours and attitudes (Rubin 1998, 494). 
Conditions of discourse alter over time according to the range of effects 
produced by the epistemes of the past and present.  
 
There are several epistemological factors that affect the futures. These include 
social structures of knowledge, values and power. “Of concern is not a particular 
plan, but rather the institutional practices, structures and languages that construct 
how we plan the future.” (Inayatullah 2004b, 55) Values are a strong determinant 
of the futures, due to the implicit influence they have over the choices made 
(Fitch and Svengalis 1979, 47). ‘The future’ can be thought of as a space that is 
subject to power and control exerted by dominant political actors and institutions 
in the present (Dunmire 2007, 19). This exercise of power and control can 
“constrain the way the future can be imagined, articulated, and realized.” 
(Dunmire 2007, 19) For example, the selection and pursuit of one, sole vision (or 
version) of the future has the inherent consequence of positioning that single 
future as inevitable compared to others, to the detriment of exploring those other 
futures through alteration or deviation. With regard to terrorism, has the 
concentration of the litany on a constant and evolving terrorism threat been to the 
detriment of alternative terrorism futures? Healy (2003, 693) refers to the 
maintenance of authority and the denial of legitimacy of rival perspectives as 
‘epistemic sovereignty’.  
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Episteme, just as it provides futures framing, also creates historical boundaries to 
knowledge, imposing an order on the real and our knowing of it (Inayatullah 
2004b, 56); “what questions one asks, how one asks them, as well as the larger 
issue of what one considers of value are equally, if not much more important in 
understanding the futures ahead of us.” (Inayatullah 1996, 194) Following the 
events of September 11, a deeper understanding of the events was sought through 
the typical litany and systemic lines of questioning, asking questions such as 
“who”, “what” and “why”. “We require an answer beyond the obvious physical 
buildings that were felled. Were the buildings symbols of “democracy” or 
“civilization”? Were they symbols of “military might” or “economic power”?” 
(Hodges and Nilep 2007, 3) In response to the question of ‘who’ the perpetrators 
are “we want more than just a list of names; we want to know what the attackers 
represent and how we should react to them.” (Hodges and Nilep 2007, 3). The 
episteme affected not only what knowledge we sought and how it was generated, 
but also on the interpretation and comprehension of that knowledge. Hodges and 
Nilep (2007, 3) provided an extensive list of questions which highlighted the role 
of the episteme and extended the line of questioning to the future. These 
included: how are enemies identified and defined; how do citizens and societies 
understand and react to events; how should terrorism threats be comprehended; 
and how do these questions translate to the futures (Hodges and Nilep 2007, 3). 
 
The episteme governs how people and institutions think about terrorism, and 
therefore what is considered, decided and acted upon. The episteme ultimately 
shapes the decisions of the counter-terrorism community, and these decisions, 
made in the past and present, affect the possible futures. Language and discourse 
are central to the episteme because “[l]anguage is not symbolic but constitutive 
of reality” (Inayatullah 1998, 387) and meaning is located in discourse (Jackson 
2007, 398). Acknowledging and exploring the impact of the episteme on 
terrorism knowledge and on the way in which terrorism futures are considered is 
not something readily done in Terrorism Studies, but including this approach 
does provide another mechanism with which to explore the construction and 
deconstruction of terrorism knowledge in the interest of promoting positive 
futures manipulation.  
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Terrorism Terminology 
 
Language is constructive of reality (Shapiro in Carver and Chambers 2012) 
because language can be used to frame actors (Lakoff 2005, 56) and can also 
create and specify a sphere from which shared meanings and relationships can be 
derived and developed (Taylor 1985, cited in Hodges and Nilep 2007, 11). 
Hence, language has an active role in perception shaping which leaks into the use 
of language to reinforce particular terrorism worldviews. The role of language in 
reinforcing terrorism worldviews is particularly evident in the dichotomous 
stakeholder and civilisation worldview metaphors, ‘us versus them’ and ‘the 
West versus the rest’ respectively. The “role of language in actively shaping 
perception and mediating views of the world was neither well understood or 
allowed for. Hence ‘problems’ have tended to be described in superficial, 
culturally specific and taken-for-granted ways.” (Slaughter 1996b, 63) Media 
portrayals of terrorism and misconceptions in public opinion are testament to this 
tendency. Labelling theory, for example, is an early manifestation of social 
construction (Harré 2004, 98). Labelling can form part of an overall strategy by 
providing a ‘spin’ that presents an inaccurately favourable, or unfavourable, 
construction of events (Freedman 2007, 316). The interpretive framework 
created by a compelling and widely accepted storyline often reinforces the 
assigning of blame and the source of hope (Freedman 2007, 316). Actions can 
also inherit a dominant collective consensus, a social construction, of actors and 
what their actions represent (Harré 2004, 92).  
 
Discussions on terrorism frequently conform to the dominant social construction, 
in that a prescribed set of terms is often utilised. This set of terms often includes 
a combination of, but not limited to the: terrorist label; religious underdone and 
particular geo-graphic backgrounds; and attack descriptors such as mass 
destruction. Depending on the target audience, the language selected can evoke 
specific feelings about the threat of terrorism – particularly fear, sometimes 
resulting in initial support for the use of draconian security measures. The terms 
of reference can also shape audiences’ feelings towards the terrorist stakeholder, 
terrorism futures and security issues in a process called nominalisation. 
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Nominalisation is a process of transformation in which verbs, typically 
representing ‘reality’ as processes and actions, are used as nouns, representing 
‘reality’ as objects and entities (Dunmire 2007, 26). Nominalisation positions the 
future actions of an enemy as presupposed (Dunmire 2007, 26).  
 
The framing of threats has prescribed the occurrence of terrorist violence in the 
futures: “Specifically, “threat” provides the lexical and syntactic structure needed 
for the public to “see” and talk about the reality of the future” (Dunmire 2007, 
34). Dunmire (2007, 34) provides evidence of this use of the word “threat” in the 
form of a statement made by former President George W. Bush (cited in 
Dunmire 2007, 34) who speaks of “emerging threats” “that are gathering against 
us and that compel us to act preventively”, as opposed to the alternative, 
presumably, of idly awaiting and living in a “future of fear”. Discussions of 
counter-terrorism policies and defence strategies use terms such as “us”, “will” 
and “must”, denoting an obligation on the government to act (Dunmire 2007, 25) 
or react to protect citizens from further terrorist threats; this is consistent with, 
and supported by, the stakeholder and civilisation metaphors.  
 
By prescribing and communicating about a threat, authors enable the projection 
of negative futures and consequences (Kaufer and Butler 1996, cited in Dunmire 
2007, 34) by extending the anticipated occurrence of additional terrorist attacks. 
The existing ‘threat’ knowledge frame supports the litany futures of terrorism 
that presuppose escalations in the nature of the threat to potentially include 
successful large-scale use of WMDs. Portraying the futures in such a manner 
forces audiences to identify with and select a side (Kaufer and Butler 1996, cited 
in Dunmire 2007, 34) thus strengthening the stakeholder and civilisation 
worldview metaphors. This identification and side-selection process is enhanced 
by linkages of the threat to conditions of fear, a feature of terrorism's litany. 
Lazuka (2006, cited in Dunmire 2007, 38) refers to these links as “fear appeals”, 
which prepare audiences for anticipated events by increasing the number and 
strength of negative associations with “the enemy”; a process effectively 
communicated through the litany and systemic causes layers, and commonly 
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referred to as ‘the politics of fear’.145 How fear is distributed (Stocchetti 2007, 
224) and assigned is also important:146 “In the politics of fear the enemy is not 
bad for what it does but for what it is – an Islamic fundamentalist or a Western 
crusader” (Stocchetti 2007, 234), because “[p]olitics is very much about 
communication, and the politics of fear depends on narratives to establish a 
particular state of affairs.” (Stocchetti 2007, 231)147 Several such narratives, in 
the form of metaphors, have been highlighted throughout this thesis.  
 
A derivative effect of threat knowledge structures is the loaded character of 
language used to discuss terrorism (Freedman 2007, 315). These arguments 
about terminology are similar to those about the terrorist/freedom-fighter 
distinction in the litany chapter. To achieve an informed language base (one that 
would not be detrimental to the potential to engage in dialogue at the political-
ideological level) the requirements or conditions for using the terms “terror and 
terrorist” must be assessed and defined (Harré 2004, 92); “Even terrorists don’t 
like to be called terrorists. An al-Qaeda statement (Oct 2001) put it this way: 
‘when the victim tries to seek justice, he is described as a terrorist’.” (Richardson 
2006, 19) The terrorist other is largely demonised, and that demonisation is 
largely reinforced by existing power structures (Gunning 2007, 369) and is also a 
feature of the litany, systemic causes and worldview layers. For these and other 
reasons, Freedman’s (2007, 316) assertion that the terrorist label be used 
sparingly should be supported though investigating alternate terminology. 
Additionally, the use of academics as expert witnesses in official inquiries has 
led to the transfer of the central assumptions and narratives of academia into 
policy (Jackson 2007, 400); but to what effect? This kind of transfer means that 
governments must remain vigilant in their sourcing of ‘alternate’ worldviews.  
                                               
145
 Stocchetti (2007, 224) defines the politics of fear as the “competition for the control of 
conditions that make safety of paramount value.” 
146
 Distribution affects people’s experience of fear. The effects of fear, and the changes 
individuals experience in regard to attitude and behaviour in response to a prolonged exposure to 
fear (whether formed through actual violence or through narratives), can promote the acceptance 
of authoritarian leadership and conservative ideologies (Stocchetti 2007, 230); “the politics of 
fear support the mass inclination to give up freedom in exchange for security” (Fromm 2002, 
cited in Stocchetti 2007, 230). Fear politics inevitably promotes reactionary stances. 
147
 Interestingly, the Research, Information, Communications Unit of the Home Office, the 
Foreign Office and the Department of Communities and Local Government of the UK aimed to 
ensure that the UK government had a positive impact in counter-terrorism discussions by using 
less inflammatory language and avoiding phrasing which linked terrorism to a “clash of 
civilisations” or to the “global war on terror” (Pantucci 2010, 264). 
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While beyond the scope of this research, the assessment of ‘terrorism’ language 
(and the search for new shared terminology) could more deeply explore the 
following questions: 
− Can an alternative term to “terrorist” be identified that acknowledges the 
grievances; and what knowledge structures would be required to move 
existing terrorism terminology beyond labels? 
− Similarly, are there any suitable alternative phrases to “terrorist attack”? 
The word “attack” reinforces the ‘us versus them’ stakeholder worldview 
and fear politics. Would the terms “event” or “incident” provide suitable 
substitutes, acknowledging the impact of existing knowledge structures?  
− Has the tendency to create multiple sub-types of terrorism emerged to aid 
the focus of counter-terrorism efforts? For example, does the distinction 
between domestic terrorism and “home-grown terrorism” facilitate a 
focus in initiatives that could not otherwise be delivered? Are the relevant 
counter-terrorism initiatives vastly different?  
− Are there alternatives to the use of phrases like ‘global war on terror’,148 
evil-doers, and WMDs149 that do not reinforce out-grouping and fear?  
The nature of terrorism terminology demonstrates the need to engage with 
language selection so that terms can be “deconstructed and challenged, rather 
than abandoned and left to those who use [them] without problematization or 
purely for political ends.” (Gunning 2007, 384) Just as institutions and social 
movements reinforce and ensure the survival of ideas (McAuley 2005, 273), they 
can also profoundly affect how political structures and citizens engage with 
terrorism and the futures by creating and sustaining a particular, and perhaps 
limiting, discourse.  
 
Engaging with the language and metaphors used to describe and frame terrorism 
is important not only because language activates frames, but that “new language 
is required for new frames. Thinking differently requires speaking differently.” 
                                               
148
 Richardson (2006, 15) describes the declaration of a global war on terrorism as a mistake and 
a policy of inevitable failure.  
149
 An alternative that could be explored is “weapons of mass effect” (WME), which appeared in 
the late-2000s.  
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(Lakoff 2005, xv) Hodges and Nilep (2007, 13) argue that the diplomatic end of 
the political spectrum could be better embraced with the introduction of new 
narratives and images. Language has played an important and powerful role in 
contextualising terrorism and the threat that it is deemed to pose: “…relations of 
power and property themselves are not possible without language; they are 
essentially realized in language” (Taylor 1985, cited in Hodges and Nilep 2007, 
11). When language is reinforced and encoded in a way that makes it focus 
exclusively on the certainty that “terrorism is conducted by evildoers” and 
warrants and requires extensive reaction and/or preventative mechanisms (at the 
expense of exploring approaches that enable engagement) (Latour 1987, cited in 
Dunmire 2007, 23) the meanings of terrorism landscape terminology become 
pre-supposed and its actions pre-determined. To examine this, the linkages that 
discourse provides between language and action must first be assessed. 
 
Terrorism Discourse 
 
“When people think seriously, they think abstractly; they conjure up simplified 
pictures of reality called concepts, theories, models, paradigms.” (Huntington 
1993b, 186) Discourse analyses have been used to characterise and differentiate 
global political issues, such as: the Cold War; divisions between rich and poor, 
democratic and non-democratic150 (Huntington 1993b, 187), oil producers and oil 
consumers,151 modern and post-modern. For Lal and Nandy (2005, xvii) “[t]he 
greater bulk of what passes for ‘terrorism’ in state discourses is the handiwork of 
those employed as counter-terrorism experts.” Because discourse provides a way 
of asserting power and control (Dunmire 2007, 23) the existence of discourse 
categories can hinder, prevent or suppress other ways of knowing, including 
knowledge of the futures. Political and cultural scholars have recognised the 
functions of political discourse in shaping conceptions and visions of the futures 
(Dunmire 2007, 21).  
                                               
150
 Fanaticism has largely overtaken the role and position of communism as “the mortal enemy of 
democracy” wrote Schlesinger (1997, 10), again, reflecting the ‘political Islam is the new Soviet 
Union’ metaphor. 
151
 “Western science and technology, which made oil first useful and then necessary, will sooner 
or later make it obsolete, and those who depend on oil revenues will confront a new reality.” 
(Lewis 1997, 119) 
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Language selection assists in matching emotions to a corresponding discourse: 
“In popular culture we have become so accustomed to moods of cynicism, 
violence and despair that it may not be immediately obvious how inhibiting they 
can be.” (Slaughter 1994, 43) This statement rings true when drawing 
comparisons between the portrayal and actual proportion of worst-case scenarios 
to preferred, owned utopian or non-killing152 images evident in the terrorism 
futures literature. In making claims about possible future conditions, political 
actors engage with and determine the future through a series of actions and 
inactions (Dunmire 2007, 21). Particular political goals and agendas can be 
reinforced by political decisions (Edelman 1988, cited in Dunmire 2007, 21) 
underpinned by unyielding and unquestioned discourses.  
 
The problem-solving attitude applied in the Terrorism Studies community’s 
approach to counter-terrorism, as revealed at the litany and systemic causes 
levels, shows how terrorism research largely “takes the world as it finds it, with 
the prevailing social and power relationships and the institutions into which they 
are organised, as the given framework for action” (Robert Cox, cited in Gunning 
2007, 369-370). The tendency to rely on unproven assumptions, categories and 
dichotomies that reinforce the state’s views and values are further examples of 
the short-term problem-solving approach that is often applied to terrorism 
(Gunning 2007, 374). When constrained within the dominant research levels of 
the litany and systemic causes it is difficult for researchers to truly explore the 
role of epistemes in framing the terrorism/counter-terrorism problem. This 
difficulty inherently limits a number of important research developments, 
including: a) exploring how to engage with terrorism futures, b) recognising 
opportunities for engagement (such as those facilitated by the shared overarching 
political ideology at the worldview level), and c) envisaging counter-terrorism 
initiatives that progress beyond terrorist stakeholder eradication and the 
dependence on threat prevention and response to ensure the security of the 
populace.  
                                               
152
 In the seminal work ‘Nonkilling Global Political Science’, Paige (2009) laid the foundations 
for non-killing futures in which there would be no actual killing, or threat to kill, no weapons 
designed or justifications offered for killing, and no societal conditions dependent on the threat or 
use of killing (Paige 2009, 21). 
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Because of this limitation of research, attention needs to be drawn to how 
particular discourses “open up or close down particular lines of possibility; how 
they invite or inhibit particular identifications for particular social fractions at 
particular moments” (Hedbige 1993, cited in Dunmire 2007, 19). The role of 
epistemes in shaping the terrorism discourse differs according to the categories 
into which parties and people are placed: for example, whether the problem is 
examined according to the stakeholder, ideological or civilisation worldviews. 
For Foucault (1970) an infinite number of divisions into which things can be 
organised and re-organised exists. Different modes of thinking, with the 
inclusion of the episteme, are required to develop alternatives and change. 
Political discourse on the futures is built on ‘threats’ and ‘promises’ (van Dijk 
1998, cited in Dunmire 2007, 24); whilst both are implicated in the future, they 
are positioned differently, and each is pivotal to the construction and 
deconstruction of terrorism futures. Enemies are represented in political 
discourse as agents of deliberate choice seeking to achieve their political 
objectives through aggressive means. This is consistent with the findings of this 
thesis at the systemic causes level. 
 
The terrorism discourse contains (at least) the following six characterisations. 
− Evolution madness: 
The threat of terrorism has and will continue to evolve. This is a standard 
characterisation in the post-September 11 literature and an argument that 
requires little to no evidentiary backing (van Dijk 2005, cited in Dunmire 
2007, 26). Evidence supporting the assessment that terrorism’s nature is 
evolving is located within terrorism litany knowledge and reinforced by 
the stakeholder and civilisation worldview metaphors. Additional 
changes in terrorism are affixed with the ‘new threat’ label; a future 
realised in the ‘experimental’ terrorism litany scenario, capturing the 
existence of a period of terrorist experimentation with ‘new’ weapons 
and tactics.  
− The rise of Islamic extremism: 
The Islamic extremism discourse expanded significantly in the post-
September 11 environment (Jackson 2007, 398) and has proven to be a 
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sustained and uncompromising narrative. This narrative is arguably 
consistent with the ‘new’ and ‘evolving’ terrorism discourse (though 
historical evidence may suggest otherwise). This narrative positions 
Islamic extremists as a “lost cause”; they are “fanatical, religiously 
motivated, murderous and irrational, there is no possibility of 
negotiation, compromise or appeasement; instead, eradication, deterrence 
and forceful counter terrorism are the only reasonable responses.” 
(Jackson 2007, 409) The social construction of terrorism locates the 
problem of ‘new’ terrorism in religion (for example, Islam); the 
discourse moves to argue that the origins of terrorism are not and cannot 
be political – this exclusive blaming of religion is in direct opposition to 
the findings at the ideological worldview level (and systemic causes), 
and ignores, for example, numerous statements released by Osama bin 
Laden expressing contempt for Western policies (Jackson 2007, 421) and 
particularly the presence of US armed forces in Saudi Arabia. 
− Increasing insecurity:  
Media saturation of terrorism-related topics has not only broadened 
exposure, it has affected the public’s perception and has been a source of 
mis-education on the nature and history of terrorism. Following air 
travel-related problems, media coverage often plays on fear of terrorism 
by including a throw-away line to the effect that “there are insufficient 
details available to determine whether the incident was the result of 
terrorism”, or if the problem had some other cause, such as a mechanical 
failure or human error. The horror of the September 11 attacks and the 
fear they created, led many people to believe that the world had changed. 
They believed that it was no longer safe to fly and that they were 
vulnerable to attack by WMDs in ways previously unimagined or which 
had been described only by science fiction. The real change arguably 
came from within the United States itself, not from outside. It came from 
the broad, newfound sense of insecurity. With that feeling came a loss of 
perspective and, ultimately, a willingness to support a response that was 
destined to make the situation worse (Richardson 2006, 175).  
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− The necessity of retaliation and retribution: 
Retaliation and retribution became the focus after September 11, at the 
expense of attempts to identify and alleviate pressures at the systemic 
causes level, especially the gateway environmental causes. Such notions 
of retaliation and retribution are at odds with other reactive government 
systems, such as the criminal justice system, which aims, in theory, to 
protect society through rehabilitation and deterrence.153 Nevertheless, 
Foucault’s theme of power and surveillance has expanded to allow 
governments to respond in the wake of an event, in the name of national 
security, with new policies (Richardson 2006, 249), many of which have 
sacrificed some civil liberties: “Governments are invariably placed under 
enormous pressure to react forcibly and quickly in the wake of a terrorist 
attack.” (Richardson 2006, 245) Responses require calibration to ensure 
the government is not accused of being soft on terrorism or of rewarding 
terrorist acts (Richardson 2006, 249); however, altering the government, 
whether by restructuring or through policy changes (such as the 
withdrawal of troops) can give the impression that the adversary is 
winning concessions (Richardson 2006, 250). The government’s action 
must be holistic and well developed – a difficult achievement when 
facing the pressure to act (or rather react) immediately.  
− The necessity of securitisation:  
The threat of terrorism has been positioned as sustainable, requiring 
strong and decisive counter strategies. This securitisation discourse 
enables the justification and legitimisation of various activities, including 
but not limited to: enhancing security measures, restricting civil liberties, 
and taking military action. 
− Right of pre-emption 
The use of pre-emption, considered by the United States government to 
be an internationally recognised right to employ even military force 
against an imminent threat,154 arguably maintains that country’s 
                                               
153
 While some nations promote rehabilitation programs in their prison systems, the long term 
effectiveness of these programs has not been investigated for this thesis, though the topic may be 
an interesting one for a future project, using CLA to compare the effectiveness of these programs.  
154
 As outlined in the US National Security Strategy (NSS). 
241 
 
increasingly challenged military elitist status.155 The US National 
Security Strategy (NSS) positions reactive military responses as 
ineffective (Dunmire 2007, 29), yet, according to knowledge at the 
systemic causes level, reactive approaches are either favoured over, or 
are the default reaction (compared to engagement strategies for example) 
and can be implemented as a proactive measure. Dennis Ross (former 
Director for Policy Planning for the US Department of State) prefers the 
term “prevention” to “pre-emption” (Dunmire 2007, 30) however the 
requirements for the prevention of terrorism are vastly different from 
those of pre-emption in counter-terrorism measures, and would likely 
involve more stakeholder engagement.  
 
Just as the terrorism discourse directs thinking, knowledge and opinions on 
terrorism it also affects counter-terrorism initiatives. Discourses can affect 
planning techniques by tending to reinforce existing governmental, bureaucratic 
and legal power structures. For example, Western propositions for change 
inevitably reflect Western ideals, such as the implementation of democracy, or 
increased globalisation to alleviate environmental causal problems at the 
systemic level. The West commonly projects the image of Western culture as a 
standard for civilisation (Sardar 1993, 42), again reflecting the ‘globalisation as 
universalism’ (Nassar 2010, 6) and ‘globalisation as Westernisation’ (Nassar 
2010, 7) metaphors. The dependence on the known is reinforced by the 
discourses that govern terrorism knowledge; defining the way of knowing, 
potentially restricting the ability to arrive at different conclusions or alternative 
futures.156 “The idea that democracy is the best antidote to terrorism has been 
enjoying widespread acceptance recently.” (Richardson 2006, 71) Richardson 
(2006, 71) notes the simplicity of the democracy antidote statement, reminding 
readers that terrorism also occurs in democratic countries; the experiences in the 
UK and Japan are evidence of this. The theory of CLA, and the findings of this 
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 As stated by the United States National Security Council (2002, cited in Dunmire 2007, 19), 
the USA “must build and maintain [its] defenses beyond challenge” and “must dissuade future 
military competition.” Paul Wolfowitz’s doctrine also promoted the policy of striking first to 
defend the United States (Dunmire 2007, 31). 
156
 For example, how do we arrive at, or encourage the potential of, the alternative systemic 
futures where reactionary measures are minimised? This requires a change of language, 
metaphors and policy though the exploration of opportunities found at the ideological worldview 
level. 
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thesis so far also support the simplicity characterisation of the democratic 
antidote statement; because it demonstrates the continued ignorance of the role 
that worldviews and unconscious governing myth metaphors play in countering 
terrorism.  
 
Because “Westerners tend to think of nation states as the principal actors in 
global affairs” (Huntington 1993a, 24), the involvement of different stakeholders 
appears to be an initial barrier to engagement at the ideological worldview level 
and arguably contributes to reinforcing the stakeholder and civilisation 
worldviews. Due to the ‘straitjacket’ view of nations as units (Inayatullah 2007b, 
92) states are accustomed to dealing with other states, so it is attractive, 
according to the existing schemas, for them to see terrorism as a threat from 
another state. There are fairly clear-cut policy implications to this perspective. If 
terrorism is viewed as being perpetrated by an adversarial state, then the 
traditional methods of diplomacy should be invoked (Richardson 2006, 71). 
 
The adversarial nature of the stakeholder and civilisation worldviews in part 
reinforces the rationality of reactionary approaches to terrorism. The concept of 
rationality is, in itself, problematic because it is based on perspective (Inayatullah 
1993, 239), which is arguably subject to the influence of episteme and 
worldview. Language selection and discourses affect understandings and 
impressions of the terrorist threat and its various stakeholders. Spending on 
defence and terrorism appears to be disconnected from the characterisations of 
occurrences provided in the litany chapter, revealing the power of the fear 
discourse affecting fear perceptions of the unintended and unforeseen accidents 
versus deliberate and intentional attacks; “The probability that terrorists will kill 
as many Americans as drunk drivers will in any given year is tiny.” (Richardson 
2006, 278) Does the level of spending reflect the fears of a misinformed public, 
or does it, in fact, reflect a desire or commitment on the part of governments to 
find a one-size-fits-all solution to terrorism? The understandings derived from 
the litany and systemic causes levels argue for the need to educate the public on 
threat emergence and prevalence, but also show that there is little chance of 
successfully pursuing a definitive one-size-fits-all solution to terrorism. What 
works to counter one threat will not necessarily transfer effectively to another – 
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and this also applies to countering specific groups. However, generating new 
shared knowledge frames may facilitate moving into this dimension, where 
solutions can be transferred from one situation to another; an idea which gains 
viability at the ideological worldview level, based on the illustrated opportunity 
for parties to engage politically.  
 
 
5.9 Epistemic Myth 
 
The epistemic vantage point reveals the dominant (and overt) idea that terrorism 
is an amorphous problem of epic and evil proportions requiring protective and 
defensive solutions. The ordering of terrorism knowledge at the litany level is 
largely based on, and reinforced by, the dichotomous worldviews at the 
stakeholder and civilisation levels. The discourses are maintained and presented 
by language selection. Language is also used to create and sustain the insecurity 
discourse; it specifies the necessity of retaliation, retribution and securitisation to 
ensure the survival of good and the protection of past sacrifices: “We must not 
squander the position of security we achieved at great sacrifice through the Cold 
War, nor eliminate our ability to shape an uncertain future in ways favorable to 
us” (Dick Cheney 1993, cited in Dunmire 2007, 21). Diametrically opposed 
stakeholders and fear of the other are sustained through language selection, 
discourse and their underpinning ‘us versus them’ and ‘the West versus the rest’ 
metaphors (that operate at the stakeholder and civilisation worldview levels 
respectively), while effectively competing against and suppressing political 
engagement at the ideological worldview level. The union of discourse and 
metaphor positions government stakeholders as the providers of society’s 
protection – this provides the epistemic metaphor: ‘society must be defended’. 
 
The ‘society must be defended’ metaphor supports the continuation of fear: “We 
are doomed, it seems, to have the enemy always at the gates, intent on destroying 
our innocent land.” (Chernus 2005, 99) Liberty at home and abroad must be 
guarded, “[t]hus innocent Americans, through no choice of their own, are 
regularly forced to go to war against savage enemies who would take away 
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human liberty.” (Chernus 2005, 100). The terrorism literature and political 
speeches are replete with statements like these,157 portraying dark and gloomy 
worst-case scenario terrorism futures featuring self-described innocence 
(Chernus 2005, 99) pitted against a threatening enemy, reinforcing the 
dichotomies at the stakeholder and civilisation worldview levels. The 
polarisation of stakeholders is powered by “the idea that the magnitude of the 
struggle does not allow any actor to be neutral or indifferent.” (Stocchetti 2007, 
234) The ‘holy war’ metaphor has been used by both Western158 and Islamic 
participants to approach the problem. Thus, terminology reinforces the 
polarisation of stakeholders: West versus Islam; terror versus anti-terror 
(Stocchetti 2007, 233). “[P]olarization creates artificial identities – forcing 
actors’ positions into the roles of friends or foes (either-or) – which dramatically 
constrain the possibilities for accurate information, reporting and debate” 
(Stocchetti 2007, 234), in this case affecting the course of terrorist conflict and 
knowledge. Indeed Foucault (1975-76, cited in Bertani, Fontana and Ewald (Eds) 
2004) recognised the power of defending society, examining the model of war as 
a lens through which to analyse politics. Exchanging war for terrorism: “How, 
when, and in what way did people begin to imagine that it is terrorism that 
functions in power relations, that an uninterrupted conflict undermines peace, 
and that the civil order is basically an order of battle?” (Foucault 1975-76, cited 
in Bertani, Fontana and Ewald (Eds) 2004, 266) 
 
Defending against all terrorist threats is a very difficult objective, both to set 
(politically) and to achieve (practically), as demonstrated by the characterisation 
of terrorism as innovative at the litany level. Nonetheless, “Americans have 
tended to imagine all the terrible things terrorists could do to them and then to 
attempt the impossible task of defending against all of them.” (Richardson 2006, 
253) In taking this stance, America has again positioned itself as the 
                                               
157
 For example, on September 11 the American government issued a declaration of war: the then 
President announced that “[i]mmediately following the first attack, I implemented our 
government’s emergency-response plans. Our military is powerful, and it’s prepared... America 
and our friends and allies join with all those who want peace and security in the world, and we 
stand together to win the war against terrorism” (Address to the Nation on September 11, cited in 
Richardson 2006, 210). 
158
 George W. Bush initially made use of (later retracting) the crusade metaphor: it featured, in a 
16 September 2001 statement, in reference to his commitment against terrorism (Stocchetti 2007, 
232-3).  
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“indispensable nation” (Madeleine Albright, cited in Dyer 2006, 147) reinforcing 
the “us versus them” battlelines, whether ‘them’ is Islam or “the rest” remains 
open for debate. 
 
Several discourses underpin the ‘society must be defended’ metaphor, including 
the necessity of increased securitisation and protection through military pressure, 
presence and prestige. “Explicitly or implicitly readiness to kill is deemed 
essential for the creation and defense of the good society” (Paige 2009, 23). In an 
era hoped to bring peace and prosperity, nations maintain and continue to expand 
their military capabilities, apparently with the mindset that military superiority 
will be required in times of crisis;159 so what future for non-killing? Dator (2012, 
12) notes that a non-killing government is required for a non-killing world. 
Killing has been legitimised as a mechanism of expansion, domination and social 
control – as a necessary price to pay for a good life (Morgan 2012, 41). Take for 
example the US strategy of going to war “to make the world safe for democracy” 
(Dyer 2006, 150). War has become a defining worldview representing 
dominance and patriarchy (Inayatullah 2003b, 112). Inayatullah (2003b, 113) 
concludes that it is not possible to transform the concept of war without first 
challenging it: war is currently fundamental to human identity, and notions of 
battle are grounded in long history. Furthermore, conflict is often celebrated and 
commemorated from a nationalistic perspective, thereby forming a large part of 
personal, societal and/or national identity (Inayatullah 2003b). Because terrorism 
has a history of over 2,000 years (Hoffman) the threat and the ‘defending 
society’ mythology could be traced through different eras to reveal progression, 
continuation or other forms of change.  
 
From the mythology of war emerges the notion of engagement as a way to 
produce, obtain or secure a desired outcome. The concentration of power needed 
to instigate warring has shifted from an individual-to-individual level to a group-
to-group level, and is now largely the prerogative or “privilege” of nation-states 
(Foucault 1975-76, cited in Bertani, Fontana and Ewald (Eds) 2004, 267). War 
leads to the defeat of the ‘wrong-doers’ and the triumph of the ‘right’. The 
                                               
159
 Arguably the military could respond to man-made (i.e. conflict, war) or naturally occurring 
events (e.g. cyclones and earthquakes).  
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demise of a few is accepted for the good of the many. “The costs of wars are 
such that participants feel they have to continue fighting to justify the costs 
already borne.” (Richardson 2006, 258), but “winning battles does not 
necessarily equate with winning wars, especially when it comes to fighting 
terrorists.” (Richardson 2006, 221) While the concept of war will remain, due to 
its unchallenged and intrinsic links to human identity, (Inayatullah 2003b, 113), 
this should not end the questioning of whether war has a future (Inayatullah 
2003b, 111), particularly as a terrorism response mechanism. Unless warring 
concepts are contested “we will assume that because it is, it always will be.” 
(Inayatullah 2003b, 113) The task therefore transforms into one of assessing the 
means that might be used to challenge the systems and worldviews that position 
war and military prowess (Inayatullah 2003b, 113) as effective ways to 
counteract terrorism.  
 
Like war, it is unlikely that terrorism will disappear; partly because of its long 
association with warfare, but also because of the cycle of violence that has 
emerged: “’Terror’ might have triggered ‘anti-terror’, but ‘anti-terror’ supports, 
in practice, though not in principle, the practices of ‘terror’” (Stocchetti 2007, 
238). This association and cycle does not, however, mandate that we cannot 
challenge terrorism’s existence – particularly through the creation of new and 
shared metaphors. If the disappearance of terrorism is the desired future, the 
existing divide between the present and the preferred futures must be examined 
and initial steps to manipulate the future accordingly must be strategically 
considered, and, importantly, in a manner that is cognisant of all stakeholders’ 
preferred futures. Creating new or alternative language, paradigms and practices 
requires the engagement of all stakeholders to ensure that the structures 
inhibiting or reinforcing the old, dominant worldviews are challenged and altered 
(Gunning 2007, 387); action learning may be a good way to achieve such 
alterations. “To work on almost any global problem… we need to understand 
individual values and goals, social and political will, human behaviour, and how 
such things can be changed.” (Richardson 1987, cited in Tough 1996, 181) 
Challenging the understandings and knowledge of the past and present enables 
the deconstruction of the constructed reality, (Inayatullah 2004b, 73) and the 
opening of the futures for engagement. 
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A constant state of battle and an ever-present enemy is implied by the notion, and 
its associated mythology, that ‘society must be defended’. Knowledge at the 
stakeholder and civilisation worldview levels is used to determine and 
contextualise who needs defending from whom. The futures appear to be 
removed from the prospect of political engagement at the worldview level of 
ideology, and remain driven by the need to respond through forceful 
engagement, a need arguably driven by discourses of evolutionary madness and 
securitisation: ‘if you prepare it, they will come’. This discourse is maintained, 
reinforced and protected by the creation and use of reactive measures and 
proactive stances relating to terrorism/military preparations and the 
terrorism/military industrial complex. In doing this work of maintenance and 
protection, how predetermined has the ‘other’ or the ‘enemy’ in future battles 
become? The discourses used to understand the terrorism threat, inevitably shape 
the selection of courses of action and inaction. For an individual, “[k]nowledge is 
attained by exploring the past; by considering his or her own experience, future 
aims, and expectations; and by setting them into the structures and realities of the 
present moment.” (Rubin 1998, 499) By its very nature, this approach ignores 
stakeholder engagement and exposure to their experiences, aspirations and 
expectations. Thus, the structures that create, support, legitimise or contest 
terrorism, can be in the episteme. The terrorism episteme myth that ‘society must 
be defended’ reinforces the dominant ‘us versus them’ stakeholder metaphor, and 
the larger ‘the West versus the rest’ civilisation metaphor, at the expense of 
opportunities to open the futures that are offered at the ideological level. 
Specifically, if left unchallenged, these metaphors will continue to close the 
transformative space created through the shared overarching political ideology 
where dialogue exchanged through consideration, negotiation and public 
engagement could be fostered.160  
 
 
                                               
160
 Annapolis, November 2007: discussions between Israel and Palestine demonstrate that 
acceptance requires all parties (including Hamas, in this instance) and larger community 
groupings. Handshake agreements between political leaders do not automatically apply to the 
populations they represent. 
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5.10 Terrorism Worldviews and Myths Scenarios 
One day we woke up and realized that Humanity has lived in a one-
dimensional world, we saw everything with a single optic, from one 
angle: harmony, intelligence, the power of upper class people, what 
eyes can see, the short term, the surface of things, the classic topics, 
the formal logic, the imposed reality, mass media’s reality. We end 
up explaining everything that we perceive and learn with the same 
old categories: our positivist training is Western, we practice 
planning without action, we only use the left side of the brain, we 
privilege reason, we cannot get out from traditional paradigms, 
somebody has told us that killing is fine, we used to say “an eye for 
an eye”. (Paz 2012, 199) 
 
 
The worldview and myth levels of CLA have exposed several interesting aspects 
of terrorism knowledge-framing and terrorism futures. These discoveries 
reaffirm the necessity of extending terrorism research beyond the traditional 
realms in order to approach the futures in a manner that considers terrorism and 
terrorism futures as spaces of malleability and opportunity to influence. 
Engaging with terrorism futures enables movement beyond a reliance on worst-
case prophecies that are based exclusively on knowledge found at the litany and 
systemic levels; knowledge sustained by our existing knowledge structures and 
governing mythologies. Table Eight below provides a summary of the 
characteristic myth metaphors of terrorism uncovered at the four worldview 
levels and their corresponding futures output.  
Table Eight: Characterising Terrorism Myth Metaphors According to 
Worldview 
 Stakeholder 
 
Ideological Civilisation Episteme 
Myth 
metaphor 
Us versus 
them 
Politically 
engaged 
The West 
versus the rest 
Society must be 
defended 
Futures 
Output 
Dichotomous 
metaphor 
reflects the 
litany and 
reactionary 
systemic 
causes. 
Without 
engagement, 
litany will 
escalate.  
Opportunity 
to foster 
engagement 
to recognise 
the high 
identification 
systemic 
causes 
scenarios. 
Dichotomous 
metaphor 
reflects the 
litany and 
reactionary 
systemic 
causes. 
Expands on 
stakeholder 
worldview 
metaphor. 
Sustains the litany 
and systemic 
causes scenarios. 
Underpins 
stakeholder and 
civilisation 
metaphors. 
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Further, Table Nine below shows the flow and connections between the litany, 
systemic causes, worldviews and myths. The table provides a summary of the 
relationships between the content revealed at the four levels. It highlights that the 
stakeholder, civilisation and episteme worldviews all share the same litany, 
depicting terrorism as a constant and evolving threat. The ideological worldview 
is the only knowledge level that has a knowledge frame that supports a different 
future – a future which challenges the persistence of terrorism as a constant and 
evolving threat.  
Table Nine: Flow and Connections Between the Litany, Systemic 
Causes, Worldviews and Myths of Terrorism 
 
 
 
In essence, three of the four worldviews and driving myths refer to a “battle 
space”, characterised by clearly defined sides and a predetermined view of how 
the futures will unfold. These perspectives on the futures may be established 
according to the stakeholders’ points of view, or through fixed, civilisational 
identification – each of which has been largely reinforced by the terrorism 
episteme. The episteme has not only played a powerful role in shaping the 
terrorism discourse through the language, dialogue and categories used and 
exchanged, but has also revealed the deepest unconscious concern of terrorism 
futures: the need and desire to ‘defend society’. This reality has been brought 
about by the creation, positioning and reinforcement of the self, and other 
categories ultimately reflected in the dichotomous stakeholder and civilisation 
worldview metaphors, but is also entrenched within the episteme by the need to 
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identify, and protect against, feared differences. The thesis has so far highlighted 
the potential to challenge these dichotomies by engaging with stakeholders at the 
ideological level. The shared overarching political worldview at the ideological 
level revealed the existence of a transformative space in which to construct and 
deconstruct alternate and possible shared futures based on political visions. This 
space provides the opportunity for all stakeholders, particularly those in 
dichotomous relationships, to pursue, engage in and exchange dialogue about 
terrorism and its futures. This opportunity will not exist at the stakeholder, 
civilisation or epistemic worldview levels until the existing metaphors are 
challenged. 
Holistically, the worldviews and myths that characterise terrorism have revealed:  
• an overarching lack of consideration of alternative futures;  
• the power and influence of dichotomies which are created and reinforced 
by the episteme, and; 
• an overtly negative and reactionary terrorism discourse. 
 
First, there is the overwhelming lack of consideration for alternate terrorism 
futures, whether they incorporate images of the self, of others, or of a global 
future. Personal images of the future often revolve around hopes, positive 
expectations and desires, while images of the larger context (of the homeland and 
the world) appear to be negative and focused on threats (Rubin 1998, 498).  
 
By not actively engaging with the futures as a space of opportunity and 
malleability we commit either to used or to disowned futures. Used futures 
involve an unconscious choice or a predetermined vision of the future; but whose 
future does this represent? The matter of conceptualising whose future becomes 
important because: 
 
…what questions one asks, how one asks them, as well as the larger 
issue of what one considers of value are equally, if not much more 
important in understanding the futures ahead of us. (Inayatullah 
1996, 194) 
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This could, for example, given the apparent human predisposition to engage in 
warfare for the purpose of determining and securing world order, witness the 
continuation of the ‘society must be defended’ epistemic myth, which, mixed 
with the fear politics of an ever-present national security threat, enables the 
positioning of conflict as a necessary and efficient means of problem resolution.  
 
Disowned futures involve the absence or disengagement of the 
self/community/collective group from visions of the future. It could be argued, 
on the basis of the limited number of accounts describing their preferred futures, 
that terrorists have a disowned future:161  
One of the very striking and quite surprising aspects of most 
terrorist movements is how little of their attention is devoted to 
describing the new world they intend to create. They are happy to 
provide the outlines of their future world like rule by sharia law or 
national independence, but they are very short on detail. 
(Richardson 2006, 110) 
  
Richardson (2006, 110) suggests that terrorist leaders have focused on the 
process and means of destroying the present system rather than on their hopes 
and on the functionalities of, or for, a new system. Thus the focus of terrorist 
groups and individuals tends to remain on the present or on reversion to the past, 
at the expense of engaging with the futures. 
 
Terrorism research is deficient in “positive guiding images of the future which 
can give both direction and the confidence that things can be radically different.” 
(Hicks 1994, 16) Contemporary images often depict futures that we wish to 
avoid (with elements like pollution and WMDs), rather than the desires we wish 
to realise (Slaughter 1994, 41). For the Terrorism Studies community, the focus 
appears to centre on defeating the ‘enemy’ and does not consider the construction 
of desired futures. The enemy focus will not guarantee that, if and when that 
focused-upon ‘enemy’ is contained, another threat will not emerge. The ‘society 
must be defended’ episteme metaphor hints at the existence of perpetual 
enemies; defending against the eternal enemies of society is paramount. It is 
arguable that a focus on desired futures may steer policy towards particular 
achievements, regardless of the changing nature of the threats faced. This does 
                                               
161
 This situation could also reflect the absence of questions on desired futures in interviews with 
terrorist leaders. 
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not challenge the notion that specific threats require custom-made policy, nor the 
contention that such strategies remain important, but a focus on desired futures 
does argue that an overarching meta-strategy or policy is necessary to enable 
futures-shaping. Threat-specific policy, for example, could aim to engage with 
the grievances (identified in the systemic causes layer) that breed resentment and 
recruits (Richardson 2006, 265). “[I]f parties in conflict could visualize a future 
situation in which their conflict had been successfully managed, they would be 
(better) able to deal with their differences in the present in the light of that 
perceived future.” (Boulding 1988, cited in Hicks 1994, 16) 
 
Sight must not be lost of the fact that “[a]ll problems are embedded in the context 
of other problems and solving one problem tends to create or exacerbate other 
problems.” (Cocks 2003, 227). Extending investigations to include intended and 
unintended consequences of change is important, and is a process that will 
require consultation and engagement between all stakeholders. In the case of 
terrorism, the opportunity for this engagement is created by the shared political 
worldview at the level of ideology: the ‘politically engaged’ metaphor. This 
metaphor should be promoted and embedded into knowledge frames. The 
Terrorism Studies community, and arguably the media, needs to consider and 
promote the creation of preferred terrorism futures for all stakeholders. Creating 
a space where futures can be considered and exchanged may even facilitate the 
making of shared futures. The viability of this process of examining or imagining 
alternatives indicates that something new can be found, and that we are not 
confined to one predetermined future or to revisiting the present or past. This 
process will also enable the reactionary nature of counter-terrorism to be 
challenged by proactively engaging with alternative terrorism futures and 
initiating the deconstruction of restrictive terrorism metaphors.  
 
The current terrorism discourse emphasises an overtly negative and reactionary 
first response, driven by the dominant images and fears of ‘evildoers’ 
perpetrating worst-case scenarios. The potency of viewing the world through a 
single lens, one that is arguably shaped and governed by three of the four 
metaphors summarised in Tables Eight and Nine, and reinforcing the existing 
terrorism knowledge frames, is prohibitive to positive futures manipulation. As 
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images of the futures vary from person to person and, as this thesis indicates, 
stakeholders are inevitably spilt between ‘good’ and ‘evil’ from one another’s 
perspectives, without positive stakeholder engagement with the future, terrorism 
futures are likely to remain closed, used and disowned.  
 
As far as terrorism is concerned, the initial responses of outrage and retribution 
dominate, taking precedence over more diplomatic approaches of reflection 
based on gaining perspective and understanding. Revenge can be a natural 
instinct and in the instance of September 11 that instinct immediately outweighed 
demands for an arguably more considered approach. The world was split, argues 
Richardson (2006, 236) according to the good and evil dichotomies that US 
political leaders proclaimed: those not in support of the USA had sided with the 
terrorists. Review may have helped to determine whether certain actions may 
have contributed to, or even instigated, resentment against the United States. 
While reactionary, the terminology used was carefully selected and combined 
with existing discourses to paint a grand picture. Over time, this picture 
developed and expanded from its initial focus on al-Qaeda, to all terrorist groups 
under the auspices of a “war on terrorism” which was to become global.162 The 
use of this terminology arguably reinforces and actualises the negative and 
reactionary discourse that characterises terrorism scholarship, all of which is 
reinforced through the worldviews, myths and underpinning epistemes. The ‘us 
versus them’, and ‘the West versus the rest’ metaphors enabled the effective use 
of the distinction drawn between the ‘good’, innocent people/victims and ‘evil’, 
destructive terrorists.  
 
Systemic causes knowledge gives weight to the argument that “man is naturally 
good, that evil comes not from inside man but from the external structures of 
society” (Rousseau, cited in Richardson 2006, 48), but also highlights the 
                                               
162
 On September 20 2001, a mere nine days after the attacks, the then President George W. 
Bush, in an address to a joint session of Congress (cited in Richardson 2006, 210), proclaimed 
that “our war on terror begins with al-Qaeda, but it does not end there. It will not end until every 
terrorist group of global reach has been found, stopped and defeated.” Thus, the ‘war on terror’ 
(meaning, in essence, a war on al-Qaeda) morphed into the global war on terror (Richardson 
2006, 215). The war on terror became intertwined with notions of a war against evil; a concept 
not to be confused with, or interpreted as, a war on Islam (as statements by President Bush in a 
meeting with King Abdullah of Jordan emphasised) (Richardson 2006, 215). 
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imbalance of keeping the focus on profiling. The social construction of evil is 
also supported by Paige (2009, 39) who argues that most humans do not kill 
other humans and that we are not “natural born killers”. If it is so that humans are 
without intrinsic evil, why are the remedies and mindset currently dominating the 
systemic causes level so tightly focused on good and evil (as portrayed in the low 
identification systemic causes scenario)? Why are remedies not pursued through 
political channels (as presented at the ideological worldview level)? Drawing 
simplified distinctions between good and evil does not aid community awareness 
or education on terrorism-related issues (as the systemic causes chapter made 
clear), nor does it foster a sufficient level of knowledge about the proposed 
means of redress, unless those distinctions acknowledge the existence and impact 
of the dichotomy. The existing knowledge frames enables the continued 
ignorance of the action and reaction dynamic that characterises the terrorist threat 
and of alternative terrorism futures informed by knowledge structures beyond 
those of the dominant West.  
 
Due to the negative and reactionary overarching discourse and lack of 
consideration of alternative futures, ‘humanity’ and ‘futures attitude’ have been 
selected as the variables for the meta-level worldview and myth scenario matrix. 
The ‘humanity’ and ‘futures attitude’ ‘tsunamis’ have a strong underpinning and, 
in combination with other elements, including the episteme, will shape and 
determine terrorism futures.  
 
The ‘humanity’ variable describes the state of the human community – on a 
continuum between being split (into good and evil) or globally united. There is a 
defining split between engaging as an inclusive global community (Gaia) and 
continuing the ‘good versus evil’ dichotomy. The purpose of the ‘humanity’ 
variable is to capture the essence of this split, while also making it possible to 
challenge the adversarial metaphors that characterise many of the worldview 
layers and the episteme. The inclusion of the dichotomy, positioned with the 
‘futures attitude’ variable, illustrates how different the futures of terrorism could 
be if stakeholders were engaged with in order to construct and deconstruct the 
futures, as the opportunity presented at the ideological worldview level suggests. 
The ‘futures attitude’ variable describes the attitude taken to the future of 
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terrorism (in a non-futures sense) – on a continuum of attitudes between “the 
future is predetermined, unalterable” and “the future is undetermined, and 
present actions can affect it”. Although ‘used’ and ‘disowned’ futures could have 
been used in this scenario matrix, neither category enabled the creation of a space 
where stakeholders could identify alternatives with the view to promote positive 
manipulation of terrorism futures.  
 
Terrorism worldviews and myths can be characterised by two dominant 
‘tsunamis’ pulling in competing directions: one pulling towards a continuation of 
dichotomous relationships at the expense of forming a global community; and 
another pulling between determined and undetermined futures spaces. These four 
competing tsunamis are depicted in the scenario matrix below (Figure Eleven). 
Consistent with the scenario matrices presented earlier in this thesis, this matrix 
remains non-specific in terms of terrorist entity or geographic location. 
Figure Eleven: Worldview and Myth Terrorism Futures Scenario Matrix 
 
 
 
Global Community and Predetermined Futures: Competing 
‘Utopias’ 
 
Competing ‘utopian’163 futures are likely to result if the human community is 
globalised and has the attitude that the future is predetermined from a positive 
                                               
163
 The Greek ‘eutopia’ (“the good place”) became ‘utopia’ (“no place”) (More, cited in Hicks 
1994, 17). Utopia was described as an ideal society, in laws, government and social conditions 
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outlook. This quadrant represents a space where a series of autonomous preferred 
futures can be created, acknowledged and exchanged. The space addresses the 
lack of positive and preferred terrorism futures, though these visions will exist in 
competition with one another. Each stakeholder’s preferred ‘utopian’ future, or 
futures, is hypothesised to be different. This is a space in which to share and 
communicate positive images of the futures. However, it is also a space that 
could be overwhelmed by existing knowledge frames, if those frames remain 
unchallenged, which could lead to the space becoming susceptible to the 
dominance of an individual or group. Different stakeholders will identify with 
their own preferred images of the future, and, therefore, diametrically opposed 
stakeholders, though engaged in the global community, will likely remain in 
opposition to one another. The major difference between this scenario and the 
others is that each stakeholder in this determinist but global future will have 
greater exposure to other’s dreams and aspirations.  
 
The current prevailing reactive and negative terrorism discourse poses one of the 
greatest challenges to the opening of lines of communication about the futures. 
As an example of this negativity, Richardson (2006, 256-7) suggests that “[t]he 
US takes it as a given that al-Qaeda’s demands are so extreme as to be non-
negotiable, but it would be worth finding out if that is, in fact, the case.” These 
knowledge structures need to be challenged in order to move beyond the mere 
exposure of different stakeholders’ futures to active engagement with those 
futures.  
 
Global Community and Undetermined Futures: Futures 
Alignment 
 
This quadrant introduces the prospect of an engaged global community moving 
towards terrorism futures alignment; where terrorism stakeholders, including 
those whom are usually opposed, identify and develop either elements of, or a 
complete preferred and shared future. This space builds on the functions of the 
                                                                                                                               
(Scheel 1988, 16). Hicks (1994, 17) writes: “Utopias provide blueprints for a better future society 
and may be presented as fiction, an ideal society set in some other time or place, or as a 
programme for political action and change.” 
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competing utopias quadrant discussed above by facilitating the participation of 
all stakeholders for the purpose of achieving a level of agreement about the 
futures – especially about which components of the various futures are aligned. 
Determining this will involve the discussion by the stakeholders of opinions and 
goals within their future images and the identification of which of these opinions 
and goals are negotiable. Language selection, discourse and episteme begin to be 
challenged and questioned in this space. Following futures alignment, positive 
manipulation of those futures can occur, in order to reach the shared desired 
future. Active involvement at this level can present a significant challenge. 
Governments, for example, “always resist talking to terrorists for fear that it 
confers legitimacy on them, or rewards their terrorism.” (Richardson 2006, 257) 
The other challenge for government stakeholders in communicating with terrorist 
stakeholders revolves around identifying appropriate participants164 and ensuring 
safety. While the ideological worldview indicates that engagement can occur at 
the level of political ideology, such engagement will ultimately require the 
breakdown of the reinforcing episteme that challenges it. In this scenario, for 
example, engagement would require the acknowledgement that terrorism spawns 
under a range of influences, and that the involvement of all stakeholders in 
efforts to alleviate these influences will open the futures. At the very least this 
process will require the engagement of stakeholders in an appropriate 
environment where dialogue and ideas can be exchanged.165 Engagement also 
causes stakeholders to think about the futures, what types of future are preferred 
over others and why, whether any components are negotiable, and how to start 
working towards the desired outcome.  
 
Sustained Dichotomies and Undetermined Futures: Dystopia 
 
A non-deterministic but negative attitude to the future of terrorism accompanied 
by prevailing dichotomous knowledge frames and also those frames depicting the 
threat as the source of potentially unlimited destruction, supports a continued 
                                               
164
 For example, the splintering of al-Qaeda after 2001 has resulted in a situation where it is 
unclear who to speak with (Richardson 2006, 257), thus impeding the process of stakeholder 
engagement and global community-creation. This difficulty is not, nor will it be, unique to al-
Qaeda, and nor should it prevent the pursuit of this futures space. 
165
 Peace negotiations with the IRA and the MILF (Moro Islamic Liberation Front) demonstrate 
the need to engage with all stakeholders in an environment conducive to participation. 
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dependence on worst-case scenario planning in terrorism policy. As with the 
existing terrorism discourse, this futures space could be characterised by the 
concern that Islamic terrorists might obtain and use WMDs. The scenario accepts 
that in spite of counter-terrorism initiatives, terrorism will continue to morph into 
an increasingly destructive, deadly threat, making unrestrained evil an image of 
the future, driving the extension and creativity of terrorism and, therefore, 
securitisation. This would be a dystopian outlook that remained connected to 
existing knowledge frames, supporting the litany and systemic causes of 
terrorism. This future remains unconcerned with the deeper questions of why 
terrorism occurs, or with engaging with all stakeholders. While worst-case 
scenario planning should arguably remain an important component of any 
counter-terrorism strategy, it should not dominate the outlook and direction of 
policy – and nor should the existing terrorism knowledge frames be left 
uncontested. 
 
Sustained Dichotomies and Predetermined Futures: 
Replication of Litany of Threat Escalation 
 
Futures in this quadrant are characterised by a determinist attitude to terrorism 
futures in which terrorism replicates the present, perhaps mimicking the cycle of 
escalation discussed in the litany chapter. The future is held to be predetermined 
by history and the likelihood is that the identification of the other (as a terrorist 
evildoer) will continue unchallenged, reinforcing existing dichotomies. The 
futures in this quadrant also position worst-case scenarios as inevitable, but, 
contrary to the futures discussed immediately above, provide the standpoint that 
aspects of these scenarios can and will be predetermined. Individual incidents 
will be predetermined in the sense that a number of potential threats have been 
identified enabling the identification of threat indicators and the making of 
preparations. Research will maintain a pivotal role in threat identification; 
counter-terrorism literature is replete with examples of the continuation and 
escalation of terrorism with WMDs, alternative explosive delivery systems, and 
more recently, cyber-terrorism. This terrorism future is dominated by knowledge 
uncovered in the litany and in the threat displacement aspect of terrorism’s 
259 
 
systemic causes, and is not actively concerned with the unconscious dimensions 
of terrorism’s worldviews or myths. 
 
5.11 Concluding Remarks 
 
This chapter represents a kind of thought that is uncommon in the Terrorism 
Studies community: engagement with terrorism worldviews and myths. The 
terrorism futures worldviews and myths scenario matrix demonstrates how 
different the futures of terrorism could be, depending on how the future is 
approached (as predetermined or undetermined) and the level or character of 
stakeholder engagement undertaken. The chapter highlighted the potential for a 
range of terrorism futures and will hopefully initiate discussions of which meta-
level futures are preferred and worth pursuing. It also reveals the importance of 
challenging the ‘us versus them’, ‘the West versus the rest’ and ‘society must be 
defended’ metaphors, and that it is possible to pursue futures that challenge these 
underlying metaphors. The preferred future among the terrorism worldview and 
myths scenarios is the global community and undetermined terrorism futures 
attitude. This future acknowledges the need for, and facilitates, engagement with 
each stakeholder’s preferred futures. This kind of active participation with 
various competing images of the future and their respective owners is expected to 
challenge discourse and episteme alike, and may reveal some shared thoughts 
and aspirations for the futures, facilitating the deconstruction of terrorism and 
terrorism futures while introducing the prospect that those futures might be 
aligned. Encouraging the understanding that terrorism’s futures are malleable 
(and not limited to predetermined worst-case scenarios) engenders hope amongst 
the citizenry and encourages the global community to use what are currently 
largely disparate buckets of knowledge (the litany, systemic causes, worldviews 
and myths) to construct and deconstruct terrorism futures. As such, this non-
deterministic, positive communal future is a transformative space where greater 
understanding could be achieved through political engagement at the ideological 
level. This space will also facilitate challenges to the existence and use of 
dichotomies which currently construct, support and reinforce terrorism 
knowledge. Rubin (1998, 494-5) writes: 
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The concepts of the future and the images that arise from them are 
factors that direct human behavior and attitudes in the present 
situations of decision making. Each individual’s idea of the future, 
together with the prevailing social facts and commonly shared ideas 
and expectations, has a contributory influence on the general 
direction of human decision making and actions in the present day. 
 
Understanding how these dynamics affect terrorism futures is important in the 
context of enabling positive manipulation of terrorism futures within the global 
community (Gaia) and undetermined but positive futures landscape attitude.  
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Chapter Six: Conclusion 
 
This thesis has contained several images of alternative meta-level terrorism 
futures. These images represent futures available at the different levels of 
terrorism knowledge: the litany, systemic causes and the combined worldviews 
and myths. These alternative futures reveal valuable insights into the pitfalls and 
opportunities that come from incorporating foresight into terrorism research to 
encourage discussions and engagement with the futures of terrorism. While the 
thesis content has been non-specific in terms of group or geographic location, the 
overarching characterisations of terrorism’s litany, systemic causes, worldviews 
and myths have hopefully made a contribution to exploring terrorism and its 
possible futures, facilitating greater systemic foresight and futures planning 
within terrorism research.  
 
The generation of systematic alternative futures is not a common feature of 
existing terrorism literature. Examining the different levels of terrorism 
knowledge has provided valuable insight into the construction and 
deconstruction of terrorism futures – particularly the impact of issue-framing and 
governing metaphors. This understanding represents a level of comprehension 
that can assist in the creation of more efficient and effective counter-terrorism 
policies and initiatives, actively pursuing the concept and possibility of positive 
manipulation of the futures of terrorism. CLA and Scenarios have shown that the 
terrorism futures landscape can be a malleable space of opportunity, navigable 
and susceptible to influence. Terrorism futures have been colonised to such a 
degree that decisions made in the past and present have shaped those futures, and 
also to the extent to which existing terrorism knowledge structures are left to 
continue uncontested. CLA and Scenarios have opened terrorism futures beyond 
the confining characterisation of an ever-present and escalating evil. Terrorism 
futures could be likened to a living maze: the prospect of opening new doors or 
pathways into, around and out of the maze presenting chances to build layered 
knowledge, understanding and even shared preferred futures.  
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The thesis described the application of a comprehensive understanding of the 
natures of terrorism intended to generate three scenario matrices based on 
different levels of knowledge; a process reliant on CLA and Scenarios, theories 
and methods of Futures Studies. CLA facilitated the examination of terrorism at 
the litany, systemic causes and combined worldview and myth levels. The 
reviewed literature was predominantly situated within the litany and systemic 
levels, with portions exploring the worldview level. The Terrorism Studies 
community has not yet fully engaged with the unconscious dimensions of 
terrorism – a dimension governed by powerful metaphors. As such, this thesis 
explores uncharted aspects of the terrorism problem, making how we know 
terrorism problematic and constituting a contribution to the Terrorism Studies 
field. While portions of the thesis merely scratched the surface of the issues 
discussed, it still provides a potential foundation for further exploration of 
terrorism futures and the breaking down of boundaries that may be 
unconsciously inhibiting our opportunities to interact with seemingly 
diametrically opposed terrorist stakeholders and the achievement of better or 
preferred terrorism futures. 
 
This chapter will initially provide summaries of the foregoing chapters, prior to 
launching into the discussion of the counter-terrorism implications of the thesis 
as a whole. These sections combined provide a summary of the construction and 
deconstruction of meta-level terrorism futures. Following these sections, a self-
assessment according to the research objectives outlined in the introductory 
chapter will be provided. The purpose of this self-assessment is to determine how 
this piece of terrorism futures literature has supported the expansion of terrorism 
knowledge, but, more importantly, how it can be expanded and developed in 
further research.  
 
6.1 Chapter Summaries 
 
 
Chapter Three contained an investigation of meta-level terrorism litany futures. 
The lens was focused squarely on terrorism trends. The terrorism litany findings 
generated in this thesis are broadly consistent with characterisations derived from 
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the existing literature – specifically the evolving and amorphous nature of 
terrorism. Five scenarios representing alternative meta-level terrorism futures 
based on litany knowledge were generated. The initial four scenarios emerged 
from the scenario matrix. These were: low destruction and high sophistication 
experimental; high destruction and high sophistication spectacular (attacks 
involving the successful use of experimental elements); high destruction and low 
sophistication spectacular repeat (representing the repetition of elements of 
previous attack spectaculars); and low destruction and low sophistication 
traditional-type attacks. The fifth scenario at the litany level emerged from the 
cyclical quality of the litany scenario matrix; a cycle of innovation, beginning 
with experimentation, followed by successful utilisation of a new technology, 
weapon or tactic, which, over time, flowed to the lower sophistication quadrants 
to be absorbed into the orthodox terrorist arsenal. The litany level emphasised the 
central importance of detection mechanisms to counter-terrorism initiatives: to 
identify, anticipate and counter attack elements currently in the experimentation 
phase while also challenging the use of traditional weapons and tactics.  
 
The systemic causes lens applied in Chapter Four explored literature published 
by political scientists, psychologists and sociologists devoted to understanding 
why terrorism occurs and the kind of individual (if there is a “kind”) who 
becomes radicalised or involved in terrorism. The existing literature explores 
several intrapersonal factors, including rationality, biographical profiling, 
individual versus collective identity, and environmental factors, including 
domestic and international social issues such as globalisation and modernisation 
pressures, and conflicts driven by religious, ideological or ethnic differences: the 
entry points or ‘gateways’ to the terrorism maze. The systemic causes lens was 
also used in deconstructing the litany in order to investigate its ‘tsunamis’; that 
is, what forces are driving the amorphous nature of terrorism. The systemic 
causes lens enabled the identification of the causes and drivers of terrorism. 
Variables driving change ranged from the political landscape, and the 
challenging dominance of the United States, to counter-terrorism leading to 
threat displacement and adaptation, globalisation and technological development. 
Threat adaptations identified as part of the litany could be described as symptoms 
of various changes in the global system – changes often a result of an action-
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reaction dynamic. The systemic causes analysis revealed a disconnect from the 
factors leading to the emergence of terrorism, and this disconnect represents a 
significant challenge for counter-terrorism strategies; in other words, that 
initiatives used to counter threat adaptations are inherently different from those 
required to reduce the emergence of terrorism or radicalisation (the gateways into 
the terrorism maze). The systemic causes terrorism futures scenario matrix 
applied the reaction force element of the action-reaction dynamic with the level 
of identification with terrorist entities to produce four scenarios: high reaction 
force and low identification of hunt, capture and kill; high reaction force and 
high identification war and dialogue (characterised by aggressive counter-action 
accompanied by some form of dialogue); low reaction force and high 
identification dialogue of healing (featuring dialogue aimed at the recognition 
and alleviation of grievances), and; low reaction force and low identification 
targeted evil-healing (resulting in profiling and labelling). The systemic causes 
analysis revealed the range of approaches available counter-terrorism strategists, 
which need to be reviewed and applied according to the specific terrorist entity 
and the supposed (limiting) litany future.  
 
Due to the inherently interconnected nature of worldviews and myths, Chapter 
Five provided a combined discussion of these levels. While discussions of the 
terrorism discourse feature in portions of the existing terrorism literature, the 
examination of underlying metaphors is not an attribute of them. The application 
of CLA’s worldview and myth layers to terrorism research can assist in 
identifying how worldviews and myths feed and drive issue-framing, implicitly 
governing the generation, depiction and communication of terrorism fact and 
(lack of positive) aspirations for the futures. This identification of worldviews 
and myths and their corresponding issue-frames is an important level of 
knowledge to generate because the worldviews and myths that govern our 
terrorism knowledge systems inevitably set the direction of counter-terrorism 
policy. The thesis explored the meta-level dynamics which exist at the 
stakeholder, ideological, civilisational and epistemic worldview levels to identify 
unconscious terrorism metaphors; many of which had been foreshadowed earlier 
in the thesis. The nature of terrorism research and experiences positions the 
primary stakeholders (governments, direct victims and terrorist entities) as 
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diametrically opposed, a relationship enforced by the ‘us versus them’ 
stakeholder metaphor. The ideological worldview analysis uncovered the 
‘politically engaged’ metaphor and the potential it provided for diametrically 
opposed stakeholders to engage with one another on the basis of a shared 
overarching political ideology. The civilisational worldview proved to be 
consistent with litany explorations which categorised the terrorism problem 
according to culture and, therefore, civilisation. The metaphor at the 
civilisational level is that of ‘the West versus the rest’; the Western ideal of a 
universal civilisation (Huntington 1993a), with the promotion of globalisation 
and westernisation, is evident throughout the systemic causes layer and also in 
exchanges in the ‘West’-al-Qaeda conflict. At the epistemic worldview level, 
investigations into the unconscious structuring of terrorism knowledge do not 
commonly feature in investigations by the Terrorism Studies community. The 
research revealed, through the episteme, that terrorism terminology selection and 
several discourses (referred to as ‘evolution madness’, ‘the rise of Islamic 
extremism’, ‘increasing insecurity’, ‘the necessity of retaliation and retribution’, 
‘the necessity of securitisation, and ‘the right of pre-emption’) underpin the 
‘society must be defended’ metaphor.  
 
The identification of terrorism’s myths facilitated the deconstruction of 
terrorism’s futures, challenging the structures and knowledge systems that 
govern our understanding of the problem. We need to challenge the thought 
structures that foreclose the ‘politically engaged’ metaphor; especially the tiered 
‘us versus them’, ‘the West versus the rest’ and ‘society must be defended’ 
metaphors (refer to Figure Twelve below) to make way for alternative 
knowledge systems that challenge the meaning we give to terrorism, thereby 
opening up its futures. Figure Twelve below not only illustrates the tiered nature 
of three of the four characterising worldview metaphors, it also reveals how 
those metaphors support one another and the various other metaphors referred to 
throughout the thesis. 
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Figure Twelve: Tiered Stakeholder, Civilisation and Episteme Worldview 
Metaphors 
 
 
 
The ‘society must be defended’ metaphor provides insight into the notions that 
underlie counter-terrorism strategies – ranging from short-term reactive measures 
(including increased security for target hardening purposes) to longer-term 
initiatives aimed at reducing recruitment and radicalisation in at-risk populations. 
The metaphor presupposes the existence of perpetual enemies. The knowledge 
generated at the combined worldview and myth levels were used to create the 
final scenario matrix, in which terrorism ‘futures attitude’ and ‘humanity’ were 
the variables. The four scenarios were: global community and predetermined 
terrorism futures of competing utopias; global community and undetermined 
terrorism futures of futures alignment (providing futures space where 
stakeholders can engage with the concept of alternative futures and alignment of 
those futures); sustained dichotomies and undetermined terrorism futures of 
dystopia (characterised by worst-case scenario planning as a means of preparing 
for the futures), and; sustained dichotomies and predetermined futures of the 
replication of litany and threat escalation. The meta-level futures of terrorism’s 
worldviews and myths revealed opportunities to challenge the futures of 
terrorism at the litany and systemic causes levels, and, like the systemic causes 
scenarios, the opportunities found and the worldview/myths level need to be 
assessed and applied specifically, according to the terrorist entity concerned.  
 
Table Nine, repeated below, provides a summary of the interrelated components 
of the litany, systemic causes, worldviews and myths of terrorism according to 
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the specified worldview and its corresponding metaphor. At present the 
ideological worldview has the only knowledge frame supporting stakeholder 
engagement as the mechanism to challenge the dominant metaphors, in order to 
take terrorism knowledge beyond the confines of the view that it is an “ever 
present and expanding evil” that requires immediate detection and prevention. 
Having revealed the governing metaphors and inter-relationships, the way in 
which the litany and systemic causes futures of terrorism were dominated by an 
overwhelmingly reactionary approach becomes understandable. The focus was 
on “defending society” (explaining the detection focus of preventative efforts), 
rather than on addressing the grievances which opened gateways to terrorism for 
new recruits (as the “politically engaged” metaphor might promote). Indeed, the 
nature of issue–framing when it comes to terrorism has maintained the focus on 
the litany and character-attacking aspects of the systemic causes to the detriment 
of addressing the true systemic causal issues. The biggest challenge for counter-
terrorism lies in challenging restrictive metaphors and creating a space where 
new shared metaphors could be generated in order to move towards shared 
preferred futures and away from the dominant idea of a constant and evolving 
threat. 
 
Table Nine (repeated): Flow and Connectivity between the Litany, 
Systemic Causes, Worldviews and Myths of Terrorism 
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6.2 Discussion: Counter-terrorism Implications  
 
As stated above, this thesis was not designed to review or challenge the existing 
counter-terrorism frameworks of any jurisdiction, as to do so would have 
required the application of a group- or national boundary-specific lens.166 
Nonetheless, a meta-level discussion of the potential impacts of this research on 
counter-terrorism frameworks may be interesting, offering a chance to explore 
and capture more of the work’s implications. This discussion will also satisfy 
research objectives five and six; these are, respectively: to highlight the value 
that generating alternative meta-level terrorism futures provides in formulating 
effective and proactive counter-terrorism policy initiatives aimed at positive 
manipulation of the futures, and; to provide a base for further studies which seek 
to actively engage with terrorism futures.  
 
Terrorism has remained a government priority because of political and public 
concern post-September 11 (Aly, Balnaves and Chalon 2007, 249). The counter-
terrorism focus that CLA has revealed was summarised in Figure Five (repeated 
below). The epistemic ‘society must be defended’ metaphor reinforces the 
stakeholder and civilisation worldviews, ‘us versus them’ and ‘the West versus 
the rest’ respectively. These three-tiered governing frames not only underpin the 
post-September 11 security environment (see Figure Twelve), but also the way in 
which terrorism issues are communicated to the public, by the media and 
government alike. Communication on terrorism knowledge will likely continue 
behind the current facade until such time as terrorism worldviews and myths are 
engaged with, opening the futures out into a more malleable space and 
challenging the terrorism issue-framings that govern the depiction of the primary 
terrorism knowledge base, the litany. 
 
 
 
 
 
                                               
166
 The unintended influence of the Western civilisation and frameworks are acknowledged. 
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Figure Five (repeated): Adapted CLA Iceberg chart with Counter-
Terrorism Focus 
 
 
6.2.1 Litany Implications 
 
The futures of terrorism’s litany describe the continuation of past and near-
present trends. According to the litany, terrorism’s futures will involve further 
threat adaptations: 
 
It is all too easy to underestimate the terrorist adversary. Their 
skill base is significantly inferior to that of a regular military and 
they can often look like an undisciplined rabble. Nonetheless, they 
have proved capable of conducting well-coordinated multiphase 
operations that require a considerable degree of patience, 
determination, and bravery. (Cralley, Garfield and Echeverria 
2004, III-IV) 
 
As such, terrorism’s litany presents its futures as a predetermined element of the 
futures landscape: the trends of the past and near-present are applicable to our 
futures and therefore alternative futures, possibly featuring the disappearance or 
reduction of terrorism, do not feature. The litany also fails to account for the 
disappearance of terrorist movements, instead merely allowing for a tapering off 
of public attitudes and for responses/reactions to incidents to be contained in the 
‘traditional’ attack category.  
 
The litany scenarios brought out a series of opportunities or focus points for 
counter-terrorism preparedness. A review of the litany scenarios in terms of the 
life-cycle of particular terrorist entities, and for a given geographic location, will 
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offer greater granularity to the consideration of the counter-terrorism 
implications and will facilitate the tailoring of preparedness and prevention 
strategies. However, there are specific opportunities presented, certainly in terms 
of the creation of stage indicators for the assessment of the current threat 
environment to determine what stage in the cycle of innovation a given terrorist 
entity is operating, and when its target nation is taking a defensive posture. This 
determination will require the integration of the systemic causes analysis to 
determine, for example, the conditions which will produce, accelerate or inhibit 
the occurrence of a particular litany future given a particular systemic causes 
future. Additionally, these stage indicators could be particularly pertinent to the 
detection of terrorism in the experimentation phase. 
 
The quadrant representing experimental terrorism future (low destruction and 
high sophistication) potentially provides the intelligence community with a 
source point to use to detect and counter further threat adaptations. The posited 
‘cycle’ of the litany futures of terrorism hypothesises that additional adaptations 
of terrorism are likely to begin in the experimentation phase, making this phase 
an effective point for the identification of trends and possible manipulation. The 
hypothesis suggests that identifying terrorist entities that are currently using, or 
seeking additional technological advancements to expand their tactical repertoire 
or arsenal of weapons, could assist in threat displacement. The starting set of 
questions to develop this type of inquiry includes: who are the most innovative 
terrorist entities operating in a particular environment; how else can weapons 
(particularly explosives) be transported internationally; who has the interest, 
scientific ability and finances necessary to pursue WMDs and novel weapon and 
delivery systems? Further research on terrorist entities is required to illuminate 
trend indicators or ‘tippers’ which can be used for counter-terrorism purposes (in 
terms of weapon and tactical progression, including target selection, financing 
and other elements of their modus operandi).  
 
Another discussion arising from the litany is the role of worst-case scenarios in 
counter-terrorism planning. Litany literature is full of references to worst-case 
scenarios, usually involving WMDs; a story line consistent with the grand 
‘society must be protected’ metaphor. For example, the terrorism litany 
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highlighted the fundamental, characterising changes to the threat between the 
1960s and the first decade of the 21st Century, and anticipated that the next big 
threat could involve the successful use of WMDs. In terms of the litany scenario 
matrix, worst-case scenarios could be represented by the successful use of 
experimental elements, resulting in significant levels of attack sophistication and 
correspondingly high levels of destruction. Do governments need to engage in a 
debate regarding what the litany means for worst-case scenario planning? For 
example: 
• Does preparing for worst-case scenarios inevitably address the threat posed 
by less sophisticated attacks?  
• Is worst-case scenario planning an efficient, effective or resilient counter-
terrorism strategy?  
• Is countering worst-case scenarios an effective way to prepare for a range of 
terrorism futures? 
• How should worst-case scenarios be prioritised? 
• How will policy frameworks cope with the need to produce timely and 
reactive responses based on and according to worst-case scenarios? 
• What will happen to public opinion and impressions of terrorism if counter-
terrorism planning is focused on worst-case scenarios?  
• Given that interest in WMDs extends beyond politically motivated extremist 
groups to nation-states (for example North Korea), should the counter-
terrorism framework extend to counter these threats; and what would this 
mean for the development of initiatives? 
 
6.2.2 Systemic Causes Implications 
 
The systemic causes scenarios depicted terrorism as a condition of intrapersonal, 
interpersonal and environmental elements, and these factors, as with terrorism 
itself, are prone to produce manifestations (or symptoms) of the underlying 
condition. The escalation of terrorist violence is treated as such; as a 
manifestation, often divorced from the intrapersonal, interpersonal and 
environmental conditions that initially led to its emergence: the terrorism 
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gateways. The litany, governed by security promoting metaphors of ‘society 
must be defended’, ‘the West versus the rest’ and ‘us versus them’, dictates the 
focus at the systemic causes level: predict, hinder or stop terrorism by focusing 
on, or reacting to, its amorphous nature. The security focused mindset suggests 
that, like medical conditions, the causal conditions and ‘symptoms’ of terrorism 
can be treated or cured through the application of the right remedy. This image of 
terrorism as disease is supported by the consideration that terrorism can be an 
indicator of international political trends, rather than an exceptional and 
disconnected form of violence (Weinberg and Eubank 2000, 94). The litany and 
systemic causes chapters illustrated the diversity of targets of, and participants in, 
terrorism.  
 
“It is how we structure our response to the new globalized threat of terrorism that 
will be the most important” wrote Stohl (20003, 91), raising questions of whether 
‘treating’ the causes that lead to the decision to engage in terrorism, the 
manifestations of terrorism (represented by the amorphous nature of terrorism), 
or a combination of the two would be most effective in countering the threat, 
and, particularly, of reducing the likelihood of further escalations as 
foreshadowed by the litany.  
 
Treating the Symptoms: Manifestations of Terrorism 
 
This approach prioritises responding to and alleviating the interpersonal and/or 
environmental divers of the litany (summarised in tables Four and Five above) 
that are actualised in the form of terrorist acts (including attacks). These 
manifestations are not necessarily indicative of their source condition(s), as the 
reasons for threat progression do not exactly match the reasons behind the initial 
emergence of the threat (for comparisons refer to Tables Two and Three). 
Counter-terrorism measures often appear to be focused on symptoms, providing 
a safeguard against vulnerabilities and striving to mount an effective defence 
against attacks. The introduction of various airport security measures, such as x-
ray screening and the limiting of sharp objects and liquids on flights, are 
examples of safeguarding in counter-terrorism initiatives in response to threat 
adaptations and, therefore, to the symptoms, not the source conditions. In theory, 
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these procedures are designed to make terrorism less attractive or to reduce its 
cost effectiveness, given the decreased likelihood of success. However, Enders 
and Sandler’s notion of the Substitution Effect implies that these counter-
measures will lead to additional manifestations, characterised by the introduction 
of additional adaptations. Counter-terrorism measures, particularly security-
orientated initiatives, appear to be reactive in terms of the need for a ‘symptom’ 
to be exhibited before new measures are introduced. This reactive approach 
illustrates the need for incorporating more foresight into counter-terrorism 
strategy. In the case of airport and aircraft security, this would involve projection 
of new adaptations and may, therefore, require new measures. For example, 
attention could be turned to items currently not confiscated during the security 
process, to a review of materials on-board aircraft that could potentially be used 
or improvised for use as a weapon, and to highly-concealable delivery systems, 
and whether these are sufficiently guarded against.  
 
Treating the Causal Conditions: the Gateways of Terrorism 
 
This approach (treating the causes) positions counter-terrorism as the cure for the 
ailments that cause terrorism or radicalisation: the intrapersonal and/or 
environmental causal factors. The treatment of terrorism as a condition/disease 
would seek to redress the overall failure in addressing the reasons that terrorist 
violence occurs (Tow, cited in O’Hagan 2003, 326). It would involve a policy 
focus aimed at addressing, minimising or mitigating the intrapersonal and/or 
environmental factors, featured in Tables Two and Three respectively, that result 
in the emergence of terrorism. Actively addressing these causal factors may also, 
at a secondary level, reduce the requirement or effectiveness of the drivers of 
change that underpin terrorism’s amorphousness. This process would include the 
creation of initiatives aimed at addressing societal ills, such as poverty, that 
contribute to and foster a range of personal grievances which, in turn, can act as a 
motivation for joining a terrorist group. For example, Greg Mortenson of the 
Central Asia Institute has made significant inroads in reducing the extremist 
recruitment pool in Afghanistan through his school building program (see 
Mortenson and Relin 2006). Programs like this shine a light on the need for well-
conceived long-term strategies that provide treatment of the source conditions 
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through targeted community engagement. Such strategies demand a group- and 
country-specific examination to identify underlying causes and grievances. To 
extend future preparations, this examination should not be limited to existing 
groups and individuals, but should examine overarching strategies to achieve 
broader applicability. 
 
For counter-terrorism policy to be effective, the measures adopted must stem 
from a comprehensive understanding of terrorism (Albini 2001, 266), an 
understanding that includes cultural and ideological elements specific to a given 
community and region. The litany chapter described the range of overarching 
mindsets, while the systemic causes analysis uncovered the diversity of 
sociological and political elements to be considered: 
 
Attempts to deal with the terrorist threat as if it were divorced from 
its intellectual, cultural, and religious fountainheads are doomed to 
failure. Counterterrorism begins on the religious-ideological level 
and must adopt appropriate methods. (Bar 2004, 36) 
 
Cultural and religious sources of ideology must be incorporated into long-term 
strategies to ensure those strategies’ effectiveness (Bar 2004, 36). Each terrorist 
entity is unique and therefore must be approached with respect to its specific 
culture and history (Post 1990, 29). 
 
For long-term reduction in terrorism, political and economic development must 
be encouraged (Dunman 2003, cited in Held 2004, 69) in a manner consistent 
with the opinions of all stakeholders; in other words, economic development 
cannot be forced upon the ‘terrorist community’ (as in the high identification and 
high reaction force war and dialogue systemic future). It is the responsibility of 
the global community to make means other than violence available to people so 
that they can advocate for and achieve legitimate political change (Held 2004, 
59). Governments have assumed responsibility for making such alternative 
means available (Held 2004, 68) and these means should not, by default, require 
the implementation of democracy, globalisation or Westernisation. Furthermore, 
if there are to be non-violent means of bringing attention to a cause, there must 
also be non-violent means of response (Held 2004, 71). Albini (2001, 276) 
discusses the provision of aid to encourage the development of economic 
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opportunities in order to establish a situation of self-sufficiency, which can then 
positively flow on to eliminate criminal behaviour that would otherwise foster 
conditions that could give rise to terrorism.  
 
A more long-sighted and proactive stance on counter-terrorism is required when 
considering the environmental and intrapersonal causes and environmental and 
interpersonal drivers of the terrorism problem. This consideration of all relevant 
factors would also require the active participation of a variety of stakeholders to 
identify the underlying reasons, causes and motivations at play. International 
cooperation and coordination is vital because of the globalisation and shared 
experience of several of the environmental factors detailed in the systemic causes 
chapter; a grievance experienced by one segment of the world population may be 
acted upon by another, thus the immediate and long-term implications of 
counter-terrorism strategies require consideration and engagement by all 
stakeholders; the actions and reactions of today are building, sustaining and 
motivating the recruits of the future.  
 
Treating Both Causes and Symptoms 
 
The most effective and robust policy is one in which the long-term goals of 
counter-terrorism match the anticipated outputs of one or a set of counter-
terrorism initiatives, and where those goals are not generated in a vacuum, 
divorced from futures thinking and the concept of positive manipulation of those 
futures. That is, initiatives that address the symptoms of threat adaptation while 
also contributing to the longer-term goal of alleviating the conditions that led to 
terrorism are selected to contribute to the achievement of a preferred futures 
space. This choice of initiatives would inevitably require a combination of 
proactive and reactive measures to alleviate the systemic causes of terrorism and 
the drivers (or ‘tsunamis’) that contribute to its amorphous nature. These 
initiatives would not be limited solely to security measures aimed at containing 
or displacing the threat, but would include the expansion of the counter-terrorism 
umbrella to cover international and geopolitical considerations. Parachini (2001, 
402) acknowledges that terrorist events, especially those of recent years, have 
intentionally and unintentionally influenced policy, demonstrating the 
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requirement on policymakers to connect arrangements for the current and future 
threat environments with the desires for the future. The task of formulating 
effective policies and responses cannot be accomplished without understanding 
current and potential future adversaries (Gunaratna 2004). Hence the initiatives 
need to be region- or entity-specific and, most importantly, connected to the 
desired terrorism futures. 
 
In light of the fact that absolute prevention of terrorism is not a realistic objective 
(Lesser 1999, 2), the action-reaction dynamic could be used to its full potential 
through the review process, providing the opportunity to actively direct policy 
towards the generation of ‘preferred’ modes of attack; that is, to positively 
influence the futures in a manner that would manipulate the adaptation of 
terrorism in ways that counter-terrorism is better prepared to deal with. For 
example, by making certain weapons or methods of operation that are more 
readily detected or tracked by counter-terrorists attractive to terrorists. Applying 
this line of thought to the litany scenarios (matrix in Figure Three), the operating 
environment in the bottom quadrants (low sophistication with low or high 
destruction traditional and spectacular repeat) could be manipulated. For 
example, by making some modes of attack more difficult, and some targets less 
attractive, terrorists will be driven to adjust their operating environment 
(according to Enders and Sandler’s theory of Substitution Effect) and the threat 
can be displaced. Could it then be possible to direct terrorists towards a 
‘preferred’ strategy, one that is easier for security services to detect, thereby 
limiting the potential impact by increasing the likelihood of detection?  
 
In applying this line of thought to the top quadrants of the litany scenario matrix 
(experimental and spectacular), WMDs provide a good discussion example. On 
the policy level, counter-proliferation and investment in global security are 
central – and much to be preferred to an arms race. Forecasting techniques could 
assist in assessing groups or individuals that are susceptible to radicalisation and 
recruitment. Nonetheless, Enders and Sandler (2000, 323) note that, in some 
instances, making certain activities more difficult may be less effective for the 
long-term goal of countering terrorism than targeting groups and their resources 
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directly.167 This choice (between direct and indirect action) emphasises the need 
to ensure that both manifestations and causes are identified and dealt with in 
counter-terrorism initiatives as they move towards preferred futures. 
 
6.2.3 Worldview and Myth Implications 
 
This thesis also incorporated a meta-level investigation of the futures of 
terrorism’s worldviews and myths. It is these lenses that bring out the 
unconscious dimensions of terrorism, a level of knowledge generation which has 
not commonly featured in terrorism literature. This thesis has revealed terrorism 
worldviews based on the stakeholder, ideology, civilisation and epistemic levels, 
and characterised the myths that underlie them. The worldview-myth scenario 
matrix illuminated how different the futures of terrorism could be, depending on 
how the CLA-created terrorism futures landscape was to be approached: 
predetermined versus undetermined and with reference to the level of stakeholder 
engagement. The contrast between possible futures is particularly evident when 
comparing the worldview-myth futures (see Figure Eleven) to those revealed at 
the litany level. The worldview-myth scenarios opened terrorism’s futures by 
providing opportunities to challenge the tiered ‘us versus them’, ‘the West versus 
the rest’ and ‘society must be defended’ myths, which were assessed to be 
responsible for supporting, sustaining and legitimising the constructs of the litany 
scenarios and the ‘high reaction’ and ‘low identification’ elements of the 
systemic causes scenarios. This level of consistency and layering across different 
levels of terrorism knowledge (with the exception of the ideological worldview 
‘politically engaged’ metaphor) arguably dictates public opinion (as the litany 
suggested) and therefore also guides support for counter-terrorism measures, 
such as those captured in the systemic causes scenario matrix. Identifying these 
potential ‘knowledge funnels’ is the first step in deconstructing these futures: by 
questioning their value and initiating dialogue on the generation of new 
metaphors and futures outside those ‘knowledge funnels’.  
 
                                               
167
 This is particularly true in relation to fanatical terrorist entities; those which will ‘stop at 
nothing’ (Enders and Sandler 2000, 323). 
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The challenging of existing metaphors and their supporting worldviews 
(commonly located within the discourse and episteme) makes engagement with 
shared and positive terrorism futures possible. Facilitating this participation in 
the futures space enables the identification of a range of futures within the 
‘undetermined’ terrorism futures attitude. Stakeholders will likely hold 
alternative and competing utopian images of terrorism’s futures, but through 
stakeholder engagement, these competing futures can be engaged with in the 
hope, and for the purpose, of uniting in a state of alignment and positive 
manipulation of the futures. This process will see a level of futures engagement 
between the present and preferred futures spaces and discussion of how to 
actively proceed from the present space into the preferred future space. For 
terrorism, the process presents an opportunity to tailor counter-terrorism policies 
to reaching preferred futures. It is acknowledged that this type of engagement 
may not be easily facilitated for, or available to, all terrorist movements. 
Alternatively, without this engagement, metaphors sustaining the popular litany 
and systemic causes levels of knowledge will likely remain unchallenged, and, as 
a result, so too will the direction of counter-terrorism policies (and the futures 
that are developing, focused on countering an expanding and amorphous threat). 
 
After the terrorism worldview and myths exploration of this thesis had been 
completed and the previous knowledge levels had been reflected upon, the 
selection of variables (or the impending ‘tsunamis’) at the litany and systemic 
levels became understandable. At the litany level, the futures scenario matrix was 
founded on the ‘destruction’ and ‘sophistication’ variables. At the systemic 
causes level, the matrix was founded on the ‘reaction force’ and ‘identification’ 
variables. These variables were selected because of their focus and the specific 
pieces of knowledge generated at their respective levels. However, the 
worldviews and myths also partially governed the selection of these variables. 
While the variables were relevant throughout the literature examining terrorism 
at the litany and systemic causes levels, these variables’ underpinning of 
knowledge and their futures importance was evident in the three-tiered 
worldview myth metaphors: 
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• Us versus them (Stakeholder): reinforces the dichotomy positioning terrorism 
and terrorist actors as evildoers who are expanding their tactical and 
weaponry arsenals.  
• The West versus the rest (Civilisation): reinforces the meta-level positioning 
of Western civilisation as the supreme civilisation. The metaphor’s drivers of 
the litany (political landscape (dominated by democracy and Westernisation), 
counter-terrorism arrangements, globalisation, and technological 
developments) are arguably led by the collective Western civilisation. 
Furthermore, the West has effectively positioned itself as the advocate of 
global security.  
• Society must be defended (Episteme): underpins the theory of terrorism 
escalation and, arguably, the fear surrounding threat adaptations, as well as 
the requirement for effective counter-terrorism measures to protect and 
defend society. 
The manner in which terrorism worldviews and myths shape reactionary counter-
terrorism measures and policies warrants further investigation, which could, 
arguably, be best achieved through jurisdiction-specific research.  
 
Terrorism worldviews and myths shape not only policy but also public opinion 
and research agendas, and the way this occurs may also be worth exploring in 
further research. Citizens could be empowered by a combination of public 
information campaigns on the likelihood of falling victim to a terrorist attack as 
compared to other risks of daily life and by knowledge of the fact that terrorism 
futures are malleable and could be a space of opportunity – the future does not 
have to be the one presented by the ‘predetermined’ litany. This popular 
empowerment would have a likely flow-on to the systemic causes level. 
Additionally, such research could also include the examination of how the 
public’s opinion on terrorist attacks, invariably framed by existing worldviews 
and metaphors, could be used to generate support for a particular form of 
recourse. The story in the post-September 11 environment and the desire and 
support for retribution could provide a good case study. The current knowledge-
framing mechanisms governed by terrorism worldviews and myths can and 
should be challenged. Moving to positive manipulation of terrorism’s futures is 
280 
 
an affirmative and achievable goal for the global community over the next few 
decades; however, this will demand further research focused at deconstructing 
and reconstructing terrorism and its futures.  
 
One pivotal point raised by the knowledge uncovered at the combined 
worldview-myth level concerning counter-terrorism arrangements is the need to 
construct new metaphors at the stakeholder, civilisation and episteme levels to 
replace, respectively, the ‘us versus them’, ‘the West versus the rest’ and ‘society 
must be defended’ metaphors. These myth metaphors are inextricably tied to 
knowledge-framing, influencing the presentation of fact, fear and response at the 
litany and systemic causes levels. For example, the notion that society must be 
defended against the increasing lethality and general escalation of terrorism 
through various counter-measures involving the identification of diametrically 
opposed terrorism stakeholders, represented by the not-so-unconscious ‘us versus 
them’ or ‘the West versus the rest’ metaphors. The kind of rhetoric that these 
metaphors exemplify has featured in several official government statements and 
doctrines, none more famous than the September 20 2001 declaration by the then 
American President, George W. Bush, in his address to a joint session of 
Congress: “And we will pursue nations that provide aid or safe haven to 
terrorism. Every nation in every region now has a decision to make: either you 
are with us or you are with the terrorists.” Failure to challenge such ‘Trojan 
horses’ of metaphor (Inayatullah 1997b, ¶25), and to critically analyse the 
meaning we give to terrorism, is undesirable, and will keep us blind to the path to 
alternate futures and positive manipulation of those futures.  
 
The creation of new, inclusive and shared metaphors represents a significant 
task, a conversation that needs to be advanced by the Terrorism Studies and 
Futures Studies communities. Because language is constitutive (Shapiro, cited in 
Carver and Chambers 2012) we need new language to generate new frames of 
knowledge (Lakoff 2005, xv). For example, terrorist acts need not be referred to 
in terms of “attack” or “threat”; words like “incident”, “event” or “practice” 
could be used instead. The previous application of the word “tree”, following the 
metaphor ‘terrorism is a tree requiring extirpation’ (adapted from Barber, cited in 
Jackson 2007, 409), demonstrates how powerful changes to language can be for 
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reframing. Building on the previous references to “trees”, and exploring the 
counter-terrorism approach, if we were to swap the word “tree” for a 
CBRN/security-relevant metaphor like “bacteria”, the framing looks 
immediately more relevant. For example, the counter-terrorism strategy could: 
a) ‘tree extirpation or pruning’: maintain the attack and kill objectives of 
detection and prevention to curtail the bacteria’s ability to attack by eradicating 
the bacteria;  
b) ‘dialogue with the trees’: develop an understanding that enables safe 
engagement with the bacteria, specifically identifying the conditions for 
engagement; or 
c) ‘plant new trees’: build a new bacteria, perhaps by making changes to 
the ecology of the existing bacteria through the development of non-aggressive 
strains or nurturing new breeds that do not attack, but also through addressing the 
gateways through resilience programs and education. 
 
New metaphors could expose different realities, characterised, for example, by 
understanding or togetherness. These realities need to work towards Gidley’s 
(2010b, 626) requirement of addressing and limiting the application of the binary 
limited logic of dualistic thinking to complex problems. Hence, the ‘us versus 
them’ and ‘the West versus the rest’ metaphors could become more collective 
and cohesive, taking the form of a partnership or unit. The grand story and 
imagery provided by the ‘society must be defended’ metaphor is more 
challenging and the deconstruction of all of its pertinent elements will require 
stakeholder engagement. The challenge may progress in increments, like this: 
‘society must be defended’ to ‘society is defended’ to ‘defence through 
engagement’ to ‘communities engaged’ to ‘Gaia enabled’. Additionally, 
stakeholder engagement may assist in generating shared metaphors, which will 
move the field closer to positive manipulation of the futures of terrorism. 
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6.3 Discussion: Research Objectives and Further 
Opportunities 
 
This thesis has embarked upon the exploration of several gaps in the existing, 
publicly available terrorism literature. It is acknowledged, post-thesis, that these 
gaps correlate to the confines of existing knowledge frames, as governed by the 
identified terrorism metaphors. Specifically, the knowledge gaps this thesis has 
perhaps helped to fill (or traverse) include: 
• the lack of attention paid to identifying and characterising a range of 
terrorism futures. This range should encompass possible, probable, and even 
the prospect of preferred, terrorism futures and should also engage with the 
episteme; 
• the lack of identification of meta-level futures that extend beyond the 
accepted wisdom that terrorism is an escalating problem, and beyond 
propositions of worst-case scenarios; 
• the lack of depictions of a range of terrorism futures that are informed by a 
comprehensive and layered understanding of the characteristics, drivers and 
knowledge frames of the past and present natures of the terrorist threat; and 
• the failure to meet the requirement that the Terrorism Studies community’s 
research framework be extended to include methodological approaches that 
can facilitate systematic, futures-oriented examinations.  
Regarding the six research objectives outlined in the introductory chapter, this 
thesis has arguably achieved the following: 
 
 
OBJECTIVE ONE: To identify a range of meta-level terrorism futures that 
represent different levels of knowledge. These images should include 
possible, probable, preferable and worst-case terrorism futures. 
A range of terrorism futures were identified at the litany, systemic causes and 
combined worldview and myth levels. These images of terrorism’s futures were 
captured through three scenario matrices, producing 13 scenarios in total (four 
each plus an emergent fifth scenario at the litany level). The scenarios were not 
labelled specifically as ‘possible’, ‘probable’, ‘preferable’ or ‘worst-case’ 
scenarios. This judgement was based on the decision that stakeholder 
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engagement and application to nation- or group-specific environments were 
required to assign such labels, as any assessment would inadvertently further 
inscribe the Western worldview. Nonetheless, the scenarios can be judged 
favourably in terms of their potential encouragement of discussion and debate, 
and the way in which they open the futures and enable the identification of 
additional futures.  
 
Figure Three (repeated): Terrorism Litany Futures Scenario Matrix 
 
 
The litany futures scenario matrix (see Figure Three, repeated above) captured 
the evolving nature of terrorism, providing scope for future terrorist activity to be 
based on two dominant variables (or ‘tsunamis’) from the past and near-present: 
‘destructiveness’ and ‘sophistication’.  
 
Litany terrorism futures also showed terrorism as a cycle of innovation: the 
introduction, familiarisation and utilisation of new technologies, weapons or 
modes of operation will likely follow experimentation. The lens through which 
the level of destruction caused by a given incident is viewed will also change 
with time. As the cycle continues, the characterisation of attacks considered to be 
of low levels of sophistication and destruction will expand as, to put it glibly, 
“the bar is raised”. This future implicitly accepts the probable continuation and 
escalation of terrorism, and terrorism of a kind that is consistent with worst-case 
scenarios and the mythology that ‘society must be defended’. 
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Figure Four (repeated): Systemic Causes Terrorism Futures Scenario 
Matrix 
 
 
 
The systemic futures scenarios (see Figure Four, repeated above) reflected the 
involvement of both intrapersonal and environmental causes of terrorism and the 
interpersonal and environmental causal factors driving terrorism’s litany. The 
matrix explored the concept that the actions and reactions of today are building, 
sustaining and motivating the terrorist recruits of the future (thereby closing 
some paths of the maze). The action-reaction dynamic is central to the futures of 
the systemic causes of terrorism, and the level of engagement with terrorist 
entities concerning their intrapersonal, interpersonal and environmental factors 
was captured through the ‘identification’ and ‘reaction force’ variables. The 
systemic causes futures presents terrorism as requiring social control 
mechanisms ranging from highly reactive or treatment-based profiling measures 
to some form of dialogue accompanied either by force or a healing mentality. 
The adversarial identification of terrorist entities at the systemic causes level is 
arguably reinforced by the binary logic of the ‘us versus them’ and ‘the West 
versus the rest’ metaphors, influencing vast amounts of literature on terrorism’s 
root causes which located the source of the threat at the intrapersonal, 
interpersonal and/or environmental levels. These stances in the literature 
reinforce the necessity of identifying, and of acting/reacting to, terrorism. Ideally, 
the most effective and robust initiatives will address the threat manifestations 
uncovered in the litany while also maintaining a focus and actively contributing 
to the alleviation of the originating conditions of terrorism and radicalisation: the 
terrorism gateways. These gateways will be specific to stakeholders. These 
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scenarios capture the range of positions governments can pursue, ranging from 
eradication to engagement. The absolute prevention of terrorism seems an 
unrealistic (Lesser 1999, 2), utopian goal, particularly from a combined litany 
and systemic causes perspective, arguably attributable to the lack of knowledge 
frames supporting positive images of terrorism futures. However, the systemic 
causes levels introduces the concept of futures manipulation of a sort with the 
idea of directing policy and initiatives towards manipulating the adaptation of 
terrorism such that it can be more easily dealt with by the counter-terrorism 
community. The application of combined litany and systemic causes inquiry to 
terrorist entities and sovereign nations could facilitate this kind of advantageous 
‘substitution effect’. 
 
Figure Eleven (repeated): Worldview and Myth Terrorism Futures 
Scenario Matrix 
 
 
The combined worldview-myth futures scenario matrix (Figure Eleven, repeated 
above) focuses on the existence of a battle space, characterised by delineated 
sides whose stance on terrorism is unconsciously influenced by existing 
dichotomies reinforced by stakeholder, civilisation and epistemic worldviews 
and governing metaphors. The worldview and myth levels revealed an 
overwhelming lack of futures consideration and virtually no engagement beyond 
the overtly negative and reactionary terrorism discourse currently at work, as the 
reflections in the litany and systemic causes layers discussed. The meta-level 
terrorism futures scenario matrix at the worldview-myth level demands 
engagement between stakeholders and that the stakeholders themselves engage 
with the futures. This engagement between stakeholders can be forged by the 
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shared political ideology identified at the worldview level. This political 
transformative space, presents an opportunity for engagement to occur in various 
forms (probably highly structured with set conditions, similar to negotiations of 
the past and present). The scenario matrix was formulated according to the 
terrorism ‘futures attitude’ and ‘humanity’ variables. These variables 
represented, and provided the potential for the construction of, a space that 
enables and supports the consideration of, and engagement with, the futures 
beyond the constraints created by the ‘us versus them’, ‘the West versus the rest’ 
and ‘society must be defended’ metaphors to make the most of the opportunity 
presented by the overarching shared political ideology. The terrorism ‘futures 
attitude’ variable represents the fact that the futures are malleable and can be 
opened. The matrix, more generally, also provides for the comparison of futures 
where the existing dichotomies are sustained and worst-case scenario planning 
dominates.  
 
OBJECTIVE TWO: To apply the Futures Studies methodology to 
terrorism. 
This thesis applied the Futures Studies theory and methods of CLA and 
Scenarios to explore terrorism futures. Futures Studies provided an alternative 
lens through which to view terrorism and incorporate methodical foresight. 
Current terrorism research is arguably focused on the past and present, and 
dominated by secondary sources and event analyses (perhaps because 
opportunities to access classified material and directly interview relevant 
individuals are limited for many researchers). As a result, most terrorism 
research, as can be seen in the reviewed, publicly available literature, explores 
terrorism’s litany and systemic causes in relative depth while merely dabbling in 
characterisations of the terrorism discourse or worst-case scenario-heavy futures. 
The application of CLA facilitated the extension of this thesis beyond traditional 
investigations and into the level of worldviews, divided into stakeholder, 
ideological, civilisation and epistemic groupings and each governed by their own 
grand (but unconscious) story or mythology of terrorism. Table Nine (reproduced 
earlier in this chapter) demonstrates the flow and connectivity between the litany, 
systemic, worldview and myth levels, summarising the relationships between the 
knowledge revealed at the four levels. Additionally, CLA and Scenarios 
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facilitated the layered integration of existing knowledge; the application of which 
enabled the expansion of the Terrorism Studies knowledge base to include 
systematic futures inquiry for the purpose of pursuing the identification of 
alternative terrorism futures. 
 
This thesis has built on the existing applications of Futures Studies in terrorism 
research. In 2001, Jensen used the Futures Studies technique of Cross-Impact 
Analysis to aid terrorism forecasting efforts. Jensen (2001) was focused on 
trends, discussing the impact that four variables had on each other. The four 
variables were: the international expansion of the Internet, the continued 
emergence of ethnic and religious sensibilities, the increased economic gap 
between the rich and the poor, and the assertion of America as the global 
superpower. While Jensen’s research differs greatly from this thesis, both share 
the goal of advocating for the incorporation of futures foresight into terrorism 
research. This thesis has not only advocated for, but has also demonstrated the 
value of seeking to focus more on futures in terrorism research. The line of 
inquiry and its outputs in this thesis demonstrate the value of applying non-
traditional Terrorism Studies methodologies to investigations of terrorism and its 
futures. Additionally, while not within the stated objectives, the research is also, 
hopefully, a contribution to the Futures Studies field; it will potentially broaden 
the audience for Futures Studies work while also demonstrating how futures 
techniques can be applied to a variety of other fields.  
 
OBJECTIVE THREE: To use CLA to develop a comprehensive 
understanding of terrorism, facilitating the construction and deconstruction 
of terrorism futures. Specifically employing the four layers of the litany, 
systemic causes, worldviews and myths. 
Each of the four layers enabled a different type of engagement with the terrorism 
problem and its futures, producing a comprehensive and layered understanding 
of terrorism that extended beyond the traditional confines of the litany and 
systemic causes. The litany represents terrorism as an evolving threat, 
increasingly sophisticated and destructive. The systemic causes lens uncovered 
the array of intrapersonal, interpersonal and environmental causes and grievances 
that contribute to the emergence of terrorism or drive terrorism’s litany. The 
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interconnectedness of the terrorism worldview and myth levels allowed for their 
combination into the single worldviews-myths analysis. The worldview and myth 
levels are not commonly considered in Terrorism Studies, which remains 
dominated by the litany and systemic causes knowledge levels. The worldview 
and myth lenses deconstructed terrorism and its futures, uncovering several 
myths that govern terrorism issue-framing, including thoughts about terrorism 
futures. The tiered nature of three of the four characterising worldview 
metaphors in Figure Twelve (featured earlier in this concluding chapter) reveals 
how the metaphors support one another as well as the various other metaphors 
identified throughout the thesis. The thesis highlighted how these governing 
metaphors are responsible for closing off our ability to generate alternative 
terrorism futures, particularly those of a positive or engaging kind. The futures 
need to be opened by the promotion of the ‘politically engaged’ metaphor or by 
generating new and shared metaphors. 
 
The comprehensive application of CLA represents a contribution to the 
Terrorism Studies field, because no previous research has applied these four 
lenses as extensively to the problem of terrorism, nor examined the 
interrelationships evident between the litany, systemic causes, worldviews and 
myths while engaging with the futures. Furthermore, terrorism futures can now 
be thought of as a ‘living maze’ – containing the prospect of opening new 
pathways into, around and out of the maze, presenting opportunities to build 
layered knowledge, understanding and even shared preferred futures for 
terrorism. The terrorism futures maze (designed in reference to the scenarios in 
this thesis) is presented in Figure Thirteen below.  
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Figure Thirteen: Terrorism Futures Maze 
 
 
OBJECTIVE FOUR: To use scenarios to capture understandings derived 
from the past and near-present, in combination with ‘drivers’, to produce a 
range of meta-level terrorism futures. 
The Futures Studies Scenarios technique provided an effective vehicle to 
generate images of terrorism futures in a manner that effectively captured 
existing knowledge bases while injecting foresight. The ‘double-driver’ scenario 
construction approach was used to develop three scenario matrices, producing a 
total of 13 scenarios depicting a range of terrorism futures. The scenarios were 
developed following an exploration of existing knowledge revealed at each level 
of CLA: litany, systemic causes and worldviews-myths – refer to Figures Three, 
Four and Eleven for the respective scenario matrices. Comprehensive analysis of 
existing knowledge at the litany, systemic causes, worldview and myth levels 
allowed characterisations of the past and near-present nature of the terrorism 
phenomenon to be made. This analysis also led to the extraction of two key 
variables deemed likely to influence the futures (drivers, or ‘tsunamis’) at each 
level that were then applied to construct the scenario matrices. This process of 
variable selection and scenario construction ensured that the scenarios captured 
understandings from the past, near-present and futures. 
 
Litany knowledge was derived from secondary sources and event analyses. The 
literature presented the modern terrorist threat as evolving. The litany led to the 
determination that the key trends of terrorism (its amorphous nature and 
increasing lethality) would likely affect or outright drive terrorism futures. The 
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litany scenarios were consistent with qualitative futures descriptions found in the 
terrorism literature. A further dimension was added in that the matrix produced 
four futures scenarios as well as an additional scenario representing the 
potentially cyclical nature of the four futures within the matrix.  
 
The systemic causes scenarios, based on existing knowledge, were required to 
encompass a number of aspects, including the action-reaction dynamic of several 
intrapersonal, interpersonal and environmental factors. The levels of ‘reaction 
force’ and ‘identification’ were selected as the key futures variables that would 
shape counter-terrorism futures. Similarly to the litany matrix, aspects of all four 
of these futures are likely to occur in the futures, rather than one of the futures 
outlined in the matrix occurring in its entirety. The systemic causes level as 
allows people, as individuals and as members of a global community to ask how 
terrorism should be responded to and/or prevented in the futures. Do we prefer to 
follow the path of profiling, potentially in hope of eradicating persons fitting a 
so-called “terrorist profile”, or could we expend more energy and funding to 
remove the conditions which cause terrorism? Alternative scenarios at the 
systemic causes level have not been a feature of the existing terrorism literature. 
The alternative images of the futures provided in the systemic causes scenarios 
show that a range of counter-terrorism initiatives can be applied in different ways 
to achieve a number of effects, outcomes, or futures.  
 
The worldviews-myths scenario matrix provided a futures space where 
stakeholders could potentially engage with each other and with futures thinking. 
The matrix was developed from two variables, ‘humanity’ and the terrorism 
‘futures attitude’: whether the human community would be global or 
dichotomous, and whether people saw the future of terrorism as predetermined or 
undetermined, and positive or negative. The terrorism ‘futures attitude’ 
component was particularly important, given the resounding failure of 
stakeholders in developing and engaging with images of positive terrorism 
futures so far. The worldviews-myths scenario matrix presented futures that were 
consistent with the earlier-discussed layers, particularly in the ‘dichotomous 
humanity’ scenarios, though, importantly, this space encouraged thought 
(perhaps even collectively) about preferred futures, creating a space where 
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competing utopian images could be discussed and engaged with. This matrix also 
provided a space where stakeholders could engage with one another, making use 
of the shared overarching political ideology, introducing the prospect of positive 
manipulation, and alignment of stakeholders’ visions, of the possible futures.  
 
 
OBJECTIVE FIVE: To highlight the value of generating alternative meta-
level terrorism futures in formulating effective and proactive counter-
terrorism initiatives aimed at positive futures manipulation.  
While the thesis did not include a review of specific counter-terrorism strategies, 
the influence of the past, near-present and futures of counter-terrorism was 
observed in the characterisations of terrorism at the litany, systemic causes and 
(in portions of) the worldviews-myths layers. Furthermore, the counter-terrorism 
implications that have been discussed in this chapter demonstrate the value of 
advocating (as this thesis does) for greater use of foresight in Terrorism Studies. 
The purpose of the research was to open the futures of terrorism, demonstrating 
that the futures can be malleable. By opening the futures, another vehicle can be 
provided by which to formulate effective and proactive counter-terrorism 
initiatives informed by the prospect of challenging existing framing of terrorism 
futures and introducing the opportunity of positive manipulation of terrorism 
futures.  
 
More than a decade on from September 11, the fear-inducing and reactionary 
framing supported (and set) by former President George W. Bush has persisted. 
Indeed, it is questionable whether the present and, indeed, the direction of the 
futures, would have unfolded in the same way had Al Gore won the presidential 
election in 2000. The overarching metaphors established, to some extent, by 
George W. Bush have remained prominent throughout President Obama’s time 
in office. This again demonstrates the power of these governing metaphors, and 
emphasises the fact that without new metaphors the outlook appears relatively 
static: the continuation of terrorism as a constant and evolving threat. The key 
question for counter-terrorism strategists now is how to set a different direction 
and what metaphors will be required to support that new course “through the 
maze”. How could a different post-September 11 direction have been set and 
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supported, particularly by the findings of the 9/11 Commission? Rather than 
focusing on ‘attacking terrorists and their organisation’, ‘preventing the 
continued growth of Islamic terrorism’ and ‘protecting against and preparing for 
terrorist attack’,168 the outlook could have been expanded to support other kinds 
of strategic and tactical responses, such as:  
• enhancing cultural awareness to challenge dualistic thinking (for 
example, public education campaigns, increasing religious and cultural 
education , and promoting a media reporting policy that accurately 
communicates terrorism threats in terms of their statistical likelihood); 
• redirecting portions of the $808 billion169 defence budget to community 
engagement and development programs (for example, the use of 
unmanned aerial vehicles to deliver medical supplies and other 
necessities to tribal areas vulnerable to, or affected by, the Taliban, or 
increasing engagement between stakeholders or empowering the United 
Nations and aid agencies to adequately engage with communities, 
facilitating the change they desire in order to stop the flow of recruits); 
and  
• searching for and engaging with preferred and positive futures.170 
These steps, had they been taken, may have enabled the advancement of the 
‘politically engaged’ metaphor, limiting and reducing the control of the ‘us 
versus them’, ‘the West versus the rest’ and ‘society must be defended’ 
metaphors and progressing positive manipulation of the futures. 
 
In introducing the notion of positive futures manipulation into terrorism research 
and counter-terrorism strategy formulation, this thesis has hopefully 
demonstrated that terrorism futures are an open space, (even if understood as a 
potentially maze-like space), that can be navigated and influenced for the 
creation of a desired future. For example it is now possible to ask: what is the 
                                               
168
 These topics are the three threads included in chapter 12 of The 9/11 Commission Report, 
‘What to Do? A Global Strategy’. 
169
 As stated above, it has been estimated that between 2001 and 2009 the United States Congress 
provided the Department of Defense with approximately $808 billion in supplemental and annual 
funding, primarily for military operations in the global war on terrorism (United States 
Government Accountability Office 2009, 1). 
170
 Including the exploration of what the departure of US troops from Saudi Arabia could have 
achieved, how people of Afghanistan could be encouraged to think about and picture preferred 
futures, and whether al-Qaeda could generate and communicate its preferred futures. 
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end goal and how will we traverse the landscape to achieve that desired state? 
What supporting metaphors will be required? Care must be taken to ensure that 
the future does not become rigid over time and that it is viewed in terms of 
capability and opportunity. This includes envisaging where decisions can be 
made, who has that decision-making power, and how the unknown can be 
incorporated into decision making. A combination of initiatives will be required, 
but the end state, as the futures presented in this thesis indicate, does not have to 
be characterised or dominated by further escalation of terrorist violence: there are 
a number of different possible policy directions depending on what the intended 
outcome is. Additionally, positive manipulation of the futures should incorporate 
‘future-proofing’ through the assessment and review of past, present and future 
mechanisms designed to promote desired future states. This thesis has 
demonstrated the value, and has advocated for, the generation of alternative 
images depicting a range of terrorism futures for the purpose of bolstering 
counter-terrorism as a means of positive manipulation of the futures. 
 
OBJECTIVE SIX: To provide a research base from which further studies 
could actively engage with terrorism futures, including epistemological 
components, such as the meaning given to terrorism. 
This thesis has provided a foundation for engagement with alternative (and 
positive) terrorism futures. The application of Futures Studies theories and 
methods, such as CLA and Scenarios, to examine terrorism and terrorism futures 
has been an important part of this foundation. While the thesis has a number of 
limitations, acknowledged in the methodology chapter, it has not only 
demonstrated the value of using non-traditional methodology to explore 
terrorism futures, but has also advocated greater inclusion of futures inquiry in 
the field of Terrorism Studies. Exploring the primary limitations of this thesis 
provides several opportunities for further research. These primary limitations are:  
• The availability of information: 
Obtaining access to files or imprisoned terrorists would certainly bolster 
knowledge generated at the systemic causes, worldview and myth levels. 
Such knowledge would certainly lend itself to giving greater granularity to 
litany and systemic causes knowledge generation and to the resulting 
scenario constructions, and also to the identification of stakeholder metaphors 
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and value-oriented futures. It would greatly assist with challenging the 
current dominating Western framework on terrorism. 
• The difficulties inherent in characterising or assessing possible futures: 
The scenarios developed in this thesis do not encompass every aspect or 
interaction of aspects relevant to meta-level terrorism futures. Nonetheless, 
the terrorism futures presented in this thesis constitute sound futures-oriented 
terrorism research, supported by the methodologies of inquiry offered by 
Futures Studies. The nature of this limitation will develop and alter over time 
as more researchers become engaged in the process of incorporating greater 
amounts of systematic futures inquiry into terrorism research.  
• The research methodology and selected futures theory and methods: 
This research was qualitative in nature; however, there are components of it, 
particularly within the litany and systemic causes levels, that could 
incorporate qualitative analysis for the purposes of trend identification and 
extrapolation. Additionally, stakeholder engagement, perhaps in the form of 
workshops or focus groups could be incorporated, to assist, particularly, in 
bolstering knowledge generated at the worldview and myth levels. This 
would also assist with challenging and reducing the Western cultural and 
civilisational framework dominating and confining terrorism research. 
• The underlying worldview informed by cultural and civilisation frameworks: 
Consistent with elements of two of the above noted limitations, the 
underlying Western worldview, informed and supported by Western cultural 
and civilisational framing of terrorism, represents an unintended limitation of 
the research. While the application of CLA facilitated the detection of 
Western bias and aided with greater incorporation of ‘the other’, the 
transition away from the dominant Western-oriented terrorism framework 
will require further research and greater stakeholder engagement.  
 
This thesis presents opportunities for further research by governments, academics 
and think-tanks in order to continue to identify whether, why and how to deviate 
from the current and popularised litany future of ‘evolving and escalating’ 
terrorism to alternative futures, including those in which greater engagement 
between diametrically opposed stakeholders is sought. Pivotal to creating new, 
inclusive terrorism metaphors and to interacting with the futures is the enabling 
295 
 
of stakeholder engagement. Several facets of stakeholder engagement warrant 
further attention, and have been identified as areas for further research: 
• Can we identify, and facilitate engagement between, the required terrorism 
stakeholders?  
• What is the role of terrorism stakeholders in this engagement?  
• Are there specific conditions for terrorism stakeholder engagement in the 
shared transformative political space to occur? 
• Can the ‘politically engaged’ narrative be used to reframe terrorism 
knowledge?  
The use of focus groups to extend the research and foster stakeholder 
engagement may assist not only in revealing different myths from those 
generated in this research, but also in creating new, inclusive and positive 
metaphors.  
 
There is also an opportunity in, and great value to be derived from, applying an 
intended and specific lens in order to move the research beyond the confines of 
meta-level descriptions to nation- or group-specific inquiry into the futures of 
terrorism.171 This type of research could include the review of a given nation’s 
counter-terrorism strategies, or of the strategies of terrorist entities, to identify 
their respective worldviews and metaphors and to map the specific effects of 
these in the past, in the present and in the prospective desired or aligned futures. 
Such research could provide greater granularity and insight into what is required 
for effective counter-terrorism policies for the given nation.  
 
 
6.4 Author’s Concluding Remarks 
 
Terrorism futures are malleable, they are not predetermined. They will, however, 
require negotiation of the maze. The futures are a transformative space in time 
that emerge as a result of decisions and actions, so too non-decisions and 
inaction, of the past and present. This thesis has challenged the mindset that ‘the 
futures of terrorism cannot be studied’ by showing how researchers can engage 
                                               
171
 The unintended influence of the Western civilisation and frameworks are acknowledged. 
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with the terrorism futures landscape. This thesis has also shown, despite the 
uncertainty of the futures and of terrorism, that with the application of critical 
and layered methodologies, investigations into terrorism futures can be realised 
and their findings can be valuable. The power of CLA in constructing and 
deconstructing terrorism and its futures has been clearly demonstrated. This 
thesis revealed different levels of terrorism knowledge and the need to challenge 
the tiered metaphors that are currently dominant and inhibitive. Indeed the 
worldview and myth levels illustrated how the governing metaphors have shaped 
not only public opinion and policy, but also, potentially, research agendas. 
Failure to challenge the mind-closing metaphors and the meaning given to 
terrorism will keep humanity blind of the paths towards alternative futures and 
positive manipulation of them. Terrorism futures are malleable, they are not 
closed or predetermined – terrorism need not be an ever-present and expanding 
threat – however, new metaphors are required to act as guides through the maze 
and towards preferred futures.  
 
This thesis presented a methodical, meta-level examination of terrorism futures; 
a kind of analysis in which Terrorism Studies has so far been deficient. The 
thesis generated foresight within the field of Terrorism Studies, and has achieved 
this in a manner that is consistent with the requirements of terrorism research. An 
increased focus on terrorism futures may assist in reducing the propensity for 
‘crisis learning’ from further terrorist attacks. While it would be unreasonable to 
hope to identify and counter every terrorist threat, opportunities to do so can 
certainly be generated. As quoted in the first chapter, “[i]t is only when we begin 
to examine how we know the past and the present that uncertainty and, 
consequently, the opportunity for alternative explanations arise.” (May 1998, 
466) In applying May’s ideas to this thesis, it is only now that the impacts of 
terrorism knowledge-framing of the past and near-present are known that they 
can be challenged, providing the opportunity for more alternative terrorism 
futures to emerge from the maze and, with these, opportunities to positively 
influence or manipulate the futures will become knowable. Increasing terrorism 
foresight in decision-making is an effective way to positively influence the 
futures. 
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Beyond the aspects assessed above, this thesis also represents my personal 
engagement, in the past and present, to encourage greater use of futures thinking 
and the generation of more foresight in Terrorism Studies. My interest in 
terrorism, its futures and the prospect of positive and shared manipulation of 
those futures is no longer driven by the events of September 11 to the same 
extent as it once was, but by things that this thesis has revealed, such as the need 
for new and shared language, frames and metaphors for terrorism. My 
application of CLA extends beyond the confines of this research – indeed it 
enables me to unpack problems in order to reveal deeper insights, increasing my 
ability to understand the logic, and make sense, of a range of personal and 
professional matters. 
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